set forth standard in Michigan

2018But the Court set forth a rule of general application to similar cases that black ice may be an open and obvious hazard when there is evidence it “would have been visible on casual inspection before the fall or . . . other indicia of a potentially hazardous condition” was present, such as “the circumstances and specific weather conditions present at the time of [the] plaintiff’s fall . . . .” Id. at 483 . -2- Our Supreme Court in Janson v Sajewski Funeral Home, Inc, 486 Mich 934 ; 782 NW2d 201 (2010), adopted the Slaughter rule.

2018But the Court set forth a rule of general application to similar cases that black ice may be an open and obvious hazard when there is evidence it “would have been visible on casual inspection before the fall or . . . other indicia of a potentially hazardous condition” was present, such as “the circumstances and specific weather conditions present at the time of [the] plaintiff’s fall . . . .” Id. at 483 . -2- Our Supreme Court in Janson v Sajewski Funeral Home, Inc, 486 Mich 934 ; 782 NW2d 201 (2010), adopted the Slaughter rule.

2020In Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Dells, 301 Mich App 368, 377 ; 836 NW2d 257 (2013), this Court set forth the framework regarding analysis of a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), explaining: In general, MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.

2020In Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Dells, 301 Mich App 368, 377 ; 836 NW2d 257 (2013), this Court set forth the framework regarding analysis of a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), explaining: In general, MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.

2020Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290, 302 ; 39 414 NW2d 706 (1987) (“In the interest of public policy, this Court has created a new cause of action to redress the violation of a penal statute and, pursuant to the following test, incorporated the statute as the specific standard of care: ‘The court may adopt as the standard conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest

2020Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290, 302 ; 39 414 NW2d 706 (1987) (“In the interest of public policy, this Court has created a new cause of action to redress the violation of a penal statute and, pursuant to the following test, incorporated the statute as the specific standard of care: ‘The court may adopt as the standard conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest

2018The Court reversed this Court because it failed apply the precedent of Slaughter that “ ’black ice’ conditions [are] open and obvious when there are ‘indicia of a potentially hazardous condition,’ including the ‘specific weather conditions present at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.’ ” Id., quoting Slaughter, 281 Mich App at 483 .

2018The Court reversed this Court because it failed apply the precedent of Slaughter that “ ’black ice’ conditions [are] open and obvious when there are ‘indicia of a potentially hazardous condition,’ including the ‘specific weather conditions present at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.’ ” Id., quoting Slaughter, 281 Mich App at 483 .

2017Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 279 ; 769 NW2d 234 (2009).

2017Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 279 ; 769 NW2d 234 (2009).

2017Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 279 ; 769 NW2d 234 (2009).

2017Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 279 ; 769 NW2d 234 (2009).

2025In Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Sterling Hts, 176 Mich App 123, 128-129 ; 439 NW2d 310 (1989),1 this Court set forth the framework for analyzing a ULP claim arising under MCL 423.210(1)(a) and (c) from adverse treatment of an employee for engaging in PERA-protected activity: [W]here it is alleged that a discharge is motivated by antiunion animus the burden is on the party making the claim to demonstrate that protected conduct was a motivating or substantial factor in the decision of the employer to discharge the employee.

2025In Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Sterling Hts, 176 Mich App 123, 128-129 ; 439 NW2d 310 (1989),1 this Court set forth the framework for analyzing a ULP claim arising under MCL 423.210(1)(a) and (c) from adverse treatment of an employee for engaging in PERA-protected activity: [W]here it is alleged that a discharge is motivated by antiunion animus the burden is on the party making the claim to demonstrate that protected conduct was a motivating or substantial factor in the decision of the employer to discharge the employee.

