state constitutional standard in Maryland

2019In support of the latter point, appellant cites Stevenson v. State , 289 Md. 167 , 188, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), and Montgomery v. State , 292 Md. 84 , 91, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), which hold "that instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof are 'binding' on the jury and are 'not advisory.' " See also Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 411, 48 A.3d 242 (2012) ("the *168 Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard").

2019In support of the latter point, appellant cites Stevenson v. State , 289 Md. 167 , 188, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), and Montgomery v. State , 292 Md. 84 , 91, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), which hold "that instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof are 'binding' on the jury and are 'not advisory.' " See also Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 411, 48 A.3d 242 (2012) ("the *168 Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard").

2019In support of the latter point, appellant cites Stevenson v. State , 289 Md. 167 , 188, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), and Montgomery v. State , 292 Md. 84 , 91, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), which hold "that instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof are 'binding' on the jury and are 'not advisory.' " See also Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 411, 48 A.3d 242 (2012) ("the *168 Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard").

2019In support of the latter point, appellant cites Stevenson v. State , 289 Md. 167 , 188, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), and Montgomery v. State , 292 Md. 84 , 91, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), which hold "that instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof are 'binding' on the jury and are 'not advisory.' " See also Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 411, 48 A.3d 242 (2012) ("the *168 Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard").

2025To be sure, in Espina, 442 Md. at 338 , 112 A.3d at 458 , in addressing whether the Local Government Tort Claims Act’s damages cap may circumscribe a petitioner’s state constitutional claim, we stated “[w]e have indicated, with regard to causes of action to recover for violations of certain fundamental rights, that an abrogation of access to the courts which would leave the plaintiff totally remediless would be unreasonable.” (Emphasis in original).

2025To be sure, in Espina, 442 Md. at 338 , 112 A.3d at 458 , in addressing whether the Local Government Tort Claims Act’s damages cap may circumscribe a petitioner’s state constitutional claim, we stated “[w]e have indicated, with regard to causes of action to recover for violations of certain fundamental rights, that an abrogation of access to the courts which would leave the plaintiff totally remediless would be unreasonable.” (Emphasis in original).

2013Id. at 353-54 , 805 A.2d at 316 .

2013Noncompliance with a state constitutional requirement is permitted only when it conflicts with a federal requirement or another more important Maryland constitutional requirement.” Id. at 353-54, 805 A.2d at 316 .

2012For the reasons set forth in Parts III and IV of the dissenting opinion in State v. Adams, supra, 406 Md. at 312-340 , 958 A.2d at 339-356 , some of which are reiterated below, we shall hold that the Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard.

2012For the reasons set forth in Parts III and IV of the dissenting opinion in State v. Adams, supra, 406 Md. at 312-340 , 958 A.2d at 339-356 , some of which are reiterated below, we shall hold that the Stevenson and Montgomery opinions set forth a new interpretation of Article 23 and established a new state constitutional standard.

2011"We have consistently declined to adopt the Federal approach [used in § 1983 claims.]" DiPino, 354 Md. at 45 , 729 A.2d at 368 .

2011"We have consistently declined to adopt the Federal approach [used in § 1983 claims.]" DiPino, 354 Md. at 45 , 729 A.2d at 368 .

2008See also Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 62-64 , 75 A.2d 327 (1950); Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 383-84 , 35 A.2d 115 (1943); Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17 , 63 A. 96 (1906). 11 In Meisinger , the first post-Weeks case in which the question of an exclusionary rule under State law was presented to *235 the Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the then-nascent federal exclusionary rule as a State constitutional requirement for evidence seized in violation of State law.

2008See also Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 62-64 , 75 A.2d 327 (1950); Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 383-84 , 35 A.2d 115 (1943); Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17 , 63 A. 96 (1906). 11 In Meisinger , the first post-Weeks case in which the question of an exclusionary rule under State law was presented to *235 the Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the then-nascent federal exclusionary rule as a State constitutional requirement for evidence seized in violation of State law.

2008See also Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 62-64 , 75 A.2d 327 (1950); Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 383-84 , 35 A.2d 115 (1943); Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17 , 63 A. 96 (1906). 11 In Meisinger , the first post-Weeks case in which the question of an exclusionary rule under State law was presented to *235 the Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the then-nascent federal exclusionary rule as a State constitutional requirement for evidence seized in violation of State law.

2008See also Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 62-64 , 75 A.2d 327 (1950); Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 383-84 , 35 A.2d 115 (1943); Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17 , 63 A. 96 (1906). 11 In Meisinger , the first post-Weeks case in which the question of an exclusionary rule under State law was presented to *235 the Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the then-nascent federal exclusionary rule as a State constitutional requirement for evidence seized in violation of State law.

2006Thus, while, to be sure, the court in that case stated that “[t]he challenged Texas statutes encourage voting by providing Texas voters with more opportunities to vote,” 199 F.3d at 777 , and “further the important federal objective of reducing the burden on citizens to exercise their right to vote by allowing them to vote at a time convenient to them, without thwarting other federal concerns,” id., it did so in the context of a challenge based on preemption as opposed to a state constitutional challenge.

2006Thus, while, to be sure, the court in that case stated that “[t]he challenged Texas statutes encourage voting by providing Texas voters with more opportunities to vote,” 199 F.3d at 777 , and “further the important federal objective of reducing the burden on citizens to exercise their right to vote by allowing them to vote at a time convenient to them, without thwarting other federal concerns,” id., it did so in the context of a challenge based on preemption as opposed to a state constitutional challenge.

2005The Circuit Court’s dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim was correct. 22 Appellants contended that the facts “establish the analogous cause of action under Maryland law for money had and received,” citing Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission., 315 Md. 361 , 554 A.2d 804 (1989), for the proposition that this Court recognized the ability to bring a common law action for money had and received in the context of a State constitutional violation.

