confrontation clause in Connecticut

2026As our discussion in part II A of this opinion reflects, the issue of whether McIntyre rendered ineffective assistance in the first habeas action for failing to allege that Pickering performed deficiently by not raising a confrontation clause objection to the autopsy report and Carver’s testimony about that report in accordance with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), gives rise to the question of whether such a claim would have been novel or untested at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial.

2026As our discussion in part II A of this opinion reflects, the issue of whether McIntyre rendered ineffective assistance in the first habeas action for failing to allege that Pickering performed deficiently by not raising a confrontation clause objection to the autopsy report and Carver’s testimony about that report in accordance with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), gives rise to the question of whether such a claim would have been novel or untested at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial.

2011To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the defendant, in exercising his right of cross-examination, must be allowed to “expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L.

2011To comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the defendant, in exercising his right of cross-examination, must be allowed to “expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L.

2025After considering the historical underpinnings of the confrontation clause, the court overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), which had interpreted the confrontation clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness so long as the statements ‘‘[bore] adequate indi- cia of reliability’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 66 ; and adopted a rule that hearsay labeled as ‘‘[t]es- timonial’’ shall not be admitted into evidence unless the witness appears at trial for cross-examination or, if the witne

2025After considering the historical underpinnings of the confrontation clause, the court overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), which had interpreted the confrontation clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness so long as the statements ‘‘[bore] adequate indi- cia of reliability’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 66 ; and adopted a rule that hearsay labeled as ‘‘[t]es- timonial’’ shall not be admitted into evidence unless the witness appears at trial for cross-examination or, if the witne

2016Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 105-106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ; see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683 , 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S.Ct. 1017 , 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, supra, 158 Conn.App. at 138 , 118 A.3d 615 . "[A trial] court may infer the defendant's waiver [of the right to be present] from the totality of his acts and conduct, so long as the defen

2016Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 105-106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ; see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683 , 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S.Ct. 1017 , 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, supra, 158 Conn.App. at 138 , 118 A.3d 615 . "[A trial] court may infer the defendant's waiver [of the right to be present] from the totality of his acts and conduct, so long as the defen

2023It bears emphasis that, although restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the trial court’s sound discretion, ‘‘this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examina- tion sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500 , 511, 131 A.3d 1132 (2016); see also State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 331 , 618 A.2d 32 (1992) (‘‘[a]lthough it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meani

2023It bears emphasis that, although restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the trial court’s sound discretion, ‘‘this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examina- tion sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500 , 511, 131 A.3d 1132 (2016); see also State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 331 , 618 A.2d 32 (1992) (‘‘[a]lthough it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meani

2022We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Under Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall un

2022We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Under Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall un

1994The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is the right to cross-examination; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S. Ct. 1074 , 13 L.

1994The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is the right to cross-examination; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S. Ct. 1074 , 13 L.

2011“We have adhered to this principle and found no error in the limitation of cross-examination into pending criminal charges where we were satisfied, upon review of the entire cross-examination, that the opportunity to impeach the witness sufficiently comported with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 224 , 502 A.2d 400 (1985).

2011“We have adhered to this principle and found no error in the limitation of cross-examination into pending criminal charges where we were satisfied, upon review of the entire cross-examination, that the opportunity to impeach the witness sufficiently comported with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 224 , 502 A.2d 400 (1985).

2012Hearsay statements that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.” State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162, 169-70 , 939 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1085 , 128 S. Ct. 2885 , 171 L.

2012Hearsay statements that are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause, and their admissibility is governed solely by the rules of evidence.” State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162, 169-70 , 939 A.2d 1105 , cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1085 , 128 S. Ct. 2885 , 171 L.

2004E.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 , 110 S. Ct. 3139 , 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990); see also id., 814 ([w]hile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, [the] Court has rejected that view as unintended and too extreme . . .).

2004E.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 , 110 S. Ct. 3139 , 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990); see also id., 814 ([w]hile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, [the] Court has rejected that view as unintended and too extreme . . .).

2025In State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 212 A.3d 1244 (2019), we explained that ‘‘the threshold inquiries [for purposes of] a confrontation clause analysis are whether the statement was hearsay, and if so, whether the statement was testimonial in nature . . . .

2025In State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 212 A.3d 1244 (2019), we explained that ‘‘the threshold inquiries [for purposes of] a confrontation clause analysis are whether the statement was hearsay, and if so, whether the statement was testimonial in nature . . . .

2025As our Supreme Court noted shortly after Crawford was decided, ‘‘[t]he express distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay statements, for purposes of the confrontation clause, is a novel one.’’ State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351 , 364 n.13, 844 A.2d 191 (2004).

2025As our Supreme Court noted shortly after Crawford was decided, ‘‘[t]he express distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay statements, for purposes of the confrontation clause, is a novel one.’’ State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351 , 364 n.13, 844 A.2d 191 (2004).

