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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92 (2025)

Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1975–2026 406citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 406 opinions since 1975, 24 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(2)(A) (11 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)

History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara. indicators and made other technical changes.

Cited. 173 C. 165; 197 C. 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 225 C. 347; 227 C. 677; 235 C. 711; 236 C. 112. Court's failure to instruct jury in accordance with 287 C. 509 was harmless because restraint of victim was not incidental to additional offenses. 293 C. 435.

Cited. 8 CA 177; 24 CA 13; 39 CA 632; 46 CA 691; Id., 741.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165. Cited. 185 C. 339; 189 C. 346; 194 C. 114; Id., 692; 198 C. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 1; Id., 240; Id., 714; 205 C. 132; Id., 673; 206 C. 40; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 210 C. 110; Id., 199; Id., 315; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 388; Id., 422; 214 C. 38; Id., 89; 215 C. 173; Id., 716; 216 C. 647; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 93; Id., 160; Id., 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 270; Id., 345; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 1; Id., 153; 228 C. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 C. 195; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284. Cited. Id., 694; 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235; 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 740. Legislature intended to exclude from scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608. Holding in 287 C. 509 that to commit a kidnapping, defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime, applies retroactively to petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenges his kidnapping conviction. 299 C. 740. Where defendant was also charged with robbery and there was no evidence that victim was bound or moved physically, and victim was restrained for five minutes and released immediately after robbery was complete, the restraint alone cannot support kidnapping charge. 301 C. 77. Subdiv. (2)(A): Subpara. not unconstitutionally vague since defendant had fair warning when he committed sexual assault in 1988 that his movement of victim could support an independent kidnapping conviction. 306 C. 718. Retroactive relief is available, as long as the evidence warrants such relief, for all collateral attacks on judgments rendered final prior to the holding in 287 C. 509, irrespective of whether the kidnapping instruction was challenged in the criminal proceeding, and such challenges are not subject to the procedural default rule; omission of a Salamon instruction not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 321 C. 56. Subdiv. (2)(B): Clarifying “merely incidental to and necessary for” language used in holding in State v. Salamon, 287 C. 509, and cited in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 C. 56. 339 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 428; 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457; 34 CA 276; 36 CA 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718; Id., 774; 37 CA 360; Id., 464; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155. Kidnapping conviction reversed and matter remanded so jury could be instructed re holdings in 287 C. 509 and 288 C. 418 that it could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping unless he intended to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the underlying crime. 115 CA 166. Subdiv. (2)(A): When assessing whether a kidnapping charge is merely incidental to and necessary for another crime, trial court must make a specific factual finding whether defendant intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than what was necessary to commit the other crime; where defendant is charged with kidnapping pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(A), and no evidence is presented at trial re defendant's intention to inflict physical injury subsequent to related sexual assault, court's analysis of the kidnapping charge is limited to defendant's conduct up to the completion of the sexual assault. 118 CA 140. Subdiv. (2)(A) is a lesser offense included within the kidnapping charge of Subdiv. (2)(B) and thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted double jeopardy. Id., 831. Subdiv. (2): 287 C. 509 does not control burglary and larceny case because restraint of victim was not necessary to accomplish those crimes and restraint occurred after defendant took jewelry. 127 CA 181. Subdivs. (2)(A) and (2)(B) are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 180 CA 371; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54. Subdiv. (2)(B): In order to prevail on habeas claim that the absence of a Salamon instruction did not constitute harmless error, petitioner is not required to establish that there was insufficient evidence to convict him or that a properly instructed jury likely would find him guilty; commissioner bears burden of demonstrating that the omission of a Salamon instruction on incidental restraint did not contribute to the verdict; test to be applied by appellate court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would reach a different result. 184 CA 101; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 1.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-92 28×subsections: (a)(2)(A) 2×cited by 242 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) defines kidnapping in the first degree and provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and .”
The case’s holding
To commit kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation more extensively than is necessary to commit that other crime.
Later courts cite it for
“to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENState v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-92 28×subsections: (a)(2)(A) 9×cited by 197 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“II In light of my conclusion that this court has no authority to reconsider the liberal rule of admissibility for prior bad acts in sex crime cases, which was applied in accordance with the code in the present case, I turn to the question presented in the state's appeal as to…”
The case’s holding
Courts may admit evidence of uncharged misconduct more liberally in sexual assault cases than in other criminal cases due to strong public policy reasons.
Later courts cite it for
“a limited exception to the prohibition on the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENLuurtsema v. Comm'r of Corr., 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 53a-92 46×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The petitioner, Peter Luurtsema, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, challenging, inter alia, the legality of his 2000 conviction under a prior interpretation of § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A).”
The case’s holding
A general presumption in favor of full retroactivity applies to judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.
Later courts cite it for
“a general presumption in favor of full retroactivity for judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Niemeyer, 782 A.2d 658 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-92 26×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“This certified appeal requires us to determine whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of the defendant, Tony Niemeyer, for kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A)…”
The case’s holding
Whether a detention is incidental to a lawful arrest is ordinarily a question for the jury (explaining that the incidental detention issue is ordinarily a question for the jury).
Later courts cite it for
“the guiding principle is whether the confinement or movement was so much the part of another substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts . . . .” · 1 citing court
5
REDState v. Sanseverino, 969 A.2d 710 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-92 20×cited by 57 cases
Overruled in part by State v. Payne: 2 citing opinions say in part, 1 limits it to other grounds, and 1 adds another limit ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 53a-92
“I join with the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize that, in my view, allowing the state the option of requesting the modification of the conviction of the defendant, Paolino Sanseverino, on the charge of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
Appellate courts may modify judgments to lesser included offenses without jury instructions if post-trial legal changes necessitate reversal and the jury necessarily found all elements of the lesser crime.
6
GREENState v. Nelson, 986 A.2d 311 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 53a-92 23×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“Nelson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), assault in the first degree in violation of…”
The case’s holding
