state constitutional analysis in Pennsylvania

2025In addition, “an examination of related federal precedent may be useful as part of the state constitutional analysis, not as binding authority, but as one form of guidance.” Id.

2017The panel did not explain that, in Perez , the Superior Court did not actually reach the merits of the state constitutional claim, holding instead it was waived for failure to present an analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991).

2020It is enough to state, for present purposes, that: (1) if this Court were to squarely face the question of what is demanded by Article I, Section 8 respecting automobile searches, I remain inclined to hold that our approach should be coextensive with the federal approach under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) failing that square joinder of the issue, it is my view that this Court's existing Article I, Section 8 holdings in this area (which do not include a state constitutional analysis under [Edmunds], at most suggest that, if Article I, Section 8 requires an exigency to justify a probable cause-

2011With respect to the Supreme Court cases that have adopted some form of the limited automobile exception (including, e.g., Baker, Rodriguez, White, and Luv), Justice Castille stated that [I]t is my view that this Courts’ existing Article I, Section 8 holdings in this area (which do not include a state constitutional analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991)), at most suggest that, if Article I, Section 8 requires an exigency to justify a probable cause-based warrantless entry of a vehicle (probable cause is the only federal requirement), all that is required is t

2015See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 621 Pa. 401 , 78 A.3d 1044, 1048 (Pa. 2013) (concluding that Baker’s failure to provide an Edmunds analysis precluded considering whether Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided higher protections that the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution on cruel and unusual punishments).

2015See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 621 Pa. 401 , 78 A.3d 1044, 1048 (Pa. 2013) (concluding that Baker’s failure to provide an Edmunds analysis precluded considering whether Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided higher protections that the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution on cruel and unusual punishments).

2019See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Arroyo , 555 Pa. 125 , 723 A.2d 162 , 166 n.6 (1999) (failure to engage in an Edmunds analysis in lower court "does not result in waiver of a state constitutional claim").

2019See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Arroyo , 555 Pa. 125 , 723 A.2d 162 , 166 n.6 (1999) (failure to engage in an Edmunds analysis in lower court "does not result in waiver of a state constitutional claim").

1994Commonwealth v. Lucas, 424 Pa.Super. 173, 177 , 622 A.2d 325, 327 (1993) (declining to consider a state constitutional analysis where the defendant did not comply with Edmunds and did not explain how the state constitution differed from its federal counterpart). 11 .

1994Commonwealth v. Lucas, 424 Pa.Super. 173, 177 , 622 A.2d 325, 327 (1993) (declining to consider a state constitutional analysis where the defendant did not comply with Edmunds and did not explain how the state constitution differed from its federal counterpart). 11 .

2011He also commented that because the cases recognizing the limited automobile exception had not done so based upon a state constitutional analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), "I do not view the notion that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires more than the Fourth Amendment in this area as ‘settled’ or ‘established.’ ” Hernandez, 594 Pa. at 339 , 935 A.2d at 1287 (Castille, J., concurring).

2011He also commented that because the cases recognizing the limited automobile exception had not done so based upon a state constitutional analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), "I do not view the notion that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires more than the Fourth Amendment in this area as ‘settled’ or ‘established.’ ” Hernandez, 594 Pa. at 339 , 935 A.2d at 1287 (Castille, J., concurring).

2017See Common wealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70 , 327 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1974) (embracing “automatic standing” as a state constitutional principle).

2017See Common wealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70 , 327 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1974) (embracing “automatic standing” as a state constitutional principle).

2017But see Perez, 97 A.3d at 766 (state ex post facto claim waived).

2016As this Court held in Perez , ”[t]he Edmunds analysis is mandatory and a failure to provide it precludes the consideration of a state constitutional claim independent of its federal counterpart.” Perez, 97 A.3d at 760 (citations omitted).

2013See Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 609 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. 1992) (not briefing factors in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), results in the waiver of constitutional issue).

2013See Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 609 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. 1992) (not briefing factors in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), results in the waiver of constitutional issue).

2011With respect to the Supreme Court cases that have adopted some form of the limited automobile exception (including, e.g., Baker, Rodriguez, White, and Luv), Justice Castille stated that [I]t is my view that this Courts’ existing Article I, Section 8 holdings in this area (which do not include a state constitutional analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991)), at most suggest that, if Article I, Section 8 requires an exigency to justify a probable cause-based warrantless entry of a vehicle (probable cause is the only federal requirement), all that is required is t

2011With respect to the Supreme Court cases that have adopted some form of the limited automobile exception (including, e.g., Baker, Rodriguez, White, and Luv), Justice Castille stated that [I]t is my view that this Courts’ existing Article I, Section 8 holdings in this area (which do not include a state constitutional analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991)), at most suggest that, if Article I, Section 8 requires an exigency to justify a probable cause-based warrantless entry of a vehicle (probable cause is the only federal requirement), all that is required is t

2016Id.

1997Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317 , 489 A.2d 1349 (1985); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 593 (3d Cir.1985) As this court stated in Leventhal , at 239, 542 A.2d at 1331 (1988): Both the federal equal protection clause, as applied to taxing statutes, and the state constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation (Pa. ConstArt.

2014Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the key inquiry remained the same as under Fourth Amendment principles: i.e., whether the defendant could claim a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that was violated by the challenged action: “To determine whether one’s activities fall within the right of privacy, we must examine: first, whether appellant has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 549 A.2d at 87 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur

1999Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 461 , 549 A.2d 81, 86 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 , 110 S.Ct. 1078 , 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990).

1996See Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 49-51 , 669 A.2d 896, 899 (1995) (reaffirming the importance of the analysis articulated by the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), vis-a-vis state constitutional claims, but addressing a state constitutional claim where appellant raised a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, cited cases in support of his claim, and related the cases to the claim).

