370 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025The confrontation clause bars admission of ‘‘testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavail- able to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportu- nity for cross-examination.’’ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 53–54, 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. 2025The confrontation clause bars admission of ‘‘testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavail- able to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportu- nity for cross-examination.’’ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 53–54, 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. | 7 | 37 |
Davis v. Alaskagreen2 sentences2011To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the defendant, in exercising his right of cross-examination, must be allowed to “expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L. 2011To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the defendant, in exercising his right of cross-examination, must be allowed to “expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L. | 4 | 34 |
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2025After considering the historical underpinnings of the confrontation clause, the court overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L. 2025After considering the historical underpinnings of the confrontation clause, the court overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L. | 4 | 25 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2016Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 105-106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ; see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683 , 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S.Ct. 1017 , 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, supra, 158 Conn.App. at 138 , 118 A.3d 615 . "[A trial] court may infer the defendant's waiver [of the right to be present] from the totality of his acts and conduct, so long as the defen 2016Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 105-106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ; see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683 , 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S.Ct. 1017 , 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, supra, 158 Conn.App. at 138 , 118 A.3d 615 . "[A trial] court may infer the defendant's waiver [of the right to be present] from the totality of his acts and conduct, so long as the defen | 4 | 6 |
| State v. Jarzbekgreen | 4 | 5 |
| State v. Herringgreen | 4 | 4 |
| Herring v. Connecticutgreen | 4 | 4 |
| Washington v. Texasgreen | 4 | 4 |
| United States v. Richard Anderson, United States of America v. Kenneth v. Greenwoodgreen | 4 | 4 |
| Bourjaily v. United Statesgreen | 3 | 4 |
State v. Santiagogreen2 sentences2014In order to comport with the constitu- tional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw infer- ences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . . ‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s right of cross- examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross- examination 2014In order to comport with the constitu- tional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw infer- ences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . . ‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s right of cross- examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross- examination | 2 | 16 |
Douglas v. Alabamagreen2 sentences1994The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is the right to cross-examination; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S. Ct. 1074 , 13 L. 1994The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is the right to cross-examination; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S. Ct. 1074 , 13 L. | 2 | 13 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2022Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall under a hear- say exception. 2022Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall under a hear- say exception. | 2 | 12 |
State v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2011“We have adhered to this principle and found no error in the limitation of cross-examination into pending criminal charges where we were satisfied, upon review of the entire cross-examination, that the opportunity to impeach the witness sufficiently comported with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 224 , 502 A.2d 400 (1985). 2011“We have adhered to this principle and found no error in the limitation of cross-examination into pending criminal charges where we were satisfied, upon review of the entire cross-examination, that the opportunity to impeach the witness sufficiently comported with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 224 , 502 A.2d 400 (1985). | 2 | 11 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1990The confrontation clause, however, does operate to “[bar] the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 , 111 L. 1990The confrontation clause, however, does operate to “[bar] the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 , 111 L. | 2 | 9 |
State v. Slatergreen2 sentences2012Hearsay statements that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.” State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162, 169-70 , 939 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1085 , 128 S. Ct. 2885 , 171 L. 2012Hearsay statements that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.” State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162, 169-70 , 939 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1085 , 128 S. Ct. 2885 , 171 L. | 2 | 8 |
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences2021During oral argument, each party was asked which individuals involved in DNA analysis were required to testify pursuant to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, especially in light of State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 212 A.3d 1244 (2019). 2021During oral argument, each party was asked which individuals involved in DNA analysis were required to testify pursuant to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, especially in light of State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 212 A.3d 1244 (2019). | 2 | 7 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2025Ed. 2d 597 (1980), which had interpreted the confrontation clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness so long as the statements ‘‘[bore] adequate indi- cia of reliability’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 66 ; and adopted a rule that hearsay labeled as ‘‘[t]es- timonial’’ shall not be admitted into evidence unless the witness appears at trial for cross-examination or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.10 Crawford v. Wash- ington, supra, 59, 68 ; see also State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 36 2025Ed. 2d 597 (1980), which had interpreted the confrontation clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness so long as the statements ‘‘[bore] adequate indi- cia of reliability’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 66 ; and adopted a rule that hearsay labeled as ‘‘[t]es- timonial’’ shall not be admitted into evidence unless the witness appears at trial for cross-examination or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.10 Crawford v. Wash- ington, supra, 59, 68 ; see also State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 36 | 2 | 6 |