Convicting a defendant of both kidnapping with intent to inflict injury and kidnapping with intent to commit assault violates double jeopardy.
7
REDState v. Sanseverino, 949 A.2d 1156 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-92 17×cited by 58 cases
Overruled in part by State v. DeJesus: 15 citing opinions say in part, 3 limit it to other grounds, and 1 adds another limit ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 53a-92
“In these certified appeals involving criminal offenses against two victims, the defendant, Paolino Sanseverino, and the state both appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the first…”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping conviction cannot stand if the restraint of the victim is merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of a separate sexual assault.
Later courts cite it for
“under the facts of sanseverino, no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of kidnapping in the first degree on the basis of the evidence that the state proffered at trial.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Tweedy, 594 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 53a-92 19×cited by 110 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“After a jury trial, the defendant, Larry Tweedy, was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), 1 one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes *491 § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), 2 one count…”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising from the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.
Later courts cite it for
“the negative connotations of restraints, nevertheless, are without significance unless the fact of the restraints comes to the attention of the jury.” · 2 citing courts
9
REDState v. Luurtsema, 811 A.2d 223 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 53a-92 12×cited by 63 cases
Overruled by State v. Salamon on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 3 say in part.
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant, Peter Luurtsema, was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) 1 and 53a-70 (a) (l), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), 3…”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping conviction is unconscionable when the restraint element is based on miniscule movement of the victim (rejecting argument imputing a temporal requirement to the restraint element).
10
GREENState v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-92 10×cited by 158 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“A jury convicted the defendant, Floyd Troupe, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (1) (A), and kidnapping in the first degree in *286 violation…”
The case’s holding
A witness testifying to a victim's complaint may only testify regarding the fact and timing of the report and details necessary to associate the complaint with the charge.
Later courts cite it for
“a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator.” · 7 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 53a-92 6×cited by 153 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certification, [3] from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(1) and…”
The case’s holding
An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion if the ruling is premised on a correct view of the law.
Later courts cite it for
“we review the trial court's decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.” · 18 citing courts
12
GREENConnecticut v. Dyson, 680 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-92 15×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant, George Dyson, appeals 1 from his conviction, after a jury trial, of kidnap *786 ping in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-92 (a) (2) (C) and 53a-8 (a), and robbery in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping statute requiring intent to terrorize is not unconstitutionally vague because the element requires proof of specific intent to terrorize the victim.
Later courts cite it for
“because the defendant has failed to provide any independent analysis under the state constitution, we limit our analysis to the federal constitution” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENBanks v. Comm'r of Corr., 259 A.3d 1082 (Conn. 2021).
cites § 53a-92 10×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“) The jury found the petitioner guilty of four counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B),2 four counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a- 134 (a) (4), and two counts of criminal possession…”
14
GREENState v. Anderson, 561 A.2d 897 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-92 8×cited by 99 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant was charged in a substitute information with two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), 1 one count of attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and…”
The case’s holding
Failure to adequately instruct a jury on every essential element of a charged crime may violate a defendant's due process rights.
Later courts cite it for
“the failure to instruct the jury adequately on each essential element of the crime charged may result in a violation of the defendant's due process rights implicating the fairness of his or her trial” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Burton, 778 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-92 6×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant was tried by a jury on charges of kidnapping in the first degree in violation *155 of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), 1 risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev.”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction must be considered as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.
Later courts cite it for
“the state may properly argue that the witnesses had no apparent motive to lie” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Johnson, 138 A.3d 1108 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 53a-92 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant, Efrain Johnson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c and one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A) for…”
The case’s holding
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.
Later courts cite it for
“the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” · 2 citing courts
17
REDState v. DeJesus, 880 A.2d 910 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 53a-92 9×cited by 21 cases
Reversed in part by State v. DeJesus (2008): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with respect to the direction to render judgment of not guilty of kidnappi…
Where it cites § 53a-92
“The defendant, Carlos DeJesus, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) and two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied when the confinement of the victim is merely incidental to the commission of a sexual assault.
18
GREENState v. Pierre, 890 A.2d 474 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-92 4×cited by 116 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“*45 As part of a six count information, the defendant was charged with capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b, murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53SL-54C, 1 two counts of kidnapping in the first…”
The case’s holding
An arrest warrant must comply with specific procedural requirements and contain particular information regarding the arrest (explaining procedure for and contents of arrest warrant and information).
Later courts cite it for
“that a witness' claimed inability to remember earlier statements or the events surrounding those statements does not implicate the requirements of the confrontation clause under crawford, so long as the witness appears at trial, takes an oath to testify truthfully, and answers the questions put to him or her during cross-examination.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Palmer, 536 A.2d 936 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 53a-92 8×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“By three separate indictments and amended informations, the defendant, Edward Palmer, was charged with the following crimes: three counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A); 1 three counts of unlawful restraint in the first…”
The case’s holding
The right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings such as an indictment or arraignment.
Later courts cite it for
“as the connecticut supreme court has consistently held, a defendant's right to counsel, under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution or its state constitutional counterpart, attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Wright, 500 A.2d 547 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 53a-92 10×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 53a-92
“General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B). 2 After a jury trial, the defendant, Arthur Lee Wright, was convicted of both crimes.”
The case’s holding
Escape from custody and kidnapping in the first degree are distinct offenses for double jeopardy purposes because each requires proof of an element the other does not.

