Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2402, 24-2408 and 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28(a), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Additionally, many of the annotations found under this Code section were taken from cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I.

Constitutionality of application.

- Defendant's contention that the provision for charging juveniles as adults was applied in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner against the defendant and other black males was not established by any evidence. Skidmore v. State, 226 Ga. App. 130, 485 S.E.2d 540 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Determination that deprivation proceeding not custody dispute.

- Juvenile court did not have jurisdiction of a deprivation proceeding brought against a mother brought by the child's temporary guardian in a transparent attempt to use the juvenile court to seek custody of the child. In re B.C.P., 229 Ga. App. 111, 493 S.E.2d 258 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Deprivation proceeding not a custody dispute.

- Because the pleadings established that the petition was a properly filed and factually supported deprivation petition, and due to the presence of unchallenged, valid allegations of deprivation, the deprivation proceeding was not a disguised custody matter; accordingly, the juvenile court properly exercised the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding. In the Interest of K.L.H., 281 Ga. App. 394, 636 S.E.2d 117 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Specific custody controversies not within supreme court appellate jurisdiction.

- Custody controversies involving delinquent children, unruly children, or deprived children are not cases "in the nature of habeas corpus" and are not within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction of juvenile court in transferred custody proceeding.

- Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the transfer of a father's petition for custody from Gwinnett County, Georgia, to Douglas County, Georgia because the "complaint for custody" that the father filed in Gwinnett County fairly was read as a petition to modify, vacate, or revoke the permanent guardianship, a petition over which the Juvenile Court of Douglas County had exclusive jurisdiction under the circumstances. In the Interest of M. F., 298 Ga. 138, 780 S.E.2d 291 (2015).

Proceeding for termination of parental rights is custody controversy involving deprived child. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Actions in which one parent seeks termination of the parental rights of the other parent by means of a deprivation petition are not all prima facie custody cases and it is not required that all such actions must be filed in superior court. In re M.C.J., 271 Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6 (1999) reversing In re W. W. W., 213 Ga. App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832 (1994); (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5); In re M.A., 218 Ga. App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5); In re M.C.J., 236 Ga. App. 225, 511 S.E.2d 533 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the husband's parental rights because the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock was a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father; after the superior court determined that the biological father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the issue became whether the superior court could grant the petition to legitimate the child, and to grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the husband, who was the legal father. Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction if agency has custody.

- That a "deprived child" may be in agency custody at the time of the hearing on termination of parental rights does not oust the juvenile court from jurisdiction to determine the ultimate issue. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Petition to terminate the parental rights to a child previously adjudicated "deprived" and in agency custody is cognizable in the juvenile court. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Custody dispute of orphaned children.

- In a custody dispute involving children orphaned by the murder-suicide of their parents, a superior court did not err in denying an aunt's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the superior court correctly held that, in the absence of an earlier-filed action in juvenile court or probate court, it was the first court to take jurisdiction and properly retained jurisdiction. Stone-Crosby v. Mickens-Cook, 318 Ga. App. 313, 733 S.E.2d 842 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court in habeas corpus action for child custody lacks authority to enter order terminating parental rights. Dein v. Mossman, 244 Ga. 866, 262 S.E.2d 83 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

General requirements necessary to terminate parental rights.

- Generally, the requirements necessary to terminate the parental rights of the mother are deprivation, probable continued deprivation, and that the child will probably suffer serious emotional harm. Beasley v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 317, 254 S.E.2d 472 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Definition of "full age."

- One becomes of "full age" on the day preceding the anniversary of one's birth, on the first moment of that day. Edmonds v. State, 154 Ga. App. 650, 269 S.E.2d 512 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Child turned 17 on the earliest moment of the day before juvenile's birthday.

- Delinquency petition against a juvenile was properly transferred to the state court on the ground that the juvenile was arrested for possessing marijuana on the day before the juvenile's seventeenth birthday; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-28 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212, and15-11-560), the juvenile was deemed to have been 17 at the earliest moment of the day before the juvenile's birthday, which was the day the juvenile was arrested. In the Interest of A.P.S., 304 Ga. App. 513, 696 S.E.2d 483 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile subject to criminal adjudication when case transferred to superior court.

- Juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Confinement implies juvenile in need of supervision, correction, and training.

- Confinement necessarily deprives the parents of their prima facie prerogative of training and supervision, and implies that the juvenile is, within the terms of the juvenile law, one who is in need of supervision beyond the control of the parents and in need of correction and training which the parents cannot provide. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court has jurisdiction despite indictment for noncapital felony.

- Indictment of a juvenile for a noncapital felony in the superior court does not oust the juvenile court of the court's first obtained jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution and statute law. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975) commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Defendant claimed under 17 at the time offenses were committed.

- Superior court had authority to try the defendant who claimed to be under 17 at the time the offenses were committed since the jury was instructed that the defendant should be found guilty only if the defendant committed the alleged acts after the defendant turned 17. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 319, 447 S.E.2d 663 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court not divested of jurisdiction unless transfer proceeding held.

- Since jurisdiction is first acquired by the juvenile court, a subsequent superior court indictment does not divest the juvenile court of the juvenile court's jurisdiction unless a proper transfer proceeding has been held. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Superior court referral of custody case retained juvenile court's jurisdiction.

- Jurisdiction of divorce in superior court, and referral by the superior court to the juvenile court for custody determination, gave the juvenile court jurisdiction over the custody issue. Order by the superior court, in response to a party's motion for modification of custody, when the custody issue had not yet been resolved by the juvenile court, was void. Owen v. Owen, 195 Ga. App. 545, 394 S.E.2d 580 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Referral from superior court to juvenile court for special findings.

- Since a custody case was referred to the juvenile court for only an investigation and report with the judgment of the superior court resting on these findings as well as testimony and other evidence before the superior court, the superior court's judgment was not void, but at most was voidable only if an appeal had been perfected. Jackson v. Gamble, 232 Ga. 149, 205 S.E.2d 256 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Exceptions to superior court jurisdiction to try juvenile.

- Superior court has jurisdictional power to try a juvenile defendant accused of an offense or offenses for which the maximum criminal penalty is neither life imprisonment nor death. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933. § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction in superior court.

- Superior court had exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of two persons, 15 and 16 years of age, who were alleged to have committed armed robbery with a rifle, and there was no error in the court's refusal to transfer the case to juvenile court. Bearden v. State, 241 Ga. App. 842, 528 S.E.2d 275 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Unaccepted offer to reduce armed robbery to robbery did not obligate the state to reduce the charge because armed robbery was punishable by life imprisonment, it was not a transferable offense, and the trial court was without authority to transfer the armed robbery case from superior court to juvenile court. State v. Harper, 271 Ga. App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

While an original child molestation charge brought against a juvenile was properly filed in the juvenile court, once the state added an aggravated sexual battery count via an amendment, the superior court gained jurisdiction. Thus, the juvenile's allegations that the state failed to comply with the procedural requirements under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-49(c)(1) and (e) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-472) should have been raised in the superior court, and had no bearing on the validity of the delinquency petitions or the substantive charges against the juvenile in juvenile court. In the Interest of K.C., 290 Ga. App. 416, 659 S.E.2d 821 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Since an armed robbery was completed when control of the money in a cash register was ceded to the defendant and the other four robbers, the facts were sufficient to indict the defendant, who was 16 years old, for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); therefore, the superior court lacked authority under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) to transfer the case to a juvenile court. Gutierrez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 371, 702 S.E.2d 642 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to 20 years to serve 10 in prison pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) and (d) because, although the defendant was only 13 years old, the defendant participated in an armed robbery; the legislature's determination that the superior court has jurisdiction over minors 13 to 17 years of age who are alleged to have committed certain serious offenses is founded on a rational basis, including the need for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders and the safety of students and citizens of Georgia. Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court loss of jurisdiction after 180 days.