2022The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause, which is binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); provides in relevant part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .’’ U.S. Const., amend.

2022The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause, which is binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); provides in relevant part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .’’ U.S. Const., amend.

2019Although Crawford 's revision of the court's confrontation clause jurisprudence is significant, its rules govern the admissibility only of certain classes of statements, namely, testimonial hearsay." (Citations omitted.) State v. Buckland , 313 Conn. 205 , 212-13, 96 A.3d 1163 (2014), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 992 , 190 L.

2019Although Crawford 's revision of the court's confrontation clause jurisprudence is significant, its rules govern the admissibility only of certain classes of statements, namely, testimonial hearsay." (Citations omitted.) State v. Buckland , 313 Conn. 205 , 212-13, 96 A.3d 1163 (2014), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 992 , 190 L.

2019The plurality reasoned that, because no one from the outside laboratory could have known the profile would inculpate the defendant-or anyone else whose DNA profile was in the police database-"there was no prospect of fabrication and no incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable profile." 12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 84-85 , 132 S. Ct. 2221 . **705 Justice Thomas authored a separate opinion concurring in the judgment reiterating his view that the confrontation clause covers only "formalized testimonial materials, such as depositions, affidavit

2019The plurality reasoned that, because no one from the outside laboratory could have known the profile would inculpate the defendant-or anyone else whose DNA profile was in the police database-"there was no prospect of fabrication and no incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable profile." 12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 84-85 , 132 S. Ct. 2221 . **705 Justice Thomas authored a separate opinion concurring in the judgment reiterating his view that the confrontation clause covers only "formalized testimonial materials, such as depositions, affidavit

2019In Davis , the Supreme Court indicated that statements made unwittingly to a government informant, or statements made from one prisoner to another, "were clearly nontestimonial." Davis v. Washington , supra, 547 U.S. at 825 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ("Where our cases ... dispense[d] with [the confrontation clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay]-even under the [pre- Crawford ] approach-the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial.

2019In Davis , the Supreme Court indicated that statements made unwittingly to a government informant, or statements made from one prisoner to another, "were clearly nontestimonial." Davis v. Washington , supra, 547 U.S. at 825 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ("Where our cases ... dispense[d] with [the confrontation clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay]-even under the [pre- Crawford ] approach-the statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial.

2025Indeed, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), the United States Supreme Court explained that ‘‘surrogate testimony’’—when the testifying expert neither participated in nor observed the test but worked in the same laboratory as the nontestifying expert who conducted the test—does not satisfy the confrontation clause because the testifying ‘‘surrogate’’ could not convey what the original expert knew or observed about the particular test utilized.

2025Indeed, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), the United States Supreme Court explained that ‘‘surrogate testimony’’—when the testifying expert neither participated in nor observed the test but worked in the same laboratory as the nontestifying expert who conducted the test—does not satisfy the confrontation clause because the testifying ‘‘surrogate’’ could not convey what the original expert knew or observed about the particular test utilized.

2022This right is secured for defendants in state criminal proceedings. . . . [T]he primary interest secured by confrontation is the right of cross-examination.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 816 , 882 A.2d 604 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025 , 126 S. Ct. 1578 , 164 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2006). ‘‘The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 636 n.4, 945 A.2d 449 (2008).

2022This right is secured for defendants in state criminal proceedings. . . . [T]he primary interest secured by confrontation is the right of cross-examination.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 816 , 882 A.2d 604 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025 , 126 S. Ct. 1578 , 164 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2006). ‘‘The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 636 n.4, 945 A.2d 449 (2008).

2025Even if we assume that these statements were improperly admitted, we 38 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Villanueva nevertheless conclude that their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 See, e.g., State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 649 , 835 A.2d 895 (2003) (‘‘[a]s with other constitutional violations that are subject to harmless error analysis, the state has the burden of demonstrating that a confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’’).

2025Even if we assume that these statements were improperly admitted, we 38 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Villanueva nevertheless conclude that their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 See, e.g., State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 649 , 835 A.2d 895 (2003) (‘‘[a]s with other constitutional violations that are subject to harmless error analysis, the state has the burden of demonstrating that a confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’’).

2020Similarly, in State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014), this court concluded that ‘‘there exists no legal basis that suggests that our state constitution provides the defendant any broader protection [than the federal constitution] to confront a witness against him.’’ Id., 466. ‘‘In the brief time since our Supreme Court conducted [its analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)] of the confrontation clause in Lockhart, no decision from our state courts or from our sister states’ appellate courts has c

2020Similarly, in State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014), this court concluded that ‘‘there exists no legal basis that suggests that our state constitution provides the defendant any broader protection [than the federal constitution] to confront a witness against him.’’ Id., 466. ‘‘In the brief time since our Supreme Court conducted [its analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)] of the confrontation clause in Lockhart, no decision from our state courts or from our sister states’ appellate courts has c