recognition principle in New York

1926The ruling made in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario ( 235 N. Y. 255 ) is pointed to as authority for a finding that the right of an alien to sue in the courts of New York is a privilege and not property.

1926The ruling made in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario ( 235 N. Y. 255 ) is pointed to as authority for a finding that the right of an alien to sue in the courts of New York is a privilege and not property.

1868Smith, 283 ) and Fowles v. Bowen ( 30 N.Y. 20 ), and the cases cited therein, show the recognition of the rule.

1868Smith 283) and Fowles v. Bowen ( 30 N. Y. 20 ), and the cases cited therein, show the recognition of the rule.

1862To these may be added, for the purpose of presenting an early and a recent case, The Attorney-General v. Parkin (Ambler, 566), and Colvette v. Middleton (3 Bevan, 520); and, also, for a recognition of the doctrine in this court, Teft v. Porter (4 Seld., 566), Giddings v. Seward ( 16 N. Y., 365 ), De Nottebeck v. Astor (3 Kern., 104, 105).

1862To these may be added, for the purpose of presenting an early and a recent case, The Attorney-General v. Parkin (Ambler, 566), and Colvette v. Middleton (3 Bevan, 520); and, also, for a recognition of the doctrine in this court, Teft v. Porter (4 Seld., 566), Giddings v. Seward ( 16 N.Y., 365 ), De Nottebeck v. Astor (3 Kern., 104, 105).

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1998Although this perception gave way to the recognition that defense and indemnification of employees, in proper cases, may be considered an emolument of public service (see, e.g., Matter of Guarino v Anderson, 259 NY 93 ; Matter of Kane v McClellan, 110 App Div 44 ; Matter of Schulz v Doetsch, 217 AD2d 861 ), the public employer’s obligation has been construed narrowly, defeating employee claims that did not fall clearly within a particular statutory authorization (see, e.g., People ex rel.

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1998Although this perception gave way to the recognition that defense and indemnification of employees, in proper cases, may be considered an emolument of public service (see, e.g., Matter of Guarino v Anderson, 259 NY 93 ; Matter of Kane v McClellan, 110 App Div 44 ; Matter of Schulz v Doetsch, 217 AD2d 861 ), the public employer’s obligation has been construed narrowly, defeating employee claims that did not fall clearly within a particular statutory authorization (see, e.g., People ex rel.

1998The award of interest reflects a recognition of the principle that damages are properly ascertained as of the date of the breach and a recognition that there may be a time lag between the accrual of a plaintiff’s cause of action and the resulting damage sustained and actual payment by defendant (see, Love v State of New York, 78 NY2d 540, 544-545 ).

1998Although this perception gave way to the recognition that defense and indemnification of employees, in proper cases, may be considered an emolument of public service (see, e.g., Matter of Guarino v Anderson, 259 NY 93 ; Matter of Kane v McClellan, 110 App Div 44 ; Matter of Schulz v Doetsch, 217 AD2d 861 ), the public employer’s obligation has been construed narrowly, defeating employee claims that did not fall clearly within a particular statutory authorization (see, e.g., People ex rel.

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1998Moss v Board of Supervisors, 178 App Div 716 ; Leo v Barnett, 48 AD2d 463 , affd 41 NY2d 879 ), so as to rest upon a strictly public, as opposed to private, benefit (see, e.g., Matter of Kilroe v Craig, 208 App Div 93, 96 , affd 238 NY 628 ; Buckley v City of New York, 264 App Div 116 , affd 289 NY 742 , supra).

1994An examination of the components of the statute show that, unlike the common-law rule of evidence stated in Mertz (supra), this statutory two-hour provision is a rule granting authority to act and is not a rule of evidence.

1990In support of this holding, the Court noted that the primary purpose of the Statute of Limitations, i.e., to weed out "belated, false or frivolous claims”, was not undermined by the recognition of this exception, since suits based solely on the presence of negligently implanted "foreign objects” do not "raise questions as to credibility” and do not "rest on professional diagnostic judgment or discretion.” ( 24 NY2d, at 431 , supra.) Further, because the unremoved object in Flanagan "retain[ed] its identity” despite the passage of time, the physician’s ability to defend, which is often implicat

1987In People v Zappacosta ( 77 AD2d 928, 930 ), the Appellate Division noted the presence of an "amalgam of peculiar circumstances” which required recusal despite a recognition of the rule that "there is no general prohibition against the same Judge conducting a bench trial as conducted preliminary hearings on the admissibility of evidence” (id., at 929).

1987Implicit in our rulings is a recognition of the principle that a municipality may not legitimately exercise its zoning power to effectuate socioeconomic or racial discrimination (Berenson v Town of New Castle, supra, 38 NY2d, at 108 ; Matter of Golden v Planning Bd., supra, 30 NY2d, at 378 ).

1987Implicit in our rulings is a recognition of the principle that a municipality may not legitimately exercise its zoning power to effectuate socioeconomic or racial discrimination (Berenson v Town of New Castle, supra, 38 NY2d, at 108 ; Matter of Golden v Planning Bd., supra, 30 NY2d, at 378 ).

1986(Supra, at p 279.) The compelling right recognized by the court was a defendant’s right to a trial by "a fair and impartial jury.” (Supra, at p 278.) Even the dissenting opinion of Judge Van Voorhis in People v De Lucia (supra, at p 286), which discussed the origins and purpose of the rule against impeaching a jury verdict, noted: "Exceptions are recognized which fall outside of the scope and policy of the rule, such as * * * where before a juror was accepted he concealed facts which it was his duty to disclose and which, if made known, doubtless would have resulted in his being excused (McHug

1986(Supra, at p 279.) The compelling right recognized by the court was a defendant’s right to a trial by "a fair and impartial jury.” (Supra, at p 278.) Even the dissenting opinion of Judge Van Voorhis in People v De Lucia (supra, at p 286), which discussed the origins and purpose of the rule against impeaching a jury verdict, noted: "Exceptions are recognized which fall outside of the scope and policy of the rule, such as * * * where before a juror was accepted he concealed facts which it was his duty to disclose and which, if made known, doubtless would have resulted in his being excused (McHug

1983(Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial Doorstep, 68 J Grim L & Criminology 122; People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Notey, 72 AD2d 279, 282 .) The limited nature of appellate review of sentencing decisions is a recognition of this principle.

1983(People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 85 .) It is clear, therefore, that the concern expressed in Farrar , that the court which modifies a sentence may do so unwisely, is as evident, if not more so, where an appellate court, which is in a worse position than the sentencing court to evaluate the circumstances of the defendant, the threat he poses to society and the chance of his being rehabilitated, is the one which alters the sentence.