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19 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wein v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2025Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated. [ 194 N.J. 364, 383 (2008).] Here, there was no court order requiring arbitration nor was any substantive proceeding held in the arbitration. | 1 | 1 |
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc.green1 sentence2021Under this test, the plaintiff must "allege[] discriminatory conduct that a reasonable person of the same sex in the plaintiff's position would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 132 N.J. at 592 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Winans v. Luppiegreen1 sentence2021In Lavigne v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 11 N.J. 473, 480 (1953), the Court set forth the standard required for the State to prove abandonment un der A-1382-19 11 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) as "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." (quoting Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Lavigne v. Family and Children's Soc. of Elizabethgreen1 sentence2021In Lavigne v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 11 N.J. 473, 480 (1953), the Court set forth the standard required for the State to prove abandonment un der A-1382-19 11 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) as "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." (quoting Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simongreen1 sentence2019Specifically, [i]n evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea, trial courts should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused. [Slater, 198 N.J. at 150 .] We review "the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw [her] guilty plea [for ] . . . an abuse of discretion which renders [a] lower court's decision clear | 1 | 1 |
STATE BY COM'R OF TRANSP. v. Caoiligreen1 sentence2013See id. at 261, 265 , 639 A.2d 275 . | 1 | 1 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Husonred2 sentences2012Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” [ 96 N.J. at 427 , 476 A.2d 763 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 308 (1971)).] Although Lovett addresses her argument to the Coons II criteria and concludes that prospective application is unwarranted, the Attorney General eschews any Goons II an 2012Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” [ 96 N.J. at 427 , 476 A.2d 763 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 308 (1971)).] Although Lovett addresses her argument to the Coons II criteria and concludes that prospective application is unwarranted, the Attorney General eschews any Goons II an | 1 | 1 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsongreen2 sentences1994The various contentions of the defendant will be treated individually and in succession. *159 LAW (1) LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION The seminal case involving the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), [1] wherein the Court set forth the test to determine whether exercising this jurisdiction would "offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 , 100 S.Ct. 559, 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, 498 (1980). 1994The various contentions of the defendant will be treated individually and in succession. *159 LAW (1) LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION The seminal case involving the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), [1] wherein the Court set forth the test to determine whether exercising this jurisdiction would "offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 , 100 S.Ct. 559, 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, 498 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1994The various contentions of the defendant will be treated individually and in succession. *159 LAW (1) LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION The seminal case involving the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), [1] wherein the Court set forth the test to determine whether exercising this jurisdiction would "offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 , 100 S.Ct. 559, 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, 498 (1980). 1994The various contentions of the defendant will be treated individually and in succession. *159 LAW (1) LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION The seminal case involving the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), [1] wherein the Court set forth the test to determine whether exercising this jurisdiction would "offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 , 100 S.Ct. 559, 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, 498 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1994The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which is applicable to the states, "limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant." World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 291 , 100 S.Ct. at 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 497 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 , 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696 , 56 L.Ed. 2d 132, 140-41 (1978)). 1994The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which is applicable to the states, "limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant." World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 291 , 100 S.Ct. at 564 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 497 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 , 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696 , 56 L.Ed. 2d 132, 140-41 (1978)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramseurgreen2 sentences1988In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, this Court set forth the test governing the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors holding views opposed to the imposition of capital punishment. 1988In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, this Court set forth the test governing the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors holding views opposed to the imposition of capital punishment. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Texasgreen2 sentences1988Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45 , 100 S.Ct. at 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 589 , and Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 418-26 , 105 S.Ct. at 849-53 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 847-53 , we determined that a prospective juror’s views regarding capital punishment warrant dismissal for cause where these “ ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordancé with his instructions and his oath.’ ” 11 State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed 1988Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45 , 100 S.Ct. at 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 589 , and Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 418-26 , 105 S.Ct. at 849-53 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 847-53 , we determined that a prospective juror’s views regarding capital punishment warrant dismissal for cause where these “ ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordancé with his instructions and his oath.’ ” 11 State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed | 1 | 1 |
