recognition rule in Kentucky

1993Id. at 574 , 79 S.Ct. at 1341 , 3 L.Ed.2d at 1443 .

1993Id. at 574 , 79 S.Ct. at 1341 , 3 L.Ed.2d at 1443 .

1981There are at least two flaws in this diamond: (i) the courts that have recognized the doctrine have limited its application to statements about public figures and public officers, Edwards, supra; Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., C.A. 10, 562 F.2d 626, 631 (1977), and movant, as we will hereinafter demonstrate, is a private person, and (ii) the constitution does not require the recognition of such a privilege, Dickey v. CBS, Inc., C.A. 3, 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (1978).

1966Wig-more, Sec. 2252, points out that this constitutional sanction is a recognition of a principle and not a new creation; that the clauses, ‘the accused’ and ‘in criminal cases,’ protect equally a mere witness in a civil case when the fact asked for is a criminal one, and that the privilege extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony is to be taken.” That principle was re-affirmed in Akers v. Fuller, 312 Ky. 502 , 228 S.W.2d 29 .

1966Wig-more, Sec. 2252, points out that this constitutional sanction is a recognition of a principle and not a new creation; that the clauses, ‘the accused’ and ‘in criminal cases,’ protect equally a mere witness in a civil case when the fact asked for is a criminal one, and that the privilege extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony is to be taken.” That principle was re-affirmed in Akers v. Fuller, 312 Ky. 502 , 228 S.W.2d 29 .

1949This decision does not impair the rule relating to latent defects in title, apnlied in the Crenshaw case (Crenshaw v. Williams, 191 Ky. 559 , 231 S. W. 45 , 48 A. L.

1949This decision does not impair the rule relating to latent defects in title, apnlied in the Crenshaw case (Crenshaw v. Williams, 191 Ky. 559 , 231 S. W. 45 , 48 A. L.

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1947For a recognition of this rule, see Major Taylor & Co. v. Harding, 182 Ky. 236 , 206 S. W. 285 ; Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705 , 265 S. W. 299 ; Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S. W. 2d 727 .

1940In the latter case the subject matter of the gift was bank *580 stock, but we said therein that the gift was incomplete “as the bank stock, was never delivered either to the infant or to cmyone for him.” (Our emphasis.) That expression was and is but a recognition of the rule which we upheld in the case of Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79 , 211 S. W. 423 , wherein we said (quoting from the syllabus, which the opinion sustains): “Where property is delivered to one with the distinct agreement that he shall distribute certain portions of it to others and shall retain a portion for himself, he is not

1940In the latter case the subject matter of the gift was bank *580 stock, but we said therein that the gift was incomplete “as the bank stock, was never delivered either to the infant or to cmyone for him.” (Our emphasis.) That expression was and is but a recognition of the rule which we upheld in the case of Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79 , 211 S. W. 423 , wherein we said (quoting from the syllabus, which the opinion sustains): “Where property is delivered to one with the distinct agreement that he shall distribute certain portions of it to others and shall retain a portion for himself, he is not

1937This text announcing such rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 11 thereto, among which is the case of Sprenger v. Wishek First State Bank, 53 N. D. 398 , 206 N.W. 224 .

1937This text announcing such rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 11 thereto, among which is the case of Sprenger v. Wishek First State Bank, 53 N. D. 398 , 206 N.W. 224 .

1925So that we feel warranted in saying that the con-1 tract here in question was one that was not to be performed by both parties within a year and is, therefore, nonenforceable, unless it be that .the performance of it by the light company takes it out of the prohibition of the statute.” However, it was held in that case that after the wires were strung and the purpose of the contract was accomplished it became executed, and, under the doctrine of the case of Dan-t v. Head, 90 Ky. 255 , the statute would not be held as applicable to an executed contract, in which fact lies the only difference be

1838Mason's Executors, ( 3 Bibb, 448 ,) clearly implies the recognition of the doctrine that a general devise of slaves will include all the slaves the testator shall own at his death.