set forth standard in Illinois

2014Id. at 619-20 .

2014Id. at 619-20 .

2009App. 3d 599 , 393 N.E.2d 538 (1979), this court set forth the standard for awarding fees to attorneys for services provided to the executor of an estate, stating as follows: “The amount of the award is determined by the probate court within the ambit of its judicial discretion. [Citations.] Each case rests upon its own facts and circumstances and there is no hard and fast rule which can he applied to determine what would be a reasonable award in each case. [Citations.] ‘The factors to be considered include the size of the estate, the work done and the skill with which it was performed, the tim

2009Applicable Principles In In re Estate of Marks, 74 Ill.App.3d 599 , 30 Ill.Dec. 502 , 393 N.E.2d 538 (1979), this court set forth the standard for awarding fees to attorneys for services provided to the executor of an estate, stating as follows: "The amount of the award is determined by the probate court within the ambit of its judicial discretion. [Citations.] Each case rests upon its own facts and circumstances and there is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine what would be a reasonable award in each case. [Citations.] `The factors to be considered include the size of the

2005The court set forth the doctrine and emphasized its applicability in the insurance context: “[U]nder the common[-]interest doctrine, when an attorney acts for two different parties who each have a common interest, communications by either party to the attorney are not necessarily privileged in a subsequent controversy between the two parties. [Citations.] This is especially so where an insured and his insurer initially have a common interest in defending an action against the former, and there is a possibility that those communications might play a role in a subsequent action between the insur

2005The court set forth the doctrine and emphasized its applicability in the insurance context: “[U]nder the common[-]interest doctrine, when an attorney acts for two different parties who each have a common interest, communications by either party to the attorney are not necessarily privileged in a subsequent controversy between the two parties. [Citations.] This is especially so where an insured and his insurer initially have a common interest in defending an action against the former, and there is a possibility that those communications might play a role in a subsequent action between the insur

1988But Mr. Abrams intends to prove the fact at trial.” Plaintiff argues that the conclusion “is no less than a reasonable inference supported by the other specific factual allegations of the complaint.” This court set forth the standard to be applied in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action in Skinner v. Mahomet Seymour School District (1980), 90 Ill.

1984As a preliminary matter, we note that this court set forth the standard to be applied in considering a motion to dismiss in Skinner v. Mahomet Seymour School District (1980), 90 Ill.

2026Id. at 127 .

2026Ardisana, 342 Ill.

2024Id. at 24 .

2023If it fails to meet either description, it is not reversible error.” Id. ¶ 49. ¶ 56 In People v. Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 50 , 115 N.E.3d 270 , this court set forth the standard of review applied when reviewing allegations of prosecutorial - 11 - misconduct in closing argument, writing as follows: “The Illinois Appellate Court is divided on whether to apply an abuse of discretion standard or de novo review when reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.

2023If it fails to meet either description, it is not reversible error.” Id. ¶ 49. ¶ 56 In People v. Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 50 , 115 N.E.3d 270 , this court set forth the standard of review applied when reviewing allegations of prosecutorial - 11 - misconduct in closing argument, writing as follows: “The Illinois Appellate Court is divided on whether to apply an abuse of discretion standard or de novo review when reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.

2019In holding that the doctrine was inapplicable to the case, the court set forth the rule that, for res ipsa loquitur to apply, “it is necessary to prove the defendant’s control of the immediate - 52 - No. 1-18-0682 cause of the injury is exclusive; the doctrine cannot be invoked without evidence tending to establish that the injury complained of was caused by someone under defendant’s control.” Id. at 1038 .

2009Applicable Principles In In re Estate of Marks, 74 Ill.App.3d 599 , 30 Ill.Dec. 502 , 393 N.E.2d 538 (1979), this court set forth the standard for awarding fees to attorneys for services provided to the executor of an estate, stating as follows: "The amount of the award is determined by the probate court within the ambit of its judicial discretion. [Citations.] Each case rests upon its own facts and circumstances and there is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine what would be a reasonable award in each case. [Citations.] `The factors to be considered include the size of the

2002However, when the legislature has not indicated what the reach of a statute should be, then the court must determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact, i.e., ‘whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.’ [Citation.] If there would be no retroactive impact, as that term is defined by the court, then the amended law may be applied. [Citation.] If, however, -applying the amended version of the law would have a retroactive impact, then t

1997The court set forth the rule that once a driver states unambiguously that he will not consent to a search, the police must release the driver, car and passengers in the absence of probable cause to search or an "articulable suspicion sufficient to prolong the investigatory stop.” Sinclair, 281 Ill.

1996In United States v. Wade, the Court set forth factors to be considered when determining whether a witness’ in-court identification had an origin independent of the uncounseled lineup; these factors include: " 'the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act

1996In United States v. Wade, the Court set forth factors to be considered when determining whether a witness’ in-court identification had an origin independent of the uncounseled lineup; these factors include: " 'the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act

1993App. 3d 567 , 563 N.E.2d 1010 , the court set forth the factors for determining the particularized guarantee of trustworthiness as found in the Supreme Court decision of Idaho v. Wright (1990), 497 U.S. 805 , Ill L.

