No absolute right to speak or publish.

- It is a fundamental principle, long established that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932).

Exercise of freedom must be compatible with preservation of other essential, guaranteed freedoms.

- Freedom of speech and of the press, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is essential to the preservation of a free society; but its exercise must be compatible with the preservation of other freedoms essential to a democracy and guaranteed by the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary and the fair and impartial administration of justice are also necessary to a free society. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

Free speech does not necessarily exempt one from regulation, license, or payment of tax, which, under some other theory of law, is a protected public or private right. That which may be a permissible regulation even though it restricts the right of free speech to some extent must bear some genuine and reasonable relation to the general welfare, and to the public health, safety, or morals. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d 331 (1961).

Free speech does not give one right to malign another or do act injurious to another's person or property. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d 331 (1961).

Restraints on freedom of speech must be reasonably related to community welfare.

- When there is no reasonable relationship between the restraints imposed on freedom of speech and the general welfare of the community, the ordinance is unconstitutional. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d 331 (1961).

All speech and press that lie outside of an "abuse of that liberty" are protected by this paragraph. The protection is absolute and cannot be abridged, curtailed, or restrained in any degree for any period of time no matter how short. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).

Abuses of liberty may be suppressed, restrained, enjoined, or punished.

- "Abuses of that liberty" are outside the protection of the Constitution and may be suppressed, restrained, enjoined, or punished without violating the Constitution, provided constitutional means for so doing are employed. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).

No prior restraints upon publications but no freedom from censure when criminal matter published.

- The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free person has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments the person pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if the person publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, the person must take the consequence of the person's own temerity. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).

Liberty of the press was intended to prevent all previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments, and in early times, to stifle the efforts of patriots to enlighten their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but one who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).

When injunction not invalid as illegal prior restraint.

- If prior to the issuance of an injunction an adequate determination is made that certain communication is unprotected by constitutional provisions safeguarding freedom of speech; that the order is based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct; and that the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary, then the injunction is not invalid as an illegal prior restraint. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975).

Regulatory statute not intended to control content of speech upheld when justified by valid governmental interest.

- The freedom of expression guaranteed under the Constitution has been consistently recognized as being narrower than an unlimited license to talk; and regulatory statutes not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise are not regarded as violating the constitutional guarantee when justified by a valid governmental interest. Hodnett v. City of Atlanta, 145 Ga. App. 285, 243 S.E.2d 605 (1978).

State conduct is required.

- Former employee's claim that the employee was dismissed because of expressive activity, failed under both Georgia's equal protection provisions and freedom of speech guarantees because the former employer and the two managers, were not state actors or private parties acting under the color of state law. Johnson v. Shoney's, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2005).

Cited in Phillips v. Rozar, 172 Ga. 862, 159 S.E. 245 (1931); Dalton v. State, 176 Ga. 645, 169 S.E. 198 (1933); Melton v. Beard, 15 F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Ga. 1936); Ferguson v. City of Moultrie, 71 Ga. App. 15, 29 S.E.2d 786 (1944); Williams v. Jenkins, 211 Ga. 10, 83 S.E.2d 614 (1954); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960); Williams v. State, 217 Ga. 312, 122 S.E.2d 229 (1961); City of Atlanta v. Lopert Pictures Corp., 217 Ga. 432, 122 S.E.2d 916 (1961); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962); City of Atlanta v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 218 Ga. 714, 130 S.E.2d 490 (1963); Mack v. Connor, 220 Ga. 450, 139 S.E.2d 286 (1964); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965); Harper v. Burgess, 225 Ga. 420, 169 S.E.2d 297 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982); Speedway Grading Corp. v. Gardner, 206 Ga. App. 439, 425 S.E.2d 676 (1992); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717 (1998); AirTran Airlines v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1999); 10950 Retail, LLC v. City of Johns Creek, 299 Ga. App. 458, 682 S.E.2d 637 (2009); DeLong v. State, 310 Ga. App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (2011); State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).

Newspaper libel as limitation on publication privilege.

- Certain newspaper publications are privileged; but the privilege is conditional, not absolute; and the "liberty of the press" will not authorize a violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-2. Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 165 S.E. 443 (1932).

Libel is abuse of liberty of press for which laws of state hold press answerable in damages. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953).

Liberty of press is subordinate to independence of judiciary and proper administration of justice. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421 (1960); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

Obstructing administration of justice by state courts is abuse of liberty of speech and of press.

- Constitution of Georgia guarantees the liberty of speech and of the press, but does not protect an abuse of that liberty. Obstructing the administration of justice by the courts of this state is an abuse of that liberty and will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

Liberty of the press is not synonymous with license, and it does not give the press any right or license to publish libelous matter without responsibility to those who are innocent victims of such libelous publication. Freedom of the press gives the right to print the truth and to comment fairly about the truth; freedom of the press does not give a license to print untruths or half-truths, which are equivalent to untruths and which, in their effect on a person's character and reputation are often more damaging and devastating than would be an outright falsehood. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

Courts may stop press when interfering with conducting court proceedings.