Pointer v. Texasgreen2 sentences2022The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause, which is binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L. 2022The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause, which is binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L. | 2 | 6 |
Williams v. Illinoisred2 sentences2019In his concurrence, Justice Thomas reiterated his previously expressed view that the confrontation clause only "reaches formalized testimonial materials, such as depositions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or statements resulting from formalized dialogue, such as custodial interrogation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 111 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . 2019In his concurrence, Justice Thomas reiterated his previously expressed view that the confrontation clause only "reaches formalized testimonial materials, such as depositions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or statements resulting from formalized dialogue, such as custodial interrogation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 111 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Slimskeygreen2 sentences2020Ed. 2d 110 (2005); see also State v. Slimskey, 257 Conn. 842, 859 , 779 A.2d 723 (2001) (‘‘[h]aving determined that the evidence in issue was especially probative and having concluded that there was no other available means of inquiry into the victim’s propensity to lie, we necessarily have concluded that the confrontation clause requires the disclosure’’). 6 For example, Allain testified for the first time in court that the defendant told him that he was in a satanic cult, that he spoke to the defendant for about three minutes about the defendant’s desire to kill the victim and that the defen 2020Ed. 2d 110 (2005); see also State v. Slimskey, 257 Conn. 842, 859 , 779 A.2d 723 (2001) (‘‘[h]aving determined that the evidence in issue was especially probative and having concluded that there was no other available means of inquiry into the victim’s propensity to lie, we necessarily have concluded that the confrontation clause requires the disclosure’’). 6 For example, Allain testified for the first time in court that the defendant told him that he was in a satanic cult, that he spoke to the defendant for about three minutes about the defendant’s desire to kill the victim and that the defen | 2 | 5 |
State v. Arroyogreen2 sentences2016With respect to the state’s claim that in-court identifications do not require prescreening because the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause ‘‘guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 622 , 935 A.2d 975 (2007); it does not follow from this principle that the state has a right to conduct an unnecessarily suggestive identification during the guaranteed con- frontation. 2016With respect to the state’s claim that in-court identifications do not require prescreening because the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause ‘‘guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 622 , 935 A.2d 975 (2007); it does not follow from this principle that the state has a right to conduct an unnecessarily suggestive identification during the guaranteed con- frontation. | 2 | 5 |
| State v. Holleygreen | 2 | 3 |
| State v. Gonzalezgreen | 2 | 3 |
Davis v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2019In Davis , the Supreme Court indicated that statements made unwittingly to a government informant, or statements made from one prisoner to another, "were clearly nontestimonial." Davis v. Washington , supra, 547 U.S. at 825 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ("Where our cases ... dispense[d] with [the confrontation clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay]-even under the [pre- Crawford ] approach-the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial. 2019In Davis , the Supreme Court indicated that statements made unwittingly to a government informant, or statements made from one prisoner to another, "were clearly nontestimonial." Davis v. Washington , supra, 547 U.S. at 825 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ("Where our cases ... dispense[d] with [the confrontation clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay]-even under the [pre- Crawford ] approach-the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial. | 1 | 12 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences2020The defendant moved to suppress Stephen- son’s in-court testimony, contending that it was inad- missible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment pursuant to Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L. 2020The defendant moved to suppress Stephen- son’s in-court testimony, contending that it was inad- missible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment pursuant to Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L. | 1 | 7 |
State v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2022Ed. 2d 309 (2006). ‘‘The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 636 n.4, 945 A.2d 449 (2008). 2022Ed. 2d 309 (2006). ‘‘The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 636 n.4, 945 A.2d 449 (2008). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020Similarly, in State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014), this court concluded that ‘‘there exists no legal basis that suggests that our state constitution provides the defendant any broader protection [than the federal constitution] to confront a witness against him.’’ Id., 466. ‘‘In the brief time since our Supreme Court con- ducted [its analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)] of the confrontation clause in Lockhart, no decision from our state courts or from our sister states’ appellate courts has 2020Similarly, in State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014), this court concluded that ‘‘there exists no legal basis that suggests that our state constitution provides the defendant any broader protection [than the federal constitution] to confront a witness against him.’’ Id., 466. ‘‘In the brief time since our Supreme Court con- ducted [its analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)] of the confrontation clause in Lockhart, no decision from our state courts or from our sister states’ appellate courts has | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Romagreen | 1 | 5 |
| Kentucky v. Stincergreen | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Ashermangreen | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Merriamgreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Lockhartgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Johnson v. Dep't of the Armygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Barkus v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Valentinegreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Kelleygreen | 1 | 4 |
| James v. Cohengreen | 1 | 4 |
