interests standard in New Mexico

2015See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 , 362 17 (Minn. 1994) (stating that simply applying the best interests standard is contrary to 18 the plain language of the ICWA read as a whole, and to its legislative history); see 19 also In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996) (deciding it is improper 11 1 to apply best interest when determining good cause because the ICWA expresses 2 presumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest to be placed in conformance 3 with the preferences). 4 {20} Other courts have held that the considerations listed in the BIA Guidelines are

2015See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 1994) (stating that simply applying the best interests standard is contrary to the plain language of the ICWA read as a whole, and to its legislative history); see also In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996) (deciding it is improper to apply best interest when determining good cause because the ICWA expresses presumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest to be placed in conformance with the preferences). {20} Other courts have held that the considerations listed in the BIA Guidelines are not exhaustive.

2015See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 , 362 17 (Minn. 1994) (stating that simply applying the best interests standard is contrary to 18 the plain language of the ICWA read as a whole, and to its legislative history); see 19 also In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996) (deciding it is improper 11 1 to apply best interest when determining good cause because the ICWA expresses 2 presumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest to be placed in conformance 3 with the preferences). 4 {20} Other courts have held that the considerations listed in the BIA Guidelines are

2015See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 1994) (stating that simply applying the best interests standard is contrary to the plain language of the ICWA read as a whole, and to its legislative history); see also In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996) (deciding it is improper to apply best interest when determining good cause because the ICWA expresses presumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest to be placed in conformance with the preferences). {20} Other courts have held that the considerations listed in the BIA Guidelines are not exhaustive.

2015See In re Adoption of M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) 6 (“Good cause is a matter of discretion, and discretion must be exercised in light of 7 many factors.

2015See In re Adoption of M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“Good cause is a matter of discretion, and discretion must be exercised in light of many factors.

2024In re Doe recognized, however, that “[c]ommunications between psychotherapists and patients are not ipso facto confidential.” Id. ¶ 24; see State v. Lucero, 2023-NMCA-035 , ¶ 19, 528 P.3d 762 (providing that “for a communication to be a confidential communication” protected by Rule 11-504 NMRA, “(1) the patient must intend the communication to be undisclosed to third parties; and (2) nondisclosure of the communication must further the interests the privilege is intended to protect” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022See NMSA 1978, § 40-10B-12(B) (2001) (requiring revocation of a kinship guardianship “[i]f the court finds that a preponderance of the evidence proves a change in circumstances and the revocation is in the best interests of the child”); see also Hough v. Brooks, 2017- NMCA-050, ¶ 30, 399 P.3d 387 (“While the best interests test is broad and vests the district court with considerable discretion, the exercise of discretion by the district court must be consistent with the evidence and statutory requirements.” (alterations, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {5} In this c

2016See Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 15-24 (construing NMSA 1978, Section 31-11-1 (A) (1988) in light of, inter alia, its history, background, function within the comprehensive statutory scheme, including the state’s sentencing scheme and probation statutes emphasizing constructive rehabilitation and general policy considerations and concluding that these factors compelled a different construction from that suggested by “[a] literal reading of Section 31-11 - 1(A) [which] would seriously undermine” rehabilitative goals). {53} We also conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the information C

2016Gault itself also emphasized that “what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.” 387 U.S. at 31 n.48. {18} The Courthas warned Ha.iA.Mir anda’s requirements may notbe extended in a manner that “would cut [Miranda’s] holding . . . completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale” and “impose the burdens associated with the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the police without serving the interests that rule was designed simultaneously to protect.”

2016Gault itself also emphasized that “what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.” 387 U.S. at 31 n.48. {18} The Courthas warned Ha.iA.Mir anda’s requirements may notbe extended in a manner that “would cut [Miranda’s] holding . . . completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale” and “impose the burdens associated with the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the police without serving the interests that rule was designed simultaneously to protect.”

2015Corp. v. Native Vill. of Eklutna, 142 P.3d 1192, 1196 (Alaska 2006) (all adopting 5 the balancing of the interests test). 6 {11} We begin our analysis, however, by determining the degree to which Armijo 7 and Milagro, are instructive.

2008The Davis court explained that, “[w]here an occupant sees the police and immediately retreats back into the premises, ... the duty of the police to knock, announce, and wait is obviated.” Id. at 1042. {14} Under the unique facts of this case, we are persuaded that the officers’ compliance with the knock-and-announce rule would have been futile because it would not have furthered any of the interests the rule is meant to protect, but instead would have amounted to a meaningless gesture.

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents."). [8] See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App. 1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child's best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents.”). 8 See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App.1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child’s best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of pro

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents.”). 8 See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App.1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child’s best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of pro

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents.”). 8 See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App.1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child’s best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of pro

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents.”). 8 See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App.1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child’s best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of pro

1991The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both contesting parents.”). 8 See also Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627-28 , 436 A.2d 299, 303 (1980) (declining to impose presumption for or against nonresident parent); Pamperin v. Pamperin, 112 Wis.2d 70, 74-75 , 331 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Ct.App.1983) (each party bears equal burden to show that award of custody to that party is in child’s best interests); cf. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1200 (Alaska 1976) (in dispositive phase of dependency-and-neglect proceeding to award custody of minors to state agency, placing burden of pro