two part test in Pennsylvania

2008Id. ¶ 15 Thus, as it relates to the case sub judice, Father’s arguments would normally require a two part analysis: first, whether Dr. Reisman possessed a specialized knowledge that would aid the court’s understanding of pornography so as to permit the court to determine whether Father’s use of pornography posed a threat to G.P.B., and second, if Dr. Reisman possessed a specialized scientific knowledge, whether the scientific evidence that she presented has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

2008Id. ¶ 15 Thus, as it relates to the case sub judice, Father’s arguments would normally require a two part analysis: first, whether Dr. Reisman possessed a specialized knowledge that would aid the court’s understanding of pornography so as to permit the court to determine whether Father’s use of pornography posed a threat to G.P.B., and second, if Dr. Reisman possessed a specialized scientific knowledge, whether the scientific evidence that she presented has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

2022Id. (citing In re: Foremost Industries, Inc. v. GLD, 156 A.3d 318, 322 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

2022Id. (citing In re: Foremost Industries, Inc. v. GLD, 156 A.3d 318 , 322 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

2015To succeed in a bad faith claim, the insured must present clear and convincing evidence to satisfy a two part test: “(1) the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and (2) the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.” 2 O’Donnell, 734 A.2d at 906 .

2015To succeed in a bad faith claim, the insured must present clear and convincing evidence to satisfy a two part test: (1) the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and (2) the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.” 2 O'Donnell, 734 A.2d at 906 .

1996Rementer, supra at 19-20 , 598 A.2d at 1305 .

1993Id. at 19-20 , 598 A.2d at 1305 .

2025In New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a two- part analysis applies to a challenge brought under the Second Amendment: When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.

2025The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. 597 U.S. at 24 .5 The first part of the test requires the court to determine whether the Second Amendment applies to the legislated conduct, i.e., whether the challenged legislation infringes “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” This Court has already determined that convicted felons are included in “the people” to whom the Second Amendment’s protections apply.

2023First, the court must determine “whether the substance of the statement at issue was improper, and (if it was) then proceed[ ] to apply the unavoidable prejudice test.” Clancy, 192 A.3d at 58 .

2022Id.

2021In Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Company v. Johnson Matthey, 188 A.3d 396 (Pa. 2018), the Supreme Court reaffirmed a two- part test articulated in United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Banking, 26 A.3d 474 (Pa. 2011), for determining whether an order issued under the Declaratory Judgments Act is final and appealable.

2021Therefore, the plurality formulated a two- part test for standing to assert the rights of third parties: First, the relationship between the litigant and the third party whose rights are asserted must be such that “the right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue. . . .” Id.

2021Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143 (Pa. Super. 2002) (some citations omitted).

2021In Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Company v. Johnson Matthey, 188 A.3d 396 (Pa. 2018), the Supreme Court reaffirmed a two- part test articulated in United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Banking, 26 A.3d 474 (Pa. 2011), for determining whether an order issued under the Declaratory Judgments Act is final and appealable.

2019Mitzelfelt, 584 A.2d at 892 . - 19 - J-A16017-19 The Supreme Court thus applied the “relaxed standard” for a plaintiff’s burden of proof in an increased-risk-of-harm case: [W]e employ a two part test.

2016Appellant rests his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the applicability of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which held that the risk of deportation, “because of its close connection to the criminal process, [is] uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral ____________________________________________ 8 The Pierce case articulated Pennsylvania’s three-part version of the two- part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). -6- J-S36008-16 consequence.” Id. at 366.

2016Appellant rests his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the applicability of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which held that the risk of deportation, “because of its close connection to the criminal process, [is] uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral ____________________________________________ 8 The Pierce case articulated Pennsylvania’s three-part version of the two- part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). -6- J-S36008-16 consequence.” Id. at 366.

2016The Turner Court “agree[d] with the Commonwealth that due process does not require the legislature to continue to provide collateral review when the offender is no longer serving a sentence.” Turner, 80 A.3d at 765 .

2016This Court applies “a two- part test to determine whether the trial court should have compelled arbitration: 1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and 2) whether the dispute is within the scope of the agreement.” Id. (citations omitted).

2015Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688 .

2015Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688 .

2014Guru cites cases Johnson v. Johnson, 410 Pa. Super. 631 , 600 A.2d 965 (1991) and Wittrien v. Burkholder, 965 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2009), which utilize a two part test found in Comment (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §308, to argue that defendant is not liable under a theory of negligent entrustment because there is generally no duty to control the acts of a third party unless the defendant stands in a special relationship with the third party or the plaintiff.

2014Guru cites cases Johnson v. Johnson, 410 Pa. Super. 631 , 600 A.2d 965 (1991) and Wittrien v. Burkholder, 965 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2009), which utilize a two part test found in Comment (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §308, to argue that defendant is not liable under a theory of negligent entrustment because there is generally no duty to control the acts of a third party unless the defendant stands in a special relationship with the third party or the plaintiff.

2014Guru cites cases Johnson v. Johnson, 410 Pa. Super. 631 , 600 A.2d 965 (1991) and Wittrien v. Burkholder, 965 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2009), which utilize a two part test found in Comment (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §308, to argue that defendant is not liable under a theory of negligent entrustment because there is generally no duty to control the acts of a third party unless the defendant stands in a special relationship with the third party or the plaintiff.