two part test in California

2025(United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417 & fn. 2 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ]; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [citations] [in which this court articulated a two- part test: (1) that some activity relating to crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) that the person to be detained is involved in that activity].)” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230 .) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circum

2025(United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417 & fn. 2 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ]; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [citations] [in which this court articulated a two- part test: (1) that some activity relating to crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) that the person to be detained is involved in that activity].)” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230 .) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circum

2025(United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417 & fn. 2 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ]; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [citations] [in which this court articulated a two- part test: (1) that some activity relating to crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) that the person to be detained is involved in that activity].)” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230 .) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circum

2025(United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417 & fn. 2 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ]; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [citations] [in which this court articulated a two- part test: (1) that some activity relating to crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) that the person to be detained is involved in that activity].)” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230 .) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circum

2026(People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797 , 811 (Cardenas).) The court may not grant the motion “unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1).) “The statute sets out a two- part test.” (Cardenas, at p. 811.) The moving defendant must show that (1) a conflict of interest exists, and (2) the conflict is “‘so grave as to render it unlikely that [the] defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.’” (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 593

2026(People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797 , 811 (Cardenas).) The court may not grant the motion “unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1).) “The statute sets out a two- part test.” (Cardenas, at p. 811.) The moving defendant must show that (1) a conflict of interest exists, and (2) the conflict is “‘so grave as to render it unlikely that [the] defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.’” (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 593

2026Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), the United States Supreme Court “held that the test for assessing constitutionality under the Second Amendment is as follows: ‘When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an [footnote continued on next page] 4 In Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1 , the United States Supreme Court “established a two- part test for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.” (People v. McCowan (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1071 , 1082.) “At Bruen ‘[s]tep one,’ courts must determine whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] If Bruen st

2026Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), the United States Supreme Court “held that the test for assessing constitutionality under the Second Amendment is as follows: ‘When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an [footnote continued on next page] 4 In Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1 , the United States Supreme Court “established a two- part test for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.” (People v. McCowan (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1071 , 1082.) “At Bruen ‘[s]tep one,’ courts must determine whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] If Bruen st

2025Not only can “ ‘reasonable suspicion . . . be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also . . . reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.’ ” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230–231, quoting Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 301 ].) 4 judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 2

2023(Id. at p. 150.) In this appeal, appellants acknowledge that under FilmOn, statements are not protected if they are “‘too tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate, and too remotely connected to the public conversation about these issues.’” but state that “the two- part analysis in FilmOn . . . has no application in determining whether alleged conduct is protected under subdivision (e)(3)” because (Fn. is continued on the next page.) 19 In conducting our analysis, we also find instructive the following cases: Albanese v. Menounos (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 923 (Albanese);

2022(Berkeley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1093 .) And the Court established the two- part test to determine whether the “unusual circumstances exception” applies precluding a categorical exemption: under the agency-deferential substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must establish an “unusual circumstance” by showing that a project “has some feature that distinguishes it from others in the exempt class, such as its size or location”; and if “unusual circumstances” are present, the petitioner must also establish that the unusual circumstance gives rise to a “reasonable possibility that

2021However, “[a]n exception to the doctrine arises when efforts to influence government are merely a sham; such efforts are not protected by the Noerr Pennington doctrine . . . .” (Hi-Top Steel Corp. v. Lehrer (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 570, 575 .) There is a two part test for determining whether a defendant’s petitioning activity falls outside the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. “[F]irst, it ‘must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success of the merits’; second, the litigant’s subjective motivation must ‘conceal an attempt to interfere directly wit

2021(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 .) We view the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, resolving all conflicts in its favor.

2016Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 306 (Low).

2016(Jon Davler, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035 .) The court reached this conclusion after applying the two part test outlined in Low v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2015We therefore focus solely on the second prong—whether plaintiff[] carried [its] burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits of [its] libel claim. [Citation.]” (Bently Reserve, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 425 .) “In this regard, our review is de novo. [Citations.] We apply a ‘summary- judgment-like’ test [citation], accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendant’s evidence only to determine whether it defeats the plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law [citations].

2007It should state "fully and with particularity" the grounds for relief under the two part test summarized above, namely that counsel's representation fell below reasonable standards and that it is reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred in the absence of the error. ( People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 , 886 P.2d 1252 ; Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667-1668, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 722 .) "`Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.' [Citati

2007It should state "fully and with particularity" the grounds for relief under the two part test summarized above, namely that counsel's representation fell below reasonable standards and that it is reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred in the absence of the error. ( People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 , 886 P.2d 1252 ; Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667-1668, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 722 .) "`Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.' [Citati

2007(Ibid.; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .) The circumstances of a habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency setting are somewhat different from those of a criminal defendant, who is generally seeking release from confinement.

2007(Ibid.; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .) The circumstances of a habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency setting are somewhat different from those of a criminal defendant, who is generally seeking release from confinement.

2007(Ibid.; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .) The circumstances of a habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency setting are somewhat different from those of a criminal defendant, who is generally seeking release from confinement.

2007(Ibid.; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .) The circumstances of a habeas corpus petitioner in a dependency setting are somewhat different from those of a criminal defendant, who is generally seeking release from confinement.

2000States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of minors and in preventing minors from gaining access to matter deemed harmful as to them. ( Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C, supra, 492 U.S. 115, 126 , 109 S.Ct. 2829 , 106 L.Ed.2d 93 ; F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 U.S. 726, 749-750 , 98 S.Ct. 3026 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 .) I assume for purposes of analysis that section 288.2, subdivision (b)'s goal of protecting minors from exposure to harmful matter is a compelling state interest.

2000States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of minors and in preventing minors from gaining access to matter deemed harmful as to them. ( Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C, supra, 492 U.S. 115, 126 , 109 S.Ct. 2829 , 106 L.Ed.2d 93 ; F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 U.S. 726, 749-750 , 98 S.Ct. 3026 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 .) I assume for purposes of analysis that section 288.2, subdivision (b)'s goal of protecting minors from exposure to harmful matter is a compelling state interest.

2000States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of minors and in preventing minors from gaining access to matter deemed harmful as to them. ( Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C, supra, 492 U.S. 115, 126 , 109 S.Ct. 2829 , 106 L.Ed.2d 93 ; F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 U.S. 726, 749-750 , 98 S.Ct. 3026 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 .) I assume for purposes of analysis that section 288.2, subdivision (b)'s goal of protecting minors from exposure to harmful matter is a compelling state interest.

2000States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of minors and in preventing minors from gaining access to matter deemed harmful as to them. ( Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C, supra, 492 U.S. 115, 126 , 109 S.Ct. 2829 , 106 L.Ed.2d 93 ; F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 U.S. 726, 749-750 , 98 S.Ct. 3026 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 .) I assume for purposes of analysis that section 288.2, subdivision (b)'s goal of protecting minors from exposure to harmful matter is a compelling state interest.