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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kevin Cowden v. BNSF Railway Companygreen1 sentence2013See Cowden, 690 F3d at 891 (noting that it is not clear how negligence claims brought under the federal common law of FELA cases, as opposed to the tort laws of the various states, threaten “the uniformity sought by the FRSA”). | 1 | 1 |
Jaffee v. Redmondgreen1 sentence2005Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U. S. 1, 12 (116 SC 1923, 135 LE2d 337) (1996) (where the U. S. Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, based in part on the recognition of the privilege by each of the 50 States). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen2 sentences1997One Justice dissented to the plurality's recognition of the exception, 496 U.S. at 610-611 , 110 S.Ct. at 2655-2656 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and four Justices found it unnecessary to examine the exception because they determined that Muniz's responses were not testimonial and did not warrant application of the Fifth Amendment. 1997One Justice dissented to the plurality's recognition of the exception, 496 U.S. at 610-611 , 110 S.Ct. at 2655-2656 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and four Justices found it unnecessary to examine the exception because they determined that Muniz's responses were not testimonial and did not warrant application of the Fifth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.green2 sentences1990Barnes, in Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 780 ( 357 SE2d 127 ) (1987), was in this position. 1990Barnes, in Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 780 ( 357 SE2d 127 ) (1987), was in this position. | 1 | 1 |
Yaeger v. Canadair, Ltd.green2 sentences1990See Yaeger v. Canadair, Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 207, 208 ( 375 SE2d 469 ) (1988), for a recognition of this principle. 1990See Yaeger v. Canadair, Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 207, 208 ( 375 SE2d 469 ) (1988), for a recognition of this principle. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metznergreen2 sentences1989This policy in favor of free competition has prompted the recognition of a privilege in favor of employees which enables them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with their employers prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.’ ” Science Accessories v. Summagraphics, supra, 425 A2d at 963 , quoting from Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 382 A2d 564, 569 (Md. 1989This policy in favor of free competition has prompted the recognition of a privilege in favor of employees which enables them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with their employers prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.'" Science Accessories v. Summagraphics, supra, 425 A2d at 963 , quoting from Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 382 A2d 564, 569 (Md. | 1 | 1 |
Gledhill v. Browngreen2 sentences1985Gledhill v. Brown, 44 Ga. App. 670, 672 ( 162 SE 824 ). 1985Gledhill v. Brown, 44 Ga. App. 670, 672 ( 162 SE 824 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re SNS
green
2 sentences1990Barnes, in Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 780 ( 357 SE2d 127 ) (1987), was in this position. 1990Barnes, in Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 780 ( 357 SE2d 127 ) (1987), was in this position. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp.
green
2 sentences1989This policy in favor of free competition has prompted the recognition of a privilege in favor of employees which enables them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with their employers prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.’ ” Science Accessories v. Summagraphics, supra, 425 A2d at 963 , quoting from Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 382 A2d 564, 569 (Md. 1989This policy in favor of free competition has prompted the recognition of a privilege in favor of employees which enables them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with their employers prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.'" Science Accessories v. Summagraphics, supra, 425 A2d at 963 , quoting from Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 382 A2d 564, 569 (Md. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences1985This is a recognition of the rule announced in the second Bray case, 103 Ga. App. 783 , supra, that if the spouse seeking loss of consortium sues first alleging that certain acts of negligence caused the other spouse's injuries and receives an adverse judgment, the injured spouse is barred from a second suit seeking damages for personal injuries because the very acts of negligence upon which liability is to attach have already been litigated with an adverse result. 1985This is a recognition of the rule announced in the second Bray case, 103 Ga. App. 783 , supra, that if the spouse seeking loss of consortium sues first alleging that certain acts of negligence caused the other spouse’s injuries and receives an adverse judgment, the injured spouse is barred from a second suit seeking damages for personal injuries because the very acts of negligence upon which liability is to attach have already been litigated with an adverse result. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Zorn v. Lamar
green
1 sentence1938The question in hand has been definitely and clearly settled in Zorn v. Lamar, 71 Ga. 80 , in which it was held that the dismissal of a case as to one only of two defendants against whom it was brought ‘was not a final adjudication to which the complainants could except’ by suing out a direct bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Shealy v. Toole
neutral
1 sentence1938The present case being an action against several persons jointly, and not a joint cause of action against them, the rule laid down in McGcmghey v. Laiham, supra, is controlling.” It will be perceived that the action being against the defendants jointly but based on a several cause of action, the decision followed the precedent established by McGaughey v. Latham , but from the language of the last sentence quoted above the court was particular to state that the action was “against several persons jointly, and not a joint cause of action against them.” This was recognition of the doctrine of She | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Taylor v. Reese
green
1 sentence1905I am also sustained by the unanimous decision of this court, in the ease of Taylor v. Reese, 108 Ga. 379 , as I understand that decision. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Christian v. Penn
neutral
1 sentence1904Among the cases, earlier and later thaiUEhose overruled, consonant with the ruling in the present case, might also be cited: Christian v. Penn, 5 Ga. 482 ; Pearson v. Reid, 10 Ga. 582 ; Central R. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.