set forth standard in Alabama

2016Standard of Review In Pittman v. United Toll Systems, LLC, 882 So.2d 842, 844 (Ala.2003), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment: “This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. “ ‘In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, “we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,” Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995

2015Standard of Review ' “In Pittman v. United Toll Systems, LLC, 882 So.2d 842 (Ala.2003), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment: ’ “ ‘This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. “‘“In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, ‘we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,’ Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.19

2017In Nance v. Matthews , 622 So.2d at 299 , this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting a motion to dismiss: "The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) [, Ala. R.

2014Standard of Review “In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting a motion to dismiss: “ ‘The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R.

2011In reviewing an order grant- ing a preliminary injunction, the Court determines whether the trial court exceeded that discretion.’ SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So.2d 706, 709 (Ala.2005). [[Image here]] “To the extent that the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction is grounded only in questions of law based on undisputed facts, our longstanding rule that we review an injunction solely to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion should not apply.

2011In reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction, the Court determines whether the trial court exceeded that discretion.’ SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So.2d 706, 709 (Ala.2005).

2017See- § 6—2—38(1) (‘All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.’); § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975 (‘In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.’).[ 6 ] In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Abston, 822 So.2d 1187, 1194-95 (Ala. 2001), this Cou

2014In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Abston, 822 So.2d 1187, 1194-95 (Ala.2001), this Court set forth the standard for evaluating when a fraud claim accrues and, therefore, when the statutory limitations period commences: “In Foremost [ Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409 (Ala.1997) ], we reinstated important, historical principles regarding the law of fraud in Alabama, including the proper standard for evaluating when the statutory limitations period commences: “ ‘Claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

2006Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So.2d 226, 229 (Ala.2004).

2006Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So.2d 226, 229 (Ala.2004).

2006This Court set forth the standard of review applicable to such a claim in Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 729 (Ala.2002): "An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." Moreover, this Court has also stated that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

2006This Court set forth the standard of review applicable to such a claim in Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 729 (Ala.2002): “An appellate court considers de novo a trial court’s judgment on a party’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Moreover, this Court has also stated that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

1991See, also, Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. Shaver, 303 N.C. 408 , 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (1981) (applying the Metro Industrial test).

1991See, also, Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. Shaver, 303 N.C. 408 , 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (1981) (applying the Metro Industrial test).

1991This Court set forth the standard for determining whether the agreement has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce activity to bring the agreement within the coverage of the FAA in Ex parte Warren, 548 So.2d 157, 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 , 110 S.Ct. 554 , 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989): “We hold that the appropriate standard for making this determination is set forth in a special opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 , 82 S.Ct. 31 , 7 L.Ed.2d 24 (1961): “ ‘[W]hether at the time [the parties]

1991This Court set forth the standard for determining whether the agreement has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce activity to bring the agreement within the coverage of the FAA in Ex parte Warren, 548 So.2d 157, 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 , 110 S.Ct. 554 , 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989): “We hold that the appropriate standard for making this determination is set forth in a special opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 , 82 S.Ct. 31 , 7 L.Ed.2d 24 (1961): “ ‘[W]hether at the time [the parties]

2016Standard of Review In Pittman v. United Toll Systems, LLC, 882 So.2d 842, 844 (Ala.2003), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment: “This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. “ ‘In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, “we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,” Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995

2015Standard of Review ' “In Pittman v. United Toll Systems, LLC, 882 So.2d 842 (Ala.2003), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment: ’ “ ‘This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. “‘“In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, ‘we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,’ Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.19

2011Cap-mark appeals. 5 Standard of Review In Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173 (Ala.2008), this Court set forth the standard for reviewing an order issuing a preliminary injunction: “We have often stated: ‘The decision to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion.

2011Standard of Review This Court set forth the standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to enter a preliminary injunction in Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1175-76 (Ala.2008): “We have often stated: ‘The decision to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion.

1991This Court set forth the standard for determining whether the agreement has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce activity to bring the agreement within the coverage of the FAA in Ex parte Warren, 548 So.2d 157, 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 , 110 S.Ct. 554 , 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989): “We hold that the appropriate standard for making this determination is set forth in a special opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 , 82 S.Ct. 31 , 7 L.Ed.2d 24 (1961): “ ‘[W]hether at the time [the parties]

1991This Court set forth the standard for determining whether the agreement has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce activity to bring the agreement within the coverage of the FAA in Ex parte Warren , 548 So.2d 157 , 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 998 , 110 S.Ct. 554 , 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989): "We hold that the appropriate standard for making this determination is set forth in a special opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co. , 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied , 368 U.S. 817 , 82 S.Ct. 31 , 7 L.Ed.2d 24 (1961): " '[W]hether at the time [the pa

2024Ex parte Ferguson, 819 So. 2d 626, 629 (Ala. 2001)(quoting United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987))." ' "Gladden [v. Gladden], 942 So. 2d [362] at 371 [(Ala. Civ.

2024Ex parte Ferguson, 819 So. 2d 626, 629 (Ala. 2001)(quoting United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987))." ' "Gladden [v. Gladden], 942 So. 2d [362] at 371 [(Ala. Civ.

2016A majority of this Court subsequently adopted the Cranman test in Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala.2000).

2011In lieu of holding that consent-to-settle clauses were unenforceable, 2 this Court set forth a framework “that will guarantee that the insured will receive the benefits of the bargain he has made, but that will, at the same time, protect the [UIM] insur- anee carrier’s subrogation rights against the tort-feasor ... and also protect the carrier against the possibility of collusion between the tort-feasor and his liability insurer,” 576 So.2d at 166 , stating, in pertinent part: “[ (1) ] If the tort-feasor’s liability insurance carrier and the insured enter into negotiations that ultimately lead

2011In lieu of holding that consent-to-settle clauses were unenforceable, [2] this Court set forth a framework "that will guarantee that the insured will receive the benefits of the bargain he has made, but that will, at the same time, protect the [UIM] insurance *956 carrier's subrogation rights against the tort-feasor ... and also protect the carrier against the possibility of collusion between the tort-feasor and his liability insurer," 576 So.2d at 166 , stating, in pertinent part: "[(1)] If the tort-feasor's liability insurance carrier and the insured enter into negotiations that ultimately l

2010In Roberts v. Roberts, 802 So.2d 230, 235 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), this court set forth the standard of review applicable to a trial court’s division of property in a divorce action: “A trial court’s division of property following an ore tenus presentation of evidence is presumed correct on appeal and will not be reversed absent a plain and palpable abuse of discretion.

2009In Dunn v. Dunn, 891 So.2d 891, 894 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court set forth the standard of review applicable to a trial court’s division of property in a divorce action: “Generally, a trial court is afforded a wide degree of discretion in dividing the marital assets of the parties upon divorce.