state constitutional claim in Oregon

1985See State v. Bounds, supra; State v. Hollywood, 67 Or App 546 , 680 P2d 655 (1984). 4 Defendant also claims that the admission of the evidence violates his rights under the federal and state Confrontation Clauses, because he was not able to cross-examine the child. 5 Under State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983), we must consider the state constitutional claim before we can reach the issue of whether defendant was denied rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.

1985See State v. Bounds, supra; State v. Hollywood, 67 Or App 546 , 680 P2d 655 (1984). 4 Defendant also claims that the admission of the evidence violates his rights under the federal and state Confrontation Clauses, because he was not able to cross-examine the child. 5 Under State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983), we must consider the state constitutional claim before we can reach the issue of whether defendant was denied rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.

2010See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 430-31 , 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 247 (1997) (a party must “clearly present” a distinct method of state constitutional analysis to preserve that state constitutional claim for appeal); see also State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 19 , 774 P2d 1082 (1989) (declining to consider the defendant’s state constitutional claim where the defendant failed to brief or argue that the state constitutional analysis differed from that under the federal constitution).

2010See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 430-31 , 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 247 (1997) (a party must “clearly present” a distinct method of state constitutional analysis to preserve that state constitutional claim for appeal); see also State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 19 , 774 P2d 1082 (1989) (declining to consider the defendant’s state constitutional claim where the defendant failed to brief or argue that the state constitutional analysis differed from that under the federal constitution).

2025See, e.g., DeAngelo, 306 Or at 100 (holding that the sentencing court violated the petitioner’s state constitutional right to be heard at her sentencing hearing by asking if she had anything to say but then quickly interrupting her, telling her that it did not want to listen to her anymore, and imposing sentence); State v. Southards, 172 Or App 634, 641-42 , 21 P3d 123 (2001) (holding that the right to allocution was violated where “defense counsel tried to assert defendant’s Article I, section 11, rights, but the trial court declined to hear from him[,]” and the “defendant was cut off after r

2025See, e.g., DeAngelo, 306 Or at 100 (holding that the sentencing court violated the petitioner’s state constitutional right to be heard at her sentencing hearing by asking if she had anything to say but then quickly interrupting her, telling her that it did not want to listen to her anymore, and imposing sentence); State v. Southards, 172 Or App 634, 641-42 , 21 P3d 123 (2001) (holding that the right to allocution was violated where “defense counsel tried to assert defendant’s Article I, section 11, rights, but the trial court declined to hear from him[,]” and the “defendant was cut off after r

2025See id. at 631 n 4 (“[I]n some cases, the information in an affidavit may give rise to prob- able cause to search a defined group of electronic devices, each of which may contain the evidence or contraband that is the subject of the search.”); see also State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 413 , 657 P2d 1223 (1983) (“The nature of ‘probable 2 Defendant also argues on appeal that the digital device warrant is over- broad and insufficiently specific under the federal constitution “[f]or the reasons given [under the state constitutional analysis].” To the extent that we reject defendant’s state constit

2025See id. at 631 n 4 (“[I]n some cases, the information in an affidavit may give rise to prob- able cause to search a defined group of electronic devices, each of which may contain the evidence or contraband that is the subject of the search.”); see also State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 413 , 657 P2d 1223 (1983) (“The nature of ‘probable 2 Defendant also argues on appeal that the digital device warrant is over- broad and insufficiently specific under the federal constitution “[f]or the reasons given [under the state constitutional analysis].” To the extent that we reject defendant’s state constit

2025See id. at 631 n 4 (“[I]n some cases, the information in an affidavit may give rise to prob- able cause to search a defined group of electronic devices, each of which may contain the evidence or contraband that is the subject of the search.”); see also State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 413 , 657 P2d 1223 (1983) (“The nature of ‘probable 2 Defendant also argues on appeal that the digital device warrant is over- broad and insufficiently specific under the federal constitution “[f]or the reasons given [under the state constitutional analysis].” To the extent that we reject defendant’s state constit

2025See id. at 631 n 4 (“[I]n some cases, the information in an affidavit may give rise to prob- able cause to search a defined group of electronic devices, each of which may contain the evidence or contraband that is the subject of the search.”); see also State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 413 , 657 P2d 1223 (1983) (“The nature of ‘probable 2 Defendant also argues on appeal that the digital device warrant is over- broad and insufficiently specific under the federal constitution “[f]or the reasons given [under the state constitutional analysis].” To the extent that we reject defendant’s state constit

2010See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 430-31 , 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 247 (1997) (a party must “clearly present” a distinct method of state constitutional analysis to preserve that state constitutional claim for appeal); see also State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 19 , 774 P2d 1082 (1989) (declining to consider the defendant’s state constitutional claim where the defendant failed to brief or argue that the state constitutional analysis differed from that under the federal constitution).