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2025The parties agree that this Court set forth the factors to consider when an excessive fines challenge is made under the Excessive Fines Clause in People v Wolfe, 338 Mich 525, 540-541 ; 61 NW2d 767 (1953), as restated in People v Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714 ; 525 NW2d 513 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703 , 709 n 2; 774 NW2d 347 (2009): “In determining whether a fine authorized by statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due regard must be had to the object designed to be accomplished, to the importance and magnitude of the p

2024The evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the claimed attorney fees was scheduled for November 20, 2019. 7 On November 6, 2019, defendant filed a motion to 6 Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519 ; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). 7 At this hearing, the trial court is to apply Smith, 481 Mich 519 , in which the Court set forth factors that are the framework for calculating a reasonable attorney fee.

2024The evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the claimed attorney fees was scheduled for November 20, 2019. 7 On November 6, 2019, defendant filed a motion to 6 Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519 ; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). 7 At this hearing, the trial court is to apply Smith, 481 Mich 519 , in which the Court set forth factors that are the framework for calculating a reasonable attorney fee.

2024The Court modified its decision in Smith in Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 281 ; 884 NW2d 257 (2016), stating that “when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded under [MCL 500.3148(1)], a trial court must begin its analysis by determining the reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services.

2024The Court modified its decision in Smith in Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 281 ; 884 NW2d 257 (2016), stating that “when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded under [MCL 500.3148(1)], a trial court must begin its analysis by determining the reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services.

2023In Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 428-429 ; 789 NW2d 211 (2010), this Court set forth the standard for reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7): When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless other evidence contradicts them.

2023In Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 428-429 ; 789 NW2d 211 (2010), this Court set forth the standard for reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7): When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless other evidence contradicts them.

2018In St Clair Med, PC v Borgiel, 270 Mich App 260, 263-264 ; 715 NW2d 914 (2006), this Court set forth the standard for evaluating a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), as follows: A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.

2018In St Clair Med, PC v Borgiel, 270 Mich App 260, 263-264 ; 715 NW2d 914 (2006), this Court set forth the standard for evaluating a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), as follows: A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.

2018Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

2018Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

2017Id. -1- In Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516 ; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), this Court set forth the standard of care that a premises possessor owes to an invitee: In general, a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.

2017Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609 ; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).

2017Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609 ; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).

2017Id. -1- In Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516 ; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), this Court set forth the standard of care that a premises possessor owes to an invitee: In general, a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.

2017Id. -1- In Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516 ; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), this Court set forth the standard of care that a premises possessor owes to an invitee: In general, a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.

2009In my opinion, putting up impossible barriers and expecting plaintiffs’ experts to leap over those barriers was not the intent behind the statute. 2 In Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386, 390-391 ; 682 NW2d 546 (2004), this Court set forth the standard for interpreting an ambiguous statute: The primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

2009In my opinion, putting up impossible barriers and expecting plaintiffs’ experts to leap over those barriers was not the intent behind the statute. 2 In Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386, 390-391 ; 682 NW2d 546 (2004), this Court set forth the standard for interpreting an ambiguous statute: The primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

2004Departing from established law, this Court set forth an exception in circumstances involving construction projects and affirmed the verdict against Darin: We regard it to be part of the business of a general contractor to assure that reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority are taken to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen. [Funk, supra at 104 .] That is, for a general contractor to be held liable under the “common work area doctrine,” a plaintiff must show that (

2004Departing from established law, this Court set forth an exception in circumstances involving construction projects and affirmed the verdict against Darin: We regard it to be part of the business of a general contractor to assure that reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority are taken to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen. [ Funk, supra at 104 , 220 N.W.2d 641 .] That is, for a general contractor to be held liable under the "common work area doctrine," *326 a pla

2003This Court set forth the factors to be considered in analyzing a claim of a denial of a speedy trial in People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 602 ; 617 NW2d 339 (2000): A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.

2003This Court set forth the factors to be considered in analyzing a claim of a denial of a speedy trial in People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 602 ; 617 NW2d 339 (2000): A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.