- Because a grand jury did not indict a juvenile within 180 days after the juvenile's detention as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(vii) and no extension of time had been granted as of that date, the grand jury lost authority over the case by operation of law. The trial court's order granting the state's request for an out-of-time extension was void. Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga. App. 558, 716 S.E.2d 608 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Same 180-day time limitation applied to both former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28(b) and15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-560,15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566), and that 180 days began to run on the day the juvenile was detained whenever the superior court was exercising jurisdiction under either section; it necessarily follows that anytime the superior court loses jurisdiction which was conferred by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) because the state failed to obtain an indictment within 180 days of the date the juvenile was detained, the time will also have expired within which the state could procure an indictment if the superior court were proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 and, thus, a transfer back to the superior court under those circumstances is pointless since an indictment returned by the grand jury would be void. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Although O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 allows the state to request one automatic 90-day extension, this extension cannot be granted after the expiration of the 180 days; the legislature intended to set time limitations for the state to act in those situations in which the juvenile is detained and the superior court is exercising jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A.15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566). In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court loss of jurisdiction after 180 days.

- Trial court erred by denying a juvenile's motion to quash the indictment for failing to obtain an indictment within 180 days of the juvenile's detention as mandated by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 because the 180-day time limit did not cease to run while the juvenile was released on bail, thus, the case had to be transferred back to the juvenile court. Edwards v. State, 323 Ga. App. 864, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013).

Exceptions to juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 24A-301 and 24A-401 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212, and15-11-560) did not vest exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the following class of youthful offenders: persons between the ages of 17 and 21 years, who have committed noncapital felonies, and who were under the supervision of or were on probation to a juvenile court for acts of delinquency committed before reaching the age of 17 years. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Transfer to superior court not required if no exclusive jurisdiction.

- In a child molestation case, it was not necessary for the juvenile court to transfer the charges to the superior court in order for the superior court to have jurisdiction because the juvenile court's finding that there was no evidence that the defendant was under 17 when the acts were committed amounted to a finding that the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction. Landrum v. State, 210 Ga. App. 275, 436 S.E.2d 40 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Transfer from superior court.

- State did not show that a superior court abused the court's discretion in reaching a decision that a 14-year-old defendant's aggravated sexual assault case was "extraordinary" and should be heard in juvenile court due to the defendant's social immaturity. State v. Ware, 258 Ga. App. 564, 574 S.E.2d 632 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Collateral estoppel did not prohibit transfer back to superior court.

- Disregarding the question of whether collateral estoppel actually applied in the context of a case, the transfer of an involuntary manslaughter case, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-567), against a juvenile to the juvenile court did not collaterally estop a later transfer of the case back to the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563,15-11-566) because the first transfer was based on the jurisdictional restrictions in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) and at the time of that transfer, the superior court did not consider or rule on the multiple factors in former § 15-11-30.2 on which the second transfer was based. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Habeas corpus petition does not confer superior court jurisdiction.

- If a juvenile court order entered pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24A-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211,15-11-212,15-11-215) after notice and hearing was still in effect, the superior court had no jurisdiction of the related habeas corpus petition. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Violation of probation.

- Under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(2)(B) and15-11-28(a)(1)(F) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10, and15-11-11), a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, who was over 17 when a probation violation occurred; thus, the defendant's commitment under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602) was void. The state had not filed a petition for probation revocation, but only for a violation of probation. In the Interest of T.F., 314 Ga. App. 606, 724 S.E.2d 892 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction to hear grandparents' petition for permanent custody after determining that the mother's four children were deprived since the grandparents' complaint for permanent custody was not in the nature of a deprivation petition and did not allege that the grandparents should be granted permanent custody of the children on the basis that the children were deprived. In re C.C., 193 Ga. App. 120, 387 S.E.2d 46 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction over children born in U.S. to Mexican citizens.

- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of Mexican citizens because, when the termination petition was filed, the children, who were born in the United States, were citizens of Georgia and thereby entitled to the protection of Georgia law, which specifically provides for the termination of parental rights. In the Interest of J.H., 244 Ga. App. 788, 536 S.E.2d 805 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Custody case could not determine other civil issues.

- Because the trial court relied upon documents other than the pleadings, a motion to dismiss should in fact have been treated as a motion for summary judgment; a juvenile court had no jurisdiction over claims of fraud, breach of contract, perjury, and defamation made by a former husband against his former wife, and thus, a custody case between parties which was litigated in juvenile court was not an adjudication of the husband's claim for purposes of res judicata. Litsky v. Schaub, 269 Ga. App. 254, 603 S.E.2d 754 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Child molestation.

