interests standard in Colorado

2025See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 137, 149 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 12 We review a district court’s best interests analysis under section 14-10-129(2)(c) for an abuse of discretion.

2025See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo. 2005) (reviewing “[a] best interests determination under subsection 14– 10–129(2)(c),” C.R.S. 2004, “for an abuse of discretion”); In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 52 (Where the trial court ruled that the child could move with the father out of state, the appellate court reviewing the order stated, “[W]e perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration and resolution of the best interests factors.”). ¶ 41 All of this said, although in the majority we reviewed the juvenile court’s order for clear error, I would

2026See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 41 (upholding district court’s decision based on its implied findings, which were sufficient); In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that, while the trial court could have made more specific findings, its findings and reference to the parenting evaluation “demonstrate that the trial court considered” the appropriate best interests factors). ¶ 15 The court cited to section 14-10-124(4)(d) in its ruling, as well as the definitions of domestic violence and coercive control within that statute.

2026See DeZalia, 151 P.3d at 649-50 ; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. App. 1998); see also In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.”).

2024See i d. ; see also In re Custody of C.J.S. , 37 P.3d 479, 483 (Colo. App. 2001) (no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the special advocate’s recommendations where those recommendations w ere based upon the best interests standard). ¶ 18 Here, the CFI concluded, in both her report and her addendum, that limiting father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest.

2024See i d. ; see also In re Custody of C.J.S. , 37 P.3d 479, 483 (Colo. App. 2001) (no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the special advocate’s recommendations where those recommendations w ere based upon the best interests standard). ¶ 18 Here, the CFI concluded, in both her report and her addendum, that limiting father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest.

2026See DeZalia, 151 P.3d at 649-50 ; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. App. 1998); see also In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.”).

2026See § 14-10-129(1.5); In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. App. 2008); see also Stewart, 43 P.3d at 742 (“[I]n instances where 4 the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.”).

2026See § 14-10- 124(1.5)(a); Pawelec, ¶ 43; cf. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo. 2005) (section 14-10-124, not section 14-10-129, applies 3 to an initial parental responsibilities determination, even if temporary parenting time orders were entered pending a final determination).

2026Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140; In re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 648 (Colo. App. 2006); see also Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163 (“[T]he goal of dissolution proceedings is to create a stable situation between the new family units arising out of the divorce, whereas the goal of a modification proceeding is to maintain this stability, if possible, in the best interests of the child.”).

2026See In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 78 (Colo. App. 2002) (recognizing that the concept of least detrimental alternative is subsumed within the concept of the best interests of the child); see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that a court may not “completely deny . . . parenting time under the best interests standard without express consideration of whether doing so is the least detrimental alternative.” (emphasis added)). ¶ 26 Finally, the court acted within its discretion when it adopted certain recommendations by the CFI after considering the

2025See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326 , 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[E]ven in those circumstances of serious criminal conduct and domestic abuse, which by their nature would likely establish endangerment and thus be most susceptible of an order denying parenting time rights, the best interests standard applies to the determination of whether parenting time should be permitted.”); see also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308-09 (Colo. App. 2006) (district court did not abuse its discretion in naming the mother the child’s primary parent after she was convicted of misdemeanor child abuse

2026See In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 78 (Colo. App. 2002) (recognizing that the concept of least detrimental alternative is subsumed within the concept of the best interests of the child); see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that a court may not “completely deny . . . parenting time under the best interests standard without express consideration of whether doing so is the least detrimental alternative.” (emphasis added)). ¶ 26 Finally, the court acted within its discretion when it adopted certain recommendations by the CFI after considering the

2025Id. ¶ 22 Even assuming the court should have expressly considered whether a less detrimental alternative to termination of parenting time existed, see Hatton, 160 P.3d at 333 , we conclude that any error was harmless. ¶ 23 For one thing, it was not even clear at the modification hearing that father was asking the court to compel daughter to attend parenting time.

2025See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326 , 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[E]ven in those circumstances of serious criminal conduct and domestic abuse, which by their nature would likely establish endangerment and thus be most susceptible of an order denying parenting time rights, the best interests standard applies to the determination of whether parenting time should be permitted.”); see also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308-09 (Colo. App. 2006) (district court did not abuse its discretion in naming the mother the child’s primary parent after she was convicted of misdemeanor child abuse

2007See In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75 (Colo.App. 2002) (best interests of child standard includes concept of least detrimental alternative); see also In re Marriage of Bertsch, 97 P.3d 219 (Colo.App.2004) (court must consider whether parent has been a perpetrator of child or spouse abuse and husband's guilty plea to third degree assault as two factors under best interests of child standard, but such acts do not preclude husband from being allocated primary parental responsibility).

2024In assessing the best interests factors, “[t]he trial court need not make specific findings on each and every factor listed in the statute so long as there is some indication in the record that the pertinent factors were considered.” See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 566 (Colo. App. 2003).

2024See People in Interest of A.M.K. , 68 P.3d 563 , 565- 66 (Colo. App. 2003) .

2024People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13 ; see also L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996). ¶ 10 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the juvenile court’s sound discretion.

2011See L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1391 .

2007See People in Interest of A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632 (Colo.App.2001) (under § 14-10-129(3)(a), court applies best interests standard and upholds order denying parenting time to father convicted of incest with a daughter from a prior marriage).

2007See People in Interest of A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632 (Colo. (under § 14-10-129(8)(a), court applies best interests standard and upholds order denying parenting time to father convicted of incest with a daughter from a prior marriage).

2004See Rideout v. Riendeau, supra, 761 A.2d at 310 (the best interests standard “delegates to judges authority to apply their own personal and essentially unreviewable lifestyle preferences to resolving each dispute”).