2010See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 430-31 , 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 247 (1997) (a party must “clearly present” a distinct method of state constitutional analysis to preserve that state constitutional claim for appeal); see also State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 19 , 774 P2d 1082 (1989) (declining to consider the defendant’s state constitutional claim where the defendant failed to brief or argue that the state constitutional analysis differed from that under the federal constitution).

2016Montez [, 355 Or at 6-7], Specifically, [a] petitioner must show that trial counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Stricklandl, 466 US at 688 ].” See also Montez, 355 Or at 7 (in evaluating a petitioner’s state constitutional claim of inadequate assistance of counsel, the court must first determine whether the petitioner demonstrated that his lawyer failed to exercise reasonable skill and judgment and, if so, whe

2016Montez [, 355 Or at 6-7], Specifically, [a] petitioner must show that trial counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Stricklandl, 466 US at 688 ].” See also Montez, 355 Or at 7 (in evaluating a petitioner’s state constitutional claim of inadequate assistance of counsel, the court must first determine whether the petitioner demonstrated that his lawyer failed to exercise reasonable skill and judgment and, if so, whe

1999The court stated that it adopted "the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States [in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) ] in determining what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to satisfy our state constitutional confrontation clause." Id. at 648, 705 P.2d 694 (emphasis added).

1998See State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985) (so stating as to questions of unavailability and reliability).

1999The court stated that it adopted “the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States [in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980)] in determining what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to satisfy our state constitutional confrontation clause.” Id. at 648 (emphasis added).

1999The court stated that it adopted “the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States [in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980)] in determining what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to satisfy our state constitutional confrontation clause.” Id. at 648 (emphasis added).

1995In Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209 , 721 P.2d 445 (1986), vacated and remanded on other, unrelated grounds, 485 U.S. 660 , 108 S.Ct. 1444 , 99 L.Ed.2d 753 (1988), Smith was denied state unemployment benefits after he was fired from his job as a drug counselor for using peyote in disregard of his employer's express requirement that he be drug free.

1995In Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209 , 721 P.2d 445 (1986), vacated and remanded on other, unrelated grounds, 485 U.S. 660 , 108 S.Ct. 1444 , 99 L.Ed.2d 753 (1988), Smith was denied state unemployment benefits after he was fired from his job as a drug counselor for using peyote in disregard of his employer's express requirement that he be drug free.

2022Each of those cases involved a market value standard for assessment and a failure by the taxing authority to apply that standard in a relatively uniform manner. 6 See also Nordlinger, 505 US at 14-15 (distinguishing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 US 336 , 109 S Ct 633 , 102 L Ed 2d 688 (1989), which involved a state constitutional requirement that properties be taxed uniformly at market value). /// 5 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2019. 6 In each case, taxpayer alleged that it had been singled out for correct assessment a

2020See State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 621 , 341 P3d 714 (2014) (Kistler, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“There would be lit- tle point * * * in announcing a state constitutional rule that permits Oregon courts to consider evidence that the Fifth Amendment precludes them from considering.”).

2020See State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 621 , 341 P3d 714 (2014) (Kistler, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“There would be lit- tle point * * * in announcing a state constitutional rule that permits Oregon courts to consider evidence that the Fifth Amendment precludes them from considering.”).

2019See State v. Cookman, 324 Or 19, 25 , 920 P2d 1086 (1996). 510 Mitchell v. State of Oregon must determine whether he proved that counsel’s failure had a tendency to affect the result of his trial.” Id. (citation omitted).

2019See State v. Cookman, 324 Or 19, 25 , 920 P2d 1086 (1996). 510 Mitchell v. State of Oregon must determine whether he proved that counsel’s failure had a tendency to affect the result of his trial.” Id. (citation omitted).