set forth standard in Florida

1989When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla. [1956] 86 So.2d 792

1988When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla., 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla., 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792 ; Florida Publ

1989As Justice Grimes stated in Smith v. Brown, 525 So.2d 868 (Fla.1988): In the oft-cited case of Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959), this Court set forth the standard of review for an order which grants a new trial because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1988In the oft-cited case of Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959), this Court set forth the standard of review for an order which grants a new trial because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1989When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla. [1956] 86 So.2d 792

1988When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla., 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla., 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792 ; Florida Publ

1989When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla. [1956] 86 So.2d 792

1988When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla., 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla., 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792 ; Florida Publ

1989When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla. [1956] 86 So.2d 792

1988When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone [Fla., 51 So.2d 33 ], supra, Turner v. Frey [Fla., 81 So.2d 721 ], supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792 ; Florida Publ

2016Id.

2016In State v. Cruse, 121 So.3d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2Q13), this court set forth the factors that may be .considered by officers to arrive at a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or is about to be committed and to support the investigatory stop or detention of a suspect: The time; the day of the week; the location; the physical appearance of the suspect; the behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge.

2014In DiGuilio, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. 491 So. 2d at 1130 .

2014In DiGuilio , the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. 491 So.2d at 1130 .

2011In Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), the court set forth a test for detei*-mining whether the detention of a victim during the commission of a crime also constitutes the separate crime of kidnapping.

2005There, the court read sections 95.281 and 95.11 together to conclude that neither provision barred the foreclosure action because "[t]he twenty-year lien of the mortgage has not yet terminated, and appellants' cause of action did not accrue until the filing of the complaint herein." Smith, 391 So.2d at 798 .

2002In Vasquez v. State, 778 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), the court set forth the test: The proper analysis to determine whether offenses arise from the same criminal episode requires consideration of the following factors: 1) whether separate victims are involved; 2) whether the crimes occurred in separate locations; and 3) whether there has been a temporal break between the incidents.

2002Id. at 1070 .

2001In United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.1987), the court set forth the standard of review of warrantless entries to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.

2001In Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), this Court set forth a test for determining compliance with the access to courts clause when the Legislature enacts provisions which appear to restrict the right.

2001In Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1992), the court set forth the test for intervention: The test to determine what interest entitles a party to intervene is set forth in Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 238-39 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918): [T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene ... must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

1990In DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), following the teaching of Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 608 , 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983), this court set forth the test to be used by the trial court in determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege under circumstances presented here.

1990In DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), following the teaching of Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 608 , 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983), this court set forth the test to be used by the trial court in determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege under circumstances presented here.

1990In DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), following the teaching of Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 608 , 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983), this court set forth the test to be used by the trial court in determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege under circumstances presented here.

1989As Justice Grimes stated in Smith v. Brown, 525 So.2d 868 (Fla.1988): In the oft-cited case of Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959), this Court set forth the standard of review for an order which grants a new trial because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1982In Peoples Gas System v. Mason, 187 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1966), this Court set forth the rule that: The effect of these decisions is that orders of administrative agencies must eventually pass out of the agency's control and become final and no longer subject to modification.

1976In the event of a conflict between the decision of a District Court of Appeal and this Court, the decision of this Court shall prevail until overruled by a subsequent decision of this Court." Following Hoffman, supra, this principle was extended to the trial court level in State v. Lott, 286 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1973).

1976In U.S. v. Pearson, supra , the court set forth the standard for judging prosecutorial actions in jury selections.