recognition defense in Louisiana

2013Barrois, supra. “Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom lathe defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 , 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (emphasis added). “[B]oth of the elements [are] necessary to the recognition of the defense.” Id.

2013Barrois, supra. “Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom lathe defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 , 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (emphasis added). “[B]oth of the elements [are] necessary to the recognition of the defense.” Id.

2013Barrois, supra. “Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom lathe defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 , 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (emphasis added). “[B]oth of the elements [are] necessary to the recognition of the defense.” Id.

2002ARGUMENT In State v. Larrivere, 98-1399 pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99); 733 So.2d 703, 705 , this court stated the following regarding the requirements of an Anders appeal: An Anders appeal should provide “a detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant and the appellate court of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.” State v. Mouton, 653 So.2d at 1177.

1976Although there is authority to the contrary, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 , 33 S.Ct. 449 , 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913), we think better reasons for admitting such evidence have been advanced by Justice Summers and by other jurists and scholars.

1976Although there is authority to the contrary, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 , 33 S.Ct. 449 , 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913), we think better reasons for admitting such evidence have been advanced by Justice Summers and by other jurists and scholars.

1939In Sturges v. Taylor, 15 La.Ann. 285 , it appeared that the testator of the plaintiff purchased two lots of ground, the property of the defendant, at a sheriff’s sale for $500 subject to the payment of the mortgages and privileges existing on the same, At the time of the sale, a privilege existed on the property for the sum of $300 in favor of one Yarborough for materials furnished to the defendant and used in the construction of buildings on the premises, After the sheriff’s sale, Yarborough obtained judgment against the defendant for the amount of his claim with a recognition of the privileg

1938“In Bickham v. Bethany, 187 La. 709 , 175 So. 465 , after showing that the only purpose of lis pendens is to give notice, the Court said in regard to section 3 of the Act: “ ‘It, therefore, follows that the act requires the carrying on of the suit to judgment, and while it is the mandatory duty of the court to cancel the notice of lis pen-dens if judgment is rendered by it against the claims or demands of the plaintiff, the court is without authority to do so until the suit is disposed of.’ [page 467.] “It follows that the duty being mandatory, the Court has no discretion in the matter after f

1938“In Bickham v. Bethany, 187 La. 709 , 175 So. 465 , after showing that the only purpose of lis pendens is to give notice, the Court said in regard to section 3 of the Act: “ ‘It, therefore, follows that the act requires the carrying on of the suit to judgment, and while it is the mandatory duty of the court to cancel the notice of lis pen-dens if judgment is rendered by it against the claims or demands of the plaintiff, the court is without authority to do so until the suit is disposed of.’ [page 467.] “It follows that the duty being mandatory, the Court has no discretion in the matter after f

1933App.) 144 So. 142 , said: “The holding in the Oilbelt Case to the effect that a prescribed claim might be the subject of a plea in compensation was a recognition of the doctrine, ‘Quae temporalia sunt ad agen-dum perpetua sunt ad excipiendum.’ But the application of this doctrine is limited to cognate claims inseparable from the original demand.” The claim pleaded here in compensation not only was extremely vague, but could not, be pleaded as an offset to the fully liquidated claim for money loaned.

1907This question was considered in a recent case, the syllabus of the opinion in which reads: “A man may lawfully surrender to his' creditors, in general, all the property that he has, and, unless the vendor of particular goods has preserved his privilege for the price, the proceeds of _ such_ goods will be distributed among the creditors in general, and, whatever he may surrender _ to his creditors in general, he may give to his wife, whom the law prefers to all other creditors, in satisfaction of her lawful claim against him, from which it follows that, though the property so given be not paid

1907This question was considered in a recent case, the syllabus of the opinion in which reads: “A man may lawfully surrender to his' creditors, in general, all the property that he has, and, unless the vendor of particular goods has preserved his privilege for the price, the proceeds of _ such_ goods will be distributed among the creditors in general, and, whatever he may surrender _ to his creditors in general, he may give to his wife, whom the law prefers to all other creditors, in satisfaction of her lawful claim against him, from which it follows that, though the property so given be not paid