44 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1879–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Schadlergreen2 sentences2022In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 413 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (“[B]ecause BS’s biological mother was not a ‘relative’ for purposes of MCL 712A.19a, the trial court was not required to consider that relative placement.”). -4- 2022In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 413 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (“[B]ecause BS’s biological mother was not a ‘relative’ for purposes of MCL 712A.19a, the trial court was not required to consider that relative placement.”). -4- | 2 | 2 |
In Re JS and SMgreen2 sentences2019Indeed, this Court has explained that “many, if perhaps not all, of the types of concerns about parental ability underlying the best interests factors of the Child Custody Act are highly relevant to a decision concerning whether parental rights should be terminated,” and while the trial court is not obligated to do so, “it is perfectly appropriate . . . to refer directly to pertinent best interests factors in the Child Custody Act in making a determination concerning whether a parent has established that termination of parental rights is clearly not in a child’s best interests.” In re JS & SM, 2019Indeed, this Court has explained that “many, if perhaps not all, of the types of concerns about parental ability underlying the best interests factors of the Child Custody Act are highly relevant to a decision concerning whether parental rights should be terminated,” and while the trial court is not obligated to do so, “it is perfectly appropriate . . . to refer directly to pertinent best interests factors in the Child Custody Act in making a determination concerning whether a parent has established that termination of parental rights is clearly not in a child’s best interests.” In re JS & SM, | 1 | 6 |
Bowie v. Ardergreen2 sentences1997See Bowie [supra], [Emphasis supplied.] See also Porter , n 14, supra at 104. 19 We note that there is some case law to the effect that a circuit court errs in modifying the terms of a custody arrangement without placing on the record its findings of fact concerning the best interests factors. 1993E.g., Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559 ; 364 NW2d 665 (1984); Bowie v Arder, supra. We express no opinion about whether we would require a Michigan court to hold a best interests of the child hearing if we were faced with the circumstances presented to the Iowa courts. | 1 | 3 |
In Re Rosebushgreen2 sentences2002Note that this case revolves around MCL 722.124a(1) and does not completely rely on the common-law right to refuse care. 127 See Martin, supra at 223-225 (only declining to apply the best interests standard because the patient had been competent and had expressed his wishes). 128 Rosebush, supra at 682 . 129 Cf. In re KI, 735 A2d 448 (US App DC, 1999). 130 Ladd’s arguments as a whole lead us to believe that in this argument he is referring to a guardian ad litem, not a guardian. 2002In no way do we intend to change the family court’s ability to appoint a guardian for a child in a protective proceeding. 131 Rosebush, supra at 682, n 5 . 132 Id. at 679 . 133 In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So 2d 365, 372 (Fla App, 1984). 134 Rosebush, supra at 685, 687 . 135 In re Shaffer, 213 Mich App 429, 432-433 ; 540 NW2d 706 (1995). 136 See Rosebush, supra at 686-687 , quoting In re LHR, 253 Ga 439, 446-447; 321 SE2d 716 (1984). 137 See Shaffer, supra at 434-436 . 138 MCR 5.916(A). 139 See MCL 330.2020 et seq. 140 See Trowel v Granville, 530 US 57, 64-65 ; 120 S Ct 2054 ; 147 L Ed 2d | 1 | 2 |
Koron v. Melendygreen2 sentences1997Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 ; 523 NW2d 870 (1994); but see DeRush v DeRush, 218 Mich App 638, 641 ; 554 NW2d 322 (1996) (in a custody case, a court is without authority to disregard a factual stipulation that does not preclude the court from considering the best interests factors). 1997Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 ; 523 NW2d 870 (1994); but see DeRush v DeRush, 218 Mich App 638, 641 ; 554 NW2d 322 (1996) (in a custody case, a court is without authority to disregard a factual stipulation that does not preclude the court from considering the best interests factors). | 1 | 2 |
In re Mossgreen2 sentences2025Although statutory grounds must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the question of “whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80, 90 ; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). 2025Although statutory grounds must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the question of “whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80, 90 ; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2024In that case, “[the] trial court signed the parties’ stipulation for ‘temporary custody’ ” without conducting an “evidentiary hearing regarding the best interests factors.” Id. at 358. 2024When discussing whether the court needed to find proper cause or a change of circumstances to revisit custody at the trial, this Court stated that the trial court “had not awarded custody before the trial.” Id. at 360.3 “It is improper to decide the issue of custody on the pleadings alone when no evidentiary hearing is held” because “parties cannot conclusively agree regarding child custody.” Id. at 359-360. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2015This inquiry is mandatory, as a party involved in a custody dispute “is entitled to have the trial court make findings on the best interests factors.” Id. at 363 . 2015“When considering the best interest factors, the trial court must consider all pertinent and relevant factors on the record as it stands at the time of hearing.” Id. at 357 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In re Sandersgreen2 sentences2015See, generally, In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 405-407 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) (explaining the difference between the trial or adjudicative phase in which the trial court considers the evidence in support of asserting jurisdiction over the children and the dispositional phase in which the trial court determines how best to protect the children and which may result in termination of the parent’s parental rights); MCL 712A.19b(5) (stating that the trial court must terminate the parent’s parental rights if it finds a ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interests). 2015See, generally, In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 405-407 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) (explaining the difference between the trial or adjudicative phase in which the trial court considers the evidence in support of asserting jurisdiction over the children and the dispositional phase in which the trial court determines how best to protect the children and which may result in termination of the parent’s parental rights); MCL 712A.19b(5) (stating that the trial court must terminate the parent’s parental rights if it finds a ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interests). | 1 | 1 |
