Intent to assure independence of branches.

- The Constitution provided for a separate existence, distinct functions, and absolute independence of the three coordinate branches of the state government - the executive, legislative, and judicial. Holliman v. State, 175 Ga. 232, 165 S.E. 11 (1932).

This paragraph is designed to preserve inviolate the separation of the legislative and the judicial branches of the government, and to assure to each independence in the sphere of its own functions. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

Separation to be strictly enforced.

- While the line of demarcation separating the legislative, judicial, and executive powers may sometimes be difficult to establish, and for this reason each of the three coordinate branches of government frequently invades the province of the others, it is nevertheless essential to the very foundation of the system of government that the mandate of the Constitution be strictly enforced. McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35 S.E.2d 144 (1945).

No separation of powers violation.

- The trial court's order revoking a probationer's probation did not violate the separation of powers doctrine under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, as the probationer's release resulted from an administrative error, and there was no evidence of any executive department finding that the probationer had fully served an imposed sentence in confinement based on a good-time allowance or otherwise. Clark v. State, 287 Ga. App. 176, 651 S.E.2d 106 (2007).

Effect of violation of separation of powers.

- When an Act cannot be sustained as a whole because it violates the separation of powers principle, the courts will uphold it in part if it is reasonably certain that to do so would correspond with the main intent and purpose which the General Assembly sought to accomplish and if, after the unconstitutional part is stricken, there remains enough to accomplish that purpose. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

Habeas court violated separation of powers by revoking sentence while petitioner in custody of parole board.

- Habeas court erred by revoking the petitioner's remaining portion of the original sentence while the petitioner was in the legal custody of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles as such action was in violation of the separation of powers provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Hayward v. Danforth, 299 Ga. 261, 787 S.E.2d 709 (2016).

Separation cannot be total.

- This paragraph attempts a separation of the three departments of government, which from the nature of things cannot be total. Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210 (1850); Johnson v. Jackson, 99 Ga. 389, 27 S.E. 734 (1896).

Complete separation not necessarily intended.

- Although the separation of powers is fundamental to the constitutional form of government, it does not follow that a complete separation is desirable or was intended. In re Pending Cases, 234 Ga. 264, 215 S.E.2d 473 (1975).

Three departments of government are not kept wholly separate in the Georgia Constitution. In re Pending Cases, 234 Ga. 264, 215 S.E.2d 473 (1975).

While the Constitution declares that the three departments of government shall be separate and distinct, this separation is not and from the nature of things cannot be total. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

While the departments of government must be kept separate and distinct, it is impossible to draw a mathematical line by which every action can be exactly classified; and there are some matters which do not inherently and essentially appertain to one department of government rather than to another. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

Separation of powers principle is sufficiently flexible to permit practical arrangements in a complex government. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

O.C.G.A. § 42-8-29 did not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers, as a probation supervisor had a duty to make the supervisor's findings and report regarding an alleged probation revocation in writing to the court with the supervisor's recommendation; not unlike a district attorney, the probation supervisor was an employee of the Department of Corrections, within the executive branch of state government, and was charged with providing the trial court with information relevant to pending criminal proceedings over which the court alone exercised judicial authority. Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (2004).

Each branch to protect its functions from invasion by other branches.

- The judicial branch doubtless invades the legislative field more frequently than does the legislative branch the judicial field, but it is the duty of each to zealously protect its function from invasion of the others. The legislature has ample power to prevent attempted judicial legislation. Likewise, the judiciary has the power to prevent judicial functions by the legislature, and the welfare of the state demands that it exercise this power when necessary. McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35 S.E.2d 144 (1945).

Paragraph applicable only to state functions.

- This paragraph, providing for separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, applies only to state functions, and not to municipal functions. Shipman v. Johnson, 89 Ga. App. 620, 80 S.E.2d 717 (1954).

No application to municipal officers.

- This paragraph has no application to municipal officers created by the legislature. Ford v. Mayor of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820, 68 S.E. 733 (1910).

Police officer's probable cause determination.

- By acting on probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, a law enforcement officer was not called upon to exercise the legislative function of defining what constituted a crime, but the executive branch function of enforcing the law; accordingly, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 631 S.E.2d 351 (2006).

Separation of branches is sufficient reason to treat branches differently.

