double jeopardy clause (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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double jeopardy clause in Connecticut

395 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2026 29 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (51)

CaseFollowedCited
Benton v. Marylandgreen
scotus · 1969 · cited in 55 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1974–2025
2 sentences

2025The defendant argues that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution, which is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; see, e.g., Benton v. Mary- land, 395 U.S. 784, 794 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

2025The defendant argues that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution, which is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; see, e.g., Benton v. Mary- land, 395 U.S. 784, 794 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

1055
Burks v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 11 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1983–2023
2 sentences

2010See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 178 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) ("[p]ursuant to Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [1978], a defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal and retrial is barred [under the double jeopardy clause] if an appellate court determines that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction").

2010See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 178 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) ("[p]ursuant to Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [1978], a defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal and retrial is barred [under the double jeopardy clause] if an appellate court determines that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction").

811
Brown v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 23 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1985–2020
2 sentences

2018That case involved a double jeopardy claim stemming from Nathaniel Brown's theft of a car in East Cleveland, Ohio, which, nine days later, he was "caught driving ... in Wickliffe, Ohio." Id., at 162 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 .

2018That case involved a double jeopardy claim stemming from Nathaniel Brown's theft of a car in East Cleveland, Ohio, which, nine days later, he was "caught driving ... in Wickliffe, Ohio." Id., at 162 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 .

623
State v. Chicanogreen
conn · 1990 · cited in 14 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2020
2 sentences

2010Because the record is adequate and a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; see State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

2010Because the record is adequate and a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; see State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

514
Chicano v. Connecticutgreen
scotus · 1991 · cited in 13 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2020
2 sentences

2010Because the record is adequate and because a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

2010Because the record is adequate and a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; see State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

513
State v. Paduagreen
conn · 2005 · cited in 12 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2006–2021
2 sentences

2010In State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 177 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005), one of the defendants, Miranda Virgilia Cálvente, claimed that the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution required the Appellate Court to consider her claim of evidentiary insufficiency before remanding the case to the trial court after reversing the trial court’s judgment on the ground of instructional error.

2010In State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 177 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005), one of the defendants, Miranda Virgilia Cálvente, claimed that the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution required the Appellate Court to consider her claim of evidentiary insufficiency before remanding the case to the trial court after reversing the trial court’s judgment on the ground of instructional error.

512
Hatch v. United States Department of Agriculturegreen
scotus · 1991 · cited in 11 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1995–2020
2 sentences

2010Because the record is adequate and because a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

2010Because the record is adequate and a double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude; see State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705 , 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 , 111 S. Ct. 2898 , 115 L.

511
State v. Devinogreen
conn · 1985 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1985–2018
2 sentences

2001The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits “not only multiple trials, but also multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial.” State v. Devino, 195 Conn. 70, 73 , 485 A.2d 1302 (1985).

2001The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits “not only multiple trials, but also multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial.” State v. Devino, 195 Conn. 70, 73 , 485 A.2d 1302 (1985).

48
State v. Johnsgreen
conn · 1981 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1985–2020
44
North Carolina v. Pearcered
scotus · 1969 · cited in 21 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1981–2001
2 sentences

1992The United States Supreme Court has explained that the guarantees of the double jeopardy clause are threefold: “[1] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [2] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. [3] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S. Ct. 2072 , 23 L.

1992The United States Supreme Court has explained that the guarantees of the double jeopardy clause are threefold: “[1] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [2] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. [3] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S. Ct. 2072 , 23 L.

321
State v. Burnellgreen
conn · 2009 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2019
2 sentences

2016A double jeopardy claim, however, "presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary." State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634 , 642, 966 A.2d 168 (2009). "[C]laims of double jeopardy involving multiple punishments present a question of law to which we afford plenary review." State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417 , 439, 973 A.2d 74 (2009).

2016A double jeopardy claim, however, "presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary." State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634 , 642, 966 A.2d 168 (2009). "[C]laims of double jeopardy involving multiple punishments present a question of law to which we afford plenary review." State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417 , 439, 973 A.2d 74 (2009).

37
State v. Ortizgreen
conn · 2000 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2004–2019
34
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1931 · cited in 32 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1976–2026
2 sentences

2026Home invasion and first degree assault with a firearm did not constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States ( 284 U.S. 299 ), as each offense requires proof of an essential element that the other does not.

