state constitutional claim in Maine

2025See State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , ¶ 31 n.13, 285 A.3d 262 (noting that in the absence of independent analysis of the state constitutional provision before the trial court, “we ordinarily would not deem a state constitutional claim preserved”); State v. Wilcox, 2023 ME 10 , ¶ 9 n.4, 288 A.3d 1200 (concluding that a state constitutional argument was not preserved where the party did not distinguish between the Maine and federal constitutions at the trial level).

2025See State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , ¶ 31 n.13, 285 A.3d 262 (noting that in the absence of independent analysis of the state constitutional provision before the trial court, “we ordinarily would not deem a state constitutional claim preserved”); State v. Wilcox, 2023 ME 10 , ¶ 9 n.4, 288 A.3d 1200 (concluding that a state constitutional argument was not preserved where the party did not distinguish between the Maine and federal constitutions at the trial level).

2024See generally State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 34 , 302 A.3d 1 (noting that “[w]hat is required to preserve a state constitutional claim will vary by context” and that less development is required “when we have already explained in some depth the scope of the state constitutional provision at issue”). 12 [¶21] “When addressing a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the motion court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 14 , 159 A.3d 840 .

2024See generally State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 34 , 302 A.3d 1 (noting that “[w]hat is required to preserve a state constitutional claim will vary by context” and that less development is required “when we have already explained in some depth the scope of the state constitutional provision at issue”). 12 [¶21] “When addressing a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the motion court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 14 , 159 A.3d 840 .

2024See generally State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 34 , 302 A.3d 1 (noting that “[w]hat is required to preserve a state constitutional claim will vary by context” and that less development is required “when we have already explained in some depth the scope of the state constitutional provision at issue”). 12 [¶21] “When addressing a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the motion court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 14 , 159 A.3d 840 .

2023State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring). [¶34] What is required to preserve a state constitutional claim will vary by context.

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

2022We nevertheless address the state constitutional claim here because White cited our decision State v. Tarbox, 2017 ME 71 , 158 A.3d 957 , which discussed the Maine Constitution, and because the question presented in this case implicates our supervisory power under state law, as discussed infra. 19 such comments do not amount to structural error. 386 U.S. 18, 23-26 (1967).

2022See State v. Armstrong, 2019 ME 117 , ¶ 23 n.6, 212 A.3d 856 .

2022See State v. Armstrong, 2019 ME 117 , ¶ 23 n.6, 212 A.3d 856 .

2022Relatedly, in United States v. Hasting, the Court concluded that the intermediate appellate court could not rely on its supervisory power outside the framework of a harmless error analysis to require a new trial based on prosecutorial error and reversed the grant of a new trial in light of the “overwhelming evidence of guilt.” 461 U.S. 499, 506-07, 509, 512 (1983); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (“Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should

2022See Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 41 , 268 A.3d 281 .

2022See Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 41 , 268 A.3d 281 .

2022Relatedly, in United States v. Hasting, the Court concluded that the intermediate appellate court could not rely on its supervisory power outside the framework of a harmless error analysis to require a new trial based on prosecutorial error and reversed the grant of a new trial in light of the “overwhelming evidence of guilt.” 461 U.S. 499, 506-07, 509, 512 (1983); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (“Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should

2020As the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated, “reliance on other state constitutional precedent does not suffice as a proxy for independent analysis of our own constitutional language, history, tradition and policy.” State v. Perez, 591 A.2d 119, 124 (Conn. 1991).

2020See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124 , ¶ 23 n.6, 124 A.3d 156 ; State v. Genotti, 601 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Conn. 1992) (declining to reach this precise issue absent “a separate state constitutional analysis alleging a violation of . . . state due process rights”); cf. Morales, 657 A.2d at 589 & n.10 (reaching the state constitutional law issue because the appellant had “furnish[ed] a detailed analysis” related specifically to the state constitution).

2020See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124 , ¶ 23 n.6, 124 A.3d 156 ; State v. Genotti, 601 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Conn. 1992) (declining to reach this precise issue absent “a separate state constitutional analysis alleging a violation of . . . state due process rights”); cf. Morales, 657 A.2d at 589 & n.10 (reaching the state constitutional law issue because the appellant had “furnish[ed] a detailed analysis” related specifically to the state constitution).

2020See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124 , ¶ 23 n.6, 124 A.3d 156 ; State v. Genotti, 601 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Conn. 1992) (declining to reach this precise issue absent “a separate state constitutional analysis alleging a violation of . . . state due process rights”); cf. Morales, 657 A.2d at 589 & n.10 (reaching the state constitutional law issue because the appellant had “furnish[ed] a detailed analysis” related specifically to the state constitution).

2014See Driscoll v. Mains, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6 , 870 A.2d 124 (“When construing a statute, we look to its plain meaning and try to give effect to the legislative intent.”); see also Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394 , 974 N.E.2d 636, 641-42 (2012) (concluding that the dismissal of the claim was unwarranted under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff landlord’s claims were based on zoning violations and the tenant’s failure to remove mulch from the landlord’s property). [¶ 15] Other remedies exist for a citizen whose rights to petition the government are allegedly suppr

2014See Driscoll v. Mains, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6 , 870 A.2d 124 (“When construing a statute, we look to its plain meaning and try to give effect to the legislative intent.”); see also Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394 , 974 N.E.2d 636, 641-42 (2012) (concluding that the dismissal of the claim was unwarranted under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff landlord’s claims were based on zoning violations and the tenant’s failure to remove mulch from the landlord’s property). [¶ 15] Other remedies exist for a citizen whose rights to petition the government are allegedly suppr

2014See Driscoll v. Mains, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6 , 870 A.2d 124 (“When construing a statute, we look to its plain meaning and try to give effect to the legislative intent.”); see also Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394 , 974 N.E.2d 636, 641-42 (2012) (concluding that the dismissal of the claim was unwarranted under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff landlord’s claims were based on zoning violations and the tenant’s failure to remove mulch from the landlord’s property). [¶ 15] Other remedies exist for a citizen whose rights to petition the government are allegedly suppr

2014See Driscoll v. Mains, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6 , 870 A.2d 124 (“When construing a statute, we look to its plain meaning and try to give effect to the legislative intent.”); see also Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394 , 974 N.E.2d 636, 641-42 (2012) (concluding that the dismissal of the claim was unwarranted under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff landlord’s claims were based on zoning violations and the tenant’s failure to remove mulch from the landlord’s property). [¶ 15] Other remedies exist for a citizen whose rights to petition the government are allegedly suppr

1985State v. Kennedy, 295 Ore. 260 , 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (1983). 2 Where, as in this case, *344 a defendant invokes the protection of Article I, Section 8, we should, State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430 , 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (1982), and will, State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d at 781 , examine the state constitutional claim before reaching any federal question.

1985State v. Kennedy, 295 Ore. 260 , 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (1983). 2 Where, as in this case, *344 a defendant invokes the protection of Article I, Section 8, we should, State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430 , 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (1982), and will, State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d at 781 , examine the state constitutional claim before reaching any federal question.

1985State v. Kennedy, 295 Ore. 260 , 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (1983). 2 Where, as in this case, *344 a defendant invokes the protection of Article I, Section 8, we should, State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430 , 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (1982), and will, State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d at 781 , examine the state constitutional claim before reaching any federal question.

1985State v. Kennedy, 295 Ore. 260 , 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (1983). 2 Where, as in this case, *344 a defendant invokes the protection of Article I, Section 8, we should, State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430 , 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (1982), and will, State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d at 781 , examine the state constitutional claim before reaching any federal question.