- Because child molestation was not an offense listed in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560), the trial court erred in using former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(D) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2) to classify the offense as a designated felony act when the court sentenced a juvenile. In the Interest of M. S., 277 Ga. App. 706, 627 S.E.2d 422 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Because the indictment alleged and the evidence at trial authorized a finding that the defendant committed aggravated child molestation on some date after July 1, 2006, the trial court could not be divested of jurisdiction pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-560). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Armed robbery.

- Denial of the defendant's motion to transfer under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) was upheld; the armed robbery was completed at the time the cash register was opened and the flap resting on the top of the cash raised, thereby ceding control of the money to the perpetrators and satisfying the requisite slightest change of location necessary for the armed robbery. Gutierrez v. State, 290 Ga. 643, 723 S.E.2d 658 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Order addressing issue not raised was a nullity.

- Since a written order issued by a juvenile court did not show deprivation of the child with regard to the child's father, and since all parties stipulated that the child was not deprived with regard to the child's father, the order was void to the extent the order directed removal of the child from the father's home; moreover, to the extent that a later contempt finding was based on the trial court's void order, it was a nullity; the trial court's direction as to removal of the child was not binding and the court's later contempt finding based on that order was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Transfer to superior court was improper.

- Juvenile court erred in granting the state's motion to transfer the defendant juvenile's case back to the superior court pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566) because the superior court had properly transferred the case to the juvenile court since the defendant was not indicted within 180 days of detention as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1; the time limits set forth in § 17-7-50.1 were plainly stated and mandatory and clearly express the legislative intent that when a juvenile was detained and the superior court was exercising jurisdiction under either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2, the state must obtain an indictment within the specified time or the superior court lost the jurisdiction conferred by those provisions. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Transfer to juvenile court was only appropriate action.

- Under the plain mandate of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1(b), once the grand jury fails to return a true bill within 180 days of the juvenile's detention, the only action the Georgia superior court is authorized to take is to transfer the case to the juvenile court and any indictment the grand jury returned after the 180 days is void. Edwards v. State, 323 Ga. App. 864, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013).

Transferral of custody habeas corpus case by superior court.

- In a custody controversy in the nature of habeas corpus, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide the issue only if the case is transferred to the juvenile court by proper order of the superior court; and in such a transferred case, appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the supreme court of this state. In re J.R.T., 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301) Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Original and appellate jurisdiction in certain custody controversies.

- Juvenile court has original jurisdiction in a custody controversy involving a delinquent child, an unruly child, or a deprived child and appellate jurisdiction in such cases is vested in the court of appeals. In re J.R.T., 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301) Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction over offenses committed when juvenile 16.

- Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over the defendant for an offense the defendant committed when the defendant was 16 years old until the entry of the court's order transferring the case to the superior court. In re D.L., 228 Ga. App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Lack of jurisdiction to award permanent custody.

- Judgment was reversed because the juvenile court's authority to place a child in the custody of a "willing" and "qualified" relative was not authority to award permanent custody of the child as custody was determined by discerning the best interests of the child and not the willingness or the qualifications of a person to take temporary custody of the child. Ertter v. Dunbar, 292 Ga. 103, 734 S.E.2d 403 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court is court of special and limited jurisdiction, and the court's judgments must show on the judgment's face such facts as are necessary to give the court jurisdiction of the person and subject matter. If the order of a juvenile court fails to recite the jurisdictional facts, the judgment is void. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers specifically conferred upon the courts by statute. In re J.O., 191 Ga. App. 521, 382 S.E.2d 214 (1989), overruled on other grounds, In re T.A.W., 265 Ga. 106, 454 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Order which fails to recite jurisdictional grounds is void.

- If the order of the juvenile court taking custody, control, and supervision of a minor child fails to show that it was by reason of one of the several grounds set out in the statute, such order is void for want of jurisdiction. Ferguson v. Hunt, 221 Ga. 728, 146 S.E.2d 756 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction of juvenile court, being civil in nature, extends only to those minors who are residents of the county. Giles v. State, 123 Ga. App. 700, 182 S.E.2d 140 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction of capital felonies and custody cases distinguished.

- Juvenile court and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction of delinquent acts which constitute capital felonies, but the juvenile court may consider questions of custody only if such issues are transferred to the juvenile court from the superior court. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction of included offenses.