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197520002026

One bar per year. Tallest: 23 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.243Conn.155D. Conn.6Ariz. Ct. App.1Conn. Super. Ct.1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
State v. Epps, 936 A.2d 701 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
Syms v. Tebow, No. 3:24-cv-01285 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2025).
(a)(1)(A)1 case
Millan v. Connecticut, 117 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Conn. 1999).
(a)(2)2 cases
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
Nogueira v. Comm'r of Corr., 149 A.3d 983 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
(a)(2)(A)11 cases
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).“II In light of my conclusion that this court has no authority to reconsider the liberal rule of admissibility for prior bad acts in sex crime cases, which was applied in accordance with the code in the present case, I turn to the question presented in the state's appeal as to…”
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).“General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) defines kidnapping in the first degree and provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and .”
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
Nogueira v. Comm'r of Corr., 149 A.3d 983 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
Pereira v. Comm'r of Corr., 171 A.3d 105 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(a)(2)(B)4 cases
Bell v. Comm'r of Corr., 194 A.3d 809 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
Sinchak v. Comm'r of Corr., 163 A.3d 1208 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Jones v. Comm'r of Corr., 150 A.3d 757 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
Rojas v. Comm'r of Corr., 157 A.3d 709 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
(a)(2)(C)1 case
State v. Lujan, 911 P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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