2023II The defendant next contends that his sentences stem- ming from his conviction of third degree sexual assault, in violation of § 53a-72a (a) (1), and fourth degree sexual assault, in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (2), violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment because (1) the ‘‘allegations that formed the basis of both charges stemmed from the same solitary event occurring on one date during one alleged interaction between the [defendant] and the complainant’’ and (2) the two offenses are the same under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52

232
State v. Goldinggreen
conn · 1989 · cited in 27 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–2025
2 sentences

2025The defendant seeks review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).10 We conclude that the record is adequate for review and that a double jeopardy violation implicates a defendant’s constitu- tional rights.

2025The defendant seeks review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).10 We conclude that the record is adequate for review and that a double jeopardy violation implicates a defendant’s constitu- tional rights.

227
Oregon v. Kennedygreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1994–2025
2 sentences

2025Syllabus This court recognized in State v. Colton ( 234 Conn. 683 ) that, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Kennedy ( 456 U.S. 667 ), and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Wallach ( 979 F.2d 912 ), the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution bars a retrial if the prosecutor had engaged in impropriety with the intent to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed was imminent in the absence of the impropriety.

2015In particular, the petitioner, relying on Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , and its progeny, argues that the prosecutor’s improper remarks during summation in Couture I were made with the intent to goad the defense into moving for a mistrial and, thus, to subvert the double jeopardy clause.

27
State v. Browngreen
conn · 2011 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2013–2021
2 sentences

2020The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 650–51; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

2017The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown , 299 Conn. 640 , 650-51, 11 A.3d 663 (2011).

26
Illinois v. Somervillegreen
scotus · 1973 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1980–2010
26
State v. Coltongreen
conn · 1995 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2025
25
State v. Pricegreen
conn · 1988 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1988–2009
25
Koch Oil Co. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims Against Powerine Oil Co.green
scotus · 1996 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2023
24
Munoz v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2023
24
Connecticut v. Coltongreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2023
24
State v. McCallgreen
conn · 1982 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1988–2021
24
State v. Rawlsgreen
conn · 1985 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1988–2018
2 sentences

2018"The proper double jeopardy inquiry when a defendant is convicted of multiple violations of the same statutory provision is whether the legislature intended to punish the individual acts separately or to punish only the course of action which they constitute." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Rawls , 198 Conn. 111 , 121, 502 A.2d 374 (1985).

2018"The proper double jeopardy inquiry when a defendant is convicted of multiple violations of the same statutory provision is whether the legislature intended to punish the individual acts separately or to punish only the course of action which they constitute." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Rawls , 198 Conn. 111 , 121, 502 A.2d 374 (1985).

18
State v. Lonergangreen
conn · 1989 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–2009
2 sentences

2009Prior to our Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Lonergan, supra, 213 Conn. 74 , our courts applied the traditional double jeopardy analysis originally formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2009Prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lonergan, supra, 213 Conn. 74 , our courts applied the double jeopardy analysis that originated in Blockburger v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. 299 .

18
State v. Grecogreen
conn · 1990 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–2021
2 sentences

2021In State v. Greco, 216 Conn. 282 , 287–88, 579 A.2d 84 (1990), this court rejected the defendant’s claim that the double jeopardy clause barred the trial court from imposing consecutive sentences for his convictions of felony murder, first degree robbery and first degree burglary.11 In our analy- sis of the felony murder statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-54c, we noted the absence of any lan- guage prohibiting a defendant from being found guilty or being convicted upon the same transaction or inci- dent as the offenses of first degree burglary or first degree robbery.

2021In State v. Greco, 216 Conn. 282 , 287–88, 579 A.2d 84 (1990), this court rejected the defendant’s claim that the double jeopardy clause barred the trial court from imposing consecutive sentences for his convictions of felony murder, first degree robbery and first degree burglary.11 In our analy- sis of the felony murder statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-54c, we noted the absence of any lan- guage prohibiting a defendant from being found guilty or being convicted upon the same transaction or inci- dent as the offenses of first degree burglary or first degree robbery.

17
State v. Gilnitegreen
conn · 1987 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991State v. Madera, supra, 98 n.6; see also State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369 , 374 n.4, 521 A.2d 547 (1987).

1991State v. Madera, supra, 98 n.6; see also State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369 , 374 n.4, 521 A.2d 547 (1987).

17
Renda Marine, Inc. v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026“A defen- dant’s double jeopardy claim presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, 307 Conn. 1 , 9, 52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 , 133 S. Ct. 1804 , 185 L.

2025We disagree. ‘‘A defendant’s double jeopardy claim presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, 307 Conn. 1 , 9, 52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 , 133 S. Ct. 1804 , 185 L.

