state constitutional claim in Indiana

2023See, e.g., Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the defendant waived an Article 1, Section 11, claim where his arguments in the trial court mentioned the state constitutional claim but did not provide any independent analysis for it) (citing Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied), trans. denied; see also Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (“Because Abel presents no authority or independent analysis supporting a separate standard under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived.”).

2019See Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (holding that failure to develop a separate state constitutional claim resulted in waiver of the issue).

2019Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359-60 (Ind. 1995).

2019We decline to revisit our state constitutional holding, as our analysis under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution does not depend on the Fourth Amendment, see Zanders , 73 N.E.3d at 185 -86 ; Wright v. State , 108 N.E.3d 307 , 315 (Ind. 2018) ; Litchfield v. State , 824 N.E.2d 356 , 359-60 (Ind. 2005), and our finding of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt would preclude relief on the state constitutional claim even if we were to find a violation, see Torres v. State , 673 N.E.2d 472 , 474-75 (Ind. 1996) (reviewing state constitutional error for harmlessness beyond a reasonabl

2017See Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Because the State failed to raise standing under the Indiana Constitution and because we cannot raise the issue sua sponte, we proceed to the merits of the state constitutional challenge.”).

2017See Willis v. State , 780 N.E.2d 423 , 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Because the State failed to raise standing under the Indiana Constitution and because we cannot raise the issue sua sponte, we proceed to the merits of the state constitutional challenge.").

2007See id. (citing Garland Indep.

1991See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 , 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 734 , 107 S.Ct. 3078, 3091 , 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). [4] Those six theories are: (1) the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 , 207 (1988); (2) the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); (3) Indiana's patient remuneration law, Ind. Code §§ 16-13-12.8 -1 to -10 (repealed in 1985 and replaced by Ind. Code §§ 16-13-23-1 to -9 (West Supp. 1990)); (4) unj

2019See Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369 , 372 n.1 (Ind. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s state constitutional claim was waived for failure to make a separate argument).

2019See Jackson, 925 N.E.2d at 372 n.1 (holding that the defendant’s state constitutional claim was waived for failure to make a separate argument).

2011Cf. Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369 , 372 n. 1 (Ind.2010); Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010 , 1015 n. 4 (Ind.1998).

2000See Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010 , 1015 n. 4 (Ind.1998).

2002See Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind.2002); Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002); Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ind.2002).

2002See Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind.2002); Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002); Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ind.2002).

1998We therefore merely looked to federal due process concepts in our disposition of the state constitutional claim “[b]ecause these are familiar principles in Indiana jurisprudence.” Id. at 361.

1997We therefore merely looked to federal due process concepts in our disposition of the state constitutional claim “[bjecause these are familiar principles in Indiana jurisprudence.” Id. at 361 .

2023See, e.g., Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the defendant waived an Article 1, Section 11, claim where his arguments in the trial court mentioned the state constitutional claim but did not provide any independent analysis for it) (citing Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied), trans. denied; see also Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (“Because Abel presents no authority or independent analysis supporting a separate standard under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived.”).

2023See, e.g., Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the defendant waived an Article 1, Section 11, claim where his arguments in the trial court mentioned the state constitutional claim but did not provide any independent analysis for it) (citing Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied), trans. denied; see also Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 , 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (“Because Abel presents no authority or independent analysis supporting a separate standard under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived.”).

2020We need not discuss that constitutional provisions because Albrecht did not raise a state constitutional challenge in his motion to suppress. 7 INDIANA CODE 35-33-5-2 provides, in relevant part, that “no warrant for search . . . shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an affidavit: (1) particularly describing: (A) the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for; or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-945 | December 16, 2020 Page 18 of 26 precise definition . . . [and] is to be decided based on the facts of each case.’” Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121,

2020We need not discuss that constitutional provisions because Albrecht did not raise a state constitutional challenge in his motion to suppress. 7 INDIANA CODE 35-33-5-2 provides, in relevant part, that “no warrant for search . . . shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an affidavit: (1) particularly describing: (A) the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for; or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-945 | December 16, 2020 Page 18 of 26 precise definition . . . [and] is to be decided based on the facts of each case.’” Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121,

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1112 | August 31, 2020 Page 24 of 29 possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the defendant was a ‘serious violent felon.’” Mills v. State, 868 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 2007). [49] Here, the State alleged that Dixon was a serious violent felon based on a 1989 conviction for dealing in cocaine.

2020See, e.g., Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 102 (Ind. 1998).

2020“Probable cause is not a high bar, and [it] is cleared when the totality of the circumstances establishes a fair probability—not proof or a prima facie showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or evidence of a crime.” Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2019Under a state constitutional analysis, we make reasonable suspicion determinations “by looking at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). [16] As under the federal analysis, an anonymous tip is generally insufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a Terry investigative stop absent evidence of the reliability of the tip.

2019Under a state constitutional analysis, we make reasonable suspicion determinations "by looking at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing." *676 State v. Renzulli , 958 N.E.2d 1143 , 1147 (Ind. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). [16] As under the federal analysis, an anonymous tip is generally insufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a Terry investigative stop absent evidence of the reliability of the tip.

2018See Davenport v. State, 734 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (declaring that failure to put forth a cogent argument acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal), trans. denied. [6] Second, although two specific objections Carney raised at trial were overruled – which we discuss below – at no time did Carney make an objection based on the so-called “running commentary” of the State’s witness.

2017See Ind. Appellate Rule 46; Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

2015See Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing Everroad v. State, 590 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ind.1992)).

2015See State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2010), reh’g denied.

2015“An appellant’s failure to provide us with a separate analysis for each constitutional claim constitutes waiver.” Russell v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citing Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)). [15] Turning to the state constitutional claim, article I, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.” Indiana court

2015“An appellant’s failure to provide us with a separate analysis for each constitutional claim constitutes waiver.” Russell v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citing Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)). [15] Turning to the state constitutional claim, article I, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.” Indiana court