recognition privilege in California

2025It is based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care towards their customers.” (Squaw Valley, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 .) III.

2020(See Squaw Valley, supra, at p. 1507 [elevated common carrier standard is “based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility[.]”].) In Gomez v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1125, 1127 (Gomez), the Supreme Court held that the definition of common carrier includes “the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride.” As a result, we must decide whether the waterslide in this case is an amusement park ride similar to a roller coaster, given the relevant criteria.

1979The policy considerations which provide support for the privilege referred to (see fn. 1) and which were first expressed in Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 382 [ 295 P.2d 405 ], and later summarized in Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ], namely that: “Underlying the recognition of this privilege is the important public policy of affording the utmost freedom of access to the courts.

1979The policy considerations which provide support for the privilege referred to (see fn. 1) and which were first expressed in Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 382 [ 295 P.2d 405 ], and later summarized in Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ], namely that: “Underlying the recognition of this privilege is the important public policy of affording the utmost freedom of access to the courts.

2020(See Squaw Valley, supra, at p. 1507 [elevated common carrier standard is “based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility[.]”].) In Gomez v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1125, 1127 (Gomez), the Supreme Court held that the definition of common carrier includes “the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride.” As a result, we must decide whether the waterslide in this case is an amusement park ride similar to a roller coaster, given the relevant criteria.

2017Code, § 2100 ; accord, Gomez , at p. 1130, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d 41 .) While common carriers are not insurers of their passengers' safety, they are required " 'to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances.' " ( Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 , 1507, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 .) This duty originated in English common law and is "based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care t

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1986(Gosewisch v. Doran (1911) 161 Cal. 511, 514-515 [ 119 P. 656 ]; Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656, 667 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 847 ].) “Underlying the recognition of this privilege is the important public policy of affording the utmost freedom of access to the courts.” (Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 641 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) While the privilege created by section 47, subdivision 2, bears some similarity to procedural defenses, e.g., usually the privilege must be raised by the defendant (Tschirky v. Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 534, 538 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 357 ]), the abs

1986(Gosewisch v. Doran (1911) 161 Cal. 511, 514-515 [ 119 P. 656 ]; Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656, 667 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 847 ].) “Underlying the recognition of this privilege is the important public policy of affording the utmost freedom of access to the courts.” (Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 641 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) While the privilege created by section 47, subdivision 2, bears some similarity to procedural defenses, e.g., usually the privilege must be raised by the defendant (Tschirky v. Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 534, 538 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 357 ]), the abs

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

1972(Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 126 [ 264 P.2d 626 ]; Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [ 187 P.2d 28 ]; cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 508 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 618 ].) Although this exception was restricted to recovery from the same community account when replenished, there is no statutory basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no authority to support it.

2017Code, § 2100 ; accord, Gomez , at p. 1130, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d 41 .) While common carriers are not insurers of their passengers' safety, they are required " 'to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances.' " ( Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 , 1507, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 .) This duty originated in English common law and is "based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care t

2017Code, § 2100 ; accord, Gomez , at p. 1130, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d 41 .) While common carriers are not insurers of their passengers' safety, they are required " 'to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances.' " ( Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 , 1507, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 .) This duty originated in English common law and is "based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care t

2017Code, § 2100 ; accord, Gomez , at p. 1130, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d 41 .) While common carriers are not insurers of their passengers' safety, they are required " 'to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances.' " ( Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 , 1507, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 .) This duty originated in English common law and is "based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care t

2017Code, § 2100 ; accord, Gomez , at p. 1130, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d 41 .) While common carriers are not insurers of their passengers' safety, they are required " 'to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances.' " ( Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 , 1507, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 .) This duty originated in English common law and is "based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care t

2014(Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981) 449 U.S. 383, 396-397 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 584 , 101 S.Ct. 677 ].) In this context, “ ‘[t]he trial court’s determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was “no legal justification” for the order granting or denying the discovery in question.’ ” (OXYResources, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 887 .) A trial court has abused its discretion in determining the applicability of a privilege when it utilizes the wrong legal standards to resolve the particular issue presented. ( Zurich, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493-1494 .) The party claiming

2014(Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981) 449 U.S. 383, 396-397 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 584 , 101 S.Ct. 677 ].) In this context, “ ‘[t]he trial court’s determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was “no legal justification” for the order granting or denying the discovery in question.’ ” (OXYResources, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 887 .) A trial court has abused its discretion in determining the applicability of a privilege when it utilizes the wrong legal standards to resolve the particular issue presented. ( Zurich, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493-1494 .) The party claiming

2014(See People v. 9 Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449-450 [overruling earlier cases to the extent they held that it is not error for a trial court to fail to instruct on lesser included offenses on its own motion, even though such an instruction would be supported by the evidence].) Now, it is well-settled that “ ‘[t]he obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a g

2014Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 ] (Zurich)) Each challenged discovery ruling concerning the recognition of a privilege is considered on a “ ‘case-by-case’ ” basis, and we decide only the issues before us.

2014Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 ] (Zurich)) Each challenged discovery ruling concerning the recognition of a privilege is considered on a “ ‘case-by-case’ ” basis, and we decide only the issues before us.

2014(See People v. 9 Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449-450 [overruling earlier cases to the extent they held that it is not error for a trial court to fail to instruct on lesser included offenses on its own motion, even though such an instruction would be supported by the evidence].) Now, it is well-settled that “ ‘[t]he obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a g

2011To that extent, Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623 , logically supports the recognition of an exception to the rule that “a single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.” (Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 ]; see DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024 .) Because the exception is inferred from Grisham’s holding, it is necessarily limited to cases presenting the same legal and factual situation, that is, a statute of limitations defense to a claim alleging a latent disease that is separate and distinct from, and beco

2011To that extent, Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623 , logically supports the recognition of an exception to the rule that “a single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.” (Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 ]; see DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024 .) Because the exception is inferred from Grisham’s holding, it is necessarily limited to cases presenting the same legal and factual situation, that is, a statute of limitations defense to a claim alleging a latent disease that is separate and distinct from, and beco

2011To that extent, Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623 , logically supports the recognition of an exception to the rule that “a single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.” (Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 ]; see DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024 .) Because the exception is inferred from Grisham’s holding, it is necessarily limited to cases presenting the same legal and factual situation, that is, a statute of limitations defense to a claim alleging a latent disease that is separate and distinct from, and beco