state constitutional privilege in California

2013Defendant argues that the error was prejudicial under either the federal constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ) or the state constitutional standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ).

2013(See People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 355 ; People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 .) Accordingly, we apply the state constitutional error standard, which asks whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) Nurse Faugno did not go into detail regarding the victim’s statements.

2023(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) The Attorney General argues that any error was harmless under either the federal standard or the state constitutional standard, which requires reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that the 67 error contributed to the verdict.

2015(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) The Attorney General counters that the applicable standard is the state constitutional standard, which requires reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict.

1988Relying on independent state grounds, our Supreme Court has refused to follow federal interpretations of Miranda in the context of the state constitutional privilege against self-in crimination (see, e.g., People v. Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d 595 ; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ]), as well as federal holdings regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when applying the separate California constitutional right to assistance of counsel (e.g., People v. Hous

1988Relying on independent state grounds, our Supreme Court has refused to follow federal interpretations of Miranda in the context of the state constitutional privilege against self-in crimination (see, e.g., People v. Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d 595 ; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ]), as well as federal holdings regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when applying the separate California constitutional right to assistance of counsel (e.g., People v. Hous

2011Up until the passage of Proposition 115 in 1990, a number of decisions by the California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as a “roadblock to prosecutorial discovery.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ] (Izazaga); see People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] (Collie)) In Collie , the court disapproved not only tire discovery order in issue, but “all other judicial attempts to frame prosecutorial discovery orders” and declined “to articulate a unit

2011Up until the passage of Proposition 115 in 1990, a number of decisions by the California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as a “roadblock to prosecutorial discovery.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ] (Izazaga); see People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] (Collie)) In Collie , the court disapproved not only tire discovery order in issue, but “all other judicial attempts to frame prosecutorial discovery orders” and declined “to articulate a unit

2011Up until the passage of Proposition 115 in 1990, a number of decisions by the California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as a “roadblock to prosecutorial discovery.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ] (Izazaga); see People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] (Collie)) In Collie , the court disapproved not only tire discovery order in issue, but “all other judicial attempts to frame prosecutorial discovery orders” and declined “to articulate a unit

2011Up until the passage of Proposition 115 in 1990, a number of decisions by the California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as a “roadblock to prosecutorial discovery.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ] (Izazaga); see People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] (Collie)) In Collie , the court disapproved not only tire discovery order in issue, but “all other judicial attempts to frame prosecutorial discovery orders” and declined “to articulate a unit

2021(Id. at p. 688.) The court further noted that “identification of arrestees is not an end in itself; rather, the primary purpose of identification is to facilitate the gathering of information about the arrestee contained in police records, which in turn informs decisions about how to proceed with the arrestee.” (Ibid., citing Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 866-867 (Loder) [upholding retention and use of arrest records, including fingerprints and other identifying information].) In rejecting the state constitutional claim, our high court also noted that King flatly rejected the

2021(Id. at p. 688.) The court further noted that “identification of arrestees is not an end in itself; rather, the primary purpose of identification is to facilitate the gathering of information about the arrestee contained in police records, which in turn informs decisions about how to proceed with the arrestee.” (Ibid., citing Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 866-867 (Loder) [upholding retention and use of arrest records, including fingerprints and other identifying information].) In rejecting the state constitutional claim, our high court also noted that King flatly rejected the

2009IV, §§ 1.5, 2.) In Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 557-558 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 , 12 P.3d 1068 ], this court recognized that Proposition 209 changed the state constitutional standard reflected in our earlier decisions in Price v. Civil Service Com. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 257, 284-285 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 ], and DeRonde v. Regents of University of California (1981) 28 Cal.3d 875, 890 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 677 , 625 P.2d 220 ], which had upheld the validity of the type of affirmative-action programs that the new constitutional provision now bars.

2009IV, §§ 1.5, 2.) In Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 557-558 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 , 12 P.3d 1068 ], this court recognized that Proposition 209 changed the state constitutional standard reflected in our earlier decisions in Price v. Civil Service Com. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 257, 284-285 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 ], and DeRonde v. Regents of University of California (1981) 28 Cal.3d 875, 890 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 677 , 625 P.2d 220 ], which had upheld the validity of the type of affirmative-action programs that the new constitutional provision now bars.

2007VI, § 14; see People v. Pacini [(1981)] 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]).

2007VI, § 14; see People v. Pacini [(1981)] 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]).

2007The function of the writ or order is to ‘institute a proceeding in which issues of fact are to be framed and decided.’ (In re Hochberg [(1970)] 2 Cal.3d 870, 876, fn. 4 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 471 P.2d 1 ], italics omitted.) The issuance of either the writ of habeas corpus or the order to show cause creates a ‘cause,’ thereby triggering the state constitutional requirement that the cause be resolved ‘in writing with reasons stated’ (Cal. Const., art.

2007The function of the writ or order is to ‘institute a proceeding in which issues of fact are to be framed and decided.’ (In re Hochberg [(1970)] 2 Cal.3d 870, 876, fn. 4 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 471 P.2d 1 ], italics omitted.) The issuance of either the writ of habeas corpus or the order to show cause creates a ‘cause,’ thereby triggering the state constitutional requirement that the cause be resolved ‘in writing with reasons stated’ (Cal. Const., art.