- Courts may stop conduct of representatives of the press in any field of activity interfering with orderly conduct of court procedure or creating distractions interfering therewith. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421 (1960), commented on in 23 Ga. B.J. 406 (1961).

When restraint upon newspaper's liberty of speech and of press unwarranted.

- A restraining order which prohibited a newspaper from publishing any information on an alleged suspect in a murder case obtained through discovery without the newspaper's first following a procedure of notifying the court of its intent to disclose any information and obtaining the permission of the court to disclose the information in the event an objection was filed constituted an unwarranted restraint upon the newspaper's liberty of speech and of the press. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981).

No right to keep news source confidential.

- The guaranty of freedom of the press does not afford a reporter a right not to disclose a confidential news source. Vaughn v. State, 259 Ga. 325, 381 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Liberty of the press balanced against right to privacy.

- Newspaper articles naming a high school student as the victim of a vicious attack by fellow students, and containing a graphic description of the attack, were not an actionable invasion of privacy, in light of the public's legitimate interest in the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators. Tucker v. News Publishing Co., 197 Ga. App. 85, 397 S.E.2d 499 (1990).

Publishing 20-year-old nude photos of an aspiring model who later became a professional wrestler and whose murder was highly publicized did not fall within Georgia's right of publicity newsworthiness exception; the photos were unrelated to the incident of public concern, the model's death, and thus, a right of publicity case filed by the plaintiff, the mother and personal representative for the model's estate, against the defendant publisher, could be pursued; under the First Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication had to have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest in order to fall within the newsworthiness exception. Toffoloni v. LFB Publ'g Group, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, mot. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1689, 176 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2010).

Newspaper acted with actual malice.

- Given that defendants, a newspaper, its editor, and a columnist, so doubted the truthfulness of their articles (alleging that a deputy sheriff beat an arrestee to death with a flashlight) that they refused to print contradictory versions of the events, actual malice could be inferred; as a result, the trial court properly denied their motions for a directed verdict and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to a deputy sheriff in the deputy's libel action. Lake Park Post, Inc. v. Farmer, 264 Ga. App. 299, 590 S.E.2d 254 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 875, 125 S. Ct. 104, 160 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2004).

Plaintiff failed to prove newspaper acted with actual malice.

- Former police officer sued a newspaper for libel based on a letter to the editor the newspaper printed. As a public figure, the officer had to establish actual malice on the part of the newspaper under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(9) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), but failed to do so because the statements at issue were opinions that were not susceptible of being proved true or false. Evans v. Sandersville Georgian, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 666, 675 S.E.2d 574 (2009).

State may penalize utterances openly advocating overthrow of government.

- A state may penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the representative and constitutional form of government of the United States and the several states, by violence or other unlawful means. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).

Freedom of speech and press does not protect disturbances to public peace or attempt to subvert government.

- Freedom of speech and press does not protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).

Constitutionality of false statement statute.

- False statement statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, when properly construed to require that the defendant make the false statement with knowledge and intent that the statement may come within the jurisdiction of a state or local government agency, is constitutional because correctly interpreted, the statute raises no substantial constitutional concern on the statute's face; the statute requires a defendant to know and intend, that is, to contemplate or expect, that his or her false statement will come to the attention of a state or local department or agency with the authority to act on the statement, and as properly construed, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 may only be applied to conduct that persons of common intelligence would know was wrongful because the statement could result in harm to the government. Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515, 712 S.E.2d 838 (2011), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 60, 183 L. Ed. 2d 711 (2012).

Ordinance forbidding use of public address system from vehicle on public streets upheld.

- An ordinance forbidding any person, firm, or corporation to operate a loud speaker or public address system from any vehicle on public streets, alleys, or thoroughfares is not an infringement upon the rights of the defendant granted to the defendant by the provisions of the Constitution of Georgia or of the United States. The thoroughfares of cities are maintained by the public and to say that anyone has a constitutional right to use a loud speaker or public address system from any vehicle on these streets seems to overlap and interfere with the constitutional rights of other people. It makes no difference whether the violator is using the loud speaker to broadcast what the violator terms recorded sermons, or using the loud speaker for vending goods, or promoting some political candidate, or for some other purpose. Brinkman v. City of Gainesville, 83 Ga. App. 508, 64 S.E.2d 344 (1951).

Ordinance regulating the volume of noise upheld.

- Local ordinance regulating the volume of noise from mechanical sound-making devices, Athens-Clarke County, Ga. Ordinance § 3-5-24(c)(2)(a), did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V since the ordinance served a significant government interest in protecting both the community in general and individual citizens from noises which could have affected their comfort, repose, health, or safety, the provision left open ample alternatives for expression, and the ordinance was the least restrictive means of promoting the county's significant interest in protecting the comfort and repose of the county's citizens. Grady v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 289 Ga. 726, 715 S.E.2d 148 (2011).

Vagueness finding reversed since party lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of county zoning provision.

- Because a lessor and a lessee did not preserve an "as applied" challenge to two county zoning code provisions, did not seek a special use permit, and lacked standing to make a constitutional challenge, the trial court erred in finding the provisions unconstitutionally vague, regardless of whether they had an otherwise viable facial challenge. Catoosa County v. R.N. Talley Props., LLC, 282 Ga. 373, 651 S.E.2d 7 (2007).

