recognition doctrine in Pennsylvania

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1972There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

1958“It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced,. ** There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 ; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 ; Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.R.A.

2017Article I [of the collective bargaining agreement], the recognition clause, recognizes the Association as “the bargaining agent for the full-time professional employees under regular contract.” There is no inclusion of part- (continued…) collective bargaining agreement excluding certain questions from the arbitration process.” 467 A.2d at 1358 . 4 time employees.

2015Id. at 998-99 .

2006Specifically, we find that Stilp has satisfied the requirements necessary for taxpayer standing consistent with the recognition of this exception to traditional standing requirements announced in Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438 , 409 A.2d 848 (1979).

2006Specifically, we find that Stilp has satisfied the requirements necessary for taxpayer standing consistent with the recognition of this exception to traditional standing requirements announced in Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438 , 409 A.2d 848 (1979).

2006Ass’n v. Northwest TriCounty Intermediate Unit No. 5, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 92, 465 A.2d 89 (1983), the Court reversed the trial court’s order vacating an award and held that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide whether full-time substitute teachers should be included in the bargaining unit under the recognition clause and that the arbitrator’s decision would not be disturbed.

1998In Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631 , 617 A.2d 319 (1992), President Judge Lavelle of the Carbon County Common Pleas Court commenced an action in mandamus to compel the county to appropriate and disburse funding for the judicial system.

1998In Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631 , 617 A.2d 319 (1992), President Judge Lavelle of the Carbon County Common Pleas Court commenced an action in mandamus to compel the county to appropriate and disburse funding for the judicial system.

1991See Packler v. State Employers’ Retirement Board, 470 Pa. 368 , 368 A.2d 673 (1977); Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423 , 290 A.2d 85 (1972); cf. Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446 , 460 A.2d 271 (1983) (burden is on court to identify legal theories underlying complaint).

1991See Packler v. State Employers’ Retirement Board, 470 Pa. 368 , 368 A.2d 673 (1977); Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423 , 290 A.2d 85 (1972); cf. Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446 , 460 A.2d 271 (1983) (burden is on court to identify legal theories underlying complaint).

1991See Packler v. State Employers’ Retirement Board, 470 Pa. 368 , 368 A.2d 673 (1977); Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423 , 290 A.2d 85 (1972); cf. Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446 , 460 A.2d 271 (1983) (burden is on court to identify legal theories underlying complaint).

1991See Packler v. State Employers’ Retirement Board, 470 Pa. 368 , 368 A.2d 673 (1977); Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423 , 290 A.2d 85 (1972); cf. Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446 , 460 A.2d 271 (1983) (burden is on court to identify legal theories underlying complaint).

1984As we stated in Philadelphia Suburban Transportation, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 196-97 , 281 A.2d at 186 : Differences in rates between classes of customers based on such criteria as the quantity of [the product] used, the nature of the use, the pattern of the use, or based on differences of conditions of service, or cost of service are not only permissible but often are desirable and even necessary to achieve reasonable efficiency and economy of operation.

1984As we stated in Philadelphia Suburban Transportation, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 196-97 , 281 A.2d at 186 : Differences in rates between classes of customers based on such criteria as the quantity of [the product] used, the nature of the use, the pattern of the use, or based on differences of conditions of service, or cost of service are not only permissible but often are desirable and even necessary to achieve reasonable efficiency and economy of operation.

1983However, in the case of Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243 , 433 A.2d 459 (1981), this court was evenly divided as to the recognition of a claim for damages for infliction of emotional distress upon a father whose son was fatally injured after being struck by an automobile but the father was neither a witness to the incident nor in the immediate vicinity.

1983However, in the case of Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243 , 433 A.2d 459 (1981), this court was evenly divided as to the recognition of a claim for damages for infliction of emotional distress upon a father whose son was fatally injured after being struck by an automobile but the father was neither a witness to the incident nor in the immediate vicinity.

1983Subsequently, that same court, in Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y. 2d 35 , 324 N.E. 2d 338 (1974), held that a child had no cause of action against his or her parent for negligent supervision because, prior to the recognition of the doctrine of parental immunity in New York, it was not a tort actionable by the child and, for reasons of public policy, the court was not persuaded that it now should be. 1 In its policy discussion, the Holodook court, with respect to the potential impact of allowing a child to sue a parent for negligent supervision, stated: We can conceive of few, if any, accident inj

1983Subsequently, that same court, in Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y. 2d 35 , 324 N.E. 2d 338 (1974), held that a child had no cause of action against his or her parent for negligent supervision because, prior to the recognition of the doctrine of parental immunity in New York, it was not a tort actionable by the child and, for reasons of public policy, the court was not persuaded that it now should be. 1 In its policy discussion, the Holodook court, with respect to the potential impact of allowing a child to sue a parent for negligent supervision, stated: We can conceive of few, if any, accident inj

1971The flaw in plaintiff’s position is that a public figure has no exclusive rights to his or her own life story, and others need no consent or permission of the subject to write a biography of a celebrity. 23 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1 , 294 N.Y.S. 2d 122 (1968).

1971The flaw in plaintiff’s position is that a public figure has no exclusive rights to his or her own life story, and others need no consent or permission of the subject to write a biography of a celebrity. 23 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1 , 294 N.Y.S. 2d 122 (1968).

1969The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of State, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keepi

1969The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of State, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keepi

1969The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of State, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keepi

1938There are many examples of the recognition of this doctrine in this State and other states: Cawley’s Est., 136 Pa. 628 [ 20 A. 567 ]; Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341 [ 17 A. 995 ] ; Wright’s Est., 155 Pa. 64 [ 25 A. 877 ]; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310 [ 54 A. 24 ]; *348 Lewallen’s Est., 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 ; Park v. Park, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 ; Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al., 27 L.

1922It is settled that where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, payment and acceptance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and satisfaction (1 Corpus Juris, 551, § 71), because it is the right of one paying money to direct its appropriation and to make a payment conditional on the recognition of a claim for set-off: Bernstein v. Hirsch, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 87, 89 ; Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576, 593 .

1922In order, however, to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is necessary that the money should be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and it must be such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that, if he takes it, he takes it subject to such conditions: Bernstein v. Hirsch, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 87 ; Society, &c., v. Loeb et al., 239 Pa. 264 .

1922It is settled that where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, payment and acceptance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and satisfaction (1 Corpus Juris, 551, § 71), because it is the right of one paying money to direct its appropriation and to make a payment conditional on the recognition of a claim for set-off: Bernstein v. Hirsch, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 87, 89 ; Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576, 593 .

1922In order, however, to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is necessary that the money should be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and it must be such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that, if he takes it, he takes it subject to such conditions: Bernstein v. Hirsch, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 87 ; Society, &c., v. Loeb et al., 239 Pa. 264 .