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19 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sato v. Schossbergergreen2 sentences2001In Sato v. Schossberger 117 Idaho 771, 775 , 792 P.2d 336 , 340 *604 (1990), this Court set forth the standard of review: If we decide to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, we ordinarily consider all the issues presented to the Court of Appeals. 2001In Sato v. Schossberger 117 Idaho 771, 775 , 792 P.2d 336 , 340 *604 (1990), this Court set forth the standard of review: If we decide to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, we ordinarily consider all the issues presented to the Court of Appeals. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Ybarragreen2 sentences2002See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576 , 634 P.2d 435, 438 (1981). 2002See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576 , 634 P.2d 435, 438 (1981). | 2 | 2 |
Nguyen v. Buigreen2 sentences2014Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states that “When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” In Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 , 191 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Ct.App.2008), this Court set forth the standard by which we determine if an issue was tried by consent: The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements. 2014Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states that “When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” In Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 , 191 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Ct.App.2008), this Court set forth the standard by which we determine if an issue was tried by consent: The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements. | 1 | 1 |
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Pazgreen2 sentences2011See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307 , 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). 2011See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307 , 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Centergreen2 sentences2006Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-65 , 45 P.3d 816, 819-21 (2002) (internal citations omitted), this Court set forth the standard of review for summary judgment orders specifically involving a medical malpractice claim, and also, the admissibility of expert testimony: The admissibility of the expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 2006Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-65 , 45 P.3d 816, 819-21 (2002) (internal citations omitted), this Court set forth the standard of review for summary judgment orders specifically involving a medical malpractice claim, and also, the admissibility of expert testimony: The admissibility of the expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Steele Motor Co.green2 sentences1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. 1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. | 1 | 1 |
MacK Financial Corp. v. Scottgreen2 sentences1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. 1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hugginsgreen2 sentences1983In State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 , 648 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ct.App.1982), aff’d as modified, 105 Idaho 43 , 665 P.2d 1053 (1983), this court set forth the test for deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal: The trial judge must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence. [Citations omitted.] Viewed in this manner, where the inculpatory evidence p 1983In State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 , 648 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ct.App.1982), aff’d as modified, 105 Idaho 43 , 665 P.2d 1053 (1983), this court set forth the test for deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal: The trial judge must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence. [Citations omitted.] Viewed in this manner, where the inculpatory evidence p | 1 | 1 |
Mutual Finance Co. v. Politzergreen2 sentences1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. 1983In Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238, 243 , 22 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1933), this Court set forth the rule that: "`A guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, [are] in any way impaired or suspended.'" (Quoting from California Civil Code, sec. 2819.) The rule was applied just a few short years ago by this Court in Mack Financial Credit Corp. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rita Hoagland v. Ada County
green
2 sentences2016Most importantly, however, a court should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional.” Id. (emphasis in original). 2016Most importantly, however, a court should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional.” Id. (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Bonz v. Sudweeks
green
2 sentences2011The district court is to “liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.” Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 , 808 P.2d 876 (1991) (citations omitted). 2011The district court is to “liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.” Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 , 808 P.2d 876 (1991) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Medrano
green
2 sentences2002In State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114 , 844 P.2d 1364 (Ct.App.1992), this Court set forth the analysis to be used when determining whether a given defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda: Miranda warnings are triggered by custodial interrogation. 2002In State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114 , 844 P.2d 1364 (Ct.App.1992), this Court set forth the analysis to be used when determining whether a given defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda: Miranda warnings are triggered by custodial interrogation. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Donato
green
2 sentences2001STANDARD OF REVIEW In State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 , 20 P.3d 5 (2001), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence. 2001STANDARD OF REVIEW In State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 , 20 P.3d 5 (2001), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bohemian Breweries v. Koehler
green
2 sentences1993In Bohemian Breweries v. Koehler, 80 Idaho 438 , 332 P.2d 875 (1958), this Court set forth the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies as follows: While as a general rule administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort is had to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts, such rule is not absolute and will be departed from where the interests of justice so require, and the rule does not apply unless the administrative agency acts within its authority. 1993In Bohemian Breweries v. Koehler, 80 Idaho 438 , 332 P.2d 875 (1958), this Court set forth the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies as follows: While as a general rule administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort is had to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts, such rule is not absolute and will be departed from where the interests of justice so require, and the rule does not apply unless the administrative agency acts within its authority. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dinneen v. Finch
green
2 sentences1990In Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620 , 603 P.2d 575 (1979), this Court set forth the standard of review where a motion for new tnal is based on a damage award which is challenged as either excessive or inadequate. 1990In Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620 , 603 P.2d 575 (1979), this Court set forth the standard of review where a motion for new tnal is based on a damage award which is challenged as either excessive or inadequate. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Johnson v. Gorton
green
2 sentences1985In Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595 , 495 P.2d 1 (1972), this Court set forth the test for measuring the sufficiency of materials to overcome a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. 1985In Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595 , 495 P.2d 1 (1972), this Court set forth the test for measuring the sufficiency of materials to overcome a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Huggins
green
2 sentences1983In State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 , 648 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ct.App.1982), aff’d as modified, 105 Idaho 43 , 665 P.2d 1053 (1983), this court set forth the test for deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal: The trial judge must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence. [Citations omitted.] Viewed in this manner, where the inculpatory evidence p 1983In State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 , 648 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ct.App.1982), aff’d as modified, 105 Idaho 43 , 665 P.2d 1053 (1983), this court set forth the test for deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal: The trial judge must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence. [Citations omitted.] Viewed in this manner, where the inculpatory evidence p | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1979The Court set forth the standard of care required of the state in the maintenance of state highways, "it is our opinion that the standard should be similar to that owed by a private individual who is the owner or possessor of land to an invitee." At 804, 473 P.2d at 946 . 1979The Court set forth the standard of care required of the state in the maintenance of state highways, “it is our opinion that the standard should be similar to that owed by a private individual who is the owner or possessor of land to an invitee.” At 804, 473 P.2d at 946 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1973In Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., Inc., 74 Idaho 483 , 264 P.2d 466 (1953), this Court set forth the test to be applied when considering a motion for continuance. 1973In Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., Inc., 74 Idaho 483 , 264 P.2d 466 (1953), this Court set forth the test to be applied when considering a motion for continuance. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.