1993Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 .

1993App. 3d 567 , 563 N.E.2d 1010 , the court set forth the factors for determining the particularized guarantee of trustworthiness as found in the Supreme Court decision of Idaho v. Wright (1990), 497 U.S. 805 , Ill L.

1992“These factors are: (1) the likelihood of enhancing the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child by allowing the move; (2) the motives of both parents: the motive of the custodial parent in seeking removal and the motive of the noncustodial parent in resisting the removal; and (3) the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, which involves a determination of whether a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the move is allowed.” (In re Marriage of Zamarripa-Gesundheit (1988), 175 Ill.

1992App. 3d 688 , the court set forth the standard of review as follows: “It is settled that a prosecutor is given great latitude in making closing arguments, and the trial court’s determination of the propriety of the argument will stand absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The prosecuting attorney may not make arguments or assumptions which have no basis upon the evidence. [Citations.] *** Generally, improper comments or remarks made by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless they are a material factor in the conviction [citation], or result in substantial prejudice to

1992The court recognized that “[a] determination of the best interests of the child cannot be reduced to a simple bright-line test, but rather must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending, to a great extent, upon the circumstances of each case.” (Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326 .) The court set forth factors to assist the trial court in determining whether the party seeking removal has satisfied the burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of the child.

1991Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 183 , the court set forth the rule as follows: “[Wjhere there has been a substantial change of position, expenditures or incurrence of obligations made in good faith by an innocent party under a building permit or in reliance upon the probability of its issuance, such party has a vested property right and he may complete the construction and use the premises for the purposes originally authorized, irrespective of subsequent zoning or a change in zoning classification.” Skokie Town House Builders, 16 Ill. 2d at 191 .

1991Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 183 , the court set forth the rule as follows: “[Wjhere there has been a substantial change of position, expenditures or incurrence of obligations made in good faith by an innocent party under a building permit or in reliance upon the probability of its issuance, such party has a vested property right and he may complete the construction and use the premises for the purposes originally authorized, irrespective of subsequent zoning or a change in zoning classification.” Skokie Town House Builders, 16 Ill. 2d at 191 .

1991Accord Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of Cook (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 510, 522-23 ; Fifteen Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 408, 416 .

1990In a comprehensive opinion, this court set forth the doctrine that the studied scheme of the Act intended labor disputes, including those concerning arbitration awards, to be decided by the IELRB through the unfair labor practice procedure. ( Board of Education of Community School District No. 1 v. Compton (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 439 , 109 Ill.Dec. 640 , 510 N.E.2d 508 .) The opinion was issued on June 25, 1987.

1990In a comprehensive opinion, this court set forth the doctrine that the studied scheme of the Act intended labor disputes, including those concerning arbitration awards, to be decided by the IELRB through the unfair labor practice procedure. ( Board of Education of Community School District No. 1 v. Compton (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 439 , 109 Ill.Dec. 640 , 510 N.E.2d 508 .) The opinion was issued on June 25, 1987.

1988Cir. 1981), 661 F.2d 1243 , the court set forth a test for determining whether the information sought was sufficiently related to the interest asserted to permit consideration of compelled disclosure which required that (1) the information sought must be so relevant to the party seeking disclosure that it goes to the heart of the matter, that is, it must be crucial to the party’s case; and (2) the party seeking the information must have exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information. 661 F.2d at 1268 .

1988Cir. 1981), 661 F.2d 1243 , the court set forth a test for determining whether the information sought was sufficiently related to the interest asserted to permit consideration of compelled disclosure which required that (1) the information sought must be so relevant to the party seeking disclosure that it goes to the heart of the matter, that is, it must be crucial to the party’s case; and (2) the party seeking the information must have exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information. 661 F.2d at 1268 .

1982App. 3d 439, 443 , 422 N.E.2d 1084 , the court set forth the standard of effective assistance of counsel, private or court-appointed, and stated that the pertinent inquiry is whether the attorney was actually incompetent, and caused such substantial prejudice to defendant that the outcome was probably changed.

1982In Polikoff the court set forth the test as an investor who expects to receive profits “solely from the efforts of others.” More specifically the court stated: “Both the Illinois and federal courts have emphasized that a security within the meaning of the acts is a contract, transaction or scheme whereby one person invests his money in a common enterprise on the theory that he expects to receive profits solely from the efforts of others.” 55 Ill.

1982App. 2d 229, 234 , 204 N.E.2d 807, 809 .

1982The court stated that plaintiff must prove that (1) the product as designed is incapable of preventing the injury complained of; (2) there existed an alternative design which would have prevented the injury; and (3) in terms of cost, practicability and technological possibility the alternative design was feasible. 34 Ill.

1979App. 2d 410 , 214 N.E.2d 139 .) In Goldberg the court set forth the rule as follows ( 36 Ill.