Malevolent picketing to injure employer and aid unlawful strike not constitutionally protected.

- The judicial theory that peaceful picketing is a form of free speech, which is protected by the Constitutions, both federal and state, cannot be stretched to shield malevolent picketing for the purpose of injuring the employer and aiding an unlawful strike. Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708 (1956); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 118, 86 S. Ct. 1306, 16 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1966).

Prohibition against showing motion pictures until permit obtained held unconstitutional.

- A charter and ordinance provision, requiring inspection of protected as well as unprotected pictures, and requiring a permit from the city authorities before any picture can be exhibited in the theater, violate this paragraph and are void. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).

A section of a city's charter amending act and an ordinance of the city adopted pursuant thereto which prohibit the display of all motion pictures, the good as well as the bad, until a permit to display any of them has been obtained from the city's Board of Censorship offend this section of Georgia's Constitution since the section of the charter amending act authorizes, and the ordinance imposes, a prior restraint of speech on good as well as bad or objectionable pictures. City of Atlanta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 219 Ga. 271, 133 S.E.2d 12 (1963), commented on in 26 Ga. B.J. 475 (1964).

Government-instituted proceeding must place defendant exhibitor or seller on notice as to what film or publication the defendant has exhibited, sold, or held for sale that the government seeks to seize or suppress. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).

Freedom of teachers to comment upon matters of public importance and concern.

- The question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the school board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question, free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate; teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent; accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).

When a questionnaire solicits the views of faculty on a broad range of issues, such as the degree of mutual confidence existing between administration and faculty, the extent to which good teaching and good research are rewarded, the extent to which faculty opinions are listened to and respected, the effectiveness of the administration in dealing with grievances, the accuracy and completeness of information used to evaluate teachers, and other matters that are of public importance and concern, comment upon them is protected speech. Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).

Former school district employee's claim that the right to free speech under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V was violated when the employee was terminated after complaining of discriminatory acts by a Superintendent was dismissed upon summary judgment because the employee's speech did not involve a matter of public concern but was related to the employee's own private interest in receiving benefits and a certain pay level. Palmer v. Stewart County Sch. Dist., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. June 17, 2005).

When restraint upon newspaper's liberty of speech and of press unwarranted.

- A restraining order which prohibited a newspaper from publishing any information on an alleged suspect in a murder case obtained through discovery without the newspaper's first following a procedure of notifying the court of its intent to disclose any information and obtaining the permission of the court to disclose the information in the event an objection was filed constituted an unwarranted restraint upon the newspaper's liberty of speech and of the press. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981).

Material printed by law publisher rating attorneys is protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1 and this paragraph. Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 248 Ga. 599, 285 S.E.2d 6 (1981).

Business license tax.

- When the purpose of a business license tax was for the purpose of revenue raising and not for the control of solicitation it was not in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V. Miles v. City Council, 551 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983).

Statement is contemptuous and therefore not constitutionally protected when the statement poses a present danger to the orderly administration of justice but neither an inherent nor a reasonable tendency to do so is enough to justify a restriction of free expression. Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789, 325 S.E.2d 131 (1985).

Equity will not enjoin libel and slander. Brannon v. American Micro Distribs., Inc., 255 Ga. 691, 342 S.E.2d 301 (1986); High Country Fashions, Inc. v. Marlenna Fashions, Inc., 257 Ga. 267, 357 S.E.2d 576 (1987).

Injunction restricting activities of abortion protesters.

- Injunction issued pursuant to a city ordinance declaring the actions of abortion protesters to be a public nuisance was not unconstitutional since the protesters were permitted to exercise their right of free speech by engaging in social protest, limited only by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221, 111 S. Ct. 2836, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1991).

Statute regulating profane words on bumper stickers unconstitutionally restricts freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and by the Georgia Constitution. Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 400 S.E.2d 916 (1991).

Ordinance prohibiting the distribution of printed materials to homes violated the freedom of speech and press clauses under the United States and Georgia Constitutions because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the city's interest in preventing litter and failed to provide for meaningful alternatives of communication. Statesboro Publ. Co. v. City of Sylvania, 271 Ga. 92, 516 S.E.2d 926 (1999).

Soliciting in privately owned shopping mall.

- Policy of a privately owned shopping mall that prohibited all mall visitors from engaging in solicitation or leafleting in the mall's common areas did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V. Cahill v. Cobb Place Assocs., L.P., 271 Ga. 322, 519 S.E.2d 449 (1999).

Intent of the Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, is to encourage the exercise of free speech and afford a procedural protection to acts of communication on public issues; in connection with this procedural protection, the appellate court held that the mere procedural filing of a verification does not end the matter as to whether a claim could go forward under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) and (d). Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Soc'y, 264 Ga. App. 356, 590 S.E.2d 737 (2003).

Unauthorized practice of law could be limited.