- The basic principle of separation of the three branches of government alone is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a reasonable basis for legislation treating one or all of the separate branches differently. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

Person in one branch may investigate another branch.

- This constitutional provision does not prohibit a person in the executive branch of the government or a person in the legislative branch of the government from investigating the official conduct of any person performing duties in any branch of the government. Dean v. Bolton, 235 Ga. 544, 221 S.E.2d 20 (1975).

Legislative members of commission may not perform executive functions.

- The fact that legislative members of a commission may be performing some functions that are appropriate to the legislative branch of the government does not alter the fact that they, as members of a commission, must also perform functions that are exclusively within the province of the executive branch and this is what the Constitution prohibits. Murphy v. State, 233 Ga. 681, 212 S.E.2d 839 (1975).

Legislators may appoint nonlegislators to executive commissions.

- The mere appointment, by a member of the legislative branch, of a nonlegislator to an executive commission, such as the State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Committee, is not a simultaneous discharge of duties and functions against which the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is directed. Caldwell v. Bateman, 252 Ga. 144, 312 S.E.2d 320 (1984).

Applicability to county governments.

- The County Building Authority Act, although designating the chairman of the board of commissioners as one of the members of the authority, was not unconstitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, which does not apply to county governments. Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Georgia Law 1973, p. 3640, which amends the Act creating the Cobb County board of commissioners to provide that the chairman and each member of the board of commissioners and the chairman and each member of the planning and zoning commission fully disclose any interest in any land sought to be rezoned, is not unconstitutional inasmuch as the doctrine of separation of powers applies only to the state and not to municipalities or to county governments. Tendler v. Thompson, 256 Ga. 633, 352 S.E.2d 388 (1987).

Failure to point out wherein an Act alleged to be violative of this paragraph is repugnant to and in conflict with the provision presents no question of judicial determination. Williams v. State, 187 Ga. 415, 1 S.E.2d 27 (1939).

Juvenile court jurisdiction statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution, nor does it violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716 (1995); Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 100, 475 S.E.2d 590 (1996).

Prosecutor's decision to bring an action in superior rather than juvenile court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because the initial option to select a forum when concurrent jurisdiction exists belongs to the litigant, and it is neither judicial, legislative, or executive power. Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989).

Jurisdiction over sentencing cannot be legislated away.

- Trial court properly ruled that O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6, which authorized the Georgia Sentence Review Panel to review and reduce sentences, was unconstitutional as the Georgia General Assembly does not have the constitutional authority to divest the trial courts of Georgia of their traditional jurisdiction over sentencing by creating a quasi-appellate tribunal (such as the Panel) to review and alter the otherwise lawful sentences imposed by those trial courts. Sentence Review Panel v. Moseley, 284 Ga. 128, 663 S.E.2d 679 (2008).

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-16, the life-without-parole statute, does not violate separation of powers because it imposes legislative restrictions on the Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant parole. Freeman v. State, 264 Ga. 27, 440 S.E.2d 181 (1994).

Mandatory minimum sentences.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, imposing mandatory minimum sentences in certain cases, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in that the legislature acted within constitutional bounds in establishing minimum and maximum punishment and in eliminating judicial discretion in sentencing certain violent offenders. Campbell v. State, 268 Ga. 44, 485 S.E.2d 185 (1997).

The statute governing the punishment for serious violent offenders, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution. Byrd v. State, 236 Ga. App. 485, 512 S.E.2d 372 (1999).

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, prescribing punishment of repeat offenders, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution. Brabham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 506, 524 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Challenge to statute governing sealing of court records not viable.

- Because an appeal of the denial of a motion to seal a criminal record under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m) failed to present a viable challenge to the statute's constitutionality, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II(1), because the challenge (a separation of powers argument, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, based on the Supreme Court's record-keeping authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21.4) was not raised below, jurisdiction was properly before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(12). Doe v. State, 303 Ga. 237, 811 S.E.2d 413 (2018).

Reapportionment.

- Because Act 444, 2002 Ga. Laws 149, does not impermissibly encroach on the power of the executive branch to control litigation, but instead is a proper assertion of legislative power to determine reapportionment, it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Perdue v. Baker, 277 Ga. 1, 586 S.E.2d 606 (2003).

Service Delivery Strategy Act did not violate separation of powers.

