interests standard in California

2025(In re Marilyn H., at p. 310.) The best interests standard, however, requires more than “a simplistic comparison between the natural parent’s and the caretakers’ households.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530 .) In determining whether a section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem 22 was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength of t

2025(In re Marilyn H., at p. 310.) The best interests standard, however, requires more than “a simplistic comparison between the natural parent’s and the caretakers’ households.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530 .) In determining whether a section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem 22 was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength of t

2026Father next argues the trial court failed to consider the best interests factors identified by LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1072 . “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 (Jameson).) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial co

2026Father next argues the trial court failed to consider the best interests factors identified by LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1072 . “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 (Jameson).) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial co

1997Justice Blackmun pointed out that it is the desire for a lawyer and the role an attorney plays in the 5th Amendment process that is the triggering mechanism in ceasing the interrogation. [(F are, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 716 [ 99 S.Ct. at p. 2567 ].)] Trusting relationships of a minor with a family member or other court officer do not always reach the level necessary to cease the interrogation; quoting the Fare case: [‘]Such an exten[s]ion would impose the burden associated with the rule of Miranda on the justice system and the police without serving the interests that the rule was designed simul

1997Justice Blackmun pointed out that it is the desire for a lawyer and the role an attorney plays in the 5th Amendment process that is the triggering mechanism in ceasing the interrogation. [(F are, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 716 [ 99 S.Ct. at p. 2567 ].)] Trusting relationships of a minor with a family member or other court officer do not always reach the level necessary to cease the interrogation; quoting the Fare case: [‘]Such an exten[s]ion would impose the burden associated with the rule of Miranda on the justice system and the police without serving the interests that the rule was designed simul

2016“A custody order based on a stipulation of the parties does not constitute a final, existing judicial custody determination unless ‘there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result.’ ” (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 19 (F.T.) [finding no such intent].) The parties agree that the de novo standard applies in this case. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 6. appropriate one. ( F.T., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14-15; see In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1078 (LaMusga); Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38 .) In applying

2016“A custody order based on a stipulation of the parties does not constitute a final, existing judicial custody determination unless ‘there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result.’ ” (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 19 (F.T.) [finding no such intent].) The parties agree that the de novo standard applies in this case. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 6. appropriate one. ( F.T., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14-15; see In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1078 (LaMusga); Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38 .) In applying

1992(See generally, 455 U.S. at pp. 752-768 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-616], and particularly p. 768 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 616 ].) Use of a preponderance standard would mean near neutrality “between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights.” (See 455 U.S. at p. 765 [711 L.Ed.2d at p. 614].) This was “constitutionally intolerable” ( 455 U.S. at p. 768 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 616 ]) because of the “relative severity” of the consequences of erroneous decisions. ( 455 U.S. at p. 766 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 615 ].) In termination proceedings, parents risk the “unnecessary

1992(See generally, 455 U.S. at pp. 752-768 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-616], and particularly p. 768 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 616 ].) Use of a preponderance standard would mean near neutrality “between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights.” (See 455 U.S. at p. 765 [711 L.Ed.2d at p. 614].) This was “constitutionally intolerable” ( 455 U.S. at p. 768 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 616 ]) because of the “relative severity” of the consequences of erroneous decisions. ( 455 U.S. at p. 766 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 615 ].) In termination proceedings, parents risk the “unnecessary

2016(In re D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 ; see, e.g., In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492 , 1507- 1508 [Applying the best interests standard and placing child in long-term foster care without considering detriment under section 361.2 was harmless error where the record contained substantial evidence to support a detriment finding.].) “Before the court may order a minor physically removed from his or her parent, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the min

2015(See, e.g., In re Nickolas T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1507-1508 [applying 3 Section 361, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: “A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of . . . [¶] (1) . . . a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home . . . .” 11 the best interests standard and placing

2013(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318 ; In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 959.) The best interests standard is not a simplistic comparison between the natural parent’s and the caretaker’s households.