2004See Rideout v. Riendeau, supra, 761 A.2d at 310 (the best interests standard "delegates to judges authority to apply their own personal and essentially unreviewable lifestyle preferences to resolving each dispute").

2026Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140; In re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 648 (Colo. App. 2006); see also Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163 (“[T]he goal of dissolution proceedings is to create a stable situation between the new family units arising out of the divorce, whereas the goal of a modification proceeding is to maintain this stability, if possible, in the best interests of the child.”).

2026See DeZalia, 151 P.3d at 649-50 ; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. App. 1998); see also In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.”).

2024Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an error only affects a party’s substantial rights if “it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself” (quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986))). ¶ 39 Specifically, the court’s order demonstrates that the court considered, and rejected, the only other alternative available: father’s proposed parenting plan.

2024Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an error only affects a party’s substantial rights if “it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself” (quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986))). ¶ 39 Specifically, the court’s order demonstrates that the court considered, and rejected, the only other alternative available: father’s proposed parenting plan.

2024Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an error only affects a party’s substantial rights if “it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself” (quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986))). ¶ 39 Specifically, the court’s order demonstrates that the court considered, and rejected, the only other alternative available: father’s proposed parenting plan.

2024Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an error only affects a party’s substantial rights if “it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself” (quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986))). ¶ 39 Specifically, the court’s order demonstrates that the court considered, and rejected, the only other alternative available: father’s proposed parenting plan.

2024I n re Marriage of DePalma , 176 P.3d 829, 834 (Colo. App. 2007) ; see also § 14- 10 -124(1.5)(a) (describing the best interests factors that the court “shall consider” in determining parenting time); § 14- 10 - 123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023 (children have the right to have parental responsibilities determined based upon their best interests ). ¶ 16 Although a court is not required to make specific findings on all the statutory best interest factors, there must be some indication that the relevant factors were considered.

2024I n re Marriage of DePalma , 176 P.3d 829, 834 (Colo. App. 2007) ; see also § 14- 10 -124(1.5)(a) (describing the best interests factors that the court “shall consider” in determining parenting time); § 14- 10 - 123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023 (children have the right to have parental responsibilities determined based upon their best interests ). ¶ 16 Although a court is not required to make specific findings on all the statutory best interest factors, there must be some indication that the relevant factors were considered.

2024Finally, the report shows that the CFI considered the child’s best interests factors pursuant to section 14 - 10 -124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI) before concluding that, although both paren ts “love their child , ” it is in the child’s best interests for mother to “continue to have decision making and that [f ather’s] parenting time be changed.” ¶ 13 Moreover, because father provided no transcript of his testimony or the CFI’s , we must presume that the district court’s factual findings were supported by the evidence. 1 See In re Marriage of Rivera , 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) (it is the obligatio

2024Finally, the report shows that the CFI considered the child’s best interests factors pursuant to section 14 - 10 -124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI) before concluding that, although both paren ts “love their child , ” it is in the child’s best interests for mother to “continue to have decision making and that [f ather’s] parenting time be changed.” ¶ 13 Moreover, because father provided no transcript of his testimony or the CFI’s , we must presume that the district court’s factual findings were supported by the evidence. 1 See In re Marriage of Rivera , 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) (it is the obligatio

2007See E.L.M.C., supra, 100 P.3d at 553, 559; In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo.App.2002)(rejecting adoptive parents' constitutional challenge to grandparent visitation statute, and concluding grandparents did not have to show the adoptive parents were unfit before the best interests analysis was undertaken in a visitation case); Marie Avery Moses, The Constitutionality of Colorado's Grandparent Visitation and Third-Party Standing Statutes, 32 Colo. Law. 51 , 54 (Feb.2003).

2007See E.L.M.C., supra, 100 P.3d at 553, 559; In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo.App.2002)(rejecting adoptive parents' constitutional challenge to grandparent visitation statute, and concluding grandparents did not have to show the adoptive parents were unfit before the best interests analysis was undertaken in a visitation case); Marie Avery Moses, The Constitutionality of Colorado's Grandparent Visitation and Third-Party Standing Statutes, 32 Colo. Law. 51 , 54 (Feb.2003).

2004Id. at 873-74.

2004Id. at 873-74.

2001CJ In re Petition of E.R.S., supra, 779 P.2d at 852 (Erickson, J., specially concurring)(concluding that consideration of the likelihood of future support is not constitutionally required and can be adequately addressed when the court determines where the best interests of the child lie).

2001Cf. In re Petition of E.R.S., supra, 779 P.2d at 852 (Erickson, J., specially concurring)(concluding that consideration of the likelihood of future support is not constitutionally required and can be adequately addressed when the court determines where the best interests of the child lie).

2003The supreme court in In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995), considered whether the best interests standard could be applied in resolving a custodial dispute between a natural parent and psychological parents pursuant to § 14-10-123 without a showing of parental unfitness.

2003The supreme court in In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995), considered whether the best interests standard could be applied in resolving a custodial dispute between a natural parent and psychological parents pursuant to § 14-10-1283 without a showing of parental unfitness.

2025Relying on In re Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330 (Colo. App. 1998), the division held that “where the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.” Stewart, 43 P.3d at 742 .

2025See In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard.”); In re Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 331-33 (Colo. App. 1998) (where the parents had equal parenting time, a modification naming one parent as the child’s residential parent requires only a best interests showing). 8 ¶ 19 Nor are we persuaded by father’s related assertion that the modification constituted a restriction under section 14-10- 129(1)(b)(I), req