C.F.R. homeSearch C.F.R.
C.F.R.Title 12Chapter II—Federal Reserve SystemSubchapter A—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemPart 202—Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B)

12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (2026)

Definitions

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1979–2026 181citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 181 opinions since 1979, 19 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (e) (9 cases).

For the purposes of this regulation, unless the context indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply.

(a) Account means an extension of credit. When employed in relation to an account, the word use refers only to open-end credit.

(b) Act means the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (title VII of the Consumer Credit Protection Act).

(c) Adverse action. (1) The term means:

(i) A refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer (to grant credit in a different amount or on other terms) and the applicant uses or expressly accepts the credit offered;

(ii) A termination of an account or an unfavorable change in the terms of an account that does not affect all or substantially all of a class of the creditor's accounts; or

(iii) A refusal to increase the amount of credit available to an applicant who has made an application for an increase.

(2) The term does not include:

(i) A change in the terms of an account expressly agreed to by an applicant.

(ii) Any action or forbearance relating to an account taken in connection with inactivity, default, or delinquency as to that account;

(iii) A refusal or failure to authorize an account transaction at point of sale or loan, except when the refusal is a termination or an unfavorable change in the terms of an account that does not affect all or substantially all of a class of the creditor's accounts, or when the refusal is a denial of an application for an increase in the amount of credit available under the account;

(iv) A refusal to extend credit because applicable law prohibits the creditor from extending the credit requested; or

(v) A refusal to extend credit because the creditor does not offer the type of credit or credit plan requested.

(3) An action that falls within the definition of both paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this section is governed by paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

(d) Age refers only to the age of natural persons and means the number of fully elapsed years from the date of an applicant's birth.

(e) Applicant means any person who requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of § 202.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.

(f) Application means an oral or written request for an extension of credit that is made in accordance with procedures used by a creditor for the type of credit requested. The term application does not include the use of an account or line of credit to obtain an amount of credit that is within a previously established credit limit. A completed application means an application in connection with which a creditor has received all the information that the creditor regularly obtains and considers in evaluating applications for the amount and type of credit requested (including, but not limited to, credit reports, any additional information requested from the applicant, and any approvals or reports by governmental agencies or other persons that are necessary to guarantee, insure, or provide security for the credit or collateral). The creditor shall exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining such information.

(g) Business credit refers to extensions of credit primarily for business or commercial (including agricultural) purposes, but excluding extensions of credit of the types described in § 202.3(a)-(d).

(h) Consumer credit means credit extended to a natural person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(i) Contractually liable means expressly obligated to repay all debts arising on an account by reason of an agreement to that effect.

(j) Credit means the right granted by a creditor to an applicant to defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its payment, or purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.

(k) Credit card means any card, plate, coupon book, or other single credit device that may be used from time to time to obtain money, property, or services on credit.

(l) Creditor means a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including setting the terms of the credit. The term creditor includes a creditor's assignee, transferee, or subrogee who so participates. For purposes of § 202.4(a) and (b), the term creditor also includes a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly refers applicants or prospective applicants to creditors, or selects or offers to select creditors to whom requests for credit may be made. A person is not a creditor regarding any violation of the Act or this regulation committed by another creditor unless the person knew or had reasonable notice of the act, policy, or practice that constituted the violation before becoming involved in the credit transaction. The term does not include a person whose only participation in a credit transaction involves honoring a credit card.

(m) Credit transaction means every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an application for credit or an existing extension of credit (including, but not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures; standards of creditworthiness; terms of credit; furnishing of credit information; revocation, alteration, or termination of credit; and collection procedures).

(n) Discriminate against an applicant means to treat an applicant less favorably than other applicants.

(o) Elderly means age 62 or older.

(p) Empirically derived and other credit scoring systems—(1) A credit scoring system is a system that evaluates an applicant's creditworthiness mechanically, based on key attributes of the applicant and aspects of the transaction, and that determines, alone or in conjunction with an evaluation of additional information about the applicant, whether an applicant is deemed creditworthy. To qualify as an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system, the system must be:

(i) Based on data that are derived from an empirical comparison of sample groups or the population of creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants who applied for credit within a reasonable preceding period of time;

(ii) Developed for the purpose of evaluating the creditworthiness of applicants with respect to the legitimate business interests of the creditor utilizing the system (including, but not limited to, minimizing bad debt losses and operating expenses in accordance with the creditor's business judgment);

(iii) Developed and validated using accepted statistical principles and methodology; and

(iv) Periodically revalidated by the use of appropriate statistical principles and methodology and adjusted as necessary to maintain predictive ability.

(2) A creditor may use an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system obtained from another person or may obtain credit experience from which to develop such a system. Any such system must satisfy the criteria set forth in paragraph (p)(1)(i) through (iv) of this section; if the creditor is unable during the development process to validate the system based on its own credit experience in accordance with paragraph (p)(1) of this section, the system must be validated when sufficient credit experience becomes available. A system that fails this validity test is no longer an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system for that creditor.