- In a dispute regarding the provision of services between a county and city, the trial court erred in granting relief pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-70-25.1 beyond the scope of that Code section, including improperly directing or enjoining particular funding for services; the dispute resolution process did not violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. City of Union Point v. Greene County, Ga. , S.E.2d (Mar. 15, 2018).

Termination of administrative procedure did not violate separation of powers.

- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2), requiring a county board of tax assessors to schedule a settlement conference within 45 days of the taxpayer's notice of appeal, and providing that the taxpayer's stated value be adopted if the board elected not to schedule a conference, did not usurp the superior court's jurisdiction or violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Westrec Props., 303 Ga. 69, 809 S.E.2d 780 (2018).

Cited in Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 48 Am. Dec. 248 (1848); Hilliard v. Doe, 7 Ga. 172 (1849); Eve v. State, 21 Ga. 50 (1857); Robison v. Beall, 26 Ga. 1 (1858); Walker v. Whitehead, 43 Ga. 538 (1871); Georgia R.R. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694 (1883); Clayton v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 270 (1886); Johnson v. Jackson, 99 Ga. 389, 27 S.E. 734 (1896); Bowen v. Clifton, 105 Ga. 490, 30 S.E. 788 (1898); Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 30 S.E. 858, 69 Am. St. R. 175, 42 L.R.A. 190 (1898); Phinizy v. Eve, 108 Ga. 360, 33 S.E. 1007 (1899); Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728, 63 S.E. 260 (1908); Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909); Daniel v. Persons, 137 Ga. 826, 74 S.E. 260 (1912); Norman v. Rehberg, 12 Ga. App. 698, 78 S.E. 256 (1913); Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S.E. 1004, 57 A.L.R. 230 (1920); Clements v. Bostwick, 158 Ga. 906, 124 S.E. 719 (1924); City Council v. Thomas, 159 Ga. 435, 126 S.E. 144, 39 A.L.R. 1317 (1924); Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S.E. 264 (1927); Morgan v. Lowry, 168 Ga. 723, 149 S.E. 37 (1929); Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930); Horne v. State, 170 Ga. 638, 153 S.E. 749 (1930); Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); Board of Comm'rs v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 175 Ga. 584, 165 S.E. 828 (1932); Southern Ry. v. Wehunt, 177 Ga. 440, 170 S.E. 380 (1933); McDonald v. Georgia Fed'n of Labor, 178 Ga. 313, 173 S.E. 662 (1933); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 179 Ga. 471, 176 S.E. 494 (1934); Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48, 178 S.E. 365 (1934); Madronah Sales Co. v. Wilburn, 180 Ga. 837, 181 S.E. 173 (1935); Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392 (1935); DeKrasner v. Boykin, 54 Ga. App. 29, 186 S.E. 701 (1936); Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937); Freeney v. Pape, 185 Ga. 1, 194 S.E. 515 (1937); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938); State Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Educ., 190 Ga. 588, 10 S.E.2d 369 (1940); Town of McIntyre v. Scott, 191 Ga. 473, 12 S.E.2d 883 (1940); Gernatt v. Huiet, 192 Ga. 729, 16 S.E.2d 587 (1941); Feagin v. Freeney, 192 Ga. 868, 17 S.E.2d 61 (1941); Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 22 S.E.2d 592 (1942); DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942); Steward v. Peerless Furn. Co., 70 Ga. App. 236, 28 S.E.2d 396 (1943); Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distrib. Co., 202 Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704 (1947); Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952); McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 76 S.E.2d 1 (1953); Martin v. Baldwin, 215 Ga. 293, 110 S.E.2d 344 (1959); South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n v. Cravey, 216 Ga. 599, 118 S.E.2d 471 (1961); Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. Christian, 109 Ga. App. 818, 137 S.E.2d 518 (1964); Howard v. Housing Auth., 220 Ga. 640, 140 S.E.2d 880 (1965); Undercofler v. Swint, 111 Ga. App. 117, 140 S.E.2d 894 (1965); Turmon v. Department of Pub. Safety, 222 Ga. 843, 152 S.E.2d 884 (1967); Campbell v. Farmer, 223 Ga. 605, 157 S.E.2d 276 (1967); Maddox v. Coogler, 224 Ga. 806, 165 S.E.2d 158 (1968); Crumley v. Head, 225 Ga. 246, 167 S.E.2d 651 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Douglas County v. Abercrombie, 226 Ga. 39, 172 S.E.2d 419 (1970); Pye v. State Hwy. Dep't, 226 Ga. 389, 175 S.E.2d 510 (1970); DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359, 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973); Hawkins v. State, 130 Ga. App. 426, 203 S.E.2d 622 (1973); Fuller v. State, 232 Ga. 581, 208 S.E.2d 85 (1974); Harmon v. State, 235 Ga. 329, 219 S.E.2d 441 (1975); Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976); State v. Andrews, 240 Ga. 531, 242 S.E.2d 153 (1978); Leonard v. State, 146 Ga. App. 439, 246 S.E.2d 450 (1978); Gunn v. State, 244 Ga. 51, 257 S.E.2d 538 (1979); Sanders v. State, 151 Ga. App. 590, 260 S.E.2d 504 (1979); Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277 (1981); Johns v. State, 160 Ga. App. 535, 287 S.E.2d 617 (1981); Charron v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 253 Ga. 274, 319 S.E.2d 453 (1984); Snelling v. State, 176 Ga. App. 192, 335 S.E.2d 475 (1985); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530 (1991); State v. Tyson, 273 Ga. 690, 544 S.E.2d 444 (2001); DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013); Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (2014); City of Union Point v. Greene County, 303 Ga. 449, 812 S.E.2d 278 (2018); State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

