two part test in Indiana

2019Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pinkins v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1079, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2018Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pinkins v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1079, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2019Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pinkins v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1079, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2018Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pinkins v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1079, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2014However, Ind. Code § 22 -4r-17-12(f) provides that when the Board’s decision is challenged as contrary to law, the reviewing court is limited to a two part inquiry into: (1) “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision;” and (2) “the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t. of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind.1998), reh’g denied.

2012However, Ind.Code § 22-4-17-12(f) provides that when the Board’s decision is challenged as contrary to law, the reviewing court is limited to a two part inquiry into: (1) “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision;” and (2) “the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind.1998), reh’g denied.

2024Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682 .

2020Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682 .

2017See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009).

2012See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009).

1998Hardin , 611 N.E.2d at 128-29 . (footnote: 4) See also Heavrin v. State , 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1083 (Ind. 1996); Taylor v. State , 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995).

1997Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128-29 . 4 See also Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1083 (Ind.1996); Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995).

1998Hardin , 611 N.E.2d at 128-29 . (footnote: 4) See also Heavrin v. State , 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1083 (Ind. 1996); Taylor v. State , 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995).

1997Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128-29 . 4 See also Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1083 (Ind.1996); Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995).

2024Ineffective Assistance of Counsel [18] When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2020Section 4 – The post-conviction court did not clearly err in finding that Vicente failed to show that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective. [18] When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2017Fisher v. State, 878 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [10] When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2015Fisher, 878 N.E.2d at 463 . [8] When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2015Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193-95 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 (1998). [17] Where, as here, a defendant raises a waiver of issue claim, we employ a two- part test: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record; and (2) whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues.

2010Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194 .

2014INDIANA DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE Double jeopardy claims under the Indiana Constitution are evaluated utilizing a two part test, pursuant to which multiple offenses are considered the same offense in violation of article 1, section 14, “if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis in original).

2008Our supreme court, in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), stated that a two part test would be used to determine if a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy had occurred.

2023Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993). [8] Mendez-Vasquez claims for the first time on appeal that Officer Ryder’s impoundment of his truck was unconstitutional; consequently, this claim is waived for appellate review.

2020Discussion and Decision [9] We generally review the appeal of a decision of the Review Board using “a two- part inquiry into the sufficiency of the facts sustaining the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the facts.” Whiteside v. Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 873 N.E.2d 673, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

2020Rondeau v. State, 48 N.E.3d 907, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)), trans. denied.

2018Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (2014). [9] When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2017Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben–Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). [6] When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two- part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 820 (Alaska Ct.App.1992); Agreda v. State, 152 So.3d 114, 116 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2014); Poe, 169 S.W.3d at 58; Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475-76 ; and State v. Button, 195 Vt. 65 , 86 A.3d 1001, 1003 (2013). 3 .

2016See, e.g., Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 820 (Alaska Ct.App.1992); Agreda v. State, 152 So.3d 114, 116 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2014); Poe, 169 S.W.3d at 58; Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475-76 ; and State v. Button, 195 Vt. 65 , 86 A.3d 1001, 1003 (2013). 3 .

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 , 34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Idaho Ct.App.2001) (requir *436 ing the officer to possess a subjective belief that an individual is in heed of immediate •assistance “in view of 'all the ’ surrounding circumstances”); People v. McDonough, 239 Ill.2d 260 , 346 Ill.Dec. 496 , 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (2010) (utilizing a two part test requiring the officer to "be performing some function other-titan the-investigation of -a crime” and that the search or seizure "be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the general public” where the officer’s rea

2016See, e.g., Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 820 (Alaska Ct.App.1992); Agreda v. State, 152 So.3d 114, 116 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2014); Poe, 169 S.W.3d at 58; Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475-76 ; and State v. Button, 195 Vt. 65 , 86 A.3d 1001, 1003 (2013). 3 .