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U.S. CodeTitle 49Subtitle VI— Motor Vehicle and Driver ProgramsPart A— GeneralChapter 301— Motor Vehicle SafetySubchapter I— General

49 U.S.C. § 30103 (2026)

Relationship to other laws

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1994–2025 127citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 127 opinions since 1994, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (1 case).

(a)Uniformity of Regulations.—The Secretary of Transportation may not prescribe a safety regulation related to a motor vehicle subject to subchapter I of chapter 135 of this title that differs from a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the Secretary may prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated by a carrier subject to subchapter I of chapter 135, a safety regulation that imposes a higher standard of performance after manufacture than that required by an applicable standard in effect at the time of manufacture.(b)Preemption.—(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.(2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter.(c)Antitrust Laws.—This chapter does not—(1) exempt from the antitrust laws conduct that is unlawful under those laws; or(2) prohibit under the antitrust laws conduct that is lawful under those laws.(d)Warranty Obligations and Additional Legal Rights and Remedies.—Sections 30117(b), 30118–30121, 30166(f), and 30167(a) and (b) of this title do not establish or affect a warranty obligation under a law of the United States or a State. A remedy under those sections and sections 30161 and 30162 of this title is in addition to other rights and remedies under other laws of the United States or a State.(e)Common Law Liability.—Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 943; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, § 308(j), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised

Section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

30103(a)

15:1392(g).

Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L. 89–563, §§ 103(g), 105(a)(6), 116, 80 Stat. 720, 721, 727.

30103(b)

15:1392(d).

Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L. 89–563, § 103(d), 80 Stat. 719; Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. 97–331, § 3, 96 Stat. 1619.

30103(c)

15:1405.

30103(d)

15:1394(a)(6).

 

15:1410a(e).

Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718, §§ 124(e), 160; added Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L. 93–492, §§ 102(a), 106, 88 Stat. 1477, 1481.

 

15:1420.

30103(e)

15:1397(k).

Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L. 89–563, § 108(k), 80 Stat. 723; Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. 100–562, § 2(b), 102 Stat. 2818.

In subsection (a), the words “or the Transportation of Explosives Act, as amended (18 U.S.C. 831–835)” are omitted as obsolete because 18:831–835 have been repealed. The word “prescribe” is substituted for “adopt” for consistency. The words “or continue in effect” and “In prescribing safety regulations” are omitted as surplus. The word “prescribed” is substituted for “issued” for consistency. The words “to comply” and “Federal” are omitted as surplus. The words “in effect” are added for clarity.

In subsection (b)(1), the word “Federal” is omitted as surplus. The word “prescribe” is substituted for “either to establish, or to continue in effect” for consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “standard prescribed under this chapter” are substituted for “Federal standard” for clarity. The words “However, the United States . . . may prescribe” are substituted for “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal . . . from establishing” for consistency. The words “of a State” are substituted for “thereof” for clarity. The word “standard” is substituted for “safety requirement” for consistency. The words “performance requirement” are substituted for “standard of performance” to avoid using “standard” in 2 different ways.

Subsection (b)(2) is substituted for 15:1392(d) (2d sentence) for consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsection (c), the words “be deemed to” and “of the United States” are omitted as surplus.

In subsection (d), the words “United States” are substituted for “Federal” in 15:1420 for consistency. The words “Consumer” in 15:1420, “not in lieu of” in 15:1410a(e) and 1420, and “not in substitution for” in 15:1394(a)(6) are omitted as surplus. The word “other” is added for clarity.