Exclusive power of legislative department.

- The legislative department is invested with the exclusive power to say what the law is. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963).

Legislature to act as check on other branches.

- The legislature has power to serve as a check upon the executive and judicial departments, and this function is properly performed by enactment of laws. If the legislature wishes to have the law other than what the judiciary construes it to be, it has the power and duty to so write it within the limits of the Constitution. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Legislature has no constitutional power to construe or alter judgments. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963).

Legislature cannot put limitations on discharge of judicial functions.

- It is not within the power of the General Assembly, by any exercise of its legitimate legislative functions, to impose limitations and restrictions upon the discharge of purely judicial functions. Holliman v. State, 175 Ga. 232, 165 S.E. 11 (1932).

Judicial review of legislative actions limited.

- If in the exercise of power to enact laws, the General Assembly merely fails to observe certain rules of internal procedure, the judiciary would not be authorized to review such action, and the same would be true as to any action of the officers of that body within the sphere of their jurisdiction. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).

Elections belong to the political branch of the government and are beyond the control of judicial power. It is for the political power of the state, within the limits of the Constitution, to provide the manner in which elections shall be held, and until the courts are empowered to act, by the Constitution or legislative enactment, they must refrain from interference. Kinman v. Monk, 179 Ga. 132, 175 S.E. 458 (1934).

Expenses of discharging legislative duties.

- The judicial department of the government cannot interfere with any provision made by the legislative branch of the government which the General Assembly may deem to be necessary as expenses in discharging its duties of legislation. Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 136 S.E. 425 (1927).

Code Revision Commission within legislative authority.

- Composition of Code Commission did not violate this paragraph, as the work of the Commission, comprised of ten legislators and five members of the State Bar, was within the sphere of legislative authority. Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 244 Ga. 325, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979).

Legislator may not be appointed to governing body of administrative agency.

- The legislature cannot constitutionally create a special instrumentality of government to implement specific legislation and then retain some control over the process of implementation by appointing legislators to the governing body of the instrumentality. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

A legislator who participates as a member of the governing body of a public corporation such as the World Congress Center Authority is performing executive functions in violation of this paragraph. Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).

Promulgation of executive branch rules and legislative oversight thereof.

- O.C.G.A. § 31-6-21.1 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine simply because it enables the Department of Community Health to promulgate and adopt regulations pursuant to a delegated power; the statute does not invest the legislature with executive power, nor does it invest the executive with legislative power. Nor could it be said that the statute runs afoul of enactment, bicameralism, and presentment provisions, as the statute allows for the adoption of rules consistent with legislation, but it does not enable the department to make laws. Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 278 Ga. 366, 602 S.E.2d 648 (2004).

Delegation permitted.

- O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1 did not unconstitutionally delegate power to the General Assembly as the delegation was permissible and was accompanied by sufficient guidelines that directed the State Board of Education, in promulgating policies and regulations, to take into consideration sickness and other emergencies that may arise. Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 748 S.E.2d 426 (2013).

