recognition principle in New Jersey

2025Ibid.; Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 224 (1966) (noting that the Court’s recognition of such immunity “serves to protect municipalities against endangering financial demands and to permit their governing bodies to govern conscientiously for the public interest, 24 as they find it, without the fears and burdens of litigating such demands”); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 550 (1964) (“Public officials must be free to determine [the general method of handling snowstorms] without fear of liability either for themselves or for the public entity they repre

2025Ibid.; Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 224 (1966) (noting that the Court’s recognition of such immunity “serves to protect municipalities against endangering financial demands and to permit their governing bodies to govern conscientiously for the public interest, 24 as they find it, without the fears and burdens of litigating such demands”); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 550 (1964) (“Public officials must be free to determine [the general method of handling snowstorms] without fear of liability either for themselves or for the public entity they repre

2018Thereafter, PERC, which had stayed the scope of negotiations petition pending the arbitration award, ruled that WEA's "grievance challenging the [Board's] decision to continue the superintendent's secretary as the district's substitute caller and transportation coordinator is not mandatorily negotiable or legally arbitrable." PERC determined that under the third prong of three-prong negotiability test articulated in In re Local 195, IFPTE, 88 N.J. 393, 404-05 (1982), the Board's selection of the superintendent's secretary was a proper exercise of its managerial prerogative "to meet its governm

1983The court then summed up with a recognition of the rule that the law of the place of contract ordinarily governs the choice of law, but added that this rule of law should not be applied "without a full comparison of the significant relationship of each state with the parties and the transaction." Id. at 37.

1983It then called for an assessment which "should encompass an evaluation of important state contacts as well as a consideration of the state policies affected by, and governmental interest in, the outcome of the controversy." Ibid.

1976See Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253 , 78 S.Ct. at 1239 , 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1298 . * * * [ 58 N.J. at 273 ] The court's approach in Avdel was a recognition of the principle that "a nonresident defendant who is not doing business in a state in the traditional sense may nonetheless be amenable to suit in that state where he enters into a contract which will have significant effects in that state [emphasis supplied]." 58 N.J. at 272 .

1976See Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253 , 78 S.Ct. at 1239 , 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1298 . * * * [ 58 N.J. at 273 ] The court's approach in Avdel was a recognition of the principle that "a nonresident defendant who is not doing business in a state in the traditional sense may nonetheless be amenable to suit in that state where he enters into a contract which will have significant effects in that state [emphasis supplied]." 58 N.J. at 272 .

1976See Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253 , 78 S.Ct. at 1239 , 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1298 . * * * [ 58 N.J. at 273 ] The court's approach in Avdel was a recognition of the principle that "a nonresident defendant who is not doing business in a state in the traditional sense may nonetheless be amenable to suit in that state where he enters into a contract which will have significant effects in that state [emphasis supplied]." 58 N.J. at 272 .

1976See Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253 , 78 S.Ct. at 1239 , 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1298 . * * * [ 58 N.J. at 273 ] The court's approach in Avdel was a recognition of the principle that "a nonresident defendant who is not doing business in a state in the traditional sense may nonetheless be amenable to suit in that state where he enters into a contract which will have significant effects in that state [emphasis supplied]." 58 N.J. at 272 .

1954It was this conflict of underlying theories that led Mr. Justice Cardozo to say in Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. 1, 13 , 53 S.Ct. 465, 469 , 77 L.Ed. 993, 999 (1933): "But the recognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions or exceptions.

1954It was this conflict of underlying theories that led Mr. Justice Cardozo to say in Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. 1, 13 , 53 S.Ct. 465, 469 , 77 L.Ed. 993, 999 (1933): "But the recognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions or exceptions.