- Superior court had jurisdiction to convict a juvenile defendant of aggravated assault since that offense was part of the same transaction as the greater offense of armed robbery over which the court had jurisdiction. Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227, 483 S.E.2d 691 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) Houston v. State, 237 Ga. App. 878, 517 S.E.2d 357 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction to enter child support award.

- Since a parent's children were found to be deprived and were placed temporarily with relatives, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(c)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), the trial court had jurisdiction to order the parent to pay temporary support. However, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final award of support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 as no final order was entered disposing of the case. In the Interest of R.F., 295 Ga. App. 739, 673 S.E.2d 108 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Granting of temporary custody of the mother's child to the mother's ex-boyfriend and his wife following their petition to have the boy adjudicated deprived was inappropriate because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(1)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212). The petition did not contain valid allegations of deprivation and nothing in the record demonstrated that present drug use on the part of the mother had a negative effect on the child rising to the level of present deprivation; the petition was an attempt to obtain custody of the child. In the Interest of C. L. C., 299 Ga. App. 729, 683 S.E.2d 690 (2009); Mauldin v. Mauldin, 322 Ga. App. 507, 745 S.E.2d 754 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Jurisdiction over legitimation petition and for placement.

- Contrary to a mother's contention, the custody order showed on the order's face such facts as were necessary to give the juvenile court jurisdiction of the person and subject matter because the order referenced and incorporated the legitimation order entered days earlier, reflected on the order's face that all parties were served with a copy of the pleadings and were present, along with their counsel, and the mother did not contest the juvenile court's personal jurisdiction. In the Interest of B. H.-W., 332 Ga. App. 269, 772 S.E.2d 66 (2015).

Age at time of offense controls.

- Although a juvenile no longer qualified as a child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(2)(A) and (B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2) after the seventeenth birthday, it is the juvenile's age at the time of the offense that controls; therefore, because the juvenile was under the age of 17 at the time the act of delinquency was committed, the juvenile court properly exercised exclusive original jurisdiction over the juvenile's case. In the Interest of J.T.D., 242 Ga. App. 243, 529 S.E.2d 377 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

As there was evidence that the defendant molested the victim after turning 17, the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the defendant's sexual molestation case, and the defendant's conviction in a superior court was proper. McGruder v. State, 279 Ga. App. 851, 632 S.E.2d 730 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court does not have original jurisdiction over custody controversy.

- It was not the intention of the General Assembly to give original jurisdiction of the custody of a child to a juvenile court when there is a dispute over the custody between the parents. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 99 Ga. App. 770, 109 S.E.2d 821 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Original and appellate jurisdiction in custody disputes between parents.

- In a case of dispute over custody between parents, original jurisdiction exists exclusively in courts having jurisdiction of habeas corpus or divorce and alimony actions, in both of which the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction on appeal. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 99 Ga. App. 770, 109 S.E.2d 821 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Termination of parental rights via divorce decree.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), except in connection with an adoption proceeding, a juvenile court was the sole court for an action involving any proceeding for the termination of parental rights. However, the parent affirmatively invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court for the purpose of obtaining the divorce, consented to the superior court's incorporation of the settlement agreement, and then failed to file a motion to set aside the judgment of divorce for four years; thus, the parent's acts and omissions estopped the parent from attacking the divorce judgment. Amerson v. Vandiver, 285 Ga. 49, 673 S.E.2d 850 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court had jurisdiction over a biological father's legitimation petition because, although the child was born while the mother was married to another man, that man's responsibility to the child was ended by stipulation of the parties in their divorce; the former husband was no longer the child's legal father, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1(a)(2)(B), he had no parental rights to terminate, and the juvenile court's jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-10(3)(D) was not invaded. Smith v. Pearce, 334 Ga. App. 84, 778 S.E.2d 248 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0247, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 33 (Ga. 2016).

Noncapital juvenile cases.

- Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over noncapital juvenile cases. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Deprivation and termination of parental rights.