Dram Shop Act did not invade judiciary's province.

- Widow's wrongful death action against a bar that served alcohol to her husband for 8 hours, and who then died in a one-vehicle crash, was barred by the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, which barred claims by consumers of alcohol; § 51-1-40 did not violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, because the legislature had the authority to enact legislation codifying the common law. Dion v. Y.S.G. Enters., 296 Ga. 185, 766 S.E.2d 48 (2014).

Creation of private right of action from criminal statute.

- Trial court erred in awarding civil damages to a girlfriend under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-90, which criminalized the transmission of photography or video depicting nudity or sexually explicit conduct of an adult without his or her consent, because it was a criminal statute that did not provide for a private right of action; further, creation of such a right from the statute would violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, and also O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a). Somerville v. White, 337 Ga. App. 414, 787 S.E.2d 350 (2016).

Dividing line between courts and legislature.

- In the dividing line of power between these coordinate branches, construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. Parks v. State, 212 Ga. 433, 93 S.E.2d 663 (1956); Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963); Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Burke, 219 Ga. 710, 135 S.E.2d 383 (1964).

Courts cannot add a line to the law, nor can the legislature enlarge or diminish a law by construction. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963); Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Burke, 219 Ga. 710, 135 S.E.2d 383 (1964).

O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(g), precluding a trial court from granting an appeal bond to defendant, who had been convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation, did not violate the separation of powers provision of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, because there was no constitutional right to an appeal bond, so the system under which prisoners were allowed to be released on bond pending an appeal was a legislative function, and the legislature's establishment of the parameters of such bonds did not invade the province of the judiciary. Getkate v. State, 278 Ga. 585, 604 S.E.2d 838 (2004).

Court to determine the law.

- Determining the meaning of the Constitution, which is binding upon everyone, is the exclusive function of the courts in the adjudication of cases properly brought before them for decision. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).

It is the prerogative of the judiciary to determine what the law is, and the responsibility of the legislature to declare what the law shall be. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

Court not to concern itself with legislative actions.

- By this paragraph, the judiciary cannot modify, amend, or repeal legislative action, nor concern itself with the wisdom of it. That is a field in which only the legislative department may work. Sirota v. Kay Homes, Inc., 208 Ga. 113, 65 S.E.2d 597 (1951).

Delegation of legislative power to courts forbidden.

- The basic principle embodied in the separation of powers doctrine is that the legislature cannot delegate legislative power to the courts. This does not mean, however, that the legislature is forbidden from conferring power on the courts to ascertain whether the statutory requirements for dissolution of a municipal charter have been satisfied in particular cases. Harrell v. Courson, 234 Ga. 350, 216 S.E.2d 105 (1975).

Authority to administer justice efficiently and completely.

- When the Constitution declares that the legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct, it thereby invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the Constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945).

Exclusive power to construe laws.

- By the Constitution, courts are invested with the exclusive ultimate power to construe laws. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963).

Unless construction unnecessary.

- When the language of a municipal code section is plain, unambiguous, and positive, and is not capable of two constructions, no court has a right to construe it to mean anything other than what it declares, and this rule precludes the courts from construing it according to what is supposed to be the legislative intent. Sirota v. Kay Homes, Inc., 208 Ga. 113, 65 S.E.2d 597 (1951).

Legislative direction of judicial construction invalid.

- It is not in the power of the legislature, under this paragraph, to enact, in any way, that the law was so and so at any past time. Crawford v. Ross, 39 Ga. 44 (1869).

In enacting a local civil service law, the legislature was performing a legislative function, and in construing the meaning of that Act, the Supreme Court was performing a judicial function, thus by that decision the meaning of the Act was judicially determined and fixed. Consequently, a later Act which was literally a legislative construction of the earlier Act, which was directly in conflict with its meaning as judicially determined, was unconstitutional since the legislature attempted a judicial function. McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35 S.E.2d 144 (1945).

An Act which does not purport to amend any existing law and amounts only to an effort on the part of the legislature to perform a judicial function in violation of this paragraph, by directing the judiciary concerning the construction which it should place upon the law. Brinkley v. Dixie Constr. Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267, answer conformed to, 79 Ga. App. 583, 54 S.E.2d 510 (1949).