2005The Circuit Court’s dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim was correct. 22 Appellants contended that the facts “establish the analogous cause of action under Maryland law for money had and received,” citing Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission., 315 Md. 361 , 554 A.2d 804 (1989), for the proposition that this Court recognized the ability to bring a common law action for money had and received in the context of a State constitutional violation.

1994Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529 , 535 n. 3, 560 A.2d 1108 , 1111 n. 3; Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47 , 513 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1986); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699 , 707 n. 3, 253 A.2d 877 , 881 n. 3 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 296 , 196 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1964). .

1994Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529 , 535 n. 3, 560 A.2d 1108 , 1111 n. 3; Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47 , 513 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1986); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699 , 707 n. 3, 253 A.2d 877 , 881 n. 3 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 296 , 196 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1964). .

1994Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529 , 535 n. 3, 560 A.2d 1108 , 1111 n. 3; Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47 , 513 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1986); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699 , 707 n. 3, 253 A.2d 877 , 881 n. 3 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 296 , 196 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1964). .

1994Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529 , 535 n. 3, 560 A.2d 1108 , 1111 n. 3; Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 246-47 , 513 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1986); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699 , 707 n. 3, 253 A.2d 877 , 881 n. 3 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 296 , 196 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1964). .

1991The first case in this Court to rule on a public official’s liability based upon a state constitutional violation was Weyler v. Gibson, supra, 110 Md. 636 , 73 A. 261 , where the Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary was held personally liable for an encroachment on the plaintiffs’ land caused by an expansion of the Penitentiary.

1991The first case in this Court to rule on a public official’s liability based upon a state constitutional violation was Weyler v. Gibson, supra, 110 Md. 636 , 73 A. 261 , where the Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary was held personally liable for an encroachment on the plaintiffs’ land caused by an expansion of the Penitentiary.

1984Id. at 426 . 12 The court in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm’n, 65 N.J. 125 , 319 A.2d 718 (1974), described compactness as an “elusive concept,” one of limited utility in view of the overriding goal of substantial equality of population, and the irregularity and odd configurations of the state’s boundaries and the boundaries of its political subdivisions. 13 A more precise definition of compactness was attempted in Acker v. Love, 178 Colo. 175 , 496 P.2d 75 (1972), involving a state constitutional requirement that districts be “as compact in area as possible.” The court said that, as used in

1984Id. at 426 . 12 The court in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm’n, 65 N.J. 125 , 319 A.2d 718 (1974), described compactness as an “elusive concept,” one of limited utility in view of the overriding goal of substantial equality of population, and the irregularity and odd configurations of the state’s boundaries and the boundaries of its political subdivisions. 13 A more precise definition of compactness was attempted in Acker v. Love, 178 Colo. 175 , 496 P.2d 75 (1972), involving a state constitutional requirement that districts be “as compact in area as possible.” The court said that, as used in

1984Id. at 426 . 12 The court in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm’n, 65 N.J. 125 , 319 A.2d 718 (1974), described compactness as an “elusive concept,” one of limited utility in view of the overriding goal of substantial equality of population, and the irregularity and odd configurations of the state’s boundaries and the boundaries of its political subdivisions. 13 A more precise definition of compactness was attempted in Acker v. Love, 178 Colo. 175 , 496 P.2d 75 (1972), involving a state constitutional requirement that districts be “as compact in area as possible.” The court said that, as used in

1984Id. at 426 . 12 The court in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm’n, 65 N.J. 125 , 319 A.2d 718 (1974), described compactness as an “elusive concept,” one of limited utility in view of the overriding goal of substantial equality of population, and the irregularity and odd configurations of the state’s boundaries and the boundaries of its political subdivisions. 13 A more precise definition of compactness was attempted in Acker v. Love, 178 Colo. 175 , 496 P.2d 75 (1972), involving a state constitutional requirement that districts be “as compact in area as possible.” The court said that, as used in

1984Id. at 426 . 12 The court in Davenport v. Apportionment Comm’n, 65 N.J. 125 , 319 A.2d 718 (1974), described compactness as an “elusive concept,” one of limited utility in view of the overriding goal of substantial equality of population, and the irregularity and odd configurations of the state’s boundaries and the boundaries of its political subdivisions. 13 A more precise definition of compactness was attempted in Acker v. Love, 178 Colo. 175 , 496 P.2d 75 (1972), involving a state constitutional requirement that districts be “as compact in area as possible.” The court said that, as used in

1984In a later Colorado case, In re Interrogatories by Gen’l Assembly, 178 Colo. 311 , 497 P.2d 1024 (1972), the court held that there had been “substantial compliance” with the compactness requirement where consideration was given to the “geography of the state, population concentrations and their location, the various sizes and shapes of census enu *680 meration districts, and the absence of census blocks in many instances, plus the various sizes and shapes of counties, all [of which] militate against one particular or ideal solution to the reapportionment problem.” 497 P.2d at 1025 .

1984In a later Colorado case, In re Interrogatories by Gen’l Assembly, 178 Colo. 311 , 497 P.2d 1024 (1972), the court held that there had been “substantial compliance” with the compactness requirement where consideration was given to the “geography of the state, population concentrations and their location, the various sizes and shapes of census enu *680 meration districts, and the absence of census blocks in many instances, plus the various sizes and shapes of counties, all [of which] militate against one particular or ideal solution to the reapportionment problem.” 497 P.2d at 1025 .

1967Ed. 667, 674 , that: “To refuse to consider evidence introduced, or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence, is arbitrary action,” and added: “Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. 1 When the legislature seemingly has conferred upon a state court a too intense right of review in an appeal from an administrative order legislative in nature — that is, a power or requirement to decide the matter de novo by making its own independent findings