1996See Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 49-51 , 669 A.2d 896, 899 (1995) (reaffirming the importance of the analysis articulated by the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), vis-a-vis state constitutional claims, but addressing a state constitutional claim where appellant raised a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, cited cases in support of his claim, and related the cases to the claim).

1997Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317 , 489 A.2d 1349 (1985); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 593 (3d Cir.1985) As this court stated in Leventhal , at 239, 542 A.2d at 1331 (1988): Both the federal equal protection clause, as applied to taxing statutes, and the state constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation (Pa. ConstArt.

1997Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317 , 489 A.2d 1349 (1985); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 593 (3d Cir.1985) As this court stated in Leventhal , at 239, 542 A.2d at 1331 (1988): Both the federal equal protection clause, as applied to taxing statutes, and the state constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation (Pa. ConstArt.

2025See Commonwealth v. Spone, 305 A.3d 602, 609 (Pa.Super. 2023) (finding -6- J-S17023-25 First Amendment challenge to harassment conviction waived where appellant did not raise it in trial court); Commonwealth v. Papp, 305 A.3d 62 , 71-72 (Pa.Super. 2023) (finding free speech challenge to harassment conviction under Pennsylvania Constitution waived where appellant “did not sufficiently articulate a separate state constitutional claim before the trial court”), appeal denied, 316 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2024), and cert. denied sub nom.

2022See Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (en banc) (“To date, neither Pennsylvania statutory authority, nor appellate case law has authorized the award of monetary damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); see also R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty.

2020Id. at 186, 615 A.2d at 325 ; accord Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 371 , 701 A.2d 492, 501 (1997) (“In order to raise double jeopardy implications, the prosecutor’s misconduct must have been deliberate, undertaken in bad faith and with a specific intent to deny the defendant of a fair trial.” (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 379-81 , 685 A.2d 96, 101 (1996))).

2020Id. at 186, 615 A.2d at 325 ; accord Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 371 , 701 A.2d 492, 501 (1997) (“In order to raise double jeopardy implications, the prosecutor’s misconduct must have been deliberate, undertaken in bad faith and with a specific intent to deny the defendant of a fair trial.” (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 379-81 , 685 A.2d 96, 101 (1996))).

2020Id. at 186, 615 A.2d at 325 ; accord Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 371 , 701 A.2d 492, 501 (1997) (“In order to raise double jeopardy implications, the prosecutor’s misconduct must have been deliberate, undertaken in bad faith and with a specific intent to deny the defendant of a fair trial.” (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 379-81 , 685 A.2d 96, 101 (1996))).

2020Id. at 186, 615 A.2d at 325 ; accord Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 371 , 701 A.2d 492, 501 (1997) (“In order to raise double jeopardy implications, the prosecutor’s misconduct must have been deliberate, undertaken in bad faith and with a specific intent to deny the defendant of a fair trial.” (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 379-81 , 685 A.2d 96, 101 (1996))).

2019Specifically, the Commonwealth cites to an en banc Colorado Supreme Court decision concluding Birchfield was distinguishable from cases involving the admissibility of refusal evidence, id. at 26-27, citing Fitzgerald v. People , 394 P.3d 671 , 675-76 (Colo. 2017), and a Vermont Supreme Court decision holding " 'criminalizing the revocation of implied consent crosses the line in terms of impermissibly burdening the Fourth Amendment ... [b]ut allowing evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI prosecution does not warrant the same constitutional protection.' " Id. at

2019Specifically, the Commonwealth cites to an en banc Colorado Supreme Court decision concluding Birchfield was distinguishable from cases involving the admissibility of refusal evidence, id. at 26-27, citing Fitzgerald v. People, 394 P.3d 671, 675-76 (Colo. 2017), and a Vermont Supreme Court decision holding “‘criminalizing the revocation of implied consent crosses the line in terms of impermissibly burdening the Fourth Amendment . . . [b]ut allowing evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI prosecution does not warrant the same constitutional protection.’” Id. at 2

2019Id., 8 at 1102, quoting Payne v. Commonwealth Dept. of Corrections, 871 A.2d 795, 809 (Pa. 2005), additional citations omitted.

2019Specifically, the Commonwealth cites to an en banc Colorado Supreme Court decision concluding Birchfield was distinguishable from cases involving the admissibility of refusal evidence, id. at 26-27, citing Fitzgerald v. People , 394 P.3d 671 , 675-76 (Colo. 2017), and a Vermont Supreme Court decision holding " 'criminalizing the revocation of implied consent crosses the line in terms of impermissibly burdening the Fourth Amendment ... [b]ut allowing evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI prosecution does not warrant the same constitutional protection.' " Id. at

2019Specifically, the Commonwealth cites to an en banc Colorado Supreme Court decision concluding Birchfield was distinguishable from cases involving the admissibility of refusal evidence, id. at 26-27, citing Fitzgerald v. People, 394 P.3d 671, 675-76 (Colo. 2017), and a Vermont Supreme Court decision holding “‘criminalizing the revocation of implied consent crosses the line in terms of impermissibly burdening the Fourth Amendment . . . [b]ut allowing evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood test in the context of a DUI prosecution does not warrant the same constitutional protection.’” Id. at 2

2018Accordingly, because McCray is unable to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object based on a state constitutional violation, he is entitled to no relief on his second claim. ____________________________________________ 10 See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 213 (Pa. 2003) (“[T]his court has been consistent in prohibiting the post-arrest silence of an accused to be used to his detriment.”). - 11 - J-S40043-17 In his final claim, McCray contends his August 30, 2016, sentence is illegal.