When a court adjudicates that a petition alleges no cause of action, whether rightly or erroneously, that becomes the law of the case, and neither the legislature nor the judiciary can disregard that ruling. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963).

Effect of legislative construction of law.

- A legislative exposition of doubtful laws may be harmless. Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga. 208 (1848).

A legislative exposition of a doubtful law is the exercise of a judicial power, and if it interferes with no vested rights, impairs the obligation of no contract, and is not in conflict with the primary principles of our social compact, it is in itself harmless, and may be admitted to retroactive efficiency. If, however, rights have grown up under even a law of somewhat ambiguous meaning, then the universal rule of the system applies. That rule is, the courts declare what the law is, and the legislature declares what the law shall be. Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298, 133 S.E.2d 32 (1963).

Legislature may establish rules of evidence.

- This paragraph does not deny the legislature the power to establish rules of evidence. Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S.E. 74 (1905).

Legislature may not set time limit for application for writ of certiorari.

- The attempt of the General Assembly to regulate the practice upon application for writ of certiorari by setting a time limit is an invasion of the prerogative of the judiciary which is not sanctioned by the Constitution. Holliman v. State, 175 Ga. 232, 165 S.E. 11 (1932).

Supreme Court's approval of a local court rule providing that civil actions seeking primarily money damages up to $25,000 or in an unspecified amount would be referred to compulsory but nonbinding arbitration did not abridge the rights of any litigants or conflict with any federal or state constitutional provision or Georgia statute. Davis v. Gaona, 260 Ga. 450, 396 S.E.2d 218 (1990).

For discussion of legislature's exercise of jurisdiction over rules of procedure and practice in the courts, in conjunction with the Supreme Court, see Gordy v. Dunwody, 210 Ga. 810, 83 S.E.2d 7 (1954).

Discretion in sentencing may be limited.

- In the absence of legislation, the judiciary cannot exercise discretion in fixing the quantum of punishment to be inflicted upon criminals, because such power is not one which inheres in the judicial department. It is therefore within the power of the legislature to direct the punishment to be prescribed for second offenders, and to leave no discretion to the trial judge. Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979).

The power to create crimes and to prescribe punishment therefore is legislative, the judge is a mere agent of the law and the judge has no discretion except as is given to the judge. Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979).

Minimum sentences made mandatory by statute do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Georgia Constitution. Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

Response to juror's question concerning functions of another governmental branch.

- When a question is propounded by a juror that involves the functions of a separate and distinct branch of the government, the jury should be told that such matters cannot be the subject of any instruction by the court. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948).

It is improper for a judge in a trial of a person charged with murder to state or intimate what action could be taken in the future by a separate and distinct branch of the government. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948).

No legislative control over granting new trials.

- This paragraph constitutes an insuperable barrier to any legislative control or interference with the courts in the exercise of their powers to grant new trials. CTC Fin. Corp. v. Holden, 221 Ga. 809, 147 S.E.2d 427 (1966).

Nonjudicial powers may not be imposed on court.

- Under the separation of powers doctrine, nonjudicial functions may not be imposed on a constitutional court. The duties or functions which the legislature may not transfer to the judiciary have been characterized as either legislative or executive. Their descriptive classification is not, however, the significant point. The vice lies in the fact that the duties or functions sought to be conferred upon the courts lie beyond the scope of judicial power. Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978).

If the legislature cannot impose upon the courts the administrative duty or function of making an initial discretionary decision, it cannot do so by the fiction of an appeal de novo which requires the court to adjudicate upon administrative rather than judicial considerations. Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978).

Issue of search warrant.

- Judge who had not served as deputy sheriff for approximately eight years at the time the search warrant in question was issued was not disqualified to issue warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227 (1982).

Mere personal associations with police officers, without more, do not disqualify a magistrate from issuing a search warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227 (1982).

A judge who also serves as a county coroner is not per se disqualified from issuing a search warrant in the judge's capacity as ex officio justice of the peace. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227 (1982).

Authority of superior court to order expert evaluation of defendant.

- Superior court of the county in which defendant was convicted of murder had authority, on defendant's motion for new trial, to order an expert evaluation of defendant, who was incarcerated beyond the boundaries of the county in which the court sat. Zant v. Brantley, 261 Ga. 817, 411 S.E.2d 869 (1992).

DFCS investigator's determination of child abuse registry listing.