1988Relying on independent state grounds, our Supreme Court has refused to follow federal interpretations of Miranda in the context of the state constitutional privilege against self-in crimination (see, e.g., People v. Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d 595 ; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ]), as well as federal holdings regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when applying the separate California constitutional right to assistance of counsel (e.g., People v. Hous

1988Relying on independent state grounds, our Supreme Court has refused to follow federal interpretations of Miranda in the context of the state constitutional privilege against self-in crimination (see, e.g., People v. Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d 595 ; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ]), as well as federal holdings regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when applying the separate California constitutional right to assistance of counsel (e.g., People v. Hous

1995We invalidated the statute, holding that it contravened the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 558 .) We have applied the harmless error standard under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , to Misener error.

1992We reject the minor’s argument that the discretion afforded juvenile courts to order discovery in delinquency proceedings is limited by the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as construed by the California Supreme Court in Prudhomme, supra, 2 Cal.3d 320, Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d 43 and Misener, supra, 38 Cal.3d 543 .

2021The state constitutional analysis requires a three-pronged approach, under which we (1) evaluate “the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of 21 danger both present to society,” (2) “compare the challenged penalty with punishments prescribed for more serious crimes in [our] jurisdiction,” and (3) “compar[e] the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425-427 .) “The weight afforded to each prong may vary by case,” and “ ‘[d]isproportionality need not be establis

2020(Baker, at p. 722.) The state constitutional analysis requires a three-pronged approach, under which a court (1) evaluates “the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society,” (2) “compare[s] the challenged penalty with punishments prescribed for more serious crimes in [its] jurisdiction,” and (3) “compar[es] the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425-427, italics omitted.) “The weight afforded to each prong may vary by case,” an

2013Defendant does not persuade us to reconsider these decisions.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 132 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ].) We have reached the same result concerning the state constitutional claim.

2013Defendant does not persuade us to reconsider these decisions.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 132 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ].) We have reached the same result concerning the state constitutional claim.

2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 926 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 200 P.3d 898 ].) Defendant also contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the admission of Bertha R.’s testimony on grounds it was not related to the circumstances of the capital crimes.

2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 926 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 200 P.3d 898 ].) Defendant also contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the admission of Bertha R.’s testimony on grounds it was not related to the circumstances of the capital crimes.

2010(People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 383-385.) 10 For the same reason, we disapprove dictum in People v. Rivera (1985) 41 Cal.3d 388 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 562 , 710 P.2d 362 ] to the effect that the rule of Burton, supra, 6 Cal.Sd 375, survives the high court’s holding in Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707 , as a “component of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” (Rivera, supra, at p. 395 ; see Cal. Const., art.

2010(People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 383-385.) 10 For the same reason, we disapprove dictum in People v. Rivera (1985) 41 Cal.3d 388 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 562 , 710 P.2d 362 ] to the effect that the rule of Burton, supra, 6 Cal.Sd 375, survives the high court’s holding in Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707 , as a “component of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” (Rivera, supra, at p. 395 ; see Cal. Const., art.

2008In support of his argument that the state constitutional error renders the judgment reversible per se, Noriega relies on Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 126 S.Ct. 2557 and People v. Burrows (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d *179 116, 269 Cal.Rptr. 206 .

2004But he may also choose not to do so: ‘a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 837.) Commenting on our decision in Bonin , the appellate court in People v. Burrows (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 116, 125 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 206 ] said: “California makes a defendant the master of his fate and allows him to proceed uninterrupted, with the exceptions of flagrant circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence [citation], with counsel of his choice if the parties involved in the conflict properly waive any potential o

2000(Id. at pp. 839-843.) Additionally, although recognizing that California had previously applied double jeopardy protections to bar the retrial of a sentence-enhancing allegation in the noncapital case of People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 , 820 P.2d 613 ] (Marks), the court in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 distinguished Marks on grounds it was based on “a state constitutional rule of double jeopardy that precludes penalizing a defendant with a longer sentence following a successful appeal of his or her conviction[, and it] included no analysis of the

2000(Id. at pp. 839-843.) Additionally, although recognizing that California had previously applied double jeopardy protections to bar the retrial of a sentence-enhancing allegation in the noncapital case of People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 , 820 P.2d 613 ] (Marks), the court in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 distinguished Marks on grounds it was based on “a state constitutional rule of double jeopardy that precludes penalizing a defendant with a longer sentence following a successful appeal of his or her conviction[, and it] included no analysis of the

1989(See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 323 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Quinn v. United States (1955) 349 U.S. 155, 162 [ 99 L.Ed. 964, 972 , 75 S.Ct. 668 , 51 A.L.R.2d 1157 ].) I dissent because the fundamental protections afforded by the California Declaration of Rights (Cal. Const., art.

1988Both are based on the same rationale of deterring unlawful police conduct.” ( 44 Cal.3d at p. 316 , brackets deleted.) Thus, the court concluded that because Disbrow did not extend the substantive protection provided by the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination (Cal. Const., art.

1986Evidence Code section 940 provides that “7b the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Italics added; see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The crucial question, then, is whether the Jimenez rule is required by the state constitutional privilege so that the rule exists “under ... the Constitution of . . . the State of California.” (Evid.

1986Evidence Code section 940 provides that “7b the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Italics added; see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The crucial question, then, is whether the Jimenez rule is required by the state constitutional privilege so that the rule exists “under ... the Constitution of . . . the State of California.” (Evid.

2024Proc, §§ 220 & 192; People v. Traugott (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 492, 500, 504 [denial of the right to a unanimous 12–person verdict constitutes a structural defect that, by its nature, results in a miscarriage of justice].) Nonetheless, Glenn resolved the state constitutional claim in a manner we find fully applicable here: “[A]rticle I, section 16, of the California Constitution … provides for a jury of 12 persons to serve in criminal trials,” and “a jury of 12 is precisely what [Pineda] got.