| Kinnard v. Kinnardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schubring v. Schubringgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foskett v. Foskettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Koron v. Melendygreen2 sentences1997Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 ; 523 NW2d 870 (1994); but see DeRush v DeRush, 218 Mich App 638, 641 ; 554 NW2d 322 (1996) (in a custody case, a court is without authority to disregard a factual stipulation that does not preclude the court from considering the best interests factors). 1997Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 ; 523 NW2d 870 (1994); but see DeRush v DeRush, 218 Mich App 638, 641 ; 554 NW2d 322 (1996) (in a custody case, a court is without authority to disregard a factual stipulation that does not preclude the court from considering the best interests factors). | 1 | 2 |
| DeRush v. DeRushneutral | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Trejo Minors
red
2 sentences2019Indeed, this Court has explained that “many, if perhaps not all, of the types of concerns about parental ability underlying the best interests factors of the Child Custody Act are highly relevant to a decision concerning whether parental rights should be terminated,” and while the trial court is not obligated to do so, “it is perfectly appropriate . . . to refer directly to pertinent best interests factors in the Child Custody Act in making a determination concerning whether a parent has established that termination of parental rights is clearly not in a child’s best interests.” In re JS & SM, 2019Indeed, this Court has explained that “many, if perhaps not all, of the types of concerns about parental ability underlying the best interests factors of the Child Custody Act are highly relevant to a decision concerning whether parental rights should be terminated,” and while the trial court is not obligated to do so, “it is perfectly appropriate . . . to refer directly to pertinent best interests factors in the Child Custody Act in making a determination concerning whether a parent has established that termination of parental rights is clearly not in a child’s best interests.” In re JS & SM, | 4 | 2016–2019 |
In re VanDalen
green
2 sentences2018AS’s safety would be a proper and important factor in evaluating AS’s best interests, In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142 ; 809 NW2d 412 (2011); but, the trial court’s best interests findings do not adequately explain the trial court’s concerns regarding AS’s safety. 2018AS’s safety would be a proper and important factor in evaluating AS’s best interests, In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142 ; 809 NW2d 412 (2011); but, the trial court’s best interests findings do not adequately explain the trial court’s concerns regarding AS’s safety. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Kantola
green
2 sentences2018In these circumstances, I would vacate the trial court’s best interests analysis and remand for reconsideration of AS’s best interests. /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 2 “Although evidence of how parents treat one child may be probative of their treatment of another, such evidence is not conclusive or automatically determinative.” Matter of Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 28 ; 361 NW2d 20 (1984) (citation omitted). 3 Circumstances may well have changed since 2015, and I do not suggest that the trial court is bound by its best interests determination in August 2015. 2018In these circumstances, I would vacate the trial court’s best interests analysis and remand for reconsideration of AS’s best interests. /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 2 “Although evidence of how parents treat one child may be probative of their treatment of another, such evidence is not conclusive or automatically determinative.” Matter of Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 28 ; 361 NW2d 20 (1984) (citation omitted). 3 Circumstances may well have changed since 2015, and I do not suggest that the trial court is bound by its best interests determination in August 2015. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Harvey v. Harvey
green
2 sentences2009Harvey, 470 Mich at 192-193 . 2005Id. at 191-192 . [Bayati, supra at 595 .] 16 MCL 552.501 et seq. | 2 | 2005–2009 |
Phillips v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2004"The trial court cannot blindly accept the stipulation of the parents, but must independently determine what is in the best interests of the child." Phillips, supra at 21 , 614 N.W.2d 183 . 2004“The trial court cannot blindly accept the stipulation of the parents, but must independently determine what is in the best interests of the child.” Phillips, supra at 21 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Ruppel v. Lesner
green
2 sentences1993E.g., Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559 ; 364 NW2d 665 (1984); Bowie v Arder, supra. We express no opinion about whether we would require a Michigan court to hold a best interests of the child hearing if we were faced with the circumstances presented to the Iowa courts. 1993E.g., Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559 ; 364 NW2d 665 (1984); Bowie v Arder, supra. We express no opinion about whether we would require a Michigan court to hold a best interests of the child hearing if we were faced with the circumstances presented to the Iowa courts. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
In the Interest of Brandon L.E.