(q) Extend credit and extension of credit mean the granting of credit in any form (including, but not limited to, credit granted in addition to any existing credit or credit limit; credit granted pursuant to an open-end credit plan; the refinancing or other renewal of credit, including the issuance of a new credit card in place of an expiring credit card or in substitution for an existing credit card; the consolidation of two or more obligations; or the continuance of existing credit without any special effort to collect at or after maturity).

(r) Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction.

(s) Inadvertent error means a mechanical, electronic, or clerical error that a creditor demonstrates was not intentional and occurred notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.

(t) Judgmental system of evaluating applicants means any system for evaluating the creditworthiness of an applicant other than an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system.

(u) Marital status means the state of being unmarried, married, or separated, as defined by applicable state law. The term “unmarried” includes persons who are single, divorced, or widowed.

(v) Negative factor or value, in relation to the age of elderly applicants, means utilizing a factor, value, or weight that is less favorable regarding elderly applicants than the creditor's experience warrants or is less favorable than the factor, value, or weight assigned to the class of applicants that are not classified as elderly and are most favored by a creditor on the basis of age.

(w) Open-end credit means credit extended under a plan in which a creditor may permit an applicant to make purchases or obtain loans from time to time directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card, check, or other device.

(x) Person means a natural person, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or association.

(y) Pertinent element of creditworthiness, in relation to a judgmental system of evaluating applicants, means any information about applicants that a creditor obtains and considers and that has a demonstrable relationship to a determination of creditworthiness.

(z) Prohibited basis means race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age (provided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding contract); the fact that all or part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program; or the fact that the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act or any state law upon which an exemption has been granted by the Board.

(aa) State means any state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States.

The 20 cases that cite 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENTonja Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile Inc., 362 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2004).
cites § 202.2 6×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“§ 1691a(e) (defining “creditor,” inter alia, as “any person who regularly *977 arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit”); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (l) (“Creditor means a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision .”
The case’s holding
An automobile dealership that participates in credit decisions and restructures terms is a creditor subject to the notice requirements of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Later courts cite it for
“congress enacted the fcra in 1970 to address abuses in the consumer reporting industry.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENValerie Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014).
cites § 202.2 6×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“Interpreting this statutory definition, the Federal Reserve Bank promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (e), -3- which provides that “the term [applicant] includes guarantors.”
Later courts cite it for
“the plain language of the ecoa unmistakably provides that a person is an applicant only if she requests credit.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENWilliam C. Lewis v. Acb Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1998).
cites § 202.2 3×cited by 631 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).”
The case’s holding
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.
Later courts cite it for
“the scope of discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is traditionally quite broad.” · 26 citing courts
4
GREENElodie Jochum v. Pico Credit Corp. of Westbank, 730 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1984).
cites § 202.2 10×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“One of them, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (c), 4 defines “adverse ac *1045 tion”; it also specifically notes creditor actions with regard to an applicant that are not included within that term.”
Later courts cite it for
“courts should not interpret an agency regulation to thwart the statutory mandate it was designed to implement.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENEst. of Dorothy Da v. Wells Fargo, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
cites § 202.2 4×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“Davis relies on 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (e), which further defines “applicant” under the ECOA as “any person who requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit.”
The case’s holding
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must provide sufficient factual details to present a coherent and facially plausible story rather than one that is merely conceivable.
Later courts cite it for
“to withstand a rule 12(b)(6) challenge . . . 'the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together,' and the question the court should ask is 'could these things have happened, not did they happen.” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENTeresa Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207 (6th Cir. 1997).
cites § 202.2 5×cited by 96 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (e). Both definitions refer to “credit,” which itself has a statutory definition: “[T]he right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its [sic] payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment…”
The case’s holding
Medicaid recipients are not applicants for credit under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act because they do not request the deferral of payment for services.
Later courts cite it for
“under federal law, medical service providers must accept the state-approved medicaid payment as payment-in-full, and may not require that patients pay anything beyond that amount.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENDurdin v. Cheyenne Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 202.2 2×subsections: (e)cited by 337 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“Under 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (), "contractually liable" means "expressly obligated to repay all debts arising on an account by reason of an agreement to that effect.”
8
GREENDiaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
cites § 202.2 5×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“26 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (c)(l)(i). The statute defines an adverse action as “a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested.”
Later courts cite it for
“the mmwa, however, creates no additional bases for liability, but allows a consumer to recover damages under existing state law, and attorneys' fees.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENTina Alexander v. Ameripro Funding, Incorpo, 848 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2017).
cites § 202.2 2×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (l) (“Creditor means a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including setting the terms of the credit.”
The case’s holding
A creditor violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by refusing to consider an applicant's public assistance income in a credit decision, but a mere inquiry does not constitute an application.
Later courts cite it for
“the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENColeman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
cites § 202.2 4×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (0 (2003). 7 The Official Staff Interpretations of Regulation B further elucidate what entities are considered creditors: “The term creditor includes all persons participating in the credit decision.”
Later courts cite it for
“courts are nearly universal in finding that auto dealers are not agents of auto financing companies.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENLott Johnson v. Sonny Perdue, 862 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2017).
cites § 202.2 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (J). Addressing several of the same defendants, Curtis Johnson found that allegations identical to those here were sufficient.”
Later courts cite it for
“a 'creditor' is defined in the ecoa as 'any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit,' including any person who 'arranges for' or 'participates' in such credit decisions.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENGermain v. M & T Bank Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
cites § 202.2 3×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“Moreover, “ ‘[c]redit’ has a particular meaning under [the ECOA], namely ‘the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.”
The case’s holding
A slander claim is adequately pleaded where a statement implying ties to organized crime is an actionable mixed opinion suggesting undisclosed facts, while conclusory conspiracy allegations must be dismissed.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he applied for credit from the defendant, (3) he was qualified for credit but the defendant denied his credit application, and (4) the defendant continued to engage in the type of transaction in question with other parties with similar qualifications.” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENBayBank v. Bornhofft, 694 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1998).
cites § 202.2 5×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (e). In support of this change, the board’s official staff commentary regarding Regulation B states: “The principal effect of the change is to give guarantors and similar parties standing to seek legal remedies when a violation occurs under § 202.”
14
GREENNewton v. United Companies Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
cites § 202.2 5×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (c)(l)(i). 110. While for some purposes a counteroffer is a kind of adverse action, see 15 U.”
15
GREENCharlotte Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2002).
cites § 202.2 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (c) defines “adverse action” for purposes of Regulation B, and includes a creditor’s refusal to extend credit as one of several manifestations of adverse action.”
The case’s holding
A prima facie case of credit discrimination requires a plaintiff to prove membership in a protected class, an application for credit, qualification for credit, and a denial.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff applied for credit from defendants; (3) plaintiff was qualified for the credit; and (4) despite plaintiff's qualification, defendants denied her credit application.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENArmstrong v. Nationwide Mortg. Plan/Trust (In re Armstrong), 288 B.R. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003).
cites § 202.2 3×cited by 16 cases
Later courts cite it for
“failure to honor a valid rescission demand is itself a tila violation giving rise to statutory damages.” · 2 citing courts
17
cites § 202.2 2×cited by 89 cases
The case’s holding
A statute of limitations does not bar a plaintiff from asserting an Equal Credit Opportunity Act violation as a defense to efforts to collect and enforce a guaranty.
Later courts cite it for
“should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.” · 9 citing courts
18
GREENJohnson v. Dep't of Agric., 833 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2016).
cites § 202.2 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“§1691a(e), and further defined by ECOA’s implementing regulations to include “a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including setting the terms of the credit,” 12 C.F.R. 202.2(1). We think it can fairly be inferred from…”
19
GREENErrico v. Pac. Capital Bank, N.A., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
cites § 202.2 4×subsections: (c)(1)(i) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (f) (in reviewing an application for completeness, “the creditor shall exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining such information” necessary to decide whether to extend credit).”
Later courts cite it for
“negligent misrepresentation 'sounds in fraud' and is subject to rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard....” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENBank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 2010).
cites § 202.2 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 202.2
“12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (e) (emphasis added). Originally, Regulation B’s definition of “applicant” excluded guarantors.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is well-established iowa law that contracts made in contravention of a statute are void, and iowa courts will not enforce such contracts.” · 3 citing courts

