two part analysis in West Virginia

2020Moreover, “[g]iven the practical difficulty of providing specific guidance on the instances where temporary suspension is appropriate, the Court will apply the two- part standard in West Virginia Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.27 to each petition on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 630 , 457 S.E.2d at 653 , syl. pt. 4.

2020Moreover, “[g]iven the practical difficulty of providing specific guidance on the instances where temporary suspension is appropriate, the Court will apply the two- part standard in West Virginia Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.27 to each petition on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 630 , 457 S.E.2d at 653 , syl. pt. 4.

2020Va. 231 , 565 S.E.2d 353 (2002), which sets forth the two- part test to determine if a sentence is excessive.

2019We note that in cases involving guilty pleas “the prejudice requirement of the two- part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.E.2d 675 (1984), and [Miller], demands that a habeas petitioner show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Syl.

2019We note that in cases involving guilty pleas “the prejudice requirement of the two- part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.E.2d 675 (1984), and [Miller], demands that a habeas petitioner show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Syl.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

2013In Syllabus point 4 of Gentry , Justice Cleckley simplified and reformulated our Daubert/Wilt standard as follows: When scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its “gatekeeper” role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 , 114 S.Ct. 2137 , 128 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994), must engage in a two part analysis in regard to the expert testimony.

1992Syllabus Point 2, Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W.Va. 45 , 239 S.E.2d 669 (1977), said: To justify a change of child custody, in addition to a change in circumstances of the parties, it must be shown that such change would materially promote the welfare of the child.

1992Syllabus Point 2, Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W.Va. 45 , 239 S.E.2d 669 (1977), said: To justify a change of child custody, in addition to a change in circumstances of the parties, it must be shown that such change would materially promote the welfare of the child.