state constitutional analysis in Utah

2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 , 642–43 (Vt. 1994) (“adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant’s due process rights because he cross- examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s “due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 41 Tiede

2012See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 37 , 162 P.3d 1106 (discussing the procedure for advancing a state constitutional claim and noting that the "mere mention of state provisions" is insufficient to brief a state constitutional argument); Utah R.App.

2011Cf. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1988) (considering only a claim under the federal constitution where the argument on appeal failed to advance a separate state constitutional analysis). 8 .

2011See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1988) (considering only a claim under the federal constitution where the argument on appeal failed to advance a separate state constitutional analysis). .

2018But while there is sound logic to this approach, when a party fails to "adequately analyze[ ] the state constitutional claim as an issue separate and distinct from its federal counterpart, we will not address it." State v. Rynhart , 2005 UT 84 , ¶ 12, 125 P.3d 938 .

2018But while there is sound logic to this approach, when a party fails to "adequately analyze[ ] the state constitutional claim as an issue separate and distinct from its federal counterpart, we will not address it." State v. Rynhart , 2005 UT 84 , ¶ 12, 125 P.3d 938 .

2016See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 19 , 164 P.3d 397 (declining to address a state constitutional claim as inadequately briefed when the appellant did not "attempt[ ] any separate state constitutional analysis"); State v. Hoffman, 2013 UT App 290, ¶¶ 54-57 , 318 P.3d 225 , We do, however, address Hawking's claim that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment.

2016See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 19 , 164 P.3d 397 (declining to address a state constitutional claim as inadequately briefed when the appellant did not "attempt[ ] any separate state constitutional analysis"); State v. Hoffman, 2013 UT App 290, ¶¶ 54-57 , 318 P.3d 225 , We do, however, address Hawking's claim that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment.

2007See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 464-65, 471 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (conducting a federal constitutional analysis of the defendant's unlawful search claim before conducting a state constitutional analysis, and concluding that the search was reasonable under the federal constitution but not under the state constitution). ¶ 34 Federal constitutional discourse and vocabulary have dominated constitutional criminal procedure cases for so long that it continues to be difficult for lawyers to shift their perspectives in state cases.

2007See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 464-65, 471 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (conducting a federal constitutional analysis of the defendant's unlawful search claim before conducting a state constitutional analysis, and concluding that the search was reasonable under the federal constitution but not under the state constitution).

2003See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). ¶ 75 Without analysis, the court can make no informed decision regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question was intended to mirror its federal counterpart, or whether it was intended to expand the scope of First Amendment guarantees.

1993Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1269 (Utah App.1990); see State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.1992); State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884 , 885 n. 2 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (appellate courts “will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless a party briefs a different analysis under the state constitution than that which flows from the federal Constitution”); Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App.1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App.1987).

1991See, e.g., Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06 ; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 , 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing cases). .

1991See, e.g., Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06 ; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 , 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (citing cases). [5] See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.App.1990). [6] Under our characterization of this roadblock, it does not fit into the traditional "three levels" of police stops, that have been described as follows: (1) an officer may approach a citizen at [any time] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a

2016Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶¶ 74-75 , 73 P.3d 334 ("For the court to consider a state constitutional claim, a litigant must at least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal precedent supports its position.

2016Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶¶ 74-75 , 73 P.3d 334 ("For the court to consider a state constitutional claim, a litigant must at least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal precedent supports its position.

2025Indeed, those three justices each wrote an opinion. ¶22 Justice Durham, who authored the lead opinion, found the recovery limits statutes “wanting under both a due process and an equal protection analysis,” id.; see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 348– 66 (lead opinion), while Justices Zimmerman and Stewart each authored separate opinions expressing disparate views, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366–69 (Zimmerman, J., writing separately); id. at 369–75 (Stewart, J., writing separately).

2025Indeed, those three justices each wrote an opinion. ¶22 Justice Durham, who authored the lead opinion, found the recovery limits statutes “wanting under both a due process and an equal protection analysis,” id.; see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 348– 66 (lead opinion), while Justices Zimmerman and Stewart each authored separate opinions expressing disparate views, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366–69 (Zimmerman, J., writing separately); id. at 369–75 (Stewart, J., writing separately).

2024Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10 , 122 P.3d 506 , rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).

2024Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10 , 122 P.3d 506 , rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).

2020An investigatory stop “must be justified at its inception.” 3 Id. (cleaned up). ¶13 A routine traffic stop is justified at its inception if the stop is supported by a “reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense.” State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (cleaned up).

2017Id. at 1134 n.2.

2020“As a general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitution is briefed.” State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 23 , 104 P.3d 1250 (cleaned up).

2020“As a general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitution is briefed.” State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 23 , 104 P.3d 1250 (cleaned up).

2002However, that is not to suggest that a separate state constitutional analysis might not be appropriate. 817 P.2d at 785 (citations omitted).

2002However, that is not to suggest that a separate state constitutional analysis might not be appropriate. 817 P.2d at 785 (citations omitted).

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2024See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36, ¶ 12 , 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding would not have served any useful purpose related to notice because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that “[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Uta

2019See State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 50 , 332 P.3d 937 (declining to review a state constitutional claim where the appellant’s brief “contains bald citations to authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority” (quotation simplified)). 3.

2019See State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 50 , 332 P.3d 937 (declining to review a state constitutional claim where the appellant’s brief “contains bald citations to authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority” (quotation simplified)). 3.