Editorial NotesAmendments

1995—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–88 substituted “subchapter I of chapter 135” for “subchapter II of chapter 105” in two places.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1995 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1301 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 49 U.S.C. § 30103 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2010).
cites § 30103 8×cited by 141 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1). But then NHTSA's counsel opined that the agency had "expressly determined that there is not a safety need for safety belts or another type of occupant crash protection at these seating positions" and cited the 1974 withdrawal of proposed regulation.”
The case’s holding
Federal law preempts state law only when compliance with both is impossible or the state law stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.
Later courts cite it for
“a state law actually conflicts with a federal law when compliance with both is impossible or when the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENGeier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
cites § 30103 4×subsections: (b)(1)cited by 896 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“" [11] This provision is now codified at 49 U. S. C. § 30103 (e). See nn. 1 and 10, supra.”
The case’s holding
A state tort claim is preempted if it imposes a safety requirement that stands as an obstacle to the objectives of federal regulations providing multiple restraint options.
Later courts cite it for
“does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” · 45 citing courts
3
GREENO'Hara ex rel. H.O. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 508 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2007).
cites § 30103 6×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“The FSA preempts state regulations, 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b), but compliance with a motor safety standard prescribed under the Act does not preempt common law suits, 49 U.”
The case’s holding
A federal safety standard intended as a minimum safety floor does not preempt state tort actions seeking greater safety levels.
Later courts cite it for
“detailed implementation time-lines, full vehicle testing procedures and 'options' language,” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENMCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 272 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008).
cites § 30103 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“And as for NHTSA's 1983 denial of the petition to require seatbelts in school buses, it is clear that that decision was based on policy considerations unique to school buses and child passengers, along with NHTSA's mandated compartmentalization for school buses as a passive form…”
Later courts cite it for
“a design defect renders a product unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENHyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 974 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1998).
cites § 30103 7×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“§ 1392 (d) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)). It also has a savings clause providing that “[cjompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”
The case’s holding
Federal safety regulations do not preempt common-law tort claims because manufacturers may comply with federal minimum standards and bear tort liability as a cost of doing business.
Later courts cite it for
“the imposition of common-law liability does not impose any particular safety standard upon a manufacturer; the manufacturer may choose to comply with the minimum federal standards and bear tort liability as a cost of doing business.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENGen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634 (Ark. 2008).
cites § 30103 4×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“1998) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 30103 ); In re Ford Motor Co.”
The case’s holding
Individual issues regarding statutes of limitations, fraudulent concealment, or reliance do not defeat predominance when common questions of alleged wrongdoing predominate.
7
GREENGreat Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Est. of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. 2001).
cites § 30103 3×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“§ 1392 (d) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)) (“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard .”
The case’s holding
Federal safety standards do not impliedly preempt state common-law tort claims when those claims seek to supplement rather than replace minimum federal requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“difficult burden of overcoming the presumption against preemption.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENPeter v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 30103 4×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1). The Safety Act also contains a state common law savings clause, however, stating that "[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.”
The case’s holding
A product is defective if it contains a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, or a failure to warn of dangers in its use.
Later courts cite it for
“a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, or a failure to warn of dangers in the product's use.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENMalcolm v. Evenflo Co., 2009 MT 285, 217 P.3d 514.
cites § 30103 4×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e) (2006); H.R. Rpt. 1776 at 24 (July 28, 1966).”
The case’s holding
Evidence of compliance with federal safety standards is inadmissible in a strict liability design defect action because such compliance pertains to negligence rather than product condition.
Later courts cite it for
“the defendant's state of mind represents a key element in determining whether a defendant acted with actual fraud or actual malice.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 30103 2×cited by 41 cases
The case’s holding
Federal law does not preempt state law design defect claims because the Federal Aviation Act lacks an express preemption provision and establishes procedural rather than substantive standards.
Later courts cite it for
“federal law does not preempt state design defect claims,” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENDoomes v. Best Transit Corp., 958 N.E.2d 1183 (N.Y. 2011).
cites § 30103 4×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“However, the United State Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable…”
12
GREENDorothy Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006).
cites § 30103 3×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“] Although 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e) provides that "Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard .”
The case’s holding
A punitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process Clause if the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages exceeds two to one.
Later courts cite it for
“the financial vulnerability of a target is particularly relevant when the harm inflicted is economic in nature.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENLohman v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 2007-NMCA-100, 166 P.3d 1091.
cites § 30103 2×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b). The second clause provides that “[compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.”
The case’s holding
The Unfair Practices Act covers indirect misrepresentations made in connection with the sale of goods and does not require proof of actual economic loss to recover statutory damages.
Later courts cite it for
“generally speaking, the upa is designed to provide a remedy against misleading identification and false or deceptive advertising.” · 12 citing courts
cites § 30103 2×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (d). Thus, the Safety Act does not expressly preempt State law.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff may assert a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability by pleading that they are a third-party beneficiary to the contract.
Later courts cite it for
“thus...where a plaintiff pleads that he or she is a third-party beneficiary to a contract that gives rise to the implied warranty of merchantability, he or she may assert a claim for the implied warranty's breach.” · 3 citing courts
15
cites § 30103 3×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“Volvo moved for summary judgment arguing that Gracia’s strict liability claim is preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1), which provides that when a federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, any non-identical state…”
The case’s holding
A federal safety standard promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempts state common law claims regarding defective windshield retention systems.
Later courts cite it for
“federal preemption of state law can occur in three circumstances: (1) express preemption where congress explicitly preempts state law; (2) implied preemption where congress has occupied the entire field (field preemption); and (3) implied preemption where there is an actual conflict between federal and state law (conflict preemption).” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENJohnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 889 F. Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
cites § 30103 9×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e). Plaintiffs ground their “air bag” claim upon the assertion that the Safety Standards set “minimum requirements,” and, therefore, they argue that the lack of air bags in the Pontiac rendered the vehicle defective in this case.”
17
GREENKarlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 30103 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“Geier and Griffith were decided under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMSA), which includes a provision preempting state regulations and lawsuits that actually conflict with that act ( 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1)) and a provision permitting state law tort claims…”
The case’s holding
A violation of a discovery order is not a prerequisite to issue and evidentiary sanctions when a party engages in a pattern of willful discovery abuse causing evidence unavailability.
Later courts cite it for
“discovery sanctions must be tailored in order to remedy the offending party's discovery abuse, should not give the aggrieved party more than what it is entitled to, and should not be used to punish the offending party. appellate courts review the trial court's order under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENSchultz v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. 2006).
cites § 30103 3×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“" 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e) (2000). They argue that giving continuing effect to the rebuttable presumption in Indiana Code section 34-20-5-1 "allow[s] manufacturers to effectively immunize themselves from liability upon a showing that their products comply with FMVSS minimum…”
19
GREENVickie Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, 980 F.3d 879 (3d Cir. 2020).
cites § 30103 1×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“4 of action, 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e), but does not confer an express private right of action.”
The case’s holding
Dismissal for lack of standing reflects a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and must be entered without prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“dismissal for lack of standing reflects a lack of jurisdiction, so dismissal of thorne's amended complaint should have been without prejudice.” · 23 citing courts
20
GREENMartin v. Ford Motor Co., 914 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
cites § 30103 4×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 30103
“See 49 U.S.C.A. § 30103 (b) (expressly permitting enforcement of state standards which are identical to applicable federal standards); id.”

Show all 127 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420092025

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 1998. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.N.J.8Ind. Ct. App.76th Cir.5SCOTUS5Tex. App.4Ariz. Ct. App.311th Cir.38th Cir.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 74 courts in all.

By subsection
(b)1 case
Cellucci v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1998).
(b)(1)1 case
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).“" [11] This provision is now codified at 49 U. S. C. § 30103 (e). See nn. 1 and 10, supra.”
(e)1 case
Cooper v. Gen. Motors Corp., 702 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1997).

Show all 127 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 943; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, § 308(j), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947.)
Amendment years (notes): 1995
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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