interests inquiry in Arizona

2022Thus, the best interests analysis “focuses primarily upon the interests of the child, as distinct from those of the parent,” id. at 287 ¶ 37, and the juvenile court considers the totality of the circumstances, Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 250 Ariz. 139 , 145 ¶ 20 (App. 2020). ¶19 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of best interests.

2021Moreover, “[i]n a best interests inquiry . . . we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence,” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 , 286 ¶ 35 (2005), and we must not “subordinate the interests of the child to those of the parent once a determination of unfitness has been made,” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15. ¶14 Conversely, as an ICWA case, permanent guardianship may be established if the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 1) the child

2024Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1 , 4 ¶ 12 (2016). ¶11 Mother argues that K.L. has not yet been adopted, leaving her without the security and stability that is the primary concern of the juvenile court in a best interests analysis.

2020Courts "must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including the child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146 , 148, ¶ 1 (2018); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3-4, ¶ 12 (finding relevant factors include whether: (1) the current placement is meeting the child's needs, (2) an adoption plan is in place, and (3) the child is adoptable). "[T]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive

2020Courts "must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including the child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146 , 148, ¶ 1 (2018); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3-4, ¶ 12 (finding relevant factors include whether: (1) the current placement is meeting the child's needs, (2) an adoption plan is in place, and (3) the child is adoptable). "[T]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive

2020"The existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests." Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). ¶25 Moreover, "[i]n a best interests inquiry, . . . we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence." Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 ; see also Maricopa Cty.

2016Action No. JS-500274 167 Ariz. 1, 5-6 , 804 P.2d 730, 734-35 (1990). ¶ 15 “In a best interests inquiry, however, we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 , 286 ¶ 35, 110 P.3d 1013, 1020 (2005); see also In re Maricopa Cty.

2016Action No. JS-500274 167 Ariz. 1, 5-6 , 804 P.2d 730, 734-35 (1990). ¶ 15 “In a best interests inquiry, however, we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 , 286 ¶ 35, 110 P.3d 1013, 1020 (2005); see also In re Maricopa Cty.

2020Once the court’s focus shifts to the best interests analysis, the “foremost concern . . . is protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Id.

2020Once the court’s focus shifts to a best interests analysis, the “foremost concern is protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c

2018Cf. Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 557 (App. 1997) (analogizing best interests requirement in revocation of guardianship to standard used in severance); accord Alexander M. v. Abrams, 235 Ariz. 104 , 3Mother’s opening brief on appeal relied heavily on Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 152 (App. 2017), which was later vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court.

2018Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (finding that the best interests requirement may be satisfied if there is credible evidence of an adoptive plan or the child is adoptable).

2017Id. ¶7 The DCS case manager testified that terminating Father’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best interests.

2023See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8); DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 11 .

2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c

2022Cook v. Losnegard, 228 Ariz. 202, 205, ¶ 11 (App. 2011). ¶7 Mother claims the superior court abused its discretion in granting Father’s petition for relocation of the child because its decision (1) relied in part on evidence that Mother possessed a medical marijuana card, (2) was not based on the child’s best interests under A.R.S. § 25-403, and (3) was not supported by substantial evidence. ¶8 In determining relocation, the superior court must consider the factors in A.R.S. § 25-408(I), as well as the best interests factors in A.R.S. 3 WEBSTER v. SMITH Decision of the Court § 25-403, and evid

2022See Pollock v. Pollock, 181 Ariz. 275, 278 (App. 1995) (explaining the best interests factors are “weighed collectively” and “no single factor is controlling”).

2022See A.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 13 (App. 2019) (holding that in the context of a best interests analysis, it is within the superior court’s discretion to consider all factors under a totality of the circumstances test, including evidence of Parents’ reunification efforts, their fitness to parent, and the bond shared between parent and children) (citation omitted).

2019See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352 ; Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365 , 370, ¶ 22 (App. 2018).

