set forth standard in Rhode Island

2003With regard to these issues, the trial justice properly relied upon Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I.1990), in which this Court set forth the factors to be considered in determining the best interests of the child, including the reasonable preference of the child, the interaction and interrelationship between the child and his or her parents, the adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community, and the moral fitness of the child’s parents.

2003Id. at 913-14 .

2002The defendant also claimed that because of this practice, he "could not possibly know or reasonably believe that his cessation of support payments aft er his parental rights were terminated was a crime." To support his position, the defendant cited State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), in which this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague: "The standard employed to gauge whether a particular statutory term reasonably informs an individual of the criminality of his conduct is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warnin

2002The defendant also claimed that because of this practice, he "could not possibly know or reasonably believe that his cessation of support payments aft er his parental rights were terminated was a crime." To support his position, the defendant cited State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), in which this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague: "The standard employed to gauge whether a particular statutory term reasonably informs an individual of the criminality of his conduct is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warnin

2002The defendant also claimed that because of this practice, he "could not possibly know or reasonably believe that his cessation of support payments aft er his parental rights were terminated was a crime." To support his position, the defendant cited State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), in which this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague: "The standard employed to gauge whether a particular statutory term reasonably informs an individual of the criminality of his conduct is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warnin

2001Recently reiterating its Diaz principles in State v. Briggs, the court set forth the factors which the court must consider in determining whether an individual is in custody: (1) the extent to which the person's freedom is curtailed; (2) the degree of force employed by the police; (3) the belief of a reasonable, innocent person in identical circumstances; and (4) whether the person had the option of not accompanying the police. 756 A.2d 731 , 737 (R.I. 2000) (citing Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195 ).

2001Recently reiterating its Diaz principles in State v. Briggs, the court set forth the factors which the court must consider in determining whether an individual is in custody: (1) the extent to which the person's freedom is curtailed; (2) the degree of force employed by the police; (3) the belief of a reasonable, innocent person in identical circumstances; and (4) whether the person had the option of not accompanying the police. 756 A.2d 731 , 737 (R.I. 2000) (citing Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195 ).

1995We said that the test for establishing whether an amendment qualifies under Rule 15(c) is the so-called identity-of-transaction test and whether the opposing party had prior notice of the new claim. 608 A.2d at 1144 .

1989In In re Advisory Opinion to House of Representatives, 519 A.2d 578 (R.I.1987), this court set forth the standard for determining if a statute violates the equal-protection clause.

1986The application must also state, so far as possible, the basis of the informant’s knowledge or belief.” Constitutionally, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Court set forth the standard by which an application that is based on state *236 ments by an informant should be reviewed.

1986The application must also state, so far as possible, the basis of the informant’s knowledge or belief.” Constitutionally, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Court set forth the standard by which an application that is based on state *236 ments by an informant should be reviewed.