- O.C.G.A. § 15-19-51(a)(7) did not limit defendant's right to free speech under U.S. Const., amend. 1, or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, as defendant had no right to engage in speech which was calculated to deceive or mislead people into thinking that defendant was qualified to practice law. Marks v. State, 280 Ga. 70, 623 S.E.2d 504 (2005).

Festival permits.

- City's moratorium on the issuance of festival permits was not an unconstitutional prior restraint under either U.S. Const., amend. 1, or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V because the moratorium did not abridge the right of free speech, the moratorium was content-neutral, and in the absence of a festivals ordinance, the city was not obligated to provide municipal services pertaining to outdoor festivals. Camp Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006).

Ninety-day advance application requirement of the Atlanta Outdoor Festivals Ordinance of 2003, Atlanta, Ga., Code of Ordinances §§ 138-186 to 138-209, was not an unconstitutional prior restraint under either U.S. Const., amend. 1, or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V because the requirement was content-neutral, the requirement was the least restrictive means of regulation, and the requirement left open alternative channels of communication. Camp Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006).

Content-neutral regulation that incidentally affected protected expression should not have been analyzed using rational basis test.

- When a night club asserted violations of the club's free speech rights under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test in denying the night club's petition for an interlocutory injunction. The challenged content-neutral amendments to county ordinances, which provided that one hour after the end of the legal period for selling alcoholic beverages, a business must be cleared of customers, close, and not reopen until 9:00 A.M., should have been analyzed using the appropriate legal standard: whether the regulation furthered an important government interest, whether the government interest was unrelated to the suppression of speech, and whether the incidental restriction of speech was no greater than was essential to the furtherance of that interest. Great Am. Dream, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. 749, 727 S.E.2d 667 (2012).

Anti-Mask Act held constitutional.

- Georgia "Anti-Mask Act", O.C.G.A § 16-11-38, which proscribes intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior, does not violate the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection of the law. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).

"Fighting words" not protected speech.

- "Fighting words" constitute one of those narrow speech areas not constitutionally protected. State v. Klinakis, 206 Ga. App. 318, 425 S.E.2d 665 (1992).

Rape Victim Confidentiality Statute.

- The victim of a sexual assault could not recover damages from a newspaper for invasion of privacy, since, when the victim shot and killed the perpetrator of the assault, the victim became the object of legitimate public interest and the newspaper had the right under the United States and Georgia Constitutions to accurately report facts regarding the incident, including the victim's name. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 263 Ga. 677, 436 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

Prior restraint of freedom of speech.

- A city's refusal to issue a building permit because the business intended to violate O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80(c) did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint of free speech. Chamblee Visuals v. City of Chamblee, 270 Ga. 33, 506 S.E.2d 113 (1998).

Obscene material not protected.

- Devices "designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs," prohibited from distribution under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80, are not protected expressions under either the First Amendment of the federal constitution or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. 129, 526 S.E.2d 336 (2000).

"Fighting words" construed narrowly.

- To ensure no abridgment of constitutional rights, the application of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3)'s proscription on "fighting words" must necessarily be narrow and limited; since the only statements shown in the evidence to have been uttered by defendant to an officer during an incident at a store were, "Arrest me" and "Damn, I'm calling corporate office" did not rise to the level of required "fighting words," defendant's conviction of disorderly conduct, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3), was not supported by sufficient evidence. Sandidge v. State, 279 Ga. App. 86, 630 S.E.2d 585 (2006).

Constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34. - O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34(a) was overbroad and was unconstitutional; the literal language of the statute was so overbroad in its scope that it led to an absurdity manifestly not intended by the legislature, and its constitutionality could not have been preserved by judicial construction. State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 629 S.E.2d 252 (2006).

Constitutionality of O.C.G.A.

§ 16-8-60(b). - Trial court did not err in finding that O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60(b) was not unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad and was not preempted by federal law, as: (1) the statute aimed to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns; (2) it did not impinge upon pure speech, but, at most, regulated a combination of commercial conduct and speech; (3) its deterrent effect on legitimate expression was minimal; and (4) it plainly prohibited the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that did not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 638 S.E.2d 292 (2006).

Constitutionality of Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act.

- Trial court properly denied the appellants' motion to dismiss various counts charging the appellants with gang-related crimes under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., since properly construed O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) did not directly or indirectly infringe upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association as, to support a conviction, gang conduct or participation was required. Further, reading of § 16-15-4(a) according to the natural and obvious import of the statute's language and in conjunction with the specific definitions in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3, the statute provided a sufficiently definite warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct and was not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, thus, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (2009).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b) is unconstitutional under the free speech provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions, U.S. Const., amend. 1 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, because it is not all assisted suicides that are criminalized but only those that include a public advertisement or offer to assist; because the state failed to provide any explanation or evidence as to why a public advertisement or offer to assist in an otherwise legal activity was sufficiently problematic to justify an intrusion on protected speech rights, it could not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 290 Ga. 508, 722 S.E.2d 722 (2012).