- Under the Child Protective Services Information System, O.C.G.A. § 49-5-180 et seq., an alleged child abuser has the right to a hearing before an administrative law judge, who makes the final agency decision after hearing evidence and argument from the alleged abuser and from DFCS. The role of the abuse investigator in the determination of whether an incident should be in the child abuse registry does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Steiner, 303 Ga. 890, 815 S.E.2d 883 (2018).

Delegation of sentencing authority.

- Statutory provision authorizing district attorney to move for sentence reduction in drug trafficking cases does not violate separation of powers clause, as such provision does not prohibit a defendant from filing such a motion or the court from proceeding under the statute sua sponte. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244 (1986).

Enforcement of child support.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-32, the mandatory income deduction statute for enforcing child support, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Word, 265 Ga. 461, 458 S.E.2d 110 (1995).

Municipal court.

- Because a municipal court is a municipal office discharging strictly municipal functions, O.C.G.A. § 36-32-2(a) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, and the city was authorized to require the judge to reinstate the contract between the county and the private probation services company. Ward v. City of Cairo, 276 Ga. 391, 583 S.E.2d 821 (2003).

2010 amendment to the Local Option Sales Tax Act, O.C.G.A.

§ 48-8-89(d)(4), violates separation of powers doctrine. - To the extent the 2010 amendment to the Local Option Sales Tax Act (LOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89(d)(4), permits judicial resolution of the issue of whether LOST should be renewed and the governing bodies of the special district should be required to levy and collect the tax, the amendment violates the separation of powers doctrine of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Turner County v. City of Ashburn, 293 Ga. 739, 749 S.E.2d 685 (2013).

Delegation of powers from General Assembly.

- The General Assembly may delegate certain powers to the executive branch of government in order to carry out the law as enacted by the General Assembly. Sundberg v. State, 234 Ga. 482, 216 S.E.2d 332 (1975).

The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers, in that the integrity of the tripartite system of government mandates that the General Assembly not divest itself of the legislative power granted to it by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).

Delegation must be made with sufficient guidelines.

- When a delegation of power to an executive official is made with sufficient guidelines, the official's exercise of the delegated power does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).

Judicial review of administrative decisions limited.

- The only judicial review of administrative decisions authorized is that inherent in the power of the judiciary: whether the agency acted beyond the discretionary powers conferred upon it, abused its discretion, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously with regard to an individual's constitutional rights. Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction to deal with an executive branch function until there had been an exhaustion of administrative remedies; accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the industrial loan commissioner on the commissioner's claim that the loan companies were not entitled to declaratory relief on their claim that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction over their practice of using an out-of-state bank to make their loans through the loan companies since the commissioner had not ruled on whether that practice was permissible. USA Payday Cash Advance Ctrs. v. Oxendine, 262 Ga. App. 632, 585 S.E.2d 924 (2003).

Administrative board may not determine and assess attorney's fees.

- A section authorizing an administrative board to include attorney's fees in an execution against a defaulting receiver is unconstitutional in that the determination of what attorney's fees incurred are reasonable and the assessment of such fees are judicial functions and cannot be delegated to an administrative official. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Floyd County, 178 Ga. 595, 173 S.E. 720 (1934).

Parole conditions.

- Trial court erred by requiring the defendant to waive the defendant's Fourth Amendment right as a condition of parole since any attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of the defendant by the State Board of Pardons and Parole would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the executive. Stephens v. State, 207 Ga. App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

Habeas court erroneously addressed a defendant's challenge to a parole condition that banned the defendant from all counties in the State of Georgia but one as the habeas court's attempt to control the parole condition was a violation of the constitutional provision regarding the separation of powers since the Board of Pardons and Paroles had executive power regarding the terms and conditions of paroles. Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 663 S.E.2d 256 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510, 172 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2008).

Approval of taking of municipal property.

- Statutes granting the Commission on the Condemnation of Public Property the power to approve the taking of municipal property do not amount to an improper delegation of legislative power and do not violate separation-of-powers principles. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).

Promulgation of executive branch rules and legislative oversight thereof.

- O.C.G.A. § 31-6-21.1 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine simply because the statute enables the Department of Community Health to promulgate and adopt regulations pursuant to a delegated power; the statute does not invest the legislature with executive power, nor does the statute invest the executive with legislative power. Nor could it be said that the statute runs afoul of enactment, bicameralism, and presentment provisions, as the statute allows for the adoption of rules consistent with legislation, but it does not enable the department to make laws. Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 278 Ga. 366, 602 S.E.2d 648 (2004).

