set forth standard in Ohio

2016Xie at id. {¶20} In State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 214 , 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.

2016Xie at id. {¶20} In State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 214 , 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.

2007We find appellant's proposition without merit. *Page 5 {¶ 10} With regard to procedure, we note that this court set forth the standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress in State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93 , 96 , 641 N.E.2d 1172 , which states: {¶ 11} "In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility.

2007We find appellant's proposition without merit. *Page 5 {¶ 10} With regard to procedure, we note that this court set forth the standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress in State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93 , 96 , 641 N.E.2d 1172 , which states: {¶ 11} "In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility.

2014Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶20} In State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph three of the syllabus, this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is file

2013Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶22} In State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 214 , 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a co

2007State v. Clay (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 250 , 63 Ohio Op.2d 391 , 298 N.E.2d 137 .

2007State v. Clay (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 250 , 63 Ohio Op.2d 391 , 298 N.E.2d 137 .

2023Guernsey No. 21CA000016, 2022-Ohio-1372 , this Court set forth analysis regarding Appellant’s arguments.

2022Guernsey No. 21CA000016, 2022-Ohio-1372 , this Court set forth analysis regarding Clark’s arguments.

2023Violation of Right to Trial by Jury {¶34} Appellant argues that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) unilaterally conducts fact finding which may extend an inmate’s sentence, and that this violates Appellant’s right to trial by jury citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

2023Violation of Right to Trial by Jury {¶34} Appellant argues that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) unilaterally conducts fact finding which may extend an inmate’s sentence, and that this violates Appellant’s right to trial by jury citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

2016The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 Scioto App. No. 14CA3674 42 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by statute and constitutional amendment on other grounds).

2003The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Thomas, supra, citing State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 . {¶ 18} "[S]ufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law." State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386 , 678 N.E.2d 541 .

2011State v. Benjamin, Cuyahoga App. No. 85071, 2005-Ohio-2322 . {¶ 9} In State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 , this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: {¶ 10} “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the acc

2011State v. Benjamin, Cuyahoga App. No. 85071, 2005-Ohio-2322 . {¶ 10} In State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 , this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: {¶ 11} “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accuse

1995The Supreme Court in York clearly enunciated the standard to be applied when granting a motion to dismiss: “ * * * In O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242 , 71 O.O.2d 223 , 327 N.E.2d 753 , this court set forth the standard for granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

1995The Supreme Court in York clearly enunciated the standard to be applied when granting a motion to dismiss: “ * * * In O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242 , 71 O.O.2d 223 , 327 N.E.2d 753 , this court set forth the standard for granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

2006The affected communities claim that it is not a bar to the litigation here because the instant case concerns Akron’s current, increased use of the Cuyahoga River. {¶ 84} This court set forth the standard for res judicata in Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 , at paragraph one of the syllabus: “[A] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava further noted that 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982), Comm

2006The affected communities claim that it is not a bar to the litigation here because the instant case concerns Akron’s current, increased use of the Cuyahoga River. {¶ 84} This court set forth the standard for res judicata in Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 , at paragraph one of the syllabus: “[A] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava further noted that 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982), Comm

2016In determining that no violation occurred, the court set forth a test for omissions triggering a Franks inquiry: “[E]xcept in the very rare case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.” Id. at 816 .

2011In determining that no violation occurred, the court set forth a test for omissions triggering a Franks inquiry: “[E]xcept in the very rare case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.” Id., at 816 .

2014In re Adoption of Masa (1986), 23 6 Ohio St.3d 163 , * * *, at paragraph 2 of the syllabus; In re Adoption of Bovett (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 102 , * * *, at paragraph four of the syllabus. {¶27} “In Bovett, the Court set forth the standard to apply in proceedings under R.C. 3107.07(A).

2005In re Adoption of Masa (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 163 , at paragraph 2 of the syllabus; In re Adoption of Bovett (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 102 , at paragraph four of the syllabus. {¶ 12} In Bovett, the Court set forth the standard to apply in proceedings under R.C. 3107.07 (A).

2012He contends that a review of the evidence in its entirety demonstrates he remained ignorant of Loewinger’s scheme until the FBI mounted its investigation in 2006. {¶28} In Wells, at ¶ 13-15, this court set forth the analysis to be applied to Petti’s argument as follows: In evaluating a challenge to the verdict based on the manifest weight of the evidence, a court sits as the thirteenth juror and intrudes its judgment into proceedings that it finds to be fatally flawed through misrepresentation or misapplication of the evidence by a jury that has “lost its way.” State v. Thompkins, [ 78 Ohio St

2012He contends that a review of the evidence in its entirety demonstrates he remained ignorant of Loewinger’s scheme until the FBI mounted its investigation in 2006. {¶28} In Wells, at ¶ 13-15, this court set forth the analysis to be applied to Petti’s argument as follows: In evaluating a challenge to the verdict based on the manifest weight of the evidence, a court sits as the thirteenth juror and intrudes its judgment into proceedings that it finds to be fatally flawed through misrepresentation or misapplication of the evidence by a jury that has “lost its way.” State v. Thompkins, [ 78 Ohio St

