state constitutional claim in Texas

2010See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690 n.23.

2010See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690 n.23. 105.

2015See Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for damages under Article I, section 19); Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 404 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“However, consent is not needed when, as here, the breach of contract (or other government action) constitutes a state constitutional violation and the plaintiff seeks a remedy other than money damages....

2015See Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for damages under Article I, section 19); Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 404 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“However, consent is not needed when, as here, the breach of contract (or other government action) constitutes a state constitutional violation and the plaintiff seeks a remedy other than money damages....

2015See Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for damages under Article I, section 19); Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 404 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“However, consent is not needed when, as here, the breach of contract (or other government action) constitutes a state constitutional violation and the plaintiff seeks a remedy other than money damages....

2015See Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for damages under Article I, section 19); Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 404 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“However, consent is not needed when, as here, the breach of contract (or other government action) constitutes a state constitutional violation and the plaintiff seeks a remedy other than money damages....

2024See Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420 & n.3.

2024See Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420 & n.3.

2014Danforth v. Minnesota , 552 U.S. 264 (2008) ( Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart , 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (" Danforth . . . allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test."). 11.

2014Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (“Danforth ... allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”). .

2009In fact, the State presented this issue when it filed its first petition, in May 2005, stating specifically: "Did the Court of Appeals err by reversing the trial court's decision on a legal theory not presented either to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals by the complaining party?" (Emphasis added.) We granted review on that question and Judge Hervey, in her dissent from our ensuing opinion, expressly noted that she would "decide that the state constitutional claim decided by the Tenth Court was not 'preserved in the trial below .'" Pena v. State , 191 S.W.3d 133, 147 (Tex. Crim.

2009In fact, the State presented this issue when it filed its first petition, in May 2005, stating specifically: “Did the Court of Appeals err by reversing the trial court’s decision on a legal theory not presented either to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals by the complaining party?” (Emphasis added.) We granted review on that question and Judge Hervey, in her dissent from our ensuing opinion, expressly noted that she would “decide that the state constitutional claim decided by the Tenth Court was not ‘preserved in the trial below.’ ” Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 147 (Tex.Crim.App.2006

2004In Thomas v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, likewise, held that the admission in a DWI prosecution of a defendant’s uncompelled refusal to submit to a breath test does not violate the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 723 S.W.2d 696, 704-05 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (expressly adopting the reasoning in Neville and finding no constitutional violation where defendant was warned his driver’s license and driver’s privileges could be suspended if he refused breath test, but was not warned his refusal could be used at trial); see also Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76

2004App.1986) (expressly adopting the reasoning in Neville and finding no constitutional violation where defendant was warned his driver's license and driver's privileges could be suspended if he refused breath test, but was not warned his refusal could be used at trial); see also Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1999See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 251-52 (Tex. Crim.

1997Although the arguments are printed separately, copying the federal argument verbatim does not satisfy the requirement of “arguing state and federal constitutional claims on separate grounds using separate analysis or argument.” Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 837 , 114 S.Ct. 116 , 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993).

2014See Ex parte Chandler , 182 S.W.3d 350, 358-60 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 358-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (noting that “a bar card does not come with a crystal ball attached” and holding that "counsel's performance will be measured against the state of the law in effect during the time of trial and we will not find counsel ineffective where the claimed error is based upon unsettled law”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). .

2008Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 542 (Tex. Crim.

2008Heidelberg v. State , 144 S.W.3d 535, 542 (Tex. Crim.

2007See id. at 290 .

2007See id. at 290 .

2004In Thomas v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, likewise, held that the admission in a DWI prosecution of a defendant’s uncompelled refusal to submit to a breath test does not violate the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 723 S.W.2d 696, 704-05 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (expressly adopting the reasoning in Neville and finding no constitutional violation where defendant was warned his driver’s license and driver’s privileges could be suspended if he refused breath test, but was not warned his refusal could be used at trial); see also Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76

2004In Thomas v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, likewise, held that the admission in a DWI prosecution of a defendant's uncompelled refusal to submit to a breath test does not violate the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 723 S.W.2d 696, 704-05 (Tex.Crim.

1993The inherent right of appeal in Hancock was again characterized as a due-process right in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex.1963). 12 .

1992The inherent right of appeal in Hancock was again characterized as a due-process right in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner , 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. 1963). 12.

2018See id.

2007See D.R. , 177 S.W.3d at 580 (holding that objection to proceeding with bench trial instead of jury trial, made for first time during charge conference, was not timely).

2006See Commonwealth v. Dozier, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 865 , 366 N.E.2d 1270 (1977) (holding that an unsigned affidavit did not meet statutory requirement); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 230 Pa.Super. 336 , 326 A.2d 522 (1974) (holding that an unsigned affidavit did not meet the state constitutional requirement to constitute a valid affidavit). 21 .

2006See Commonwealth v. Dozier, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 865 , 366 N.E.2d 1270 (1977) (holding that an unsigned affidavit did not meet statutory requirement); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 230 Pa.Super. 336 , 326 A.2d 522 (1974) (holding that an unsigned affidavit did not meet the state constitutional requirement to constitute a valid affidavit). 21 .

2006See id.

2006See id.

2000Appellant's constitutional argument is based on a misreading of Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

2000Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd); Smith v. White, 695 S.W.2d 295 , 296 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding); accord Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.1962) (orig.proceeding).

2000Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d); Smith v. White, 695 S.W.2d 295 , 296 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding); accord Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.1962) (orig.proceeding).

2000See, e.g., Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1987) (orig. proceeding); In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412, 415-16 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2000Ex parte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196, 197-98 (Tex.1975) (orig.proceeding); In re Speer, 965 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding).

2000Ex parte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196, 197-98 (Tex.1975) (orig.proceeding); In re Speer, 965 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding).