Former O.C.G.A.

§ 24-4-60 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160) constitutional. - Prisoners' claim that former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-60 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160) was unconstitutional because the statute forced them to submit self incriminatory evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI, failed because DNA samples were not testimonial in nature. Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2003).

Constitutionality of implied consent notice.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI was held to protect against compelled breath tests and affords individuals a constitutional right to refuse testing. Submitting to a breath test implicates a person's right against compelled self-incrimination and prior decisions holding otherwise are overruled. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017).

No violation as defendant consented to breath test.

- Because the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the state-administered breath test and was not compelled to undergo that test, the defendant's right against self-incrimination was not violated. MacMaster v. State, 344 Ga. App. 222, 809 S.E.2d 478 (2018).

Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the defendant's state-administered chemical breath test, taken at police headquarters following the defendant's arrest, was properly denied as the defendant's consent to the breath test following the implied consent warning was voluntary because the traffic stop did not appear to be unreasonable or needlessly extended at any point; the officer made no effort to deceive the defendant into consenting to the test and, in fact, went to some length to clarify the defendant's choice in the matter; and the record did not support an inference that the defendant did not understand what the defendant was being asked to decide or that the defendant was pressured into consenting to the test. Oh v. State, 345 Ga. App. 729, 815 S.E.2d 95 (2018).

Defendant not subjected to custodial interrogation.

- Defendant's claim that the statements defendant made to an officer as to defendant's intent to buy drugs and ownership of the jacket defendant was wearing, which contained a digital scale, should have been excluded as defendant had not been advised of defendant's Miranda rights was rejected. Miranda was inapplicable as defendant was not in custody since: (1) defendant was being questioned pursuant to a developing crime scene investigation; (2) a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have believed that the person was in custody as defendant's accomplice was the target of the investigation; and (3) defendant was allowed to leave the scene. Lewis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 547, 602 S.E.2d 278 (2004).

Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation.

- Questioning an inmate, whether by peace officers or prison officials, when the purpose of the interrogation relates to a suspected crime for which criminal prosecution might ensue, is a custodial hearing, and requires a Miranda warning in order to render any statements made therein admissible in a subsequent hearing. Grant v. State, 154 Ga. App. 758, 270 S.E.2d 42 (1980).

A disciplinary hearing while incarcerated in a state correctional institution is a custodial hearing which requires an appropriate warning of the right against self-incrimination before any statements made are admissible against the speaker in a subsequent criminal proceeding for those same criminal acts (in the absence of waiver). Grant v. State, 154 Ga. App. 758, 270 S.E.2d 42 (1980).

Time when Miranda warnings required.

- Defendant who voluntarily accompanied police to a sheriff's office where the defendant was interviewed, who was not under arrest and not restrained, and who began telling the officers what the defendant had "heard" when it became apparent that the defendant knew too much about the crime only needed to have Miranda warnings at that point. Wilson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 812, 432 S.E.2d 211 (1993).

Factors for determining whether defendant in custody.

- Trial court erred in suppressing a defendant's pre-Miranda statements based on the court's findings that police had probable cause to arrest and that defendant was the focus of the investigation as these considerations were irrelevant for determining whether the defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. The proper inquiry was how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have perceived the situation. State v. Folsom, 285 Ga. 11, 673 S.E.2d 210 (2009).

Inadequate invocation of self-incrimination privilege.

- Because defendant's statement that defendant should not talk in the absence of "real talk" was insufficient to trigger the interrogating agent's duty to cease questioning, the trial court did not err in admitting defendant's later statements to the police. Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (2010).

Warnings not required at nonaccusatory, on-the-scene investigation.

- Miranda warnings are not required when a person responds to an officer's initial inquiry at an on-the-scene investigation which has not become accusatory. Collins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 651, 269 S.E.2d 509 (1980).

Interrogation must cease when individual unequivocally asks for attorney. United States v. Webb, 633 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).

Privilege applies to attorney being investigated by disciplinary authorities of bar.

- An attorney whose professional activities are under investigation by the disciplinary authorities of the State Bar of Georgia is entitled to the protection of the constitutional safeguards of the federal and state Constitutions against self-incrimination. Wilson v. State Bar, 225 Ga. 343, 168 S.E.2d 584, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957, 90 S. Ct. 429, 24 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1969).

Judge cannot call defendant as witness at hearing.

- Although a defendant has the right to testify at the defendant's Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial judge cannot call the defendant as a witness. Shepherd v. State, 236 Ga. 787, 225 S.E.2d 312 (1976).

Immunity promised when party compelled to answer incriminating questions.

- This paragraph is not violated by an act compelling a party to answer incriminating questions, provided it guarantees immunity from a criminal proceeding. White v. Crane, 62 Ga. 399 (1879).

Comments on pre-trial silence.

- Prosecutor's two improper comments on defendant's pre-trial silence were not reversible error as the trial court took corrective measures after the first comment and defendant failed to request a curative instruction or a mistrial after the second comment. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 987, 126 S. Ct. 571, 163 L. Ed. 2d 478 (2005).

In a prosecution for shoplifting, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial after the state improperly commented on the right to remain silent, as the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, eyewitness testimony, and videotaped evidence of the crime, and the prosecutor's compliance with an instruction to not make any further comment on defendant's silence. Ekanger v. State, 279 Ga. App. 421, 631 S.E.2d 459 (2006).

During a defendant's trial for aggravated child molestation and related charges, even if a police officer was properly allowed to testify about the defendant's refusal to discuss or deny the allegations against the defendant, it was error to permit questioning of the defendant on the subject; the error was not harmless and the defendant's convictions required reversal because the prosecution deliberately and repeatedly placed the evidence before the jury, the defendant denied having sexual relations with the victim, numerous witnesses testified for the defense, and the victim gave conflicting testimony. Maynard v. State, 282 Ga. App. 598, 639 S.E.2d 389 (2006).

In a case in which ineffective assistance of counsel was claimed due to counsel's failure to object to a comment in the prosecutor's closing argument that the defendant could have given the defendant's version of the facts of a domestic dispute to the police, the appellate court improperly relied on exclusions to comments on a defendant's silence in Morrison v. State, 554 S.E.2d 190 (2001); the court overruled Morrison based on the bright-line rule in Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991), that, with reference to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-36 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801), that comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward was far more prejudicial than probative. Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).

No prejudice from improper comment on silence.

- Denial of a motion for a mistrial was proper given the trial court's prompt, detailed curative instruction to the jury; it was unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper comment on defendant's silence. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005).

Denial of a motion for a mistrial was proper as there was only one reference to the defendant's election not to make a statement to the police, the prosecutor did not solicit the reference, and the prosecutor neither mentioned the defendant's silence nor sought to draw any prejudicial inferences from it; there was no focus on the defendant's silence sufficient to constitute prejudicial error. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

In a defendant's trial for armed robbery and related offenses, a police officer's comment on the defendant's refusal to make a statement was harmless error because no prejudice resulted; the officer's inadvertent remark was stopped mid-sentence, the trial court instructed the jury to completely disregard the remark, and the state made no subsequent references to the defendant's silence and drew no prejudicial inferences from it. Wright v. State, 282 Ga. App. 649, 639 S.E.2d 581 (2006).

Accused may not be placed in incriminating circumstances for identification.

- For the purposes of identification, the accused may not be taken and placed within the framework of the scene of the crime, there for identification within the coordinating, incriminating circumstances of the scene. Meriwether v. State, 63 Ga. App. 667, 11 S.E.2d 816 (1940).

Forced participation in lineup after illegal arrest does not contravene rights. Meriwether v. State, 63 Ga. App. 667, 11 S.E.2d 816 (1940).

No violation of rights by confession of defendant when not under arrest or in custody.

- When the defendant was not under arrest or in custody at the time of the confession and no police or other law enforcement personnel were present, the defendant's constitutional rights could not have been violated. Gaston v. State, 153 Ga. App. 538, 265 S.E.2d 866 (1980).

Because of the absence or dissipation of coercion once a suspect is released from custody, subsequent confessions obtained from even police initiated interrogations are admissible without violating the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights if there has been an intervening break in custody. Wilson v. State, 264 Ga. 287, 444 S.E.2d 306, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 988, 115 S. Ct. 486, 130 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1994).

Invoking right to refuse independent psychiatric evaluation bars claim of insanity.

- Defendant may invoke the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, refuse to submit to an examination by an independent expert, and thereby forego the right to present expert testimony on the issue of insanity. Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987).

Finding of no custodial interrogation not clearly erroneous.

- Trial court's finding that defendant was not restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest was not clearly erroneous because: (1) defendant met with two plain clothes officers and defendant's high school principal in the principal's office; (2) defendant appeared to understand the officers and personally identified defendant as one of the people photographed using stolen credit cards after defendant was shown the photographs; (3) the officers' manner was conversational and defendant did not appear frightened; (4) defendant was not in handcuffs, defendant had not been told that defendant was not free to go or under arrest, and defendant was never threatened or promised anything; and (5) defendant never asked to terminate the meeting, defendant never objected to the questioning, and defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the police department for further questioning. Dillard v. State, 272 Ga. App. 523, 612 S.E.2d 804 (2005).

Trial court did not err when the court ruled that the defendant was not in custody when the defendant made statements during the execution of a search warrant of the defendant's home, and thus Miranda warnings were not required when an officer and an investigator testified that the defendant was not under formal arrest during the execution of the search warrant, the defendant moved about the defendant's home without restriction, made and received telephone calls without restraint, and was free to leave the property. Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006).

Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because the defendant agreed to accompany officers to the police station, did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was told the defendant was free to leave, but agreed to remain at the station, was made comfortable, and was not denied access to a telephone. Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 629 S.E.2d 213 (2006).

Requiring defense counsel to produce copies of videotape not an act of incrimination.

- Trial court's reproduction of missing videotape exhibits for appeal was proper because, inter alia, contrary to the defendant's claim, requiring defense counsel to turn over counsel's copy of the tapes was not an act of incrimination against the defendant, but rather was an effort to allow the defendant to complete the record in the defendant's own appeal. Hughes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 113, 679 S.E.2d 121 (2009).

Scar, voluntarily exhibited, can be examined by doctor on cross-examination. Gordon v. State, 68 Ga. 814 (1882).

Scope of cross-examination is limited to matters opened by direct examination. Bishop v. Bishop, 157 Ga. 408, 121 S.E. 305 (1924).

When a defendant voluntarily testifies to matters on direct examination, a defendant can be cross-examined, and required to give a physical demonstration, concerning the matters to which the defendant testified to on direct examination. Scott v. State, 270 Ga. 93, 507 S.E.2d 728 (1998).

Cited in Sheppard v. State, 68 Ga. App. 127, 22 S.E.2d 347 (1942); Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517, 25 S.E.2d 9 (1943); Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944); Shepherd v. State, 203 Ga. 635, 47 S.E.2d 860 (1948); McKay v. Balkcom, 203 Ga. 790, 48 S.E.2d 453 (1948); Notis v. State, 84 Ga. App. 199, 65 S.E.2d 622 (1951); Allbright v. State, 92 Ga. App. 251, 88 S.E.2d 468 (1955); Walther v. Walther, 219 Ga. 644, 135 S.E.2d 401 (1964); Bass v. Bass, 222 Ga. 378, 149 S.E.2d 818 (1966); Hackney v. State, 223 Ga. 802, 158 S.E.2d 239 (1967); Reid v. State, 116 Ga. App. 640, 158 S.E.2d 461 (1967); Sark v. State, 118 Ga. App. 529, 164 S.E.2d 266 (1968); Hunsinger v. State, 225 Ga. 426, 169 S.E.2d 286 (1969); Townsend v. Northcutt, 121 Ga. App. 230, 173 S.E.2d 470 (1970); Mallin v. Mallin, 226 Ga. 628, 176 S.E.2d 709 (1970); Fryer v. Stynchcombe, 228 Ga. 576, 186 S.E.2d 885 (1972); Master v. Savannah Sur. Assocs., 148 Ga. App. 678, 252 S.E.2d 186 (1979); Thompson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 567, 258 S.E.2d 180 (1979); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Baker v. State, 162 Ga. App. 606, 292 S.E.2d 451 (1982); State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892, 770 S.E.2d 629 (2015); Latta v. State, 341 Ga. App. 696, 802 S.E.2d 264 (2017).

Protection from being compelled to furnish evidence against self.

- A defendant cannot be compelled to personally incriminate oneself by acts or words. Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879).

The constitutional guaranty protects one from being compelled to furnish evidence against oneself, either in the form of oral confessions or incriminating admissions of an involuntary character, or of doing an act against one's will which is incriminating in its nature. Smith v. State, 17 Ga. App. 693, 88 S.E. 42 (1916); Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964); Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 206 S.E.2d 662, appeal dismissed, 233 Ga. 10, 209 S.E.2d 605 (1974).

The essential element in the provision of the bill of rights against self-incrimination is that no one shall be compelled to give evidence tending to incriminate that person personally. State v. J.T., 155 Ga. App. 812, 273 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

Applicability of privilege.

- The constitutional privileges against self-incrimination are applicable to post-arrest, pretrial police interrogation as well as to the trial itself, i.e., the accused cannot be compelled to testify at trial. Howard v. State, 237 Ga. 471, 228 S.E.2d 860 (1976).

Defendant in a criminal case, an attorney who was the sole shareholder of a professional corporation, was properly held in civil contempt for not producing a noncompetition agreement between the corporation and a former employee. The agreement was a corporate document, and the defendant had been subpoenaed to produce the document as a corporate agent; thus, the defendant could not assert the defendant's personal right against self-incrimination and the small size of the corporation was immaterial. Thompson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 363, 670 S.E.2d 152 (2008).

Criminal Procedure Discovery Act.

- The requirement of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4, part of the Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, that a defendant disclose any mitigating evidence the defendant intended to introduce in the presentence hearing did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination; statements of witnesses a defendant intends to call to testify are not personal to the defendant, and although the disclosure of the list of witnesses a defendant intends to call is personal to the defendant, a trial court can exercise its discretion to specify the time, place, and manner of making the discovery and to enter such orders as seem just under the circumstances when self-incrimination concerns arise, such as a protective order or a continuance pending the completion of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007).

Implied consent warnings administered to motorists suspected of driving under the influence need not inform them of their privilege against self-incrimination. Heller v. State, 234 Ga. App. 630, 507 S.E.2d 518 (1998).

Statements voluntary.

- Statements the defendant made at the scene and the station during an interview were admissible because the defendant received and waived Miranda warnings before making the incriminating statements, and the defendant's interrogators testified that the interrogators made no threats or promises and did not coerce the defendant in any way. Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 664, 732 S.E.2d 65 (2012).

Extent of protection afforded by provision.

- The protection is not limited to cases where the question or answer has a direct tendency to incriminate the defendant, or to expose the defendant to a penalty or forfeiture, but the defendant is protected from answering any question which may form a link in the chain by which such cases are to be established. Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 209 S.E.2d 611 (1974).

Unlawful to compel person under suspicion to produce evidence upon which the person could be convicted. Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 206 S.E.2d 662, appeal dismissed, 233 Ga. 10, 209 S.E.2d 605 (1974).

Prosecutor's reference to defendant's right to have psychiatrist not testify was not a violation of defendant's right against self-incrimination. Willett v. State, 223 Ga. App. 866, 479 S.E.2d 132 (1996).

Testimony that was an improper comment on a defendant's silence or failure to come forward was an impropriety but did not automatically require reversal. Bruce v. State, 268 Ga. App. 677, 603 S.E.2d 33 (2004).

Because an agent's improper reference during testimony to the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent was made gratuitously and not in response to a specific question, because the state did not highlight the statement for the jury or suggest any inference that could be drawn from the defendant's invocation, and, because after several more questions, the trial court removed the jury from the courtroom, but no further reference was made to the improper statement, it was unlikely that the statement had an impact on the verdict; the evidence was strong, when juxtaposed with the likely impact of the statement, and, thus, the improper statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Kania v. State, 280 Ga. App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (2006).

An officer's vague, nonresponsive comment, in response to defense counsel's interrogation, that the defendant had invoked the defendant's right to remain silent did not merit reversal as defense counsel had quickly moved past the comment and the state had not drawn attention to the comment or encouraged the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Conviction for driving under the influence was affirmed because the prosecutor did not manifestly intend to comment on the defendant's failure to testify and the nature of the statement by the prosecutor was not such that the jury would naturally and necessarily have taken the statement to be such a comment. Moreover, even assuming that the statement was an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify, considering that the comment did not appear intentionally designed to or likely to urge any negative inference, the context in which the comment was made, and the strength of the evidence against the defendant, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Schenck v. State, 307 Ga. App. 890, 706 S.E.2d 218 (2011).

Provision construed to limit state from forcing individual to present "evidence, oral or real."

- While the language of the Fifth Amendment in the United States Constitution has long been construed to be limited to "testimony," the language of this paragraph has been construed to limit the state from forcing the individual to present "evidence, oral or real." Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).

An accused cannot be compelled to produce evidence, oral or real, regardless of whether or not it is "testimonial." Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).

Impermissible to compel accused to perform act resulting in production of incriminating evidence.

- Although evidence may be compulsorily adduced from an accused, it is constitutionally impermissible to compel an accused to perform an act which results in the production of incriminating evidence. The distinction is between forcing an accused to do an act against the accused's will and requiring an accused to submit to an act; the latter "takes evidence from the defendant" and is constitutionally acceptable, the former compels the defendant, in essence, to give evidence which violates an individual's right against self incrimination. State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979).

Impermissible to compel handwriting exemplar.

- To compel a handwriting exemplar is to compel the defendant to do an act, not to submit to an act. State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979).

Requiring suspect to give voice exemplar for identification purposes does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. Davis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 549, 281 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Rights violated when defendant forced to produce evidence against the defendant's will.

- When a police officer compels a defendant to produce, against the will of the defendant, illegal lottery tickets by threat and by placing the officer's hand on a pistol, the method of forcing the defendant to produce this evidence violates the defendant's constitutional rights, in that it compels the defendant to produce evidence to incriminate oneself. Grant v. State, 85 Ga. App. 610, 69 S.E.2d 889 (1952).

Against public policy to call accused before grand jury.

- The grand jury has no lawful right to call the accused before it while considering the bill of indictment against the accused, and swear or question the accused regarding such charge. It is against the public policy of this state. Jenkins v. State, 65 Ga. App. 16, 14 S.E.2d 594 (1941).

Self-incrimination would result from use of notice to produce.

- When the state, through resort to the notice to produce, in effect seeks to reseize property and redivest the defendant of custody and possession by retaining it and using it as evidence in a criminal proceeding, the state may not use a notice to produce to accomplish this end. Unconstitutional self-incrimination would be the result of compliance with the state's notice. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).

When use of notice to produce prohibited.

- The state may not, by using a notice to produce pursuant to former Code 1933, §§ 38-801 and 38-802 and Ga. L. 1966, p. 502, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-10-26 and24-10-29), attempt to secure indirectly the same disposition of the property which would have obtained in accordance with former Code 1933, § 79A-828 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49) had the state's libel for condemnation been successful. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).

No violation of rights by removal of bullet.

- Constitutional rights of defendant were not violated by the state in requiring the removal of a bullet from the defendant's body. Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975, 93 S. Ct. 1454, 35 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1973).

"Testimony" means all types of evidence. Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964), commented on in 16 Mercer L. Rev. 315 (1964).

Codefendant cannot be compelled to testify.

- The defendant is not unfairly deprived of favorable testimony when the trial court, at the state's suggestion, advises an unrepresented codefendant of the co-defendant's constitutional rights as a witness and, after the trial court advises the co-defendant of the co-defendant's rights and appoints counsel for the co-defendant, the co-defendant chooses not to testify. Neither the trial court, the state, nor a codefendant can compel another codefendant to testify in favor of a calling codefendant, for to do so violates constitutional protections. In re J.S.S., 168 Ga. App. 340, 308 S.E.2d 855 (1983).

No need to advise defendant of rights when defendant did not testify.

- Since defendant did not testify and was not cross-examined, there was no harm in the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the defendant's right not to be compelled to testify under oath. Coonce v. State, 171 Ga. App. 20, 318 S.E.2d 763 (1984).

Debtor bears burden to establish privilege to fieri facias interrogatories.

- When interrogatories in fieri facias do not constitute or evidence extensive questioning as to the judgment debtor's financial affairs which would tend, as a matter of law, to incriminate the debtor, work a forfeiture of the debtor's estate, or bring disgrace or infamy upon the debtor or the debtor's family, but are clearly within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, the burden is on the debtor to state the general reason for the debtor's refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination exists with respect to each question. Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418, 312 S.E.2d 874 (1984).

No blanket privilege in civil case.

- There was no blanket right to refuse to answer questions in civil proceedings based on the self-incrimination privilege and when there was no transcript of the hearing at which the trial court made the court's finding that the privilege was not implicated, the appellate court presumed that evidence supported the trial court's finding and order compelling discovery; further, the trial court's order compelling an employee and the husband to produce financial documents such as checks, account statements, and tax returns in a civil proceeding did not violate the self-incrimination privilege. Dempsey v. Kaminski Jewelry, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 814, 630 S.E.2d 77 (2006).

Driver could not assert right against self-incrimination to suppress results of field sobriety test since the driver was not a person "charged in a criminal proceeding" at the time the test was given, the driver was not in police custody at that time, and no force or threat of penalty was used against the driver. Montgomery v. State, 174 Ga. App. 95, 329 S.E.2d 166 (1985).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, evidence of a field sobriety test should not have been excluded when the defendant was not in custody at the time the test was administered. State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 443 S.E.2d 688 (1994).

There was no violation of the defendant's right against self-incrimination because the defendant was not in custody at the time field sobriety tests were administered. State v. Sumlin, 224 Ga. App. 205, 480 S.E.2d 260 (1997).

Defendant was not in custody nor compelled by force or threats to perform roadside sobriety tests in violation of the defendant's rights against self incrimination. Sisson v. State, 232 Ga. App. 61, 499 S.E.2d 422 (1998).

Breath test.

- Defendant's motion in limine to suppress the results of a breath test obtained after the defendant's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) was improperly granted as the administration of the breath test did not violate the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination because the defendant was not compelled to perform the breath test as the DUI officer did not make any promises in exchange for the defendant's agreement to submit to a breath test; and, although the DUI officer did not allow the defendant to make any phone calls until they were finished with the breath tests, there was no evidence that the defendant was forced to take the breath tests against the defendant's will in order to make the phone calls. State v. Council, 343 Ga. App. 583, 807 S.E.2d 504 (2017).

Boat operator's self incrimination rights not violated.

- Department of Natural Resources officer who observed the defendant's boat operating with its docking lights improperly illuminated, O.C.G.A. § 52-7-11(b)(2), had the authority to detain the defendant and make a brief safety inspection under O.C.G.A. § 52-7-25(b)(4); the defendant was not in custody during the stop and Miranda warnings were not required prior to field sobriety tests. Pedersen v. State, 337 Ga. App. 159, 786 S.E.2d 535 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1641, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 828 (Ga. 2016).

No violation of right by requiring defendant to strip to waist and be photographed.

- Requiring a defendant to strip to the defendant's waist and be photographed neither compelled the defendant to be a witness nor compelled the defendant to give testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating. Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 323 S.E.2d 801 (1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S. Ct. 3538, 87 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1985).

Requiring suspect to verbalize specified words for identification purposes, whether or not the words used are the same as those allegedly used during the commission of the offense, does not violate an accused's privilege against self-incrimination accorded the accused by the United States Constitution and the state's statutes and Constitution. Clark v. State, 166 Ga. App. 366, 304 S.E.2d 494 (1983).

Defendant does not have right to refuse to speak at a post-indictment lineup. Jenkins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 840, 308 S.E.2d 14 (1983).

No violation by taking of blood sample.

- The compelled taking of a blood sample does not violate a defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 331 S.E.2d 573 (1985).

No violation by taking of blood and urine samples.

- Admitting the results of blood and urine analysis into evidence in the defendant's felony murder trial did not violate U.S. Const., amend. V, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI, or former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-20(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506) because the removal of a substance from the body through a minor intrusion did not cause the defendant to be a witness against oneself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and similar provisions of Georgia law. Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

Obtaining of blood, hair, and saliva samples from an accused represent "minor intrusions" which do not cause the person to be a witness against themselves within the meaning of the constitution. Calloway v. State, 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811 (1991).

Use of body excrement.

- The use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body does not violate a defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution. Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 935, 111 S. Ct. 2059, 114 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1991); State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 443 S.E.2d 688 (1994).

The use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body does not violate a DUI suspect's constitutional rights, and therefore there is no requirement that one be informed of one's right against self-incrimination. Nawrocki v. State, 235 Ga. App. 416, 510 S.E.2d 301 (1998).

Measurement of blood alcohol content is incriminating.

- Measurement of blood alcohol content based on a breath test requires the cooperation of the person being tested and compelling a defendant to perform an act that is incriminating in nature is precisely what Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI prohibits. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017).

No violation of right by admission of blood test refusal.

- The admission of a refusal to submit to blood-alcohol chemical test does not violate the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246, 312 S.E.2d 361 (1983).

Taking of dental impressions, dental photographs, and a dental examination of the accused did not violate the provision against incrimination because there was no surgical foray into the body of the accused which would require the additional precaution of an evidentiary hearing before a superior court to assure safe medical procedures, and to extend the Constitution so far would prohibit reasonable police practices, such as the taking of fingerprints, to which the taking of dental impressions is analogous. State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984).

The fact-finder's consideration of the accused's demeanor in reaction to the testimony of others, even when the accused does not take the stand, does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI. In re M.E.H., 180 Ga. App. 591, 349 S.E.2d 814 (1986).

Prosecutor's statement that only two people knew what went on in the room where an assault occurred, the victim and defendant, did not violate defendant's rights against self-incrimination. Neal v. State, 198 Ga. App. 518, 402 S.E.2d 114 (1991).

Prosecutor's comment about the defense's failure to rebut state's evidence was not an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Incrimination prerequisite determination not satisfied.

- Attorney who delivered an anonymous campaign contribution on behalf of a client in violation of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30(e) was improperly held in contempt for failing to disclose the client's name to the State Ethics Commission; the attorney invoked the self-incrimination privilege, and the trial court found the attorney in contempt without first determining whether the commission's proposed questions might have been incriminating. Begner v. State Ethics Comm'n, 250 Ga. App. 327, 552 S.E.2d 431 (2001).

Right to remain silent.

- Defendant invoked the right to remain silent and the state police investigator's questions that got defendant to talk about the shooting violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights because they were not routine booking questions exempt under Miranda's right to remain silent provision; thus, the inculpatory statements made by defendant had to be suppressed. State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 619 S.E.2d 684 (2005).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as to the statements the defendant gave the police before the defendant was given the defendant's Miranda warnings as, although the defendant was in custody as the defendant was approached at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed on the ground while guarded by three police officers even before the defendant was advised that the defendant was under arrest, the defendant was not subjected to interrogation as the officers asked the defendant's father, not the defendant, about the missing truck, and their questions to the father were not reasonably likely to elicit any response from the defendant. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

Improper comment on defendant's silence required new trial.

- Because the trial court erroneously commented on the defendant's refusal to make a post-arrest statement to police, and the error, absent a curative instruction, was not harmless or the result of inadvertence, the defendant's robbery by sudden snatching conviction was reversed; thus, the trial court erred in denying the defendant a new trial on those grounds. Wright v. State, 287 Ga. App. 593, 651 S.E.2d 852 (2007).

Not in custody.

- Defendant's motion to suppress two statements the defendant made to the police were properly denied as the defendant was not in custody when the defendant made the statements; the defendant's motion to suppress a third statement was properly denied as the defendant was read the defendant's Miranda rights before the defendant made the statement. Durham v. State, 281 Ga. 208, 636 S.E.2d 513 (2006).

As the defendants voluntarily went to the police station, were not under formal arrest at any time during their interviews, and were told before the interview that the defendants were free to leave, a reasonable person in the defendants' situation would not have felt so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest. Therefore, the failure to give the defendants Miranda warnings did not require suppression of the defendants' statements. Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009).

Defendant driven to hospital by police not in custody and Miranda not required.

- Since the defendant was not under formal arrest or any restraint when an officer questioned the defendant in the defendant's hotel room and drove the defendant to a hospital, Miranda warnings were not required. That the defendant was the focus of a murder investigation did not require the officer to give Miranda warnings; the relevant inquiry was whether a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have perceived that the person was in custody. Timmreck v. State, 285 Ga. 39, 673 S.E.2d 198 (2009).

Jury instructions.

- When during deliberations a juror sent a note asking for an answer from defendant about why defendant was on the burglary victim's property on the morning of the burglary, the failure to recharge the jury that defendant was not required to testify and that the jury should not make any adverse inferences against the defendant for not testifying did not violate defendant's right against self-incrimination since neither the jury nor defendant requested such a recharge. Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (2003).

No violation in asking defendant to stand at juror's request.

- Trial court did not err by complying with a juror's request that the defendant briefly stand before the jury before the jury watched a video of a drug transaction a second time. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005).

Questioning must come when witness invokes privilege.

- When a witness testifies under oath that the witness's answer to any question asked of the witness would incriminate the witness and comes within the constitutional immunities guaranteed to the witness, the court can demand no further testimony of the fact. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wilmont, 123 Ga. App. 337, 180 S.E.2d 913 (1971).

Trial court did not engage in the required analysis for a witness asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege, but merely declared that answering the questions concerning knowledge of the court's order regarding removing a child from a father's home would not incriminate the witness; at a minimum, such knowledge would establish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove the witness was in contempt of that order and the trial court's finding of contempt based on the witness's refusal to answer the question was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006).

When co-defendants claimed privilege, motion for continuance properly denied.

- At the time of the defendant's trial, defendant's potential witnesses' appeals were pending and their counsel informed the defendant that, if called as witnesses, they would assert their privilege against self-incrimination; therefore, the defendant could not satisfy the requirement of showing that the witnesses would be available at the next term of court and, thus, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-25. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Party's invocation of privilege must be honored.

- A questioned party's invocation of the party's constitutional privilege to be free from compulsion to testify against the party must be honored. Eason v. Berger & Co., 153 Ga. App. 126, 264 S.E.2d 579 (1980).

Privilege is personal and cannot be claimed for benefit of another.

- Joint principals to a crime as accomplices are competent witnesses against each other, and while the one sought to be used as a witness has the right to claim the protection afforded by this paragraph, this constitutional guaranty is a personal privilege belonging to the witness and cannot be claimed for the witness for the benefit of another party. Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742 (1948).

Witness must but accused need not claim privilege when before grand jury.

- If the person testifying before a general grand jury is a mere witness, the person must claim the privilege on the ground that the person's answers will incriminate; whereas, if the person be in fact the party proceeded against, the person cannot be subpoenaed and sworn, even though the person claims no privilege. Jenkins v. State, 65 Ga. App. 16, 14 S.E.2d 594 (1941).

No presumption of guilt because accused does not deny charges.

- It has long been Georgia law that an accused who is taken into custody cannot be presumed to acknowledge guilt just because the accused does not deny the charges. Emmett v. State, 243 Ga. 550, 255 S.E.2d 23 (1979).

Prosecution may not use claim of privilege against defendant.

- Evidence as to silence on the part of the defendant at the time of the defendant's arrest should be excluded when objected to, for the defendant is entitled to remain silent, and the prosecution may not use against the defendant the fact that the defendant stood or claimed the defendant's privilege. Kitchens v. State, 150 Ga. App. 707, 258 S.E.2d 544 (1979).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial due to a fire investigator's comments on defendant's exercise of defendant's right to remain silent as the motion was initially made before any such testimony was given, and, while in the second instance the investigator did improperly comment on the exercise of defendant's right, the trial court properly gave the jurors a curative instruction and specifically asked them whether they could disregard the testimony. George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 588 S.E.2d 312 (2003).

Evidence of defendant's post-arrest silence admitted in error harmless.

- In a prosecution for battery and aggravated assault, defense counsel's failure to object to a police officer's single gratuitous reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence was not reversible error because, in view of the strong evidence of the defendant's guilt, this error was unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (2008).

Witness may voluntarily answer questions.

- A witness, fully apprised of the witness's rights, under this paragraph, may voluntarily answer questions tending to degrade or incriminate the witness. Gravett v. State, 74 Ga. 191 (1884); Wilburn v. State, 141 Ga. 510, 81 S.E. 444 (1914).

Defendant initiated discussions.

- Statements made while the defendant was in jail were admissible because it was clear that the defendant initiated the conversation in question, and persisted in talking to the investigator after the investigator reminded defendant that the investigator could not discuss the case in the absence of defense counsel. Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006).

Harmless error in admitting voluntary statement.

- Even if it was error to admit defendant's pre-Miranda custodial statement that was both voluntary and not incriminating, even though it appeared to have been made in response to a police officer's statement which was a psychological ploy designed to elicit an incriminating response, the error was harmless. Brown v. State, 273 Ga. App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (2005).

Complete waiver of privilege when defendant testifies voluntarily.

- A defendant in a criminal case who voluntarily testifies in the defendant's own behalf waives completely the defendant's privilege under the Fifth Amendment and this paragraph. Furthermore, when a defendant voluntarily takes the stand in the defendant's own behalf and testifies as to the defendant's guilt or innocence as to a particular offense, the defendant's waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, the defendant may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing. Leonard v. State, 146 Ga. App. 439, 246 S.E.2d 450 (1978).

Allowing a codefendant to give testimony regarding the substance of defendant's prior testimony at a probation revocation hearing, after defendant elected not to take the stand at trial, did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, since defendant waived the privilege by testifying voluntarily on the defendant's behalf at the prior hearing. Bobbitt v. State, 215 Ga. App. 131, 449 S.E.2d 674 (1994).

Age and education as factors in capacity to waive rights.

- The mere fact that the defendant was 21 years old with a sixth grade education does not lead to the conclusion that the defendant was incapable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving the defendant's constitutional rights. Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S. Ct. 1332, 63 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1980).

Under Georgia statutes, those who have reached the age of 17 are no longer considered juveniles by Georgia's criminal justice system. Therefore, for purposes of Miranda, statements made by a person who is at least 17 years old are admissible if made voluntarily, without being induced by the hope of benefit or coerced by threats. Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 601 S.E.2d 793 (2004).

Juvenile waiver-of-rights form.

- The trial court did not err in finding that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's federal and state constitutional rights prior to giving a statement to police because a juvenile waiver-of-rights form was read in its entirety to, and signed by, the defendant and the defendant's parent, and neither the defendant nor the defendant's parent ever invoked the defendant's right to remain silent or asked that the questioning cease. Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 651 S.E.2d 40 (2007).

Advisement of charges not relevant.

- Failure to advise a defendant as to the crimes about which the defendant was to be questioned before a Miranda waiver was irrelevant to whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Rivera v. State, 279 Ga. App. 1, 630 S.E.2d 152 (2006).

Privilege against self incrimination can be voluntarily waived by property settlement agreement as to future income tax returns and financial information covering future financial events unknown at the time of entering into the contract. Feig v. Feig, 246 Ga. 763, 272 S.E.2d 723 (1980).

Express notice or reference to waiver not required.

- When a person represented by counsel enters into a property settlement agreement which has the necessary effect of waiving a constitutional right, express notice of or reference to such waiver is not required. Feig v. Feig, 246 Ga. 763, 272 S.E.2d 723 (1980).

Waiver not invalidated by presence of attorney hired by mother.

- Waiver of Miranda rights was not invalid due to police officers' failure to tell a defendant that an attorney hired by the defendant's mother had arrived at the station, because the attorney, without having consulted the defendant, was not empowered to invoke the defendant's personal rights. Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 629 S.E.2d 213 (2006).

Waiver at former trial is immaterial. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794 (1896).

Failure to base objection on self-incrimination claim waived the claim.

- In a prosecution against a defendant for aggravated assault and other charges arising out of a road rage incident, the defendant waived a claim that a subpoena directing the production of the defendant's gun violated the defendant's rights against self-incrimination; when the defendant raised the claim in a motion to quash the subpoena, the trial court reserved ruling on the argument, and when the defendant objected to the admission of the gun into evidence, the defendant limited the grounds of the objection to a claim that the chain of custody had not been proven and did not raise the objection that the defendant's self-incrimination rights were being violated. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Trial judge was authorized to accept the interrogating officers' testimony and to find that the defendant's statement to police was voluntary and in accordance with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI; although the defendant claimed that the defendant's statement to police was not voluntary due to various factors, the trial court was authorized to credit police testimony indicating that the defendant voluntarily waived the defendant's Miranda rights. Carswell-Danso v. State, 281 Ga. App. 576, 636 S.E.2d 735 (2006).

Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to file a motion to exclude the introduction of the defendant's videotaped statement admitting to having sex with the victim and for failing to move to exclude or object to evidence of a prior molestation; there was no basis for such a motion, as the defendant's videotape showed the defendant being advised of and waiving the defendant's Miranda rights under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, and the evidence of the prior molestation was admissible at trial and no compliance with Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3 governing similar transactions was required. Hutchens v. State, 281 Ga. App. 610, 636 S.E.2d 773 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Statements made prior to waiver.

- Admission of voluntary statements, freely given, prior to a waiver was harmless error, if error at all, given the other cumulative evidence of guilt. Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 26, 619 S.E.2d 294 (2005).

Defendant's refusal to sign Miranda waiver form was not an invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel. Hunter v. State, 273 Ga. App. 52, 614 S.E.2d 179 (2005).

Waiver not invalidated by failure to inform of all charges.

- Fact that an officer failed to give a Miranda warning that specifically notified the defendant that the defendant was going to be questioned about an armed robbery, instead of just outstanding bad check charges, did not render the defendant's ensuing statement inadmissible. Hill v. State, 279 Ga. App. 402, 631 S.E.2d 446 (2006).

Defendant waived defendant's claim that defendant's statement was not voluntary and that defendant was not properly advised of defendant's Miranda rights as defendant failed to induce a ruling on the issue, even though defendant had filed a motion for a Jackson-Denno hearing and a motion in limine to exclude defendant's statement, and argued the issue during the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Bond v. State, 271 Ga. App. 849, 610 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Waiver of constitutional rights in guilty plea.

- Because the transcript of proceedings and trial counsel's affidavit did not show that defendant was advised that a guilty plea would waive the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation, the trial court erred in denying defendant's habeas corpus petition. Green v. State, 279 Ga. 687, 620 S.E.2d 788 (2005).

Habeas court's finding that a petitioner's guilty pleas were validly entered was reversed as the waiver forms signed by the petitioner and reviewed with the petitioner by the petitioner's attorneys addressed only the right to be tried by a jury; the waiver forms did not advise the petitioner that the petitioner was waiving the petitioner's right against self-incrimination and the petitioner's confrontation right. Beckworth v. State, 281 Ga. 41, 635 S.E.2d 769 (2006).

Waiver held to have been knowing and voluntary.

- A trial court did not err in ruling that a defendant's statements were made following a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right against self-incrimination: the 15-year-old defendant (1) stated that the defendant wanted to speak to an officer the morning after the defendant had refused to talk to police after being given Miranda warnings; (2) was given Miranda warnings again after indicating a willingness to talk, and did not request the presence of a relative or an attorney; and (3) had received no threats or promises from the attending officer. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that a defendant waived the defendant's right to counsel and that the defendant's statements to a detective were made voluntarily; thus, the statements were properly admitted into evidence. After the defendant said that the defendant wanted a lawyer, the defendant said that the defendant would tell the detective what happened if the defendant could speak to the defendant's family; after speaking with family members, the defendant was again advised of the defendant's rights and waived those rights; and after again asking to speak to police the next day, the defendant was again advised of the defendant's rights and waived those rights. Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71 (2008).

Trial court did not err in admitting a defendant's custodial statement into evidence, although the defendant argued that the defendant was illiterate and was awoken at 3 A.M. to give a statement, because the interviewing officer read the defendant the defendant's rights; the defendant appeared to understand those rights; the defendant complained of no physical injury or ailment; the police removed the defendant's handcuffs, permitting the defendant to use the restroom, and offered the defendant water; and the defendant did not appear groggy or non-responsive after napping. Billingsley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 661, 669 S.E.2d 699 (2008).

Admission of a defendant's inculpatory statement during the defendant's armed robbery trial was not an abuse of discretion based on the fact that the defendant had completed the ninth grade, the fact that the defendant acknowledged the seriousness of the crime the defendant was charged with, and the fact that the defendant also acknowledged that the defendant understood the defendant's right to counsel and the right to remain silent; the totality of the circumstances indicated that the sixteen years and nine months old defendant, gave the statement voluntarily after a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's rights. Killings v. State, 296 Ga. App. 869, 676 S.E.2d 31 (2009).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights, despite the testimony of the defendant's expert witness to the contrary, because: (1) the detective who interviewed the defendant testified that the defendant said that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (2) the detective had experience in dealing with people under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (3) the detective saw no evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (4) the defendant had no difficulty speaking or communicating; (5) the detective read the defendant the defendant's Miranda rights; and (6) the defendant said that the defendant understood each of the rights. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).

Revocation of waiver of right to counsel during interrogation.

- Defendant signed a Miranda waiver, later invoked the right to counsel, and still later, told another officer the defendant wanted to talk. As the defendant was re-Mirandized and re-signed the waiver of rights form, and the interviewing officer testified the officer neither made promises to the defendant nor coerced the defendant to give a statement, the defendant's confession to armed robbery was properly admitted into evidence. Grant-Farley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 293, 664 S.E.2d 302 (2008).

Criminal contempt conviction reversed.

- Defendant's criminal contempt conviction was reversed as the trial court relied on another court's ex parte immunity grant in ordering defendant to testify and neither court made a finding that defendant's testimony was "necessary to the public interest" as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-9-28; the state had to grant a valid immunity as broad in scope as the privilege it replaced and show the applicability of that state immunity to the witness. In re Long, 276 Ga. App. 306, 623 S.E.2d 181 (2005).

Limitation on promise to forego prosecution.

- A promise to forego prosecution must be limited to prosecution as to specific crimes or transactions. State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 295 S.E.2d 297 (1982).

Matters to be specified in promise to forego prosecution.

- A valid promise to forego prosecution based on prosecutorial discretion rather than on O.C.G.A. § 24-9-28 must, first, contain a description of the crimes or transactions in regard to which an individual is excused from prosecution, and, secondly, the prosecutor must obtain court approval of an agreement to forego prosecution. State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 295 S.E.2d 297 (1982).

Immunity not available when no constitutional right forfeited.

- When defendant neither engaged in a plea bargain nor was compelled to testify but apparently gave information in exchange for dismissal of charges against the defendant and a promise of the prosecutor not to prosecute the defendant for any crimes committed prior to September, 1980, the defendant gave up no constitutional right, and was not entitled to immunity for purpose of constitutional protection. State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 295 S.E.2d 297 (1982).

Incriminating statement is not direct evidence of guilt.

- A statement which does not confess guilt, though incriminating in nature, is an admission only. As such, it is not direct evidence of guilt, but only circumstantial evidence tending to prove the offense when considered with other evidence and may be used to justify a conviction. Thompson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 128, 258 S.E.2d 776 (1979).

Defendant's demand for counsel does not bar voluntary statements if defendant spontaneously incriminates the defendant after questioning has ceased. United States v. Webb, 633 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).

Defendant not required to testify.

- Refusal to permit defendant to introduce evidence of a victim's violent acts against third persons during the state's case was not tantamount to mandating that defendant testify, despite evidence that: (1) the victim pinned defendant against a wall; (2) defendant ran into a house screaming that defendant had been robbed and reported the robbery to the police; (3) defendant had fresh cuts or bruises on the neck; and (4) defendant reported to police that defendant had shot at someone as defendant tried to fend off a robber; it did not necessarily follow that defendant honestly sought self defense when firing a gun at the victim, given evidence that the victim turned away or ran from the defendant before the shooting and that the victim was shot in the back from at least two and one-half feet away. Nelloms v. State, 273 Ga. App. 448, 615 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

Admissibility of evidence obtained from receiver of accused.

- The introduction of documentary evidence obtained from a receiver of the property and assets of one accused of a crime, by the process of subpoena duces tecum, although such evidence may be incriminatory in its nature and tend to convict the accused of a crime, is not violative of this paragraph. Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S.E. 448 (1926).

Evidence voluntarily given to police is admissible.

- The bloody sweater and shoes of a defendant who is charged with robbery by intimidation, when voluntarily given to the officer, are admissible, and the defendant cannot complain of being compelled to testify against the defendant. Moton v. State, 225 Ga. 401, 169 S.E.2d 320 (1969).

Because the defendant's spontaneous outburst was voluntarily made and not the product of police interrogation, the evidence was not subject to a hearsay exception, Miranda warnings were not required, and the statement was admissible. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 646 S.E.2d 219 (2007).

Based on the totality of the circumstances and the undisputed evidence, because the defendant's confession to a police detective was voluntary and admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824), not coerced or received as a result of promises made, and not subject to exclusion due to improper methods used by the police, the trial court did not err in admitting the confession; further, exclusion of the confession was not required based on a violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007).

Because the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant made a rational and intelligent choice to waive the rights outlined under Miranda and speak with police detectives on two separate and distinct occasions, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress those statements. Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 656 S.E.2d 518 (2008).

When the defendant asked the reason for the arrest, an officer said, child molestation; the defendant voluntarily responded that the defendant did not think the defendant had touched the child anymore. As the officer's answer had not been reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant's statement was voluntary, not the result of interrogation, to admit the statement despite the lack of Miranda warnings. Terry v. State, 293 Ga. App. 455, 667 S.E.2d 109 (2008).

Defendant's state rights against self-incrimination were not violated because the defendant was required to turn over the defendant's clothes to the police for inspection since the defendant did not perform any act against the defendant's will to incriminate the defendant, but surrendered the clothing when asked to do so. Simpson v. State, 289 Ga. 685, 715 S.E.2d 142 (2011).

Pat-down was not "custody," so the defendant was not in custody when, immediately after a pat-down, the defendant made an incriminating statement in response to an officer's question, and thus, Miranda warnings were not required. Montgomery v. State, 279 Ga. App. 419, 631 S.E.2d 717 (2006).

Because the record indicated that the defendant was not being interrogated and was not in custody at the time two pretrial statements to a police sergeant were made, and a statement to a crimes against children detective was voluntarily given and involved general and routine booking protocol, those statements were properly admitted. Ellis v. State, 283 Ga. App. 808, 642 S.E.2d 869 (2007).

Field sobriety tests.

- Miranda played no part in the admissibility of field sobriety test results, notwithstanding the definition of arrest contained in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-1, as the defendant was not under arrest for constitutional purposes when the defendant failed to show any restraints comparable to those associated with formal arrest, the defendant's statement that the defendant knew the officer was going to "take her in" demonstrated defendant's apprehension, not the fact of an arrest, the defendant was not informed that the defendant's detention would not be temporary, and the defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests did not support a claim that the defendant was exposed to custodial interrogation at the scene. Evans v. State, 267 Ga. App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (2004).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as an officer was not required to give defendant Miranda warnings before administering field sobriety tests as the officer did not make any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the person was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation. Moody v. State, 273 Ga. App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds that a refusal to submit to voluntary field sobriety tests was testimonial in nature, and thus subject to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, as a refusal to submit to the tests was not testimonial in nature, and the mere fact that the defendant refused to submit to a blood test was not subject to the privilege against self-incrimination since no impermissible coercion was involved, regardless of the form of refusal. Ferega v. State, 286 Ga. App. 808, 650 S.E.2d 286 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 195, 172 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2008).

Because there was no evidence that an officer threatened or coerced the defendant to perform three field sobriety tests, the results of the tests were properly admitted; moreover, as the defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to performing an alco-sensor test, refusal to undergo the test did not violate any right against self-incrimination. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 884, 658 S.E.2d 372 (2008).

Evidence showed that a DUI defendant voluntarily performed three field sobriety tests while the defendant was not in custody, although the defendant had been stopped by a deputy and asked to perform the tests without Miranda warnings. Therefore, the motion to suppress evidence from the tests was properly denied. Bramlett v. State, 302 Ga. App. 527, 691 S.E.2d 333 (2010).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress on the basis of a Miranda violation because the defendant was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda at the time the field-sobriety tests were conducted; nothing in the deputy's words or actions would have caused a reasonable person to conclude that the person's freedom was more than temporarily curtailed pending the outcome of the investigation. State v. Mosley, 321 Ga. App. 236, 739 S.E.2d 106 (2013).

Breath test.

- Because defendant was not compelled by the state to submit to a breath test after the defendant's arrest, the admission at trial of the test results did not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Fantasia v. State, 268 Ga. 512, 491 S.E.2d 318 (1997).

DNA tests.

- In convictions of aggravated sodomy, kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated assault, use of evidence comparing DNA on lip balm found at the crime scene with the defendant's blood sample and with evidence retained from a prior rape prosecution, which resulted in the defendant's acquittal pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-60 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160 et seq.) did not violate defendant's right against self-incrimination under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-20(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506). Fortune v. State, 300 Ga. App. 550, 685 S.E.2d 466 (2009).

Evidence voluntarily produced from body cavity.

- When a small piece of plastic containing cocaine residue was produced byt he defendant from a body cavity in acquiescence to a search warrant for the defendant's person while the defendant was in lawful detention, the evidence was admissible. Scott v. State, 216 Ga. App. 692, 455 S.E.2d 609 (1995).

Admissions made while accused under illegal arrest are admissible and this paragraph is not violated. Boyers v. State, 198 Ga. 838, 33 S.E.2d 251 (1945).

Admissibility of evidence given to school official.

- When an item is produced by a student in accordance with the proper request of a school official having "adequate reason" and before any involvement of law enforcement officers, the item is not inadmissible in evidence as being violative of any rights against self-incrimination. State v. J.T., 155 Ga. App. 812, 273 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

State was properly allowed to use defendant's signature on fingerprint card for comparison by an expert with the signatures on allegedly forged checks since there was no indication that requiring the signing of the card was for any purpose other than as part of the administrative processing when the defendant was booked by police. Hudson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 684, 374 S.E.2d 212 (1988).

Grant of consent for search of defendant's automobile was neither incriminating nor exculpatory and, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to suppression of evidence found during the search based on the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18, 513 S.E.2d 763 (1999).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized, as the search of the defendant's truck was conducted after a valid traffic stop after the defendant gave the officer consent to conduct the search, and nothing supported the defendant's claim that this consent was coerced because it was obtained during a custodial interrogation and without the benefit of Miranda warnings, as the officer's questioning did not unduly prolong the traffic stop and did not result in an unauthorized seizure or an equivalent custodial detention for which Miranda warnings were required. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

Videotape confession.

- Because defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights before giving a videotaped statement to the police, the trial court did not err in ruling that the videotaped statement was admissible. Boynton v. State, 277 Ga. 130, 587 S.E.2d 3 (2003).

Voluntary statements.

- Whilethe defendant claimed an officer had promised the defendant leniency in exchange for the defendant's statement, the officer denied this; therefore, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's custodial statements on the grounds those statements were not voluntary was not clearly erroneous. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).

Trial court properly admitted defendant's statement to the police as defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived defendant's Miranda rights, despite defendant's .093 blood alcohol level, as the interviewing officer testified that defendant appeared to understand defendant's rights, that defendant was not confused, that defendant's eyes were focused, that defendant was coherent and answered questions clearly, and that defendant did not have slurred speech or glassy eyes; there was no evidence that promises or threats were made. Forehand v. State, 271 Ga. App. 746, 611 S.E.2d 78 (2005).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object when the state asked the defendant why the defendant did not stay at the victim's home following the robbery, report the incident to authorities, or tell anyone the defendant's version of events prior to the trial; the state's cross-examination did not infringe upon the defendant's right to remain silent and since defendant's direct examination brought out virtually the same testimony as the allegedly improper cross-examination, the defendant was not prejudiced by the state's inquiry. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's statement to a police officer as it was a voluntary spontaneous utterance, rather than the product of custodial interrogation, since: (1) the statement was made shortly after the defendant's arrest while the officer was transporting the defendant to the police barracks; (2) the defendant made the statement after hearing a police broadcast about the discovery of the gun used in the shooting; and (3) the officer did not prompt the defendant to speak. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Videotape made at a police barracks while an officer was completing paperwork and swabbing the defendant's hands to test for gun residue that showed the defendant making a number of comments to the officer was properly admitted as: (1) the officer asked the defendant only for basic biographical data and whether the defendant was right- or left-handed, so that the officer would know which hand to un-cuff to permit the defendant to sign paperwork, which were all related to legitimate administrative needs and fell within the "booking exception" to the Miranda rule; and (2) all further discussion between the officer and the defendant, including the defendant's volunteered statement that the defendant might have fired guns on the defendant's birthday, was initiated by the defendant and was not the product of custodial interrogation. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Motion to suppress a statement was properly denied because the defendant was given Miranda rights, both orally and in writing, the defendant indicated an understanding and waived those rights, and the statement was found to have been given voluntarily and knowingly; the fact that the defendant may have been under the influence of a chemical agent did not, on its own, render the confession inadmissible. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 884, 627 S.E.2d 897 (2006).

Since, at the time the defendant made statements to an officer, the defendant was not under arrest or being restrained in any way, but rather, the officer, the defendant, and the defendant's wife were outside the couples' house, and the officer was simply investigating why the officer had been called to the house, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant made voluntary, non-custodial statements which did not trigger the requirement that Miranda warnings be given. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. App. 616, 629 S.E.2d 546 (2006).

Defendant's admission to a different burglary was properly admitted as similar transaction evidence in a burglary trial since, although the defendant was in custody when the statement was made, the statement was exculpatory, volunteered by defendant, and unprompted by police questioning. Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga. App. 756, 629 S.E.2d 593 (2006).

Defendant's motion to suppress the custodial statement the defendant gave to the police was properly denied as: (1) the Miranda warnings were first read aloud to the defendant and then the defendant was allowed to read and initial each right and to sign the waiver form; (2) the defendant's mother was present during the interrogation; (3) the defendant's statement to the police was not the result of threats or intimidation; and (4) the interrogation tactics used, including alleged screaming and chair-kicking, were not more than were ordinarily employed. Peterson v. State, 280 Ga. 875, 635 S.E.2d 132 (2006).

Despite the defendant's possible intoxication, a statement given to police was knowingly and voluntarily made, and a waiver of the rights accorded under Miranda was intelligent; thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's videotaped custodial statements into evidence. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

A trial court properly admitted a defendant's incriminating statement into evidence, having found that the statement was freely and voluntarily made. The trial court found particularly noteworthy the fact that the interviewing officer stopped the interview to make sure the defendant understood the defendant's rights, and a mental evaluation revealed that defendant had an average intelligence quotient and was neither mentally nor cognitively impaired; even if the defendant was slow to understand the defendant's rights, this did not render the defendant's confession inadmissible. Mezick v. State, 291 Ga. App. 257, 661 S.E.2d 635 (2008).

Defendant's confessions to the murder of defendant's spouse made to police were voluntary: the defendant was 37 years old, could read and write, had graduated from high school, and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Defendant accompanied police to the station voluntarily, was not handcuffed, and was free to leave at any time. Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 700 S.E.2d 386 (2010).

Defendant's videotaped statement made to police during a custodial interrogation was admissible because the defendant made the statement voluntarily after the defendant was advised of, and waived, the defendant's Miranda rights, and the defendant presented no evidence the statement was made under duress or coercion. McCoy v. State, 292 Ga. 296, 736 S.E.2d 425 (2013).

Statements the defendant made to police at the hospital and the police station were admissible because the defendant was not in custody at the hospital and, thus, no Miranda warnings were required, and the defendant voluntarily waived those rights at the police station. Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 740 S.E.2d 163 (2013).

Admission of the defendant's statements to an investigator was not erroneous because Miranda rights were read to the defendant, the defendant waived those rights, and there was no evidence that the defendant was coerced prior to giving the taped statement. Lindsey v. State, 321 Ga. App. 808, 743 S.E.2d 481 (2013).

Defendant's videotaped statement, which police obtained before giving Miranda warnings, was properly admitted because a reasonable person would not have perceived the defendant to be in custody when the defendant made a statement agreeing to an examiner's summary of the defendant's prior, unrecorded confession, and the defendant confessed again after the Mirandized portion of the interview. Pressley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 243, 744 S.E.2d 439 (2013).

Spontaneous statements.

- It was not error for the trial court to refuse to suppress the defendant's inculpatory statements made while being transported by officers from Maryland to Georgia; the evidence supported the trial court's findings that the inculpatory statements at issue, which had been made after the defendant was advised of the Miranda rights, were not the result of interrogation or questioning but were spontaneously uttered by the defendant. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (2007).

Admission of inculpatory statement was harmless error.

- Any error in the admission of a defendant's inculpatory statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the overwhelming evidence against the defendant in an armed robbery prosecution; the defendant made inculpatory admissions at trial, the defendant met the physical description of one of the armed robbers, and the gun and proceeds from the robbery were on the defendant's person when the defendant was arrested. Hawkins v. State, 292 Ga. App. 76, 663 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

Request for attorney on videotape permitted.

- Admission of videotape which ended with a segment when the defendant requested an attorney was proper and did not involve a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent, as defendant's request was not evidence of the defendant's guilt nor was it directed to undermining any of the defendant's defenses. Rowe v. State, 276 Ga. 800, 582 S.E.2d 119 (2003).

Presumption of regularity attached.

- Given that no transcript of the defendant's Jackson v. Denno hearing appeared in the record, the appeals court was left only to assume the trial court's findings at the hearing admitting the defendant's statement to police, upon the officers' full compliance with Miranda, were supported by the evidence and the trial court's actions during that hearing were appropriate; moreover, illiteracy did not dictate a determination that there was no voluntary and knowledgeable waiver of a person's Miranda rights. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 461, 636 S.E.2d 183 (2006).

Administrative processing.

- When, after the defendant was arrested, the defendant was asked about the defendant's employment, in the course of completing biographical information about the defendant, defendant's response, before the defendant was warned of the defendant's Miranda rights, was admissible, because, while the question was not asked as part of a formal booking, it was part of an administrative processing which was not intended to elicit an incriminating response. English v. State, 260 Ga. App. 620, 580 S.E.2d 351 (2003).

The trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's statements made at a hospital to a sheriff's deputy and an investigator, as the statements were given while the defendant was in a medical, rather than an investigative, setting; moreover, the fact that the officers might have suspected the defendant of having committed a murder did not render the statements at issue violative of Miranda, and thus subject to suppression. Jennings v. State, 282 Ga. 679, 653 S.E.2d 17 (2007).

Not in custody.

- Defendant was not in custody simply from being pulled over and temporarily detained; since the defendant was not in custody at the time that the officer pulled the defendant over, there was no need for the officer to give a Miranda warning prior to asking the defendant about drugs found in the defendant's car, and the defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. Connell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 413, 631 S.E.2d 456 (2006).

Trial court did not err in determining that the defendant was not in custody at the time the defendant made statements to an officer. While the statements were made prior to the defendant being advised of the defendant's Miranda rights, there was no evidence that the defendant had been placed under formal arrest or restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest, the defendant was not in a police-dominated atmosphere, the defendant's mother and aunt were present during the interview, and the temporary detention, although two hours, was not unreasonably long under the circumstances. Tobias v. State, 319 Ga. App. 320, 735 S.E.2d 113 (2012).

Statement admissible after juvenile defendant did not invoke right to have parent present.

- Because the undisputed evidence established that a juvenile defendant was informed of the right to have a parent present during an interview with police in which a custodial statement was obtained, but did not invoke that right, there was no error in allowing the juvenile defendant's statement into evidence. Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007).

The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the admission of statements given to a polygraph examiner had to be excluded as not freely and voluntarily given and because Miranda warnings had not been given, as: (1) the defendant was not in custody when the challenged statements were made; (2) incriminating statements were made only upon receipt of Miranda after an arrest; and (3) the confession was not given with the hope of benefit. Ramirez v. State, 288 Ga. App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI when the defendant was interviewed by police in a child abuse case; the defendant voluntarily went to the police station to be interviewed, no restraint was placed on the defendant's freedom of movement, nor was the defendant otherwise prevented from leaving the interview, and the defendant was not arrested until after the interview had ended. Bass v. State, 282 Ga. App. 159, 637 S.E.2d 863 (2006).

Because the record failed to contain any indication that the defendant: (1) informed the officers of the defendant's desire to end an interview; (2) wished to speak with counsel; or (3) wished to leave the station, and after the statements were made the defendant was driven home by an officer, the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda; therefore, admission of these non-custodial statements was proper. Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212 (2007).

Inadmissibility of evidence that witness invoked privilege during testimony before grand jury.

- The court erred in admitting certain documentary evidence showing that the witness in a criminal case has declined to answer before the grand jury certain questions propounded to the witness on the ground that the witness's answer to those questions might tend to incriminate the witness. The admission of this evidence tended to destroy or at least abridge the privilege of the witness guaranteed by the Constitution of this state of refusing to answer questions tending to incriminate the witness, and to deprive the witness of the protection of that privilege which it was the purpose of the Constitution to give. Loewenherz v. Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank, 144 Ga. 556, 87 S.E. 778, 1917E Ann. Cas. 877 (1916).

Instances when evidence inadmissible.

- Evidence that a witness forcibly placed the defendant's foot in certain tracks near the scene of the burglary, and that the footprints were of the same size, is not admissible. Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879).

Evidence of guilt found upon a person under legal arrest may be used in evidence against the person, but when a person not in legal custody is compelled to furnish incriminating evidence against that person, the evidence is not admissible. Evans v. State, 106 Ga. 519, 32 S.E. 659, 71 Am. St. R. 276 (1899).

Although the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce defendant's custodial statement to police, the error was harmless because the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the guilty verdict when the eyewitness testimony was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gardner v. State, 261 Ga. App. 10, 582 S.E.2d 7 (2003).

Trial court properly suppressed the alco-sensor tests taken by the defendant because the officer incorrectly informed defendant that defendant did not have the right to refuse the test; O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 gave the defendant the right to withdraw implied consent, as, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have thought the defendant, who was ordered to turn around and place the defendant's hands behind the defendant's back after refusing the test, was being placed under arrest. State v. Norris, 281 Ga. App. 193, 635 S.E.2d 810 (2006).

Trial court properly suppressed the oral and written statements made by the defendant, a public employee, during an internal investigation interview conducted by the Georgia Department of Corrections, and after the defendant was forbidden to seek the advice of counsel, as the defendant had an objective belief that a failure to cooperate with the investigation by taking part in the interview and signing a written document entitled "Notice of Interfering with On-Going Internal Investigation" would result in a loss of employment; thus, the defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated. State v. Aiken, 281 Ga. App. 415, 636 S.E.2d 156 (2006).

The trial court did not err in refusing to strike a victim's testimony upon invoking a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the questions posed to that victim concerning a weapon dealt with collateral matters that occurred prior to the commission of the crimes at issue. Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (2008).

While non-custodial and custodial statements were properly admitted, as not vitiating the defendant's constitutional rights once defendant invoked the right to counsel, a subsequent interview initiated by police violated this right; as a result, cocaine seized through information obtained from the interview had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

The trial court properly suppressed those statements made by the defendant in violation of Miranda, and after the defendant invoked the right to counsel, as the mere act of allowing the defendant to meet with an attorney did not permit law enforcement to re-initiate any conversation with the defendant at a later time without counsel present. State v. Sammons, 283 Ga. 364, 659 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

As a defendant's statements to an officer were inadmissible under Miranda, those portions of a videotaped conversation between the defendant and the defendant's parent that recapped the interrogation by the officer (who had told the parent of the defendant's incriminating statements) were inadmissible. However, the remaining portions of the videotape were admissible. State v. Darby, 284 Ga. 271, 663 S.E.2d 160 (2008).

As the state could not comment on a defendant's failure to come forward, defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting when the state elicited testimony that the defendant knew police were looking for the defendant in connection with the charged crimes, but did not contact the authorities. Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 728, 667 S.E.2d 637 (2008).

Factors which indicate voluntariness of confession.

- When the evidence heard was sufficient to authorize the trial court to determine that the defendant was advised of the defendant's rights, that the defendant was not placed under any duress, that the defendant seemed to understand the defendant's rights, that the defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that the defendant seemed completely aware of what was going on around the defendant, the defendant's confession was voluntarily elicited and not in violation of the Fifth and Sixth amendments. Simonton v. State, 151 Ga. App. 431, 260 S.E.2d 487 (1979).

A trial court properly admitted defendant's statement at trial with regard to defendant's conviction of felony murder and possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of another, as the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the defendant's rights before making the statement to police; the evidence established that State of Georgia police officers went to the city in the State of Florida where the defendant had fled and had been arrested and, prior to the interview, the defendant was read Miranda rights and agreed to speak with the officers after informing the officers that the defendant understood the defendant's rights. The evidence further showed that no promises or threats were made to the defendant to get the defendant to speak and at no time did the defendant ask for the questioning to stop. Martinez v. State, 283 Ga. 122, 657 S.E.2d 199 (2008).

Defendant, convicted of voluntary manslaughter, argued that because the defendant was hysterical after being told that the defendant's spouse, whom the defendant had stabbed in the chest, had died, the defendant did not understand the defendant's Miranda rights or the consequences of the defendant's statements and that those statements were thus not voluntary. This claim failed as the interviewing officer testified that the defendant understood the questions and made coherent responses and that the officer did not threaten or coerce the defendant to give a statement. McKenzie v. State, 294 Ga. App. 376, 670 S.E.2d 158 (2008).

Defendant's custodial statements were properly deemed voluntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824). The defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights; signed a waiver of those rights; admitted no threats or promises were made; and, although the defendant claimed not to understand the Miranda rights due to limited mental capacity, there was no evidence the defendant was mentally or cognitively impaired. Inman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 461, 671 S.E.2d 921 (2009).