- Juvenile court shall be sole court for initiating action for termination of legal parent-child relationship. Dein v. Mossman, 244 Ga. 866, 262 S.E.2d 83 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving deprivation and termination of parental rights. Abrams v. Daffron, 155 Ga. App. 182, 270 S.E.2d 278 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Superior court has jurisdiction to consider termination of the rights of a putative father only "in connection with adoption proceedings." Alexander v. Guthrie, 216 Ga. App. 460, 454 S.E.2d 805 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider divorced mother's petition for termination of the father's parental rights. In re A.D.B., 232 Ga. App. 697, 503 S.E.2d 596 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving termination of parental rights. The juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over a grandmother's petition to terminate a mother's parental rights because the grandmother already had custody of the children and the mother was facing allegations of having deprived her children. In the Interest of K.N.C., 264 Ga. App. 475, 590 S.E.2d 792 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Jurisdiction over deprivation cases is exclusive.

- Subparagraph (a)(1)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212) clearly placed exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court as the sole court for initiating an action concerning any child who is alleged to be deprived. Williams v. Davenport, 159 Ga. App. 531, 284 S.E.2d 45 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, and the juvenile court had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody. In re A.L.L., 211 Ga. App. 767, 440 S.E.2d 517 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Because the action appealed from involved a deprivation proceeding, and the court's order reflected on the order's face that the order was addressing the alleged deprivation of the child at issue, the juvenile court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over the deprivation petition. In the Interest of T. L., 269 Ga. App. 842, 605 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Absent evidence of a custody dispute, a deprivation proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Exclusive jurisdiction for two years over children found deprived.

- Juvenile Code vests exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court for at least two years over matters concerning children whom the juvenile court has duly found to be deprived. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Child was not deprived so as to confer jurisdiction since it was admitted that both grandparental homes were suitable as placements for the child. In re C.F., 199 Ga. App. 858, 406 S.E.2d 279 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Termination-of-rights petition which seeks adoption of child.

- If a petition for termination of the rights of a putative father of an illegitimate child specifically states that it is in pursuance of the petitioners' prospective adoption of the child, the petition is "in connection with adoption proceedings" within the meaning of subparagraph (a)(2)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212). H.C.S. v. Grebel, 253 Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) H.C.S. v. Grebel, 172 Ga. App. 819, 325 S.E.2d 925 (1984);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition for termination of parental rights because the termination was sought "in connection with" an adoption proceeding. In re B.G.D., 224 Ga. App. 124, 479 S.E.2d 439 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Termination action in which adoption will be pursued at a later date.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over a child's grandparents' action seeking termination of the child's parents' parental rights. Although the grandparents planned to adopt the child, the grandparents intended to adopt the child under the laws of Florida, where the grandparents lived. In re J. S., 302 Ga. App. 342, 691 S.E.2d 250 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Speeding is an act designated a crime by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (now subsection (a) of § 40-6-1) and, therefore, a speeding charge against a 16-year-old juvenile could be tried only in juvenile court. In re L.J.V., 180 Ga. App. 400, 349 S.E.2d 37 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Acts constituting armed robbery with a firearm.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that the prosecution was barred by double jeopardy since the defendant previously had been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for the acts alleged in the indictment because the juvenile court's adjudication of the defendant as delinquent was void, and jeopardy did not attach during the juvenile court proceeding; because the superior court had exclusive jurisdiction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(vii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) since the defendant was alleged in the juvenile court to have committed acts constituting armed robbery with a firearm, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant delinquent for acts constituting armed robbery, notwithstanding the state's initial participation in the juvenile proceedings or the defendant's admission of the allegations in that court. Bonner v. State, 302 Ga. App. 57, 690 S.E.2d 216 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-528).

Violation of probation.

- Although the violation of probation may constitute a "delinquent act" in and of itself, a violation of probation which occurs after the juvenile's 17th birthday will not authorize the initiation of a new delinquency petition against the juvenile. The juvenile court's jurisdiction would extend only to revoking the juvenile's probation for the juvenile's previous adjudication of delinquency. In re B.S.L., 200 Ga. App. 170, 407 S.E.2d 123 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court properly dismissed delinquency petition since transfer hearing did not apply.

- Juvenile court properly dismissed a delinquency petition without a hearing, which petition alleged that the juvenile committed aggravated sodomy, as former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(f) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) expressly provided that the transfer hearing provisions did not apply to any proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of a superior court, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560), which included aggravated sodomy. In the Interest of N.C., 293 Ga. App. 374, 667 S.E.2d 181 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Exclusive original jurisdiction existed in juvenile court.