Freedom to choose own counsel.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance and ruling that the defendant had three options: proceed to trial with old counsel, proceed with new counsel instanter, or self-represent when the trial court engaged in a proper balancing test by weighing the fact that the defendant and trial counsel, who was prepared for trial, disagreed regarding trial strategy against what the court determined was an undue delay in trying the case. Alwi v. State, 331 Ga. App. 903, 773 S.E.2d 387 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 559 (Ga. 2015).

Sign ordinance's content-based restrictions were invalid.

- In grandfathering a condominium development sign pursuant to Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-370, while prohibiting all other commercial signs in residential areas, the city imposed differential burdens upon speech based on its content. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Selective enforcement of sign ordinance prohibited.

- Grandfather provision of Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-370, was unconstitutional to the extent that city sign ordinance enforcement officials chose not to enforce the sign ordinance against any non-compliant sign in place before their jobs began; having decided to enact a rigorous sign ordinance, the city was prohibited from selectively applying its provisions for the sake of convenience; moreover, if aesthetics were a concern, as the city stated, that concern was not promoted by allowing non-compliant signs, no matter when they were erected. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

1994 Sign Ordinance.

- The 1994 Sign Ordinance, a comprehensive regulatory framework for the posting of all signs within the City of Atlanta, does not violate equal protection or free speech. Outdoor Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 885 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

City sign ordinance that prohibited the display of noncommercial messages at locations where commercial messages were permitted was unconstitutional. Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).

Ordinance that restricted signs in residential zoning districts to on-premise signs and certain temporary or special signs, allowing temporary political signs, but not providing for permanent signs expressing the political, religious, or other noncommercial views of residents, was unconstitutional. Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a city in a suit brought by an outdoor sign company challenging the constitutionality of the city's sign ordinance as the company's sign applications failed to meet the city's height and size restrictions and the restrictions were constitutional. Since the company lacked standing to challenge any other provision of the ordinance, the trial court should not have addressed the company's constitutional arguments concerning other provisions of the ordinance, though that appellate court determination did not change the grant of summary judgment to the city. Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Roswell, 283 Ga. 417, 658 S.E.2d 587 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 222, 172 L. Ed. 2d 143 (2008).

Standing to object to city ordinance.

- In a corporation's suit alleging that a city's denial of the corporation's variance applications under the September 20, 1983, Cumming, Georgia zoning ordinance, as amended on June 20, 2006, violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. V, the corporation lacked standing to assert the corporation's claims regarding the actual denial of the variances; those claims were not redressible because the corporation did not challenge the height or spacing requirements upon which the denials were predicated. However, the corporation had standing to assert the corporation's claims regarding the city's long delay in processing the applications because such injury was redressible. Roma Outdoor Creations, Inc. v. City of Cumming, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

County sign ordinance.

- A county ordinance which prohibited off-premise signs in commercially-zoned areas, including all commercial signs, and then permitted the county to decide on a case-by-case basis which signs were allowed, violated the First Amendment. By initially declaring all signs as illegal and allowing the county to exempt from the ban only on a case-by-case basis, the ordinance was more extensive than was necessary to protect against misleading commercial speech and provided insufficient protection for protected speech, both commercial and otherwise. Fulton County v. Galberaith, 282 Ga. 314, 647 S.E.2d 24 (2007).

Standard for determining constitutionality of sign ordinance.

- Trial court erred by holding that there was a rational relationship between a county's sign restrictions and its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety in denying a request filed by two residents to temporarily enjoin the enforcement of certain provisions of the county ordinance; the court should have applied a time, place, and manner standard as required by the U.S. Constitution, or a least restrictive means analysis as required by the Georgia Constitution, drawing regulations to suppress no more speech than was necessary to achieve the county's goals. Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 610 S.E.2d 41 (2005).

In considering the constitutionality of ordinances restricting free speech, the courts were required to review the ordinance closely to ensure that it was narrowly drawn to serve the governmental interest and were not permitted to merely defer to the discretion of the governmental entity; a trial court erred in upholding a county's sign ordinance without taking evidence and in deferring without question to the decisions made at the discretion of the county. Coffey v. Fayette County, 280 Ga. 656, 631 S.E.2d 703 (2006).

Ban on signs in public right of way not unconstitutional.

- City clearly had the right to prohibit the erection of signs on the public right of way; therefore, the provision of the city sign ordinance, banning signs on the public right of way, Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-372(e), was not unconstitutional. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Holiday decoration exemption unconstitutional.

- Although the general setback provision of the city sign ordinance, Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-374(a), requiring signs to be set back 10 feet from the edge of the sidewalk or 15 feet from the edge of the road where there was no sidewalk, was constitutional since it was narrowly drawn to ensure that yard signs did not block the view of traffic or otherwise obstruct intersections, but otherwise allowed those passing by to be able to read the signs, the exemption for seasonal displays and decorations found in Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-363(f) was not constitutional; if the city did not wish a sign near its right of way because of traffic and visibility concerns, allowing a large holiday decoration near the sidewalk would have posed the same problems. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Content-based ban on flags unconstitutional.