Although the defendant was 17 when the defendant had intercourse with a 12-year-old child, as the defendant was 18 when interrogated by police about the statutory rape, the nine-factor analysis of voluntariness set forth in Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976), was inapplicable. The test that applied was whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statements were made voluntarily, without being induced by hope of benefit or coerced by threats. Henry v. State, 295 Ga. App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (2009).

Voluntary statements by an accused admitted into evidence.

- When an accused freely and voluntarily submits to examination by arresting officers and the prosecuting attorney, respecting the accused's alleged crime, and there is no claim that the accused was influenced by force, threats, hope, or reward, it is not error on the accused's trial to receive in evidence a signed transcript of such examination containing incriminating admissions. Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943).

Although defendant disputed many of the facts offered by a police detective and a federal agent regarding whether defendant was given Miranda warnings prior to defendant's statements to the detective and the agent and whether defendant's statements were made without bribery and coercion, the trial judge was the arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses at defendant's Jackson v. Denno hearing and ample testimony supported the trial court's conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given where the testimony of the detective and the federal agent indicated that the two custodial interviews each lasted about an hour, defendant was read Miranda warnings and executed a written waiver of rights form before giving each statement, and defendant was never threatened or promised any hope of benefit in exchange for the statements; since the trial court's factual and credibility findings were not clearly erroneous, its decision to admit the statements was upheld on appeal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

Since the defendant, who was not in custody at the time, volunteered an explanation as to why the defendant possessed a weapon without authority, no Miranda warning was necessary and the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was shot by the defendant in a government building with a weapon that the defendant took from police custody, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 and16-7-24(a); therefore, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. McClendon v. State, 264 Ga. App. 174, 590 S.E.2d 189 (2003).

Trial court did not err in admitting defendant's statement that if the police would let defendant walk away, defendant would identify a major drug dealer, as there was no evidence that defendant was coerced or threatened by the police, or that defendant did not understand defendant's Miranda rights; the trial court was authorized to find that the statement was freely and voluntarily given. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667 (2004).

Defendant's statement to the police during a custodial interrogation was voluntary and was admissible as defendant was an adult and did not have a right to have defendant's parent present during questioning. Finney v. State, 270 Ga. App. 422, 606 S.E.2d 637 (2004).

Trial court's findings that defendant was advised of defendant's constitutional rights, that defendant knowingly and voluntarily relinquished those rights, and that defendant's subsequent statements were voluntary was not clearly erroneous because an officer testified that defendant was not under arrest when the defendant made the statement, that defendant was nonetheless advised of defendant's Miranda rights and appeared to understand them, and that defendant was not threatened, coerced, or promised anything in return for a statement; thus, defendant did not provide a specific basis for excluding defendant's statement. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 609 S.E.2d 346 (2005).

Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived defendant's constitutional rights before making a statement to the police because defendant was 15 years old when questioned, defendant had the verbal comprehension level of a nine-year-old, defendant was advised that defendant was suspected of child molestation, and defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights and exercised them; the methods used in the interrogation and the 27-minute length of the interrogation were not coercive. Stone v. State, 271 Ga. App. 748, 610 S.E.2d 684 (2005).

Defendant's statement to the police was presumptively valid as before making the statement, defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights, defendant understood those rights, defendant executed a waiver of rights form, and defendant did not invoke defendant's right to have an attorney present during defendant's interview. Ray v. State, 273 Ga. App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

Defendant's videotaped statement to police was voluntarily given as defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights, was coherent, and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs; there was no evidence of mental incapacity other than a draft suicide note written while defendant was hiding. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

The trial court did not err in admitting a defendant's custodial statement, taken when the defendant was 17, after finding that the defendant had voluntarily waived the defendant's rights and signed the statement; there was testimony that the defendant was read the Miranda rights, signed a waiver, did not ask for the defendant's parents or an attorney, did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that an investigator advised the defendant that the defendant would be asked questions about the crimes in question, and that the defendant was not threatened or promised leniency and read and corrected the statement. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

The trial court properly refused to suppress a defendant's confession. The evidence enabled the trial court to find that the defendant's relative was present during most of the questioning, that the defendant was able to speak privately with the relative on occasion, that the defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that the defendant was not threatened or offered any hope of benefits, and that the defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained prior to confessing to participation in a shooting; furthermore, although the defendant claimed that the statement was not knowing and voluntary because of the defendant's limited intellect, the defendant was able to provide some involved explanations to police, a police interviewer saw no confusion about the defendant's rights, and the relative testified that the defendant never indicated that the defendant felt that the defendant had to talk to the police. Boseman v. State, 283 Ga. 355, 659 S.E.2d 364 (2008).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that a defendant waived the defendant's right to counsel and that the defendant's statements to a detective were made voluntarily; thus, the statements were properly admitted into evidence. After the defendant said that the defendant wanted a lawyer, the defendant said that the defendant would tell the detective what happened if the defendant could speak to the defendant's family; after speaking with family members, the defendant was again advised of the defendant's rights and waived those rights; and after again asking to speak to police the next day, the defendant was again advised of the defendant's rights and waived those rights. Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71 (2008).

In a statutory rape case, as the record showed that police had not misrepresented the 12-year-old victim's status to the defendant or promised that the defendant would be charged with rape only if the investigation established that the defendant had committed forcible rape, the defendant's confession and DNA test results were not inadmissible as having been obtained through trickery and deceit. Henry v. State, 295 Ga. App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (2009).

Trial court did not err by determining that the defendant's response to law enforcement agents, who stopped the defendant's car at a park, that the defendant was at the park to counsel a 14-year-old-girl about the dangers of meeting men from the Internet was admissible because the trial court determined that the stop of the defendant's car was authorized by the facts before the officers as: (1) the defendant arrived at 10:00 P.M. at the isolated park location in a vehicle with a Tennessee license plate, which fit the description of the individual whom a task force was investigating; (2) the statements made by the investigating officer who stopped the defendant's vehicle and explained the reason for the stop would not objectively have been understood to be an interrogation; and (3) the statement made by the defendant was spontaneous and voluntary. Moreover, because the defendant was properly Mirandized prior to giving a later statement to the officers, the trial court did not err by admitting that statement. Logan v. State, 309 Ga. App. 95, 709 S.E.2d 302, cert. denied, No. S11C1101, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 579; cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 823, 181 L. Ed. 2d 533 (2011).

Defendant's custodial statement was admissible because the statement was made during questioning prompted by the defendant after the defendant signed a written waiver of rights form. Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 740 S.E.2d 158 (2013).

Voluntary statements by an accused after using ecstasy admitted into evidence.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to exclude a statement made to a detective because the statement was made while the defendant was under the influence of Ecstasy and was induced by the hope of a light sentence because the defendant never told the detective that the defendant had taken Ecstasy a few hours earlier and the detective credibly testified that no promise of leniency was made. Leonard v. State, 292 Ga. 214, 735 S.E.2d 767 (2012).

Questions of fact concerning voluntariness determined by jury after prima facie showing by state.

- After the state made a prima facie showing of voluntariness, the court properly admitted the defendant's statement into evidence for the jury's consideration, and thereafter, the question of whether or not defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily given, without hope of benefit or fear of injury, became one of fact for determination by the jury. Simonton v. State, 151 Ga. App. 431, 260 S.E.2d 487 (1979).

Appellate court will not override verdict unless evidence that confession unlawfully obtained.

- Although the facts in evidence will be examined to determine whether or not they show a conviction by use of a coerced confession, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, or the provision in the state Constitution against self-incrimination, when such a question has been properly raised and presented, yet when a prima facie case as to the voluntary character of the confession has been made, it is not within the power of the court to usurp the function of the jury in passing upon an issue, and to override the jury's verdict supported by legal evidence and upheld by the judge in refusing a new trial, or to reverse a ruling admitting the confession in evidence, unless the evidence requires but one rational inference, that the confession was unlawfully obtained. Under this and the preceding rulings, the judge did not err in refusing to exclude from evidence the alleged illegal confession and incriminatory statements of the defendant. Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 13 S.E.2d 820 (1941).

Statements overheard by police do not amount to evidence involuntarily given and without advice of counsel.

- Evidence of statements made by the defendant in a conversation overheard by the arresting officers who had concealed themselves, as planned between them and the person with whom the defendant talked, does not amount to evidence given by the defendant involuntarily and without the advice of counsel, and is not coerced from the defendant in violation of the defendant's rights against self incrimination. Blackwell v. State, 113 Ga. App. 536, 148 S.E.2d 912 (1966).

No error to allow evidence of voluntary acts into trial.

- When a person after arrest does an act voluntarily or without objection which tends to incriminate the person it is not error or unconstitutional to allow evidence of the act in the trial of the case. State v. J.T., 155 Ga. App. 812, 273 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

Defendant's contention of forced self incrimination in violation of the broader protection offered by the Georgia Constitution or O.C.G.A. § 24-9-20(a) was without merit because defendant voluntarily provided the handwriting samples which were used in overturning defendant's probation. Poole v. State, 270 Ga. App. 432, 606 S.E.2d 878 (2004).

Question was not a request for counsel.

- Question by a defendant as to whether the defendant would have been arrested if the defendant asked for an attorney was not a clear request for counsel that required cessation of police questioning or clarification before continuing the interrogation and there was no evidence that the statement was given in fear of injury or for a hope of benefit; additionally, while the investigator lied to the defendant throughout the interview about the existence and amount of inculpatory evidence, nothing suggested that the investigator sought to procure a false statement. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (2006).

Hope of benefit not created.

- In a prosecution for felony murder, armed robbery, and burglary, a defendant's post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial as a detective's telling the defendant the detective knew the defendant was not the shooter did not constitute the hope of a lighter sentence that tainted the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 484, 668 S.E.2d 700 (2008).

Defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible because the investigators framed the investigators' inquiries in terms of what they wanted to be able to tell the judge, and any suggestions of a possible benefit were either nonspecific (e.g., "help yourself") or along the lines of allowing the defendant to have more credibility with the jury for being honest; the promises did not relate to the charges or sentence the defendant was facing so as to render the confession inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824. Baughns v. State, 335 Ga. App. 600, 782 S.E.2d 494 (2016).

This provision is not applicable if the defendant voluntarily submits for purpose of others identifying the defendant. Foster v. State, 213 Ga. 601, 100 S.E.2d 426 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 967, 78 S. Ct. 559, 2 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1958); Whippler v. State, 218 Ga. 198, 126 S.E.2d 744 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 960, 84 S. Ct. 446, 11 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1963).

No violation when fingerprinting voluntary.

- When a defendant voluntarily submits to fingerprinting, there is no violation of this paragraph. Gunter v. State, 223 Ga. 290, 154 S.E.2d 608 (1967).

Suspect's mental illness did not render confession involuntary.

- Admissions made by defendant after defendant had been read Miranda rights and had waived them did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 5 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI; even if defendant was mentally ill as alleged, mental illness did not render a defendant incapable of making a voluntary statement. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1116, 126 S. Ct. 1917, 164 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2006).

Drug and alcohol impairment.

- Defendant's claim that a statement to police was involuntary due to drug and alcohol impairment was properly rejected as the defendant admitted during the interview to consuming only two tranquilizers due to nervousness, and the interviewers testified that the defendant did not appear to be impaired and communicated with them in a lucid and coherent manner. Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 1035 et seq. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses, § 78 et seq.