2002STANDARD OF REVIEW In Rose Hill Center, Inc v Holly Twp, 224 Mich App 28, 31 ; 568 NW2d 332 (1997), this Court set forth the standard by which we review decisions of the Tax Tribunal: *492 Judicial review of a determination by the Tax Tribunal is limited to determining whether the tribunal made an error of law or applied a wrong [legal] principle.

2002STANDARD OF REVIEW In Rose Hill Center, Inc v Holly Twp, 224 Mich App 28, 31 ; 568 NW2d 332 (1997), this Court set forth the standard by which we review decisions of the Tax Tribunal: *492 Judicial review of a determination by the Tax Tribunal is limited to determining whether the tribunal made an error of law or applied a wrong [legal] principle.

2001In May, supra, this Court set forth a framework for trial courts to follow when considering if factual disputes exist with regard to the “nature and extent” of the plaintiff’s ii\juries: In determining the “nature” of plaintiff’s injuries, the trial court should make appropriate findings concerning whether there is a factual dispute with respect to whether plaintiff has an “objectively manifested” impairment and, if so, whether “an important body function” is impaired.

1999After articulating its rationale, the Court set forth the standard of review, which we adopt here: The character or seriousness of an error of law which will invite judicial action to vacate an arbitration award under the formula we announce today must be error so material or so substantial as to have governed the award, and but for which the award would have been substantially otherwise. [ Id. at 443 , 331 N.W.2d 418 (emphasis supplied).] This Court recently held that the Gavin standard of judicial review applies to review of an arbitral award in a statutory discrimination suit.

1999After articulating its rationale, the Court set forth the standard of review, which we adopt here: The character or seriousness of an error of law which will invite judicial action to vacate an arbitration award under the formula we announce today must be error so material or so substantial as to have governed the award, and but for which the award would have been substantially otherwise. [ Id. at 443 , 331 N.W.2d 418 (emphasis supplied).] This Court recently held that the Gavin standard of judicial review applies to review of an arbitral award in a statutory discrimination suit.

1999In Collins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 567 ; 579 NW2d 435 (1998), the arbitrator determined that an employee who expressed homicidal ideation regarding her supervisor was entitled to the protection of disability discrimination statutes.

1999In Collins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 567 ; 579 NW2d 435 (1998), the arbitrator determined that an employee who expressed homicidal ideation regarding her supervisor was entitled to the protection of disability discrimination statutes.

1994In Nogueras v Maisel & Associates of Michigan, 142 Mich App 71, 86 ; 369 NW2d 492 (1985), this Court set forth the standard for piercing the corporate veil: [T]here are three requisites to piercing the corporate veil and finding an identity between business entities.

1994In Nogueras v Maisel & Associates of Michigan, 142 Mich App 71, 86 ; 369 NW2d 492 (1985), this Court set forth the standard for piercing the corporate veil: [T]here are three requisites to piercing the corporate veil and finding an identity between business entities.

1990"In the final analysis, the outcome of a case such as this should be determined not by precise seman *576 tic shadings of terms of art, but by a commonsense appraisal of the overall situation.” [Id., pp 539-540, quoting Ben Pulitzer Creations, Inc v Phoenix Ins Co, 47 Misc 2d 801, 804 ; 263 NYS2d 373 (1965).] In applying such a test to the facts in the case at bar, we conclude that plaintiffs tools were "in transit.” It would be unreasonable for us to conclude that the tools would be covered while on plaintiffs premises or in plaintiffs van en route to customers, but not while temporarily stop

1990"In the final analysis, the outcome of a case such as this should be determined not by precise seman *576 tic shadings of terms of art, but by a commonsense appraisal of the overall situation.” [Id., pp 539-540, quoting Ben Pulitzer Creations, Inc v Phoenix Ins Co, 47 Misc 2d 801, 804 ; 263 NYS2d 373 (1965).] In applying such a test to the facts in the case at bar, we conclude that plaintiffs tools were "in transit.” It would be unreasonable for us to conclude that the tools would be covered while on plaintiffs premises or in plaintiffs van en route to customers, but not while temporarily stop