Member of political committee not public officer.

- An officer, member, or employee of a political committee is not a "public officer." 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-181.

Combination of judicial, legislative, and executive officers on commission.

- If a commission does not exercise executive, legislative, or judicial powers of the state, this paragraph does not prohibit the combination of judicial, legislative, or executive officers in its composition. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-142.

Justices of the peace may be legislators.

- Those persons who are justices of the peace are also eligible to membership in the General Assembly. This does not violate the separation of powers doctrine contained in the Constitution. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-92.

Member of General Assembly may not serve as an appointed judge pro tem of the Recorder's Court of Chatham County. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-58.

Member of the General Assembly cannot serve simultaneously as a juvenile court judge. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-46.

Legislator may not perform functions of State Board of Postsecondary Vocational Education by direct employment or other contractual arrangement. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-11.

Service of judges on advisory council to Department of Human Resources.

- The uncompensated services of juvenile and superior court judges on the advisory council to the Department of Human Resources would meet the letter as well as the spirit of both statutory and constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 320.

Membership on Constitutional Amendments Publication Board.

- Contracting for publication of proposed amendments is not an executive function, therefore the presence of the Speaker of the House on the Constitutional Amendments Publication Board does not conflict with this paragraph. Because the unique and sole function of the Constitutional Amendments Publication Board is to submit the constitutional amendments to the people, by proper publication, members of both the executive and legislative branches may serve on the Board. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-127.

Presence of legislative members on Outdoor Advertising Citizen's Advisory Council should not offend this paragraph, due to the advisory nature of the body. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

Member of the General Assembly may serve on a county planning commission. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-11.

Solicitors of municipal court.

- Solicitors of the municipal court are not within the judicial branch of state government for purposes of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, prohibiting one person from simultaneously exercising the functions of more than one of three branches of state government. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U91-4.

Fiscal officers of appellate courts.

- The appellate courts may designate their fiscal officers to handle their payrolls under procedures satisfactory to the appellate courts and the Office of Planning and Budget. However, in the establishment of these procedures, the Office of Planning and Budget, as an arm of the executive department of state government, must be ever mindful of the delicate balance of power between the executive and the judiciary, founded upon the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-100.

Administrative agency may not include legislator.

- The "Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Act" is invalid to the extent that membership on the authority created thereby includes officers of the legislative branch of state government, violating this paragraph. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-109.

Court contract for private probation services.

- Should a state court, as a separate governmental entity, attempt to contract for private probation services on its own, it is possible that such an agreement would violate the separation of powers provision. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-8.

Court reporter cannot be employed by worker's compensation board.

- A court reporter may not hold simultaneous employment with the State Board of Workers' Compensation and a superior court or state court. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-56.

Member of General Assembly may not serve as municipal court judge.

- While the "separation of powers" doctrine does not apply when the issues relate solely to municipal officials utilizing municipal powers, it does apply when it concerns a municipal court judge exercising state judicial powers. Because of that, the exercise of those state judicial powers by a legislator would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against a member of one branch exercising the powers of another branch of government. Therefore, a member of the Georgia General Assembly may not serve as a municipal court judge. 2014 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2014-2.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 237, 238.

C.J.S.

- 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 272 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity and effect of provisions limiting the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional, 15 A.L.R. 331; 66 A.L.R. 1466.

Power of judiciary to compel Legislature to make apportionment of representatives or election districts as required by Constitution, 46 A.L.R. 964.

Conclusiveness of governor's decision in removing officers, 52 A.L.R. 7; 92 A.L.R. 998.

Power of legislation respecting admission to bar, 144 A.L.R. 150.

Constitutionality of statute fixing time within which court or judge shall or shall not act, 168 A.L.R. 1125.

Validity of delegation to private persons or organizations of power to appoint or nominate to public office, 97 A.L.R.2d 361.

Inherent power of court to suspend for indefinite period execution of sentence in whole or in part, 73 A.L.R.3d 474.

Validity of a state statute imposing mandatory sentence or prohibiting granting of probation or suspension of sentence for narcotics offenses, 81 A.L.R.3d 1192.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.