7 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Deshay Arkel Stith v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2024“In Jewell [v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 353 (1989)], this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a defendant meets or exceeds a particular statutory age.” Stith v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 27, 31 (2015). [T]he rule set forth in Jewell envisions two categories of cases: (1) those where it is obvious from the defendant’s appearance that he or she meets or exceeds the statutory age and (2) those where it is not obvious whether the defendant meets or exceeds the statutory age. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998In Hill v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 480, 486 , 438 S.E.2d 296, 300 (1993), this Court set forth the principle which underlies our decision here: The Commonwealth ... argu[es] that when intent is an element of the offense, prior offenses should be admissible. 1998In Hill v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 480, 486 , 438 S.E.2d 296, 300 (1993), this Court set forth the principle which underlies our decision here: The Commonwealth ... argu[es] that when intent is an element of the offense, prior offenses should be admissible. | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 525 , 446 S.E.2d 451, 460-61 (1994) (en banc) (citation omitted). 1996Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 525 , 446 S.E.2d 451, 460-61 (1994) (en banc) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lloyd Ballivierogreen1 sentence1996In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set forth the test for materiality, finding that evidence is material, "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682 . * * * * * * * "A defendant cannot simply allege the 8 presence of favorable material and win reversal of his conviction." United States v. Balliviero, 708 F.2d 934, 943 (5th Cir. 1983)[, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983)]. | 1 | 1 |
Standard Drug Co. v. General Electric Co.green2 sentences1991See also, Standard Drug v. General Electric, 202 Va. 367, 378-379 , 117 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1960); 17 M.J. 1991See also, Standard Drug v. General Electric, 202 Va. 367, 378-379 , 117 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1960); 17 M.J. | 1 | 1 |
Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerkgreen2 sentences1991In Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 761 , 214 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1975), the court set forth the principle of legislative construction that: If apparently conflicting statutes can be harmonized and effect given to both of them, they will be so construed. 1991In Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 761 , 214 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1975), the court set forth the principle of legislative construction that: If apparently conflicting statutes can be harmonized and effect given to both of them, they will be so construed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1996In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set forth the test for materiality, finding that evidence is material, "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682 . 1996In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set forth the test for materiality, finding that evidence is material, "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682 . | 3 | 1994–1996 |
Jewell v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2024“In Jewell [v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 353 (1989)], this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a defendant meets or exceeds a particular statutory age.” Stith v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 27, 31 (2015). [T]he rule set forth in Jewell envisions two categories of cases: (1) those where it is obvious from the defendant’s appearance that he or she meets or exceeds the statutory age and (2) those where it is not obvious whether the defendant meets or exceeds the statutory age. 2024This Court in Jewell explained that, for the first type of cases, a factfinder may rely on the defendant’s physical appearance by itself when arriving at its conclusion regarding the defendant’s age. [ 8 Va. App. at 356 .] For the second type of cases, where it is less obvious whether a defendant meets or exceeds a statutory age, corroborating evidence is necessary and the factfinder may not rely solely on a defendant’s physical appearance to arrive at a determination regarding the defendant’s age. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Barnes v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2004The Court set forth the rule as follows: “[When], as here, there is evidence that the victim was intoxicated at the time of the shooting, evidence of his character ... for turbulence when in such condition is admissible on the issue of self-defense.” Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Yalkowsky v. Mollen
green
1 sentence1996In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set forth the test for materiality, finding that evidence is material, "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682 . * * * * * * * "A defendant cannot simply allege the 8 presence of favorable material and win reversal of his conviction." United States v. Balliviero, 708 F.2d 934, 943 (5th Cir. 1983)[, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983)]. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.