1997(E.g., In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 85 , 878 P.2d 1297 ] [observing that at the hearing on the section 388 motion, the “juvenile court’s task was to determine whether” the *527 moving party “had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there was new evidence or a change of circumstances” that it was in the child’s “best interests” that the previous order be changed]; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ] [observing that “ultimate question before” juvenile court on section 388 motion for change of placement w

2007Only a `statutorily presumed father' is entitled to reunification services under ... section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under ... section 361.2." ( In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 .) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inapplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services. ( In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 259 , 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 894 ( Eric E. ).) Family Code section 7611 generally sets forth the exclusive means for an unwed father to establish presumed fatherhood. ( In re Zacharia D. (1

2007Only a `statutorily presumed father' is entitled to reunification services under ... section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under ... section 361.2." ( In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 .) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inapplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services. ( In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 259 , 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 894 ( Eric E. ).) Family Code section 7611 generally sets forth the exclusive means for an unwed father to establish presumed fatherhood. ( In re Zacharia D. (1

2007Only a `statutorily presumed father' is entitled to reunification services under ... section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under ... section 361.2." ( In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 .) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inapplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services. ( In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 259 , 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 894 ( Eric E. ).) Family Code section 7611 generally sets forth the exclusive means for an unwed father to establish presumed fatherhood. ( In re Zacharia D. (1

2007Only a `statutorily presumed father' is entitled to reunification services under ... section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under ... section 361.2." ( In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 .) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inapplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services. ( In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 259 , 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 894 ( Eric E. ).) Family Code section 7611 generally sets forth the exclusive means for an unwed father to establish presumed fatherhood. ( In re Zacharia D. (1

2007Only a ‘statutorily presumed father’ is entitled to reunification services under . . . section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under . . . section 361.2.” (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ].) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inápplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services.

2007Only a ‘statutorily presumed father’ is entitled to reunification services under . . . section 361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under . . . section 361.2.” (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ].) Ordinarily, a best interests standard is inápplicable in determining whether a presumed father is entitled to reunification services.

2003Given the state's strong interest in the expeditiousness and finality of juvenile dependency proceedings (see In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 , 920 P.2d 716 [the state has a "strong" interest in the expeditiousness of dependency proceedings, and its interest in the finality of such proceedings is "stronger still"]), the statutory scheme generally does not permit the critical findings and orders made prior to the final setting of the 366.26 hearing to be reopened and relitigated in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights. [10] Nor can the order setting

2003Given the state's strong interest in the expeditiousness and finality of juvenile dependency proceedings (see In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 , 920 P.2d 716 [the state has a "strong" interest in the expeditiousness of dependency proceedings, and its interest in the finality of such proceedings is "stronger still"]), the statutory scheme generally does not permit the critical findings and orders made prior to the final setting of the 366.26 hearing to be reopened and relitigated in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights. [10] Nor can the order setting

2003(In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 84 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 , 859 P.2d 1290 ].) Therefore, the use of the best interests test when considering withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from a dependent child is particularly appropriate in this case.

2003(In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 84 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 , 859 P.2d 1290 ].) Therefore, the use of the best interests test when considering withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from a dependent child is particularly appropriate in this case.

2025(See People v. 52 Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [where the trial court fails to exercise “‘“informed discretion,”’” the “appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion’”].) Therefore, we vacate the sentence and direct the trial court to resentence Nazir, including by reconsidering Nazir’s motion to dismiss the sentence enhancements in light of Walker.

2023(In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 ; accord, In re Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 827 [the appropriate standard for ordering a modification in parenting authority that does not rise to the level of a change in custody is the best interests test].) Relevant factors for the court to consider in determining the best interest of the child include the health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of physical or substance abuse by either parent, and the nature and amount of contact with each parent.

2016(In re D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 ; see, e.g., In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492 , 1507- 1508 [Applying the best interests standard and placing child in long-term foster care without considering detriment under section 361.2 was harmless error where the record contained substantial evidence to support a detriment finding.].) “Before the court may order a minor physically removed from his or her parent, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the min

2014By contrast, Father relies on our opinion in Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1382 (Enrique M.), and argues the court should have applied the best interests test because he sought to modify a visitation schedule, not the custody determination.