- City's arbitrary enforcement of Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-376(e), which banned all commercial flags on residential property, was unconstitutional, based on the city's own definition of a "commercial message," found in Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance § 5-362; the city's failure to enforce the ban on the posting of commercial messages in residential areas against the flags of professional sports teams constituted content-based discrimination since non-sports team commercial messages were at a disadvantage; accordingly, such content-based restrictions were presumptively invalid. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Content-neutral sign ordinance constitutionally valid.

- Cherokee County, Ga., sign ordinance did not violate the state or federal constitution because the number, height, and area requirements under which the permit applications were denied were constitutionally valid; the sign ordinance allowed a maximum area of 120 square feet, a maximum height of 35 feet and restricted businesses to only one freestanding sign. Furthermore, the ordinance was content-neutral and did not grant unfettered discretion to government officials, as the ordinance itself contained adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to judicial review. Douglas Outdoor Adver. of Ga., Inc. v. Cherokee County, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2004).

Because there was a reasonable fit between the city's stated goals of public and traffic safety and aesthetic harmony and the city sign ordinance's restrictions on the size and height of real estate signs and the number and location of yard sale signs, Avondale Estates, Ga., Sign Ordinance §§ 5-361(a) and 5-380(a)(4), the court found that the restrictions, limiting real estate signs to four square feet in area and three square feet in height, as well as the number and location of yard sale signs, were constitutional limitations on commercial speech. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Sign ordinance's content based restrictions were invalid.

- Corporation was successful in the corporation's suit alleging that a city's denial of the corporation's variance applications under the September 20, 1983, Cumming, Georgia zoning ordinance, as amended on June 20, 2006, violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V since the ordinance, which limited billboard content to travel services and attractions, was unconstitutional on the ordinance's face because the ordinance was a prior restraint that was content-based and lacked time limits, and the city's delay of more than 150 days in processing the corporation's billboard variance applications violated the corporation's rights. Roma Outdoor Creations, Inc. v. City of Cumming, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

Government must bear burden of proof of obscenity.

- In each case, the government must institute judicial proceedings whereby the material or film is seized or suppressed and the government bears the burden of proof of the obscenity of the material or film. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).

Sexually-oriented communication.

- Statute prohibiting certain nude and sexual conduct on premises where alcoholic beverages are sold or dispensed for consumption on the premises infringes upon protected speech and must fall as an improper exercise of the state's police power. Harris v. Entertainment Sys., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989).

Although a state may have a certain amount of its police power restored to it under the Twenty-first Amendment that would otherwise be limited under the First Amendment, the expression involved in an establishment offering sexually-oriented communication where alcohol is served is still within the purview of the First Amendment, and is still protected by Georgia's free expression guarantees. Because Georgia has no constitutional equivalent to the Twenty-first Amendment, the state's police power, though possibly not limited under the U.S. Constitution, is limited by Georgia's Constitution. Harris v. Entertainment Sys., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989).

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103(b)(2) prohibiting the admission of persons between 18 and 21 years of age to premises where sexually explicit performances are exhibited is unconstitutional as an infringement on free speech rights without proof of a compelling state interest justifying the application of such a restriction. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 269 Ga. 486, 500 S.E.2d 574 (1998).

"Total nude dancing" municipal ordinance unconstitutional.

- Municipal ordinance prohibiting total nude dancing and placing restrictions on partial nude dancing was an unconstitutional infringement on protected expression as overly broad, and void for vagueness for lack of sufficient warning as to proscribed conduct. Pel Assoc., Inc. v. Joseph, 262 Ga. 904, 427 S.E.2d 264 (1993).

Ordinance prohibiting sale of alcohol in adult entertainment establishments.

- City ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol at an erotic dance establishment was constitutional. The adult entertainment establishment ordinance was narrowly drawn to promote the city's interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments. Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993).

County ordinance restricting adult entertainment establishments offering nude dancing and alcohol was sufficiently narrow in its descriptions of prohibited attire and conduct to pass constitutional challenges for "overbreadth". S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267, 430 S.E.2d 726 (1993).

A legislative restriction on adult entertainment must satisfy a tripartite test in order to comport with the free speech guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. The constitutionality of a law regulating adult entertainment will be upheld only: (1) if it furthers an important government interest; (2) if that government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that government interest. Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council, 264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).

When the stated purpose of a municipal ordinance regulating adult entertainment on premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages was to reduce criminal activity and deterioration of neighborhoods as pernicious secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, the city failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact as to these issues. Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council, 264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).

A city ordinance adopted pursuant to the authority of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VII, and providing that a liquor license would not be issued for a location where adult entertainment licenses were required did not violate constitutional free speech guarantees. Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818, 118 S. Ct. 70, 139 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1997).

Nightclub's First Amendment challenge to a city's ordinances restricting the sale of alcohol in nude dancing establishments was rejected because under intermediate scrutiny, the ordinances furthered important government interests of preserving the quality of urban life and reducing criminal activity. Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga. , 816 S.E.2d 31 (2018).

Restricting off-site advertising of nude dance establishments.

- A statute proscribing any form of off-site advertising for commercial establishments featuring nude dancing impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the state's legitimate interest in preventing hazards to the traveling public, and, thus, impermissibly infringes the right of free speech. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97, 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

Indecent or obscene speech.

- Defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21(a)(1) was reversed as the statute was an overbroad infringement on defendant's First Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V rights to free speech; the statute does not contain the necessary language setting out the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest as it applies to indecent or obscene speech, whether heard by children or adults, and whether not welcomed by listeners or spoken with intent to please. McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265, 626 S.E.2d 77 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 424 et seq., 465 et seq.

Homeowners' Association Defense: Free Speech, 93 Am. Jur. Trials 293.

C.J.S.

- 16B C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 740 et seq., 841 et seq., 918 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of legislation directed against social or industrial propaganda deemed to be of a dangerous tendency, 1 A.L.R. 336; 20 A.L.R. 1535; 73 A.L.R. 1494.

Right of association to expel or discipline member for exercising a right, or performing duty, as a citizen, 14 A.L.R. 1446.

What amounts to vagrancy, 14 A.L.R. 1482.

Constitutionality of statute regulating newspapers or magazines, 35 A.L.R. 7; 110 A.L.R. 327.

Validity of statute or ordinance against picketing, 35 A.L.R. 1200; 108 A.L.R. 1119; 122 A.L.R. 1043; 125 A.L.R. 963; 130 A.L.R. 1303.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating advertising by physician, surgeon, or other person professing healing arts, 54 A.L.R. 400.

Constitutionality, construction, and effect of censorship laws, 64 A.L.R. 505.

Constitutionality of statute regulating or imposing tax or license fee upon newspapers or magazines, 110 A.L.R. 327.

Power of legislature or school authorities to prescribe and enforce oath of allegiance, "salute to flag," or other ritual of a patriotic character, 110 A.L.R. 383; 120 A.L.R. 655; 127 A.L.R. 1502; 141 A.L.R. 1030; 147 A.L.R. 698.

Injunction against picketing per se, where past picketing has been accompanied by violence or other improper conduct, 132 A.L.R. 1218.

Right of privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22; 57 A.L.R.2d 634; 57 A.L.R.3d 16.

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance prohibiting solicitation of passers-by in street in front of place of business, 139 A.L.R. 1197.

Unfair labor practice, within National Labor Relations Act or similar state statute, predicated upon expressions of opinion or statements by employer concerning labor unions, 146 A.L.R. 1024.

Freedom of speech and press as limitation on power to punish for contempt, 159 A.L.R. 1379.

Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties, 163 A.L.R. 1358.

Constitutionality of statute respecting employer's control of or interference with political affiliations or activities of employees, 166 A.L.R. 707.

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance regarding solicitation of persons to join an organization or society or to pay membership fees or dues, 167 A.L.R. 697.

Picketing of place of business by persons not employed therein, 1 A.L.R.2d 1274.

Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loud-speaker broadcasts in streets and other public places, 10 A.L.R.2d 627.

Defamatory nature of statements reflecting on plaintiff's religious beliefs, standing, or activities, 87 A.L.R.2d 453.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring or prohibiting posting or other publication of price of commodity or services, 89 A.L.R.2d 901; 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Nonlabor picketing or boycott, 93 A.L.R.2d 1284.

Modern concept of obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1158.

Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1214; 93 A.L.R.3d 297.

Legality of peaceful labor picketing on private property, 10 A.L.R.3d 846.

Invasion of privacy by publication dealing with one other than plaintiff, 18 A.L.R.3d 873.

Right of publisher of newspaper or magazine, in absence of contractual obligation, to refuse publication of advertisement, 18 A.L.R.3d 1286.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances regulating telephone answering services, 35 A.L.R.3d 1430.

Student organization registration statement, filed with public school or state university or college, as open to inspection by public, 37 A.L.R.3d 1311.

Attacks on judiciary as a whole as indirect contempt, 40 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding pharmacist to advertise prices of drugs or medicines, 44 A.L.R.3d 1301.

Censorship of convicted prisoners' "legal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Censorship of convicted prisoners' "nonlegal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1192.

Right of accused to have press or other media representatives excluded from criminal trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1007.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance forbidding unauthorized persons to enter upon or remain in school building or premises, 50 A.L.R.3d 340.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

Invasion of privacy by radio or television, 56 A.L.R.3d 386.

Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16.

Consumer picketing to protest products, prices, or services, 62 A.L.R.3d 227.

Application of state law to sex discrimination in employment advertising, 66 A.L.R.3d 1237.

Criminal offenses under statutes and ordinances regulating charitable solicitations, 76 A.L.R.3d 924.

Power of corporation to make political contribution or expenditure under state law, 79 A.L.R.3d 491.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

Restricting public access to judicial records of state courts, 84 A.L.R.3d 598.

Right of clergyman appearing in court as professional attorney to be in clerical garb, 84 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Publication of address as well as name of person as invasion of privacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 1159.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming, or hygiene, 88 A.L.R.3d 150.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or ordinances prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors, 93 A.L.R.3d 297.

State regulation of the giving or making of political contributions or expenditures by private individuals, 94 A.L.R.3d 944.

Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute forbidding use of telephone to annoy or harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411.

