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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania v. Labrongreen1 sentence2026That is because “[t]he automobile exception ‘does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.”’” Furness, ¶ 17 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen, ¶ 32; in turn quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)); see Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (probable cause is 8 all that’s required under the automobile exception; an automobile’s “ready mobility” justifies the search without a warrant).1 ¶ 21 Thiret and other | 1 | 1 |
People v. Romerogreen1 sentence2026Thiret articulated a two- part test for the automobile exception: “(1) there is probable cause to believe that [the vehicle] contains evidence of a crime; and (2) the 7 circumstances create a practical risk of the vehicle’s unavailability if the search is postponed until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 202 (quoting People v. Meyer, 628 P.2d 103, 106 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 20 But, under the current state of the law, “the police may make a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause and without exigent circumstances.” People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Colo. 1989) (citing California v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
People v. Meyergreen1 sentence2026Thiret articulated a two- part test for the automobile exception: “(1) there is probable cause to believe that [the vehicle] contains evidence of a crime; and (2) the 7 circumstances create a practical risk of the vehicle’s unavailability if the search is postponed until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 202 (quoting People v. Meyer, 628 P.2d 103, 106 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 20 But, under the current state of the law, “the police may make a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause and without exigent circumstances.” People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Colo. 1989) (citing California v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Dysongreen1 sentence2026That is because “[t]he automobile exception ‘does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.”’” Furness, ¶ 17 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen, ¶ 32; in turn quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)); see Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (probable cause is 8 all that’s required under the automobile exception; an automobile’s “ready mobility” justifies the search without a warrant).1 ¶ 21 Thiret and other | 1 | 1 |
California v. Carneygreen1 sentence2026Thiret articulated a two- part test for the automobile exception: “(1) there is probable cause to believe that [the vehicle] contains evidence of a crime; and (2) the 7 circumstances create a practical risk of the vehicle’s unavailability if the search is postponed until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 202 (quoting People v. Meyer, 628 P.2d 103, 106 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 20 But, under the current state of the law, “the police may make a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause and without exigent circumstances.” People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Colo. 1989) (citing California v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences2022In this case, a division of the court of appeals applies the two- part test established in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985), to novel facts. 2022Id. | 1 | 1 |
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Districtgreen1 sentence2008Such "development exactions will be deemed takings requiring just compensation unless they satisfy a two part test: (1) there must be an 'essential nexus' between the legitimate government interest and the exaction demanded; and (2) there must be 'rough proportionality' between the governmental interest and the required dedication." Krupp, 19 P.3d at 695 (citations to Nollan and Dolan omitted); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. | 1 | 1 |
Benton v. Cameco Corporationgreen1 sentence2005See id. at 1270-71 (noting that due process analysis revolves around the defendant’s “conduct and connection” with the forum state); OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091 (“Within [the minimum contacts] inquiry we must determine whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, and whether the plaintiffs claim arises out of or results from actions... that create a substantial connection with the forum state.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d at 1078 (applying this two-part minimum contacts inquiry where both contract and | 1 | 1 |
Omi Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Company Of Canadagreen1 sentence2005See id. at 1270-71 (noting that due process analysis revolves around the defendant’s “conduct and connection” with the forum state); OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091 (“Within [the minimum contacts] inquiry we must determine whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, and whether the plaintiffs claim arises out of or results from actions... that create a substantial connection with the forum state.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d at 1078 (applying this two-part minimum contacts inquiry where both contract and | 1 | 1 |
In re Aarongreen1 sentence2001While not per se takings, development exactions will be deemed takings requiring just compensation unless they satisfy a two part test: (1) there must be an "essential nexus" between the legitimate government interest and the exaction demanded, Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 , 114 S.Ct. 2317 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 817 ; Nollaon, 488 U.S. at 887, 107 S.Ct. 3149 , 97 LEd.2d at 689; and (2) there must be "rough proportionality" between the governmental interest and the required dedication. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of John Doe Trader Number Onegreen1 sentence1999See In re John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir.1990) (citing S.Rep. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dillongreen1 sentence1987See People v. Dillon, 739 P.2d 919 (Colo.App.1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Begay
green
1 sentence2026Thiret articulated a two- part test for the automobile exception: “(1) there is probable cause to believe that [the vehicle] contains evidence of a crime; and (2) the 7 circumstances create a practical risk of the vehicle’s unavailability if the search is postponed until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 202 (quoting People v. Meyer, 628 P.2d 103, 106 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 20 But, under the current state of the law, “the police may make a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause and without exigent circumstances.” People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Colo. 1989) (citing California v. Ca | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-48 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) (discussing Nollan and Dolan ). 2008Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-48 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) (discussing Nollan and Dolan ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2004The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo.1983). 2004The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Dement
green
2 sentences2004The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo.1983). 2004The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Dolan v. City of Tigard
green
2 sentences2001While not per se takings, development exactions will be deemed takings requiring just compensation unless they satisfy a two part test: (1) there must be an "essential nexus" between the legitimate government interest and the exaction demanded, Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 , 114 S.Ct. 2317 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 817 ; Nollaon, 488 U.S. at 887, 107 S.Ct. 3149 , 97 LEd.2d at 689; and (2) there must be "rough proportionality" between the governmental interest and the required dedication. 2001While not per se takings, development exactions will be deemed takings requiring just compensation unless they satisfy a two part test: (1) there must be an "essential nexus" between the legitimate government interest and the exaction demanded, Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 , 114 S.Ct. 2317 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 817 ; Nollaon, 488 U.S. at 887, 107 S.Ct. 3149 , 97 LEd.2d at 689; and (2) there must be "rough proportionality" between the governmental interest and the required dedication. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1999Given the Act’s limited definition of “oral communication,” we must apply the two part test established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), to determine whether the juvenile had a reasonable expectation that his initial conversation with the detective was private. 1999Given the Act’s limited definition of “oral communication,” we must apply the two part test established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), to determine whether the juvenile had a reasonable expectation that his initial conversation with the detective was private. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Keohane v. Stewart
green
1 sentence1998In Keohane v. Stewart, supra, the supreme court established a two-part- inquiry to determine whether a statement is protected. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Deutschendorf v. People
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Ursery, supra; Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53 (Colo.1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1987The two part standard adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 1987The two part standard adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Wimberly v. Ettenberg
green
2 sentences1985Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977). 1985Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.