two part test in Connecticut

2025Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2025Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2004We traditionally have applied the following two part test to determine whether aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 255-56 .

2002We traditionally have applied the following two part test to determine whether aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gladysz v. Planning Zoning Commission , 256 Conn. 249 , 255-56 (2001).

2011As an interlocutory order, this discovery order would be immediately appealable only if it met the two part test articulated in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 , 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2011As an interlocutory order, this discovery order would be immediately appealable only if it met the two part test articulated in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 , 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2013“Our due process inquiry takes the form of a two part analysis. [W]e must determine whether [the plaintiff] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was [she] due.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 499 , 778 A.2d 33 (2001).

2013“Our due process inquiry takes the form of a two part analysis. [W]e must determine whether [the plaintiff] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was [she] due.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 499 , 778 A.2d 33 (2001).

2010On appeal, "[t]he determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 504-505 , 838 A.2d 981 (2004).

2010On appeal, "[t]he determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 504-505 , 838 A.2d 981 (2004).

1999(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd. , 236 Conn. 602 , 605-06 , 674 A.2d 426 (1996). "[A] motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction [requires] a two part inquiry. . . .

1999(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd. , 236 Conn. 602 , 605-06 , 674 A.2d 426 (1996). "[A] motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction [requires] a two part inquiry. . . .

2019We traditionally have applied the following two part test to determine whether aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal inter- est in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nanni v. Dino Corp., 117 Conn. App. 61, 70 , 978 A.2d 531 (2009).

2019We traditionally have applied the following two part test to determine whether aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal inter- est in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nanni v. Dino Corp., 117 Conn. App. 61, 70 , 978 A.2d 531 (2009).

2015To determine whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, we use the two part test that Justice Harlan set forth in his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2015To determine whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, we use the two part test that Justice Harlan set forth in his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2007“The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. *515 If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606 , 674 A.2d 426 (1996); see also Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 286 , 661 A.2d 595 (1995); Frazer v. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 246 , 502 A.2d 905 (198

2007“The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. *515 If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606 , 674 A.2d 426 (1996); see also Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 286 , 661 A.2d 595 (1995); Frazer v. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 246 , 502 A.2d 905 (198

1998Review of atrial court’s determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists ‘involves a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct.’ State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 660 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992). ‘The trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts.’ State v. Cofield, supra [44].” State v. Harrison, 30 Conn. App. 108, 111-13 , 618 A.2d 1381 (1993), aff'd, 228 Conn. 758

1998Review of atrial court’s determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists ‘involves a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct.’ State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 660 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992). ‘The trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts.’ State v. Cofield, supra [44].” State v. Harrison, 30 Conn. App. 108, 111-13 , 618 A.2d 1381 (1993), aff'd, 228 Conn. 758

1999State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 420 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991). ‘We first review the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the guilty verdict.’ Id. ‘We then determine, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Id.

1999State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 420 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991). ‘We first review the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the guilty verdict.’ Id. ‘We then determine, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Id.

1997Connecticut Business Administration Assoc., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, supra 730; Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 .

1994Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision . . ." New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. CHHC , 226 Conn. 105 , 121 (1993); Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns , 194 Conn. 43 , 47 , 478 A.2d 601 (1984); State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry , 203 Conn. 295 , 299-300 , 524 A.2d 636 (1987); Bakelaar v. West Haven , 193 Conn. 59 , 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984).

1996Walls v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 475, 477-78 , 408 A.2d 252 (1979).

1996Walls v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 475, 477-78 , 408 A.2d 252 (1979).

2018The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 , 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed. 2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156 , 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage ....

2018The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 , 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed. 2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156 , 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage ....

2018The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 , 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed. 2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156 , 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage ....

2018The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 , 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed. 2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156 , 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage ....

2015I We begin by setting forth the standard of review governing claims of insufficient evidence. ‘‘A defendant who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an arduous burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Rodriguez, 146 Conn. App. 99, 110 , 75 A.3d 798 , cert. denied, 310 Conn. 948 , 80 A.3d 906 (2013). ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two part test.

2015I We begin by setting forth the standard of review governing claims of insufficient evidence. ‘‘A defendant who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an arduous burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Rodriguez, 146 Conn. App. 99, 110 , 75 A.3d 798 , cert. denied, 310 Conn. 948 , 80 A.3d 906 (2013). ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two part test.

2001A “Our due process inquiry takes the form of a two part analysis. ‘[W]e must determine whether [the city] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was [its] due.’ Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S. Ct. 1148 , 71 L.

2001A “Our due process inquiry takes the form of a two part analysis. ‘[W]e must determine whether [the city] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was [its] due.’ Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S. Ct. 1148 , 71 L.

2008In State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (enbanc), the court enunciated a two part test.

2008In State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (enbanc), the court enunciated a two part test.

2004That test requires (1) demonstration that the witness is unavailable to testily at trial, and (2) adequate indicia of reliability of the previous testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 71 Conn. App. 488, 492 , 802 A.2d 224 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 939 , 808 A.2d 1133 (2002).

2004That test requires (1) demonstration that the witness is unavailable to testily at trial, and (2) adequate indicia of reliability of the previous testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 71 Conn. App. 488, 492 , 802 A.2d 224 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 939 , 808 A.2d 1133 (2002).

2003Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney, 234 Conn. 488, 493-94 , 662 A.2d 124 (1995).

2003Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney, 234 Conn. 488, 493-94 , 662 A.2d 124 (1995).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2001Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493 , 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700 , 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623 , 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508 , 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26 , 232 A.2d 330 (1967).

2000Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 126 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994).

2000Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 126 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994).