Show all 181 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197920022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 12 cases in 2004. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
7th Cir.9N.D. Ill.9E.D. Pa.8E.D. Va.8D.D.C.7S.D. Ohio73rd Cir.65th Cir.6

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 69 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)4 cases
Tonja Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile Inc., 362 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2004).“§ 1691a(e) (defining “creditor,” inter alia, as “any person who regularly *977 arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit”); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (l) (“Creditor means a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision .”
Johnson v. Dep't of Agric., 833 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2016).“§1691a(e), and further defined by ECOA’s implementing regulations to include “a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including setting the terms of the credit,” 12 C.F.R. 202.2(1). We think it can fairly be inferred from…”
Barber v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In re Barber), 266 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
Liberty Leasing Co. v. MacHamer, 6 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
(c)(1)(i)1 case
Errico v. Pac. Capital Bank, N.A., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2010).“See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (f) (in reviewing an application for completeness, “the creditor shall exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining such information” necessary to decide whether to extend credit).”
(c)(2)(ii)2 cases
Abston v. New Penn Fin. LLC, No. 3:19-cv-00195 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2020).
Johnson v. Reverse Mortg. Funding LLC, No. 3:19-cv-00856 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 5, 2020).
(c)(2)(iv)1 case
Weidman v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
(c)(2)(v)1 case
Copple v. S. Bank of Tennessee, No. 3:22-cv-00692 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2023).
(e)9 cases
Durdin v. Cheyenne Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).“Under 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (), "contractually liable" means "expressly obligated to repay all debts arising on an account by reason of an agreement to that effect.”
Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. WKC Restaurants Venture Co., 961 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Medmark, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 511 (D. Kan. 1995).
Cragin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(f)1 case
Cragin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980).
(l)1 case
Treadway, Tonja v. Gateway Chevrolet, No. 03-2828 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2004).
(m)1 case
Williams v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
(n)1 case
(x)1 case
Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

Show all 181 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

C.F.R. Home  |  Search C.F.R.  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com