Privilege of newsgatherer against disclosure of confidential sources of information, 99 A.L.R.3d 37.

Identification of jobseeker by race, religion, national origin, sex, or age, in "Situation Wanted" employment advertising as violation of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154.

Defamation: publication of "Letter to Editor" in newspaper as actionable, 99 A.L.R.3d 573; 54 A.L.R.5th 443.

Validity of "war zone" ordinances restricting location of sex-oriented businesses, 1 A.L.R.4th 1297.

Validity and construction of state statute or ordinance prohibiting picketing, parading, demonstrating, or appearing in public while masked or disguised, 2 A.L.R.4th 1241.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance prohibiting use of "obscene" language in public, 2 A.L.R.4th 1331.

Validity of ordinances restricting location of "adult entertainment" or sex-oriented business, 10 A.L.R.4th 524, 10 A.L.R.5th 538.

Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 29 A.L.R.4th 287, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.

Validity, under state constitutions, of private shopping center's prohibition or regulation of political, social, or religious expression or activity, 38 A.L.R.4th 1219.

Validity and construction of "terroristic threat" statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949.

Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees, 51 A.L.R.4th 702.

False light invasion of privacy - cognizability and elements, 57 A.L.R.4th 22.

False light invasion of privacy - defenses and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.

Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation - post-New York Times cases, 57 A.L.R.4th 404.

Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520.

Intrusion by news-gathering entity as invasion of right of privacy, 69 A.L.R.4th 1059.

Liability for discharge of employee from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.

Propriety of exclusion of press or other media representatives from civil trial, 39 A.L.R.5th 103.

Propriety of publishing identity of sexual assault victim, 40 A.L.R.5th 787.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes or ordinances regulating sexual performance by child, 42 A.L.R.5th 291.

Validity of regulation by public-school authorities as to clothes or personal appearance of pupils, 58 A.L.R.5th 1.

Constitutionality of state statutes banning distribution of sexual devices, 94 A.L.R.5th 497.

First Amendment protection afforded to commercial and home video games, 106 A.L.R.5th 337.

First Amendment protection afforded to comic books, comic strips, and cartoons, 118 A.L.R.5th 213.

Construction and application of federal and state constitutional and statutory speech or debate provisions, 24 A.L.R.6th 255.

Amendment protection afforded to web site operators, 30 A.L.R.6th 299.

First Amendment protection afforded to blogs and bloggers, 35 A.L.R.6th 407.

Validity of restrictions imposed during national political conventions impinging upon rights to freedom of speech and assembly under First Amendment, 46 A.L.R.6th 465.

Restrictive covenants or homeowners' association regulations restricting or prohibiting flags, signage, or the like on homeowner's property as restraint on free speech, 51 A.L.R.6th 533.

When does use of pepper spray, mace, or other similar chemical irritants constitute violation of constitutional rights, 65 A.L.R.6th 93.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961, 159 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10166 (2010), that government may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, 65 A.L.R.6th 503.

Constitutionality of restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - Characteristics of forum, 70 A.L.R.6th 513.

Constitutionality of restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - Manner of restriction, 71 A.L.R.6th 471.

Constitutional challenges to compelled speech - General principles, 72 A.L.R.6th 513.

Constitutional challenges to compelled speech - Particular situations or circumstances, 73 A.L.R.6th 281.

Constitutionality of teaching or otherwise promoting secular humanism in public schools, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 538.

Protection of commercial speech under first amendment - Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Construction and application of establishment clause of First Amendment - U.S. Supreme Court cases, 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 573.

First Amendment protection for members of military subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 229.

Application of First Amendment's "ministerial exception" or "ecclesiastical exception" to federal civil rights claims, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445.

Application of First Amendment in school context - Supreme Court cases, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

When does use of pepper spray, mace, or other similar chemical irritants constitute violation of constitutional rights, 65 A.L.R.6th 93.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961, 159 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10166 (2010), that government may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, 65 A.L.R.6th 503.

Constitutionality of Restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - characteristics of forum, 70 A.L.R.6th 513.

Constitutionality of restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - manner of restriction, 71 A.L.R.6th 471.

Constitutional challenges to compelled speech - general principles, 72 A.L.R.6th 513.

Constitutional challenges to compelled speech - particular situations or circumstances, 73 A.L.R.6th 281.

Expectation of privacy in and discovery of social networking web site postings and communications, 88 A.L.R.6th 319.

Provisions of divorce, child custody, or child support orders as infringing on federal or state constitutional guarantees of free speech, 2 A.L.R.7th 6.

Invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising - First Amendment cases, 15 A.L.R.7th 6.

Application of First Amendment in school context - Supreme Court cases, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

First Amendment protection for school principals subjected to demotion, transfer, or reassignment because of speech, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.

Constitutional claims of persons placed on federal government's no-fly list or other terrorist watch lists, 5 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.

Application of federal constitutional guarantees or federal statutory provisions to discipline or punishment of students with disabilities, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1.

University code or policy forbidding speech or conduct that is offensive, degrading, or the like as violative of First Amendment Rights, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 2.