16
Bernacki v. Connecticutgreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026“A defen- dant’s double jeopardy claim presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, 307 Conn. 1 , 9, 52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 , 133 S. Ct. 1804 , 185 L.

2025We disagree. ‘‘A defendant’s double jeopardy claim presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bernacki, 307 Conn. 1 , 9, 52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 , 133 S. Ct. 1804 , 185 L.

16
State v. Goldsongreen
conn · 1979 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1988–2023
2 sentences

2023Although it is true that this court has used the phrase ‘‘substantially the same’’ in relation to the applicable double jeopardy test, we did so for the first time in State v. Goldson, 178 Conn. 422, 425 , 423 A.2d 114 (1979), with no citation indicating from where this language derived.

2023Although it is true that this court has used the phrase ‘‘substantially the same’’ in relation to the applicable double jeopardy test, we did so for the first time in State v. Goldson, 178 Conn. 422, 425 , 423 A.2d 114 (1979), with no citation indicating from where this language derived.

16
Baker v. Cordiscogreen
conn · 1995 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–2016
2 sentences

2016See State v. Laws, 37 Conn.App. 276 , 289, 655 A.2d 1131 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907 , 659 A.2d 1210 (1995) ; see also State v. Barber, 64 Conn.App. 659 , 671, 781 A.2d 464 ("[i]f double jeopardy claims arising in the context of a single trial are raised for the first time on appeal, these claims are reviewable" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

2016See, e.g., State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321, 354 , 875 A.2d 510 (2005) (‘‘Connecticut appellate courts never have held that the double jeopardy guarantees implied in the state constitution exceed those embodied in the federal constitution’’); State v. Laws, 37 Conn. App. 276, 295 , 655 A.2d 1131 (1994) (‘‘we decline the defen- dant’s invitation to find that our state constitution affords any greater due process rights than those afforded under the federal constitution’s double jeopardy clause’’), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907 , 659 A.2d 1210 (1995). 6 In its long form information, the state al

16
State v. Lawsgreen
conn · 1995 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–2016
2 sentences

2016See State v. Laws, 37 Conn.App. 276 , 289, 655 A.2d 1131 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907 , 659 A.2d 1210 (1995) ; see also State v. Barber, 64 Conn.App. 659 , 671, 781 A.2d 464 ("[i]f double jeopardy claims arising in the context of a single trial are raised for the first time on appeal, these claims are reviewable" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

2016See, e.g., State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321, 354 , 875 A.2d 510 (2005) (‘‘Connecticut appellate courts never have held that the double jeopardy guarantees implied in the state constitution exceed those embodied in the federal constitution’’); State v. Laws, 37 Conn. App. 276, 295 , 655 A.2d 1131 (1994) (‘‘we decline the defen- dant’s invitation to find that our state constitution affords any greater due process rights than those afforded under the federal constitution’s double jeopardy clause’’), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907 , 659 A.2d 1210 (1995). 6 In its long form information, the state al

16
Robichaud v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen
conn · 2004 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2004–2016
16
Hartford Casualty Insurance v. Litchfield Mutual Fire Insurancegreen
conn · 2004 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2004–2016
16
State v. Lawsgreen
connappct · 1995 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–2016
16
State v. Crudupgreen
connappct · 2004 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2004–2016
16
State v. Nixongreen
connappct · 2005 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2006–2026
15
State v. Snookgreen
conn · 1989 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–2018
15
Green v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1957 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1980–2014
15
United States v. Perezgreen
scotus · 1824 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1980–2010
15

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (29)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Hickam green
conn · 1995
2 sentences

2016"To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions 'criminal' for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions...." Id. "[A] civil or administrative sanction that serves a legitimate remedial purpose ... does not give rise to a double jeopardy violation even if the sanction has some deterrent effect." State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614 , 623, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 257 Conn.

2016"To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions 'criminal' for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions...." Id. "[A] civil or administrative sanction that serves a legitimate remedial purpose ... does not give rise to a double jeopardy violation even if the sanction has some deterrent effect." State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614 , 623, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 , 116 S.Ct. 1851 , 134 L.Ed.2d 951 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 257 Conn.

111996–2016
State v. Miranda green
conn · 2002
2 sentences

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

92004–2022
Miranda v. Connecticut green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

82004–2022
Parke v. United States green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

2021Indeed, as the trial court observed, ‘‘this is a trial about what hap- pened in the course of about ten seconds.’’ These fac- tors are not dispositive, of course, because spatial and temporal proximity alone do not always trigger a double jeopardy violation. ‘‘[D]istinct repetitions of a prohib- ited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 122 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L.