green
2 sentences1993Id. 183 W Va 113; 394 SE2d 515 (1990). 1993The court noted that the adoptive parents had "used all possible legal stratagems to avoid an unfavorable ruling in the Ohio courts, but at no time did they resort to self-help by fleeing or by refusing to follow a lawful court order." Id., p 385. [65] Lemley differs from EEB in that the parents in Lemley did not ask the Ohio courts to conduct a best interests hearing. [66] Id. [67] 183 W Va 113; 394 SE2d 515 (1990). | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Painter v. Bannister
green
2 sentences1993The DeBoers also include arguments to the effect that even under Iowa law, a best interests hearing was required, citing several cases, Halstead v Halstead, 259 Iowa 526 ; 144 NW2d 861 (1966); Painter v Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 ; 140 NW2d 152 (1966), and statutes, Iowa Code Ann 600.1, 600.13(l)(c) (Adoption Code); 600A.1 (termination of parental rights); 600B.40 (Paternity Act). 1993The DeBoers also include arguments to the effect that even under Iowa law, a best interests hearing was required, citing several cases, Halstead v Halstead, 259 Iowa 526 ; 144 NW2d 861 (1966); Painter v Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 ; 140 NW2d 152 (1966), and statutes, Iowa Code Ann 600.1, 600.13(l)(c) (Adoption Code); 600A.1 (termination of parental rights); 600B.40 (Paternity Act). | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Halstead Ex Rel. Lee v. Halstead
green
2 sentences1993The DeBoers also include arguments to the effect that even under Iowa law, a best interests hearing was required, citing several cases, Halstead v Halstead, 259 Iowa 526 ; 144 NW2d 861 (1966); Painter v Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 ; 140 NW2d 152 (1966), and statutes, Iowa Code Ann 600.1, 600.13(l)(c) (Adoption Code); 600A.1 (termination of parental rights); 600B.40 (Paternity Act). 1993The DeBoers also include arguments to the effect that even under Iowa law, a best interests hearing was required, citing several cases, Halstead v Halstead, 259 Iowa 526 ; 144 NW2d 861 (1966); Painter v Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 ; 140 NW2d 152 (1966), and statutes, Iowa Code Ann 600.1, 600.13(l)(c) (Adoption Code); 600A.1 (termination of parental rights); 600B.40 (Paternity Act). | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Scripps v. Foster
neutral
2 sentences1913Before the statute was amended, it had been held by this court that information acquired by observation while the physician was in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to , the physician, was excluded (Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 ), that the rule established by the statute is one of privilege, which the patient may waive (Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742 [ 3 N. W. 216 ]), and that what he may do in his lifetime those who represented him may also do for the protection of the interests they claim - under'him (Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 [ 3 N. W. 882 ] 1913Before the statute was amended, it had been held by this court that information acquired by observation while the physician was in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to , the physician, was excluded (Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 ), that the rule established by the statute is one of privilege, which the patient may waive (Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742 [ 3 N. W. 216 ]), and that what he may do in his lifetime those who represented him may also do for the protection of the interests they claim - under'him (Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 [ 3 N. W. 882 ] | 2 | 1879–1913 |
Briggs v. Briggs
green
2 sentences1913Before the statute was amended, it had been held by this court that information acquired by observation while the physician was in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to , the physician, was excluded (Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 ), that the rule established by the statute is one of privilege, which the patient may waive (Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742 [ 3 N. W. 216 ]), and that what he may do in his lifetime those who represented him may also do for the protection of the interests they claim - under'him (Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 [ 3 N. W. 882 ] 1879This statute, as we have held, covers information acquired by observation while the physician is in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to him, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich., 34 ; but the rule it establishes is one of privilege for the protection of the patient; and he may waive it if he sees fit, Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich., 742 ; and what he may do in his lifetime, those who represent him after his death may4 also do for the • protection of the interests they claim under him. | 2 | 1879–1913 |
People v. Ginther
green
2 sentences2022In addition, the guardian ad litem for the child informed the trial court that if the information introduced at the Ginther hearing had been provided to her 1 In re N R Tiernan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 16, 2021 (Docket No. 357076). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -3- before the best interests hearing, it would have altered her recommendation and she instead would have urged the trial court to find that termination was not in the child’s best interests. 2022In addition, the guardian ad litem for the child informed the trial court that if the information introduced at the Ginther hearing had been provided to her 1 In re N R Tiernan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 16, 2021 (Docket No. 357076). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -3- before the best interests hearing, it would have altered her recommendation and she instead would have urged the trial court to find that termination was not in the child’s best interests. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Clausen