| Basham v. Kentuckygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Asherman v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2025It is undisputed that the defendant failed to preserve this claim at trial; thus, he seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).2 The state urges us to conclude that the confrontation clause is not self-executing, meaning that the defendant’s failure to raise it at trial precludes him from invoking Golding review on appeal to assert its violation under any cir- cumstances. 2025It is undisputed that the defendant failed to preserve this claim at trial; thus, he seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).2 The state urges us to conclude that the confrontation clause is not self-executing, meaning that the defendant’s failure to raise it at trial precludes him from invoking Golding review on appeal to assert its violation under any cir- cumstances. | 12 | 1990–2025 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1989“To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause the defendant in exercising his right of cross-examination must be allowed to ‘expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Id., quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L. 1988Because the core value protected by the confrontation clause is the enhancement of the truth-seeking process; see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 692-93 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987); ‘[c]ross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted.’ State v. Wilson, 188 Conn. 715, 720 , 453 A.2d 765 (1982); State v. Corley, 177 Conn. 243, 246 , 413 A.2d 826 (1979). | 11 | 1984–1990 |
State v. Milum
green
2 sentences1994The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him In State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118 , 126 n.6, 635 A.2d 762 (1993), we subsequently explained our holding in State v. Santiago, supra, 224 Conn. 325 , as resting on “[t]wo facts, taken together”: (1) that the witness in question was a “key witness for the state”; and (2) that “the witness may have had a re 1994The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him In State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118 , 126 n.6, 635 A.2d 762 (1993), we subsequently explained our holding in State v. Santiago, supra, 224 Conn. 325 , as resting on “[t]wo facts, taken together”: (1) that the witness in question was a “key witness for the state”; and (2) that “the witness may have had a re | 8 | 1985–1994 |
California v. Green
red
2 sentences2025The court further explained that the confrontation clause ‘‘does not require excluding from evidence the prior state- ments of a witness who concedes making the state- ments, and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his present version[s] of the events in question, thus open- ing himself to full cross-examination at trial as to both stories.’’ Id., 164 . 2000Since it is the search for truth that is the primary object of the confrontation clause; see Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 65-66 ; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 , 90 S. Ct. 1930 , 26 L. | 7 | 1985–2025 |
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences2001The defendant concedes that the confrontation clause guarantees “ ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish’ ”; id., quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 474 U.S. 20 . 1995The court emphasized that the confrontation clause of the federal constitution is implicated only “when there [is] a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at trial on the scope of questioning.” Id., 53-54 . | 7 | 1988–2017 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1998“The confrontation clause does not, however, suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” State v. Johnson, 21 Conn. App. 291, 293 , 573 A.2d 1218 (1990). 1998“The confrontation clause does not, however, suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” State v. Johnson, 21 Conn. App. 291, 293 , 573 A.2d 1218 (1990). | 7 | 1994–2000 |
Delaware v. Fensterer
green
2 sentences2025It held that, in general, the confrontation clause ‘‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross- 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23 0 Conn. 1 ,0 25 State v. Jacques examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 20 . 1993In rejecting the defendant’s constitutional claim, the United States Supreme Court stated that the confrontation clause guarantees “ ‘an opportunity for effec tive cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 53 , quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S. Ct. 292 , 88 L. | 6 | 1988–2025 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 674 (1986). ‘‘[W]hether . . . limitations on impeachment, including cross-examination, [were] so severe as to vio- late [the defendant’s rights under] the confrontation clause . . . is a question of law [that is] reviewed de novo.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). 2023Ed. 2d 674 (1986). ‘‘[W]hether . . . limitations on impeachment, including cross-examination, [were] so severe as to vio- late [the defendant’s rights under] the confrontation clause . . . is a question of law [that is] reviewed de novo.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). | 6 | 2011–2023 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2019Accordingly, pursuant to the confrontation clause, "[a witness'] testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305 , 309, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). 2019Accordingly, pursuant to the confrontation clause, "[a witness'] testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305 , 309, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). | 6 | 2015–2020 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2020Although ‘‘the extent of the proof of details lies in the court’s discretion’’; (internal quota- tion marks omitted) id.; ‘‘the preclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitu- tional requirements [of the confrontation clause] of the sixth amendment . . . [and] may deprive the defen- dant of his constitutional right to present a defense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 9 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘The confrontation clause does not, however, sus- pend the 2020Although ‘‘the extent of the proof of details lies in the court’s discretion’’; (internal quota- tion marks omitted) id.; ‘‘the preclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitu- tional requirements [of the confrontation clause] of the sixth amendment . . . [and] may deprive the defen- dant of his constitutional right to present a defense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 9 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘The confrontation clause does not, however, sus- pend the | 6 | 1996–2020 |
| State v. Pratt green | 5 | 1997–2002 |
| State v. Beliveau green | 5 | 1998–2000 |
| State v. Pierre green | 4 | 2007–2019 |
| State v. Arline green | 4 | 1992–2007 |
| State v. Morant green | 4 | 1998–2001 |
| State v. Lubesky green | 4 | 1990–2000 |
| State v. Spencer green | 4 | 1989–1999 |
| State v. Vessichio green | 4 | 1989–1992 |
| Davis v. City of Roswell green | 4 | 1989–1992 |
| Wallace v. Herron green | 4 | 1989–1992 |
| State v. Gaynor green | 4 | 1986–1991 |
| Dutton v. Evans green | 4 | 1980–1990 |
| State v. McMurray green | 3 | 1993–2024 |
| State v. Clark green | 3 | 2004–2022 |
| State v. Geisler green | 3 | 2016–2020 |
| State v. Lopez green | 3 | 2006–2018 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 3 | 1994–2018 |
| State v. Moye green | 3 | 1993–2017 |
| State v. Sandoval green | 3 | 2004–2012 |
| State v. Abernathy neutral | 3 | 2002–2011 |
| Bethlehem Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission green | 3 | 2002–2011 |
| Franco v. East Shore Development, Inc. neutral | 3 | 2002–2011 |
| State v. Colton green | 3 | 1998–2010 |
| State v. Howard green | 3 | 2005–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.