state constitutional claim in Massachusetts

1999Defense counsel did not object. 9 In its closing, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant’s refusal to participate was evidence of consciousness of guilt: “Would an innocent man fail to show up on two separate dates when he was asked to participate in a voice identification procedure?” Defense counsel did not object to the consciousness of guilt argument or to the trial judge’s refusal to give a consciousness of guilt instruction. 10 Generally, “the admission of refusal evidence violate[s] a defendant’s State constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 42

1996Lydon, supra at 313-315 (evidence of refusal to submit to swabbing of hands for evidence of gunpowder inadmissible).

2004See State v. Miller, 110 Wash. App. 283, 284-285 (2002) (“Portuondo effectively overrules [contrary State court decisions] insofar as they state a different rule”).

1999Defense counsel did not object. 9 In its closing, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant’s refusal to participate was evidence of consciousness of guilt: “Would an innocent man fail to show up on two separate dates when he was asked to participate in a voice identification procedure?” Defense counsel did not object to the consciousness of guilt argument or to the trial judge’s refusal to give a consciousness of guilt instruction. 10 Generally, “the admission of refusal evidence violate[s] a defendant’s State constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 42

1996In any event, even if we were to reach the issue and were to assume that § 1983 can be used as a vehicle for raising the State constitutional claim, but see Johnson v. Rodriquez, 943 F.2d at 108 (under § 1983, aggrieved individual may sue for abridgment of rights created by Constitution or laws of United States), his argument is probably foreclosed by the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Gray v. Commissioner of Rev., 422 Mass, at 674-675, despite the absence in this case of the Child Support Enforcement, CSE Directive C-93-1, referred to in Gray .

1995See State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253, 260 (1985).

1984See id. at 101-103 . 21 Previously, this court has interpreted challenges to a jury selection procedure under Federal law and held that only purposeful discrimination against a discrete group constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause.

1984L. c. 234, § 1 (other exemptions from jury service due to position as public servant, elected representative, etc.). 18 The Commonwealth appears to concede that the key man finding as to Gloucester is correct and hence challenges the findings as to the use of the key man system in Lawrence and Peabody only. 19 Although the judge carefully examined both Federal and State constitutional authority, we need not express our views as to Federal constitutional matters since, in our view, determination of the State constitutional claim is dispositive of the Commonwealth’s appeal. 20 It is likely that

1981It did so before the Franks opinion (see Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 100-101 [1972]), and subsequently expanded on the principle (People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 88 [1978]).

1981It did so before the Franks opinion (see Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 100-101 [1972]), and subsequently expanded on the principle (People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 88 [1978]).