Reliability of Polygraph Examination, 14 POF2d 1.

Involuntary Confession - Psychological Coercion, 22 POF2d 539.

Custodial Interrogation Under Miranda v. Arizona, 23 POF2d 713.

Invalidity of Suspect's Waiver of Miranda Rights, 42 POF2d 617.

Invalidity of Confession or Waiver of Miranda Rights by Mentally Retarded Person, 42 POF3d 147.

C.J.S.

- 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 906, 907.

ALR.

- Right to recover property held by public authorities as evidence for use in a criminal trial, 13 A.L.R. 1168.

Constitutional immunity against giving incriminating testimony as affecting contractual stipulation to submit to examination, 18 A.L.R. 749.

Plea of privilege by the woman concerned in violation of White Slave Act, 48 A.L.R. 991.

Privilege against self-incrimination as applicable to answer to pleadings, 52 A.L.R. 143.

Privilege against self-incrimination as extending to danger of prosecution in other state or country, 59 A.L.R. 895; 82 A.L.R. 1380.

Admissibility of secondary evidence of incriminating document in possession of defendant, 67 A.L.R. 77.

What amounts to violation of statute forbidding comment by prosecuting attorney on failure of accused to testify, 68 A.L.R. 1108.

Constitutional provision against self-incrimination as applicable to questions asked or testimony given in proceeding before nonjudicial officer or body, 68 A.L.R. 1503.

Waiver of immunity from testifying and constitutional provision against self-incrimination, by accomplice testifying for prosecution, 87 A.L.R. 882.

Comment by court suggesting that jury may take into consideration failure of accused person to testify, 94 A.L.R. 701.

Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statutes in relation to conduct of driver of automobile after happening of accident, 101 A.L.R. 911.

Calling upon accused in the presence of jury to produce document in his possession as violation of privilege against self-incrimination, 110 A.L.R. 101.

Admissibility of inculpatory statements made in presence of accused and not denied or contradicted by him, 115 A.L.R. 1510.

Admissibility of plea of guilty at preliminary hearing, 141 A.L.R. 1335.

Power of juvenile court to require children to testify, 151 A.L.R. 1229.

Privilege against self-incrimination as available to member or officer of unincorporated association as regards its books or papers, 152 A.L.R. 1208.

Testimony of incriminating character which witness was compelled to give, by virtue of immunity statute or otherwise, as admissible in a prosecution of the witness for an offense subsequently committed, 157 A.L.R. 428.

Right to cross-examine accused as to previous prosecution for, or conviction of, crime, for purpose of affecting his credibility, 161 A.L.R. 233.

Requiring submission to physical examination or test as violation of constitutional rights, 164 A.L.R. 967; 25 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Waiver of privilege against self-incrimination in exchange for immunity from prosecution as barring reassertion of privilege on account of prosecution in another jurisdiction, 2 A.L.R.2d 631.

Use in subsequent prosecution of self-incriminating testimony given without invoking privilege, 5 A.L.R.2d 1404.

Power of prosecuting attorney to extend immunity from prosecution to witness claiming privilege against self-incrimination, 13 A.L.R.2d 1438.

Right of witness to refuse to answer, on the ground of self-incrimination, as to membership in or connection with party, society, or similar organization or group, 19 A.L.R.2d 388.

Inferences arising from refusal of witness other than accused to answer question on the ground that answer would tend to incriminate him, 24 A.L.R.2d 895.

Requiring submission to physical examination or test as violation of constitutional rights, 25 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Right of witness to claim privilege against self-incrimination on subsequent criminal trial after testifying to same matter before grand jury, 36 A.L.R.2d 1403.

Privilege against self-incrimination as to testimony before grand jury, 38 A.L.R.2d 225.

Assertion of immunity as ground for removing or discharging public officer or employee, 44 A.L.R.2d 789.

Sufficiency of witness' claim of privilege against self-incrimination, 51 A.L.R.2d 1178.

Adequacy of immunity offered as condition of denial of privilege against self-incrimination, 53 A.L.R.2d 1030, 29 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right of state in criminal contempt case to obtain data from defendant by interrogatories or pretrial discovery as permitted in civil actions, 72 A.L.R.2d 431.

Testifying in civil proceeding as waiver of privilege against self-incrimination, 72 A.L.R.2d 830.

Admissibility of inculpatory statements made in presence of accused to which he refuses to reply on advice of counsel, 77 A.L.R.2d 463.

Duty of court to inform accused who is not represented by counsel of his right not to testify, 79 A.L.R.2d 643.

Admissibility, in contempt proceeding against witness, of evidence of incriminating nature of question as to which he invoked privilege against self-incrimination, 88 A.L.R.2d 463.

Admissibility of confession, admission, or incriminatory statement of accused as affected by fact that it was made after indictment and in the absence of counsel, 90 A.L.R.2d 732.

Right of prosecution to pretrial discovery, inspection, and disclosure, 96 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Admissibility of confession as affected by its inducement through artifice, deception, trickery, or fraud, 99 A.L.R.2d 772.

Comment on accused's failure to testify, by counsel for codefendant, 1 A.L.R.3d 989.

Dismissing action or striking testimony where party to civil action asserts privilege against self-incrimination as to pertinent question, 4 A.L.R.3d 545.

Plea of guilty or conviction as resulting in loss of privilege against self-incrimination as to crime in question, 9 A.L.R.3d 990.

Necessity of informing suspect of rights under privilege against self-incrimination, prior to police interrogation, 10 A.L.R.3d 1054.

Comment or argument by court or counsel that prosecution evidence is uncontradicted as amounting to improper reference to accused's failure to testify, 14 A.L.R.3d 723.

Propriety under Griffin v. California and prejudicial effect of unrequested instruction that no inferences against accused should be drawn from his failure to testify, 18 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Violation of federal constitutional rule (Griffin v. California) prohibiting adverse comment by prosecutor or court upon accused's failure to testify, as constituting reversible or harmless error, 24 A.L.R.3d 1093; 32 A.L.R.4th 774.

Requiring suspect or defendant in criminal case to demonstrate voice for purposes of identification, 24 A.L.R.3d 1261.

Right of motorist stopped by police officers for traffic offense to be informed at that time of his federal constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 25 A.L.R.3d 1076.

Applicability, in proceedings under statutes relating to sexual psychopaths, of constitutional provisions for the protection of a person accused of crime, 34 A.L.R.3d 652.

Privilege against self-incrimination as ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege, but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373.

Propriety of requiring accused to give handwriting exemplar, 43 A.L.R.3d 653.

Witness's refusal to testify on ground of self-incrimination as justifying reception of evidence of prior statements or admissions, 43 A.L.R.3d 1413.

Censorship and evidentiary use of unconvicted prisoners' mail, 52 A.L.R.3d 548.

Right of member, officer, agent, or director of private corporation or unincorporated association to assert personal privilege against self-incrimination with respect to production of corporate books or records, 52 A.L.R.3d 636.

Use in disbarment proceeding of testimony given by attorney in criminal proceeding under grant of immunity, 62 A.L.R.3d 1145.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court, 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda rule, 77 A.L.R.3d 669.

Nonverbal reaction to accusation, other than silence alone, as constituting adoptive admission under hearsay rule, 87 A.L.R.3d 706.

Modern status: instruction allowing presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property as violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 88 A.L.R.3d 1178.

Admissibility in evidence of confession made by accused in anticipation of, during, or following polygraph examination, 89 A.L.R.3d 230.

Admissibility of hypnotic evidence at criminal trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 442; 77 A.L.R.4th 927.

Propriety of requiring criminal defendant to exhibit self, or perform act, or participate in demonstration, during trial and in presence of jury, 3 A.L.R.4th 374.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense charged against accused, 19 A.L.R.4th 368.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419.

Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication, 26 A.L.R.4th 1112.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495.

What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings - state cases, 83 A.L.R.4th 443.

Propriety, under state constitutional provisions, of granting use or transactional immunity for compelled incriminating testimony - post-Kastigar cases, 29 A.L.R.5th 1.

Coercive conduct by private person as affecting admissibility of confession under state statutes or constitutional provisions - post-Connelly cases, 48 A.L.R.5th 555.

Admissibility of evidence of voice identification of defendant as affected by allegedly suggestive voice lineup procedures, 55 A.L.R.5th 423.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs - Drugs or narcotics administered as part of medical treatment and drugs or intoxicants administered by the police, 96 A.L.R.5th 523.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at suspect's or third party's residence, 28 A.L.R.6th 505.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" of adult by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police station or sheriff's office, where defendant voluntarily appears or appears at request of law enforcement personnel, or where unspecified as to circumstances upon which defendant is present, 29 A.L.R.6th 1.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" of adult by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police station or sheriff's office, where defendant voluntarily appears or appears at request of law enforcement personnel, or where unspecified as to circumstances upon which defendant is present, 30 A.L.R.6th 103.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" at hospital by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - suspect hospital visitor, not patient, 31 A.L.R.6th 465.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" of adult by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police station or sheriff's office, where defendant is escorted or accompanied by law enforcement personnel, or is otherwise at station or office involuntarily, 32 A.L.R.6th 1.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police vehicle, where defendant outside, but in immediate vicinity, 34 A.L.R.6th 1.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police vehicle, where defendant in moving vehicle, or where unspecified as to whether vehicle moving or stationary, 35 A.L.R.6th 127.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - in jail or prison, 38 A.L.R.6th 97.

Propriety of using otherwise inadmissible statement, taken in violation of Miranda rule, to impeach criminal defendant's credibility - state cases, 42 A.L.R.6th 237.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - upon hotel property, 45 A.L.R.6th 337.

Suppression of statements made during police interview of non-English-speaking defendant, 49 A.L.R.6th 343.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within rule of requiring that suspect be informed of his federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - private security guards, detectives, or police, 51 A.L.R.6th 219.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at nonpolice vehicle for traffic stop, where defendant outside, but in immediate vicinity of vehicle, or where unspecified as to whether inside or outside of nonpolice vehicle, 55 A.L.R.6th 513.

Availability of sole shareholder's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to resist production of corporation's books and records--modern status, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 177.

Construction and application of provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18 USCS § 3501(c)), that defendant's confession shall not be inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal prosecution solely because of delay in presentment before magistrate, 124 A.L.R. Fed. 263.

Duty of court, in federal criminal prosecution, to conduct inquiry into voluntariness of accused's statement - modern cases, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 415.

Construction and application of constitutional rule of Miranda - Supreme Court Cases, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 465.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - in nonpolice vehicle for traffic stop, 56 A.L.R.6th 323.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at nonpolice vehicle for other than traffic stop, 57 A.L.R.6th 83.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - where unspecified as to precise location of roadside questioning by law enforcement officers, 58 A.L.R.6th 215.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at suspect's place of employment or business, 58 A.L.R.6th 439.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at school, 59 A.L.R.6th 393.

Construction and application of booking question exception to Miranda, 81 A.L.R.6th 505.

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as applied to compelled disclosure of password or production of otherwise encrypted electronically stored data, 84 A.L.R.6th 251.

Propriety of using otherwise inadmissible statement, taken in violation of Miranda Rule, to impeach criminal defendant's credibility - federal cases, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 77.