2019Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 30 (App. 2013); cf. A.R.S. § 25- 403(A)(4) (listing the child’s wishes as one of eleven factors to consider in the best interests analysis for legal decision-making and parenting time).

2018A.R.S. § 25-409(E); see also Egan, 221 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 41 (requiring the court to consider the best interests factors of A.R.S. § 25-409 as well as any “other relevant best interests factors”).

2018“Assuming parental fitness, the analysis required under § 25-409 is not a typical balancing test in which the court’s own determination of best interests is controlling” but rather the “special weight” requirement means that a parent’s determination controls “unless a parental decision clearly and substantially impairs a child’s best interests.” Goodman v. Forsen, 239 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 13 (App. 2016); see also Egan, 221 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 41 (applying “a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent’s decision to deny or limit [third-party] visitation was made in the child’s best interests” and requir

2018“Assuming parental fitness, the analysis required under § 25-409 is not a typical balancing test in which the court’s own determination of best interests is controlling” but rather the “special weight” requirement means that a parent’s determination controls “unless a parental decision clearly and substantially impairs a child’s best interests.” Goodman v. Forsen, 239 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 13 (App. 2016); see also Egan, 221 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 41 (applying “a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent’s decision to deny or limit [third-party] visitation was made in the child’s best interests” and requir

2018Our observations are limited to the transcript and we must therefore be very careful in attempting to second guess the front line trial court from our rather limited appellate vantage point.” Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 253 (App. 1977). ¶7 First, Mother argues the superior court failed to make adequate findings on the record as required by A.R.S. § 25-403, and “failed to consider and properly apply the best interests standard.” The superior 3 Prior to the hearing on Mother’s petition to modify, Father, now represented by counsel, moved to dismiss Mother’s petition.

2018Cf. Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 557 (App. 1997) (analogizing best interests requirement in revocation of guardianship to standard used in severance); accord Alexander M. v. Abrams, 235 Ariz. 104 , 3Mother’s opening brief on appeal relied heavily on Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 152 (App. 2017), which was later vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court.

2017See Christopher K., 233 Ariz. at 300, ¶ 15 , 311 P.3d at 1113 . ¶11 Next, Husband argues the trial court was statutorily required to hold a hearing on his motion to modify, and by refusing to do so, “failed to follow the clear law and apply it [to] the facts of this case.” Upon a party’s motion to modify parenting time, the trial court “shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the pleadings.” A.R.S. § 12-411(L).

2017While we agree that A.R.S. § 25-411(L) requires an “adequate cause” showing before the court will set a hearing on a petition to modify parenting time, see Pridgeon, 134 Ariz. at 180-82 (interpreting predecessor statute to A.R.S. § 25-411(L)), once a court holds a hearing, that provision has been satisfied and does not apply to the court’s analysis or findings following the hearing.

2017See Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 10 (App. 2015).

2016Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). ¶16 In a best interests analysis, we “may assume that the interests of the parent[] and the child diverge,” because the parent has already been found unfit (in this case based on abandonment) under A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

2016Although the court reiterated that it would not be addressing placement on that day, it nevertheless permitted Father to make a statement concerning placement. ¶19 Finally, the fact that Father was represented and advised by counsel throughout the dependency proceedings and during the severance trial at which he entered his no contest plea “strongly militates against the conclusion that the plea was involuntary.” State v. Lerch, 107 Ariz. 529, 530 , 490 P.2d 1, 3 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016Although the court reiterated that it would not be addressing placement on that day, it nevertheless permitted Father to make a statement concerning placement. ¶19 Finally, the fact that Father was represented and advised by counsel throughout the dependency proceedings and during the severance trial at which he entered his no contest plea “strongly militates against the conclusion that the plea was involuntary.” State v. Lerch, 107 Ariz. 529, 530 , 490 P.2d 1, 3 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014See also Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 , 219 P.3d 258, 261 (App. 2009).

2014See also Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 , 219 P.3d 258, 261 (App. 2009).