recognition principle in Florida

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2025The inquiry, therefore, is not simply whether the Fourth Amendment was violated but whether police acted with the kind of culpability the rule is meant to deter, namely, “‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights,” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 . 1 Florida’s counterpart to the Fourth Amendment—Article I, section 12—does state that “[a]rticles or information obtained in violation of this right” are inadmissible, but only to the extent that such evidence “would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to

1987Indeed, it has been stated that the judicial branch of government, more than any other, has the duty to maintain and preserve the provisions of organic law relating to the separation of the three branches of government, Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1953), and that courts will not substitute their judgment with reference to matters properly within the domain of the legislative and executive branches of government.

1983Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 , 89 S.Ct. 1764 , 23 L.Ed.2d 229 (1969); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1983Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 , 89 S.Ct. 1764 , 23 L.Ed.2d 229 (1969); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1983Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 , 89 S.Ct. 1764 , 23 L.Ed.2d 229 (1969); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1983Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 , 89 S.Ct. 1764 , 23 L.Ed.2d 229 (1969); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1983Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 , 89 S.Ct. 1764 , 23 L.Ed.2d 229 (1969); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1981Therefore, the lack of a rule requiring the reporting or disclosure of such information does not distinguish this case from Cripe . "[T]he same considerations which underlie the recognition of the privilege as to acts done in connection with a mandatory duty apply with equal force to discretionary *417 acts... ." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 575 , 79 S.Ct. at 1341 .

1981Therefore, the lack of a rule requiring the reporting or disclosure of such information does not distinguish this case from Cripe . "[T]he same considerations which underlie the recognition of the privilege as to acts done in connection with a mandatory duty apply with equal force to discretionary *417 acts... ." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 575 , 79 S.Ct. at 1341 .

1958See Montgomery v. Stary, Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 34 ; and Crovella v. Cochrane, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 307 .

1944It was because of the recognition of this rule in the case of West v. State, 50 Fla. 154 , 39 So. 412 , that Governor Gilchrist, in the case of Crawford v. Gilchrist, supra, obtained an injunction against the Secretary of State to prevent the latter’s publication of an initiative and referendum proposal that was then being published, upon the ground that the Legislature had not proposed the amendment in accordance with the constitutional provision.