- Because there was a bona fide allegation that a child was deprived, because the issue of permanent custody or modification of the divorce decree had not been transferred to the juvenile court, and because a mother's temporary custody had expired, the juvenile court had authority to exercise the court's exclusive original jurisdiction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(1)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212); therefore, the habeas court erred in denying the father's petition for relief. Douglas v. Douglas, 285 Ga. 548, 678 S.E.2d 904 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over termination proceedings pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28 and15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212,15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) as the petition was filed by the mother, who had already been awarded sole physical custody of the child and as the termination petition dealt specifically with factors relating to the father's inability to provide proper care and support for the child such that the father's parental rights should be terminated. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction.

- Although a great aunt and great step-uncle argued that the trial court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction in a custody matter at a time when the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction, there was no order of the superior court transferring the petition to the juvenile court, and the jurisdiction obtained during an original deprivation proceeding did not serve to retain such jurisdiction; therefore, the juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction. The complaint for permanent custody filed by the grandmother and the step-grandfather was not in the nature of a deprivation petition. Wiepert v. Stover, 298 Ga. App. 683, 680 S.E.2d 707 (2009), overruled on other grounds, Artson, LLC v. Hudson, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28(a), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Character of proceeding determines jurisdiction.

- It is the character of the proceeding, rather than the specific items of relief granted, which determines jurisdiction. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Scope of exclusive jurisdiction.

- Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over the following classes of traffic offenders: (1) offenders under the age of 16 who have committed a "juvenile traffic offense"; (2) offenders under the age of 17 who have committed any traffic offense; and (3) offenders under the age of 21 who have committed any traffic offense, and "who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 17 years, and who have been placed under the supervision of the court or on probation to the court." 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-18 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

No conflict with jurisdictional grant over adoptions to superior courts.

- Jurisdiction of superior courts over adoptions does not conflict with the general grant of "exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters" to the juvenile courts. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Magistrate court judge must be designated to serve as a superior court judge in order to issue arrest warrants, conduct a first appearance hearing, and conduct a preliminary or committal hearing for juveniles prosecuted as adults. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Magistrate court judge may issue arrest warrants for juveniles charged with an offense enumerated in subparagraph (b)(2)(A) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560). 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U98-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Superior court may terminate parent-child relationship only with adoption.

- Although both superior and juvenile courts have jurisdiction to terminate the parent-child relationship, the superior court may do so only in conjunction with an adoption proceeding which has been filed in that court; the juvenile court remains the sole court for initiating a parental termination proceeding if there is no concomitant adoption proceeding in process. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction of superior courts not affected by Interstate Compact on Juveniles.

- No provision of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles has any effect on the jurisdiction and authority of superior courts over matters of adoption. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceedings.

- Superior court may not transfer a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19, proceeding to a juvenile court. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 343 et seq. 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 180 et seq., 287 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 99 et seq., 122 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 3, 4.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute as affected by discrimination in punishments for same offense based upon age, color, or sex, 3 A.L.R. 1614; 8 A.L.R. 854.

Jurisdiction of another court over child as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court, 11 A.L.R. 147; 78 A.L.R. 317; 146 A.L.R. 1153.

What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant, 45 A.L.R. 1533; 85 A.L.R. 1099.

Power of juvenile court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, 76 A.L.R. 657.

Enlistment or mustering of minors into military service, 137 A.L.R. 1467; 147 A.L.R. 1311; 148 A.L.R. 1388; 149 A.L.R. 1457; 150 A.L.R. 1420; 151 A.L.R. 1455; 151 A.L.R. 1456; 152 A.L.R. 1452; 153 A.L.R. 1420; 153 A.L.R. 1422; 154 A.L.R. 1448; 155 A.L.R. 1451; 155 A.L.R. 1452; 156 A.L.R. 1450; 157 A.L.R. 1449; 157 A.L.R. 1450; 158 A.L.R. 1450.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or dependent, 14 A.L.R.2d 336.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of a juvenile court, 48 A.L.R.2d 663.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time of legal proceedings, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506.

Parent's involuntary confinement, for failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 A.L.R.3d 568.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 A.L.R.4th 985.