green
2 sentences2022Our Supreme Court noted that “[t]here will be many cases in which the putative father meets the conditions that bring him within [the protection of] subsection 2, but in which someone else could make a persuasive showing that the best interests of the child require denying the father custody[;] [n]evertheless, under the statute, the best interests standard of subsection would not apply.” In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 677-678 ; 502 NW2d 649 (1993). 2022Our Supreme Court noted that “[t]here will be many cases in which the putative father meets the conditions that bring him within [the protection of] subsection 2, but in which someone else could make a persuasive showing that the best interests of the child require denying the father custody[;] [n]evertheless, under the statute, the best interests standard of subsection would not apply.” In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 677-678 ; 502 NW2d 649 (1993). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re White
green
1 sentence2018We have explained that “if the best interests of the individual children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 715 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wiechmann v. Wiechmann
green
2 sentences2016The referee found that M.A. “should be afforded the opportunity to bond with her younger sibling.” The referee cited Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995), for the proposition that she had to consider the sibling bond as part of the best interests analysis. 2016The referee found that M.A. “should be afforded the opportunity to bond with her younger sibling.” The referee cited Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995), for the proposition that she had to consider the sibling bond as part of the best interests analysis. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Parent v. Parent
green
2 sentences2016Id.; Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 157 ; 762 NW2d 553 (2009). 2016Id.; Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 157 ; 762 NW2d 553 (2009). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kubicki v. Sharpe
green
2 sentences2014It would be equally illogical, if not more so, to let a party with sole legal custody skip that step too under MCL 722.31(2) and change custody with no proofs whatsoever; it would turn a person’s sole legal custody status into a trump card. 5 We note that neither Gagnon nor Rittershaus addressed the precise issue in this case, i.e., whether the trial court must consider the child’s established custodial environment in a situation where a parent has sole legal custody and therefore is not required to satisfy the factors set forth in MCL 722.31(4); however, given the analysis of MCL 722.31 and M 2014It would be equally illogical, if not more so, to let a party with sole legal custody skip that step too under MCL 722.31(2) and change custody with no proofs whatsoever; it would turn a person’s sole legal custody status into a trump card. 5 We note that neither Gagnon nor Rittershaus addressed the precise issue in this case, i.e., whether the trial court must consider the child’s established custodial environment in a situation where a parent has sole legal custody and therefore is not required to satisfy the factors set forth in MCL 722.31(4); however, given the analysis of MCL 722.31 and M | 1 | 2014–2014 |
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio
green
1 sentence2014It would be equally illogical, if not more so, to let a party with sole legal custody skip that step too under MCL 722.31(2) and change custody with no proofs whatsoever; it would turn a person’s sole legal custody status into a trump card. 5 We note that neither Gagnon nor Rittershaus addressed the precise issue in this case, i.e., whether the trial court must consider the child’s established custodial environment in a situation where a parent has sole legal custody and therefore is not required to satisfy the factors set forth in MCL 722.31(4); however, given the analysis of MCL 722.31 and M | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Centennial Healthcare Management Corp. v. Department of Consumer & Industries Services
neutral
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brown v. Loveman
green
2 sentences2014Plaintiff cited as *573 support Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576 ; 680 NW2d 432 (2004). 2014Plaintiff cited as *573 support Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576 ; 680 NW2d 432 (2004). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Fletcher v. Fletcher green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Berger v. Berger
green
1 sentence2009MCL 722.28; Berger, supra at 705 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In the Interest of A.D. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Youmans v. Ramos green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Estes green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| In Re Marriage of Slayton green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Karen P. v. Christopher J.B. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Patterson v. Huff neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Grievance Administrator v. Vos neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Karner v. McMahon green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| York v. Morofsky green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Van v. Zahorik green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bayati v. Bayati green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Speers v. Speers green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Arndt v. Kasem green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Adams v. Adams green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Troxel v. Granville green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re KI green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.