2011State v. Benjamin, Cuyahoga App. No. 85071, 2005-Ohio-2322 . {¶ 9} In State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 , this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: {¶ 10} “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the acc

2011State v. Benjamin, Cuyahoga App. No. 85071, 2005-Ohio-2322 . {¶ 10} In State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 , this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea: {¶ 11} “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accuse

2001A. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT With regard to procedure, we note that in Cardinal v. Family Foot Care Centers (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 181 , the court set forth the test to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: The trial judge must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-movant and if upon all the evidence, there is substantial evidence upon which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied.

1999Further, in Cardinal v. Family Foot Care Center (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 181 , the court set forth the test to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: The trial judge must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-movant and if upon all the evidence there is substantial evidence upon which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied.

2000Civ.R. 49(B) states that “[wjhen one or more of the answers is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.” In Shaffer v. Maier (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 416, 421 , 627 N.E.2d 986, 990 , a case with a conflicting general verdict and interrogatory response, this court stated that “the clear, best choice was to send the jury back for further deliberations.” The trial judge certainly

2000Civ.R. 49(B) states that “[wjhen one or more of the answers is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.” In Shaffer v. Maier (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 416, 421 , 627 N.E.2d 986, 990 , a case with a conflicting general verdict and interrogatory response, this court stated that “the clear, best choice was to send the jury back for further deliberations.” The trial judge certainly

1999Id. at 53 , 550 N.E.2d at 470 . {¶ 15} Here, the court of appeals found that restricting Hartman’s driving privileges and requiring her to have an ignition interlock device installed on her automobile were not related to the offense of which she was found guilty, nor were these conditions intended to rehabilitate her.

1999Id. at 53, 550 N.E.2d at 470 .

1995In State v. Laskey (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 187 , 50 O.O.2d 432 , 257 N.E.2d 65 , this court set forth the standard for considering such a request. “ * * * Generally, proceedings before a grand jury are secret and an accused is not entitled to inspect grand jury minutes before trial [or at trial] * * *.

1995In State v. Laskey (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 187 , 50 O.O.2d 432 , 257 N.E.2d 65 , this court set forth the standard for considering such a request. “ * * * Generally, proceedings before a grand jury are secret and an accused is not entitled to inspect grand jury minutes before trial [or at trial] * * *.

1995In State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 , the court set forth the standard for reviewing the admissibility of photographs in a capital case: “Properly authenticated photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible in a capital prosecution if relevant and of probative value in assisting the trier of fact to determine the issues or are illustrative of testimony and other evidence, as long as the danger of material prejudice to a defendant is outweighed by their probative value and the photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in number.” Id. at paragraph seven o

1995In State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 , the court set forth the standard for reviewing the admissibility of photographs in a capital case: “Properly authenticated photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible in a capital prosecution if relevant and of probative value in assisting the trier of fact to determine the issues or are illustrative of testimony and other evidence, as long as the danger of material prejudice to a defendant is outweighed by their probative value and the photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in number.” Id. at paragraph seven o

2025This rule embodies the common-law principle that “‘proof that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused’s propensity or inclination to commit crime.’” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, ¶ 20 , quoting State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1975). {¶42} In Hartman, the Court set forth a framework for considering the admissibility of other-act evidence.

2024Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Sykes, 2007- Ohio-3086, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.). {¶11} In State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236 (1st Dist. 1995), overruled on other grounds in State v. Sims, 2017-Ohio-8379 (1st Dist.), this court set forth the factors to be considered when reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

2024Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Sykes, 2007- Ohio-3086, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.). {¶11} In State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236 (1st Dist. 1995), overruled on other grounds in State v. Sims, 2017-Ohio-8379 (1st Dist.), this court set forth the factors to be considered when reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

2023Richland No. 02CA73, 2003-Ohio-3387 , ¶ 14. {¶ 27} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the test for unlawful discrimination under R.C. 4112.02(G) “is simply whether the proprietor, keeper, manager, or employee of a place of public accommodation has denied to any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not applicable alike to all persons irrespective of race, color, religion, [sex, military status] national origin, [disability, age,] or ancestry.” (Emphasis sic.) Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 221 , 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974) (bracketed terms are now part of the stat

2023Richland No. 02CA73, 2003-Ohio-3387 , ¶ 14. {¶ 27} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the test for unlawful discrimination under R.C. 4112.02(G) “is simply whether the proprietor, keeper, manager, or employee of a place of public accommodation has denied to any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not applicable alike to all persons irrespective of race, color, religion, [sex, military status] national origin, [disability, age,] or ancestry.” (Emphasis sic.) Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 221 , 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974) (bracketed terms are now part of the stat