State v. Deutschgreen1 sentence1983See State v. Taylor , above, 80 N.J. at 363-364 ; State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 201 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen1 sentence1983See State v. Taylor , above, 80 N.J. at 363-364 ; State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 201 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Di Giosiagreen1 sentence1954In State v. DiGiosia, 3 N.J. 413, 419 (1950), Mr. Justice Heher in his opinion for the Court set forth the test to be implied in these cases: "It has been said that the true test of former jeopardy is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to secure a legal conviction upon the first; but this is not an absolute rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2008Although the Court set forth that standard to deal with police interrogations, it emphatically noted that it did not intend to imply that “statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.” Id. at 822 n. 1, 126 at 2274 n. 1, 165 L.Ed.2d at 237 n. 1. 2008Although the Court set forth that standard to deal with police interrogations, it emphatically noted that it did not intend to imply that “statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.” Id. at 822 n. 1, 126 at 2274 n. 1, 165 L.Ed.2d at 237 n. 1. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Slater
green
1 sentence2019Specifically, [i]n evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea, trial courts should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused. [Slater, 198 N.J. at 150 .] We review "the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw [her] guilty plea [for ] . . . an abuse of discretion which renders [a] lower court's decision clear | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Cesar A. Lipa (071011)
green
1 sentence2019Specifically, [i]n evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea, trial courts should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused. [Slater, 198 N.J. at 150 .] We review "the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw [her] guilty plea [for ] . . . an abuse of discretion which renders [a] lower court's decision clear | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Yarbough
red
2 sentences2017Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44 . 2017Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McGrogan v. Till
green
1 sentence2017In McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414 (2001), the Court set forth the test to be employed when determining the appropriate statute of limitations to apply. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” [ 96 N.J. at 427 , 476 A.2d 763 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 308 (1971)).] Although Lovett addresses her argument to the Coons II criteria and concludes that prospective application is unwarranted, the Attorney General eschews any Goons II an 2012Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” [ 96 N.J. at 427 , 476 A.2d 763 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 308 (1971)).] Although Lovett addresses her argument to the Coons II criteria and concludes that prospective application is unwarranted, the Attorney General eschews any Goons II an | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Coll v. Sherry
green
2 sentences2003In Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166 , 148 A.2d 481 (1959), this Court set forth the standard in adult injury cases for instructing a jury on such damages. 2003In Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166 , 148 A.2d 481 (1959), this Court set forth the standard in adult injury cases for instructing a jury on such damages. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
NJ Chamb. Commerce v. NJ Elec. Law Enforce. Comm.
green
2 sentences2001The Court set forth this standard in cases in which the statute in question "encroach[es] on First Amendment interests"; whether it is overbroad turns upon whether there is a compelling state interest to be served by the statute and a substantial connection between that compelling governmental interest and the statutory regulation; the compelling state interest must clearly outweigh the "repressive effect" on expressional or associational rights engendered by the application of the statute. [ New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 70 , 4 2001The Court set forth this standard in cases in which the statute in question "encroach[es] on First Amendment interests"; whether it is overbroad turns upon whether there is a compelling state interest to be served by the statute and a substantial connection between that compelling governmental interest and the statutory regulation; the compelling state interest must clearly outweigh the "repressive effect" on expressional or associational rights engendered by the application of the statute. [ New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 70 , 4 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Reyes
green
2 sentences1997In State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 , 236 A.2d 385 (1967), the Court set forth the test for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence: [W]hether, viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 1997In State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 , 236 A.2d 385 (1967), the Court set forth the test for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence: [W]hether, viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Doe v. Poritz
green
1 sentence1995The Court set forth the factors that "may often point in differing directions," and that "[a]bsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute *64 ... must be considered in relation to the statute on its face." [15] Id. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. at 568 , 9 L.Ed. 2d at 661 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences1995The Court set forth the factors that “may often point in differing directions,” and that “[ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute ... must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.” 15 Id. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 661 . 1995The Court set forth the factors that “may often point in differing directions,” and that “[ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute ... must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.” 15 Id. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 661 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences1988Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45 , 100 S.Ct. at 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 589 , and Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 418-26 , 105 S.Ct. at 849-53 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 847-53 , we determined that a prospective juror’s views regarding capital punishment warrant dismissal for cause where these “ ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordancé with his instructions and his oath.’ ” 11 State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed 1988Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45 , 100 S.Ct. at 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 589 , and Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 418-26 , 105 S.Ct. at 849-53 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 847-53 , we determined that a prospective juror’s views regarding capital punishment warrant dismissal for cause where these “ ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordancé with his instructions and his oath.’ ” 11 State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Ronald Berkowitz, Paul D'alessandro, Kevin Van Coughnett, Bisan Vafaie, and Wendall Howell
green
2 sentences1987The defense of a defendant reaches a level of antagonism (with respect to the defense of a codefendant) that compels severance of that defendant, if the jury, in order to believe the core of the testimony offered on behalf of that defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of his codefendant. [ Id. at 1134 ] In that situation, the codefendants "become the government's best witnesses against each other." Ibid. 1987The defense of a defendant reaches a level of antagonism (with respect to the defense of a codefendant) that compels severance of that defendant, if the jury, in order to believe the core of the testimony offered on behalf of that defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of his codefendant. [ Id. at 1134 ] In that situation, the codefendants "become the government's best witnesses against each other." Ibid. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.