82004–2022
Menna v. New York green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

1991Thus, after an unqualified plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may challenge his conviction if the conviction is in violation of the double jeopardy clause; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975); if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); or if the statute under which the defendant is charged is unconstitutional.

1991Thus, after an unqualified plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may challenge his conviction if the conviction is in violation of the double jeopardy clause; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975); if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); or if the statute under which the defendant is charged is unconstitutional.

71985–1991
Blackledge v. Perry green
scotus · 1974
2 sentences

1991Thus, after an unqualified plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may challenge his conviction if the conviction is in violation of the double jeopardy clause; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975); if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); or if the statute under which the defendant is charged is unconstitutional.

1991Thus, after an unqualified plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may challenge his conviction if the conviction is in violation of the double jeopardy clause; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975); if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); or if the statute under which the defendant is charged is unconstitutional.

71985–1991
State v. Tweedy green
conn · 1991
2 sentences

2015Also instructive is this court’s decision in State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 496 , 594 A.2d 906 (1991), which held that the defendant’s multiple convictions for kid- napping in the first degree in violation of different subdi- visions of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) did not violate the double jeopardy clause.

2015Also instructive is this court’s decision in State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 496 , 594 A.2d 906 (1991), which held that the defendant’s multiple convictions for kid- napping in the first degree in violation of different subdi- visions of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) did not violate the double jeopardy clause.

61996–2019
American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. USX Corp. green
scotus · 1996
61996–2016
Glavey v. Dime Savings Bank green
scotus · 1996
61996–2016
Veneman v. Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n green
scotus · 1996
61996–2016
State v. Freeney green
conn · 1994
61997–2014
United States v. Scott green
scotus · 1978
61980–2012
State v. Aillon green
conn · 1980
61986–2002
Haynes v. United States green
scotus · 1968
61991–1991
State v. Porter green
conn · 2018
52018–2023
State v. Garvin green
conn · 1997
51997–2020
Cochran v. City of Akron green
scotus · 1981
51986–2001
McGugan v. Ohio green
scotus · 1981
51986–2001
Evans v. Anderson green
scotus · 1981
51986–2001
GlaxoSmithKline v. Human Med. Plans, Inc. green
scotus · 2013
42018–2026
State v. Ferguson green
conn · 2002
42002–2018
State v. Aparo green
conn · 1992
42001–2016
Abney v. United States green
scotus · 1977
41985–2008
State v. James green
conn · 1999
41999–2001
United States v. Halper red
scotus · 1989
41992–1997
State v. Tabone green
conn · 2009
32016–2021
State v. John green
conn · 1989
31990–2021
Rutledge v. United States green
scotus · 1996
32016–2021
State v. Santiago green
connappct · 2013
32017–2020

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (68) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 (62) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21 (54) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59 (54) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (52) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3 (52) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-134 (46) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 (46) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 (45) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8 (37) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92 (34) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 (33)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 1301 (1962–2026) FL 756 (1965–2026) IN 635 (1971–2026) WA 625 (1945–2026) IL 593 (1958–2026) PA 564 (1967–2026) CA 507 (1953–2026) NM 488 (1973–2026) OH 424 (1971–2025) CT 395 (1974–2026) MO 319 (1956–2025) MI 281 (1970–2026) MA 225 (1970–2026) TN 224 (1975–2026) AZ 205 (1960–2026) VA 199 (1970–2026) MS 192 (1977–2026) LA 179 (1974–2025) NY 175 (1960–2026) MD 169 (1956–2026) NJ 148 (1951–2025) KY 145 (1971–2026) GA 142 (1972–2026) WI 139 (1949–2026) AL 131 (1978–2026) KS 117 (1970–2026) CO 115 (1972–2026) AR 111 (1983–2026) NC 104 (1972–2026) WV 101 (1978–2025) DC 100 (1959–2026) HI 96 (1970–2026) AK 85 (1967–2025) IA 82 (1973–2026) MN 75 (1967–2026) WY 67 (1975–2024) NH 66 (1960–2025) OR 65 (1969–2025) MT 62 (1977–2025) ID 61 (1963–2025) NE 59 (1970–2025) SC 57 (1970–2025) ND 56 (1971–2025) RI 54 (1973–2023) OK 52 (1972–2020) UT 48 (1979–2026) ME 48 (1969–2026) DE 48 (1974–2025) NV 47 (1983–2024) SD 35 (1975–2025) VT 22 (1980–2024) VI 15 (1979–2024) GU 4 (2022–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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