12 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2007The determinative question is not whether the accused was intoxicated, but what was his mental capacity. 593 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tenn. Crim. 2002The determinative question is not whether the accused was intoxicated, but what was his mental capacity. 593 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Tallent v. Sherrellgreen2 sentences2012In Tallent v. Sherrell, this Court set forth the test for determining whether two lawsuits involve identical subject matter and held that “[t]he test of the question of subject matter is whether the judgment in the first suit could be pleaded to the second suit in bar as former adjudication.” Tallent v. Sherrell, 184 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); see also Fid. & Guar. 2012It asserts, however, that the subject matter of the lawsuits is not identical; that the statutes governing declaratory judgments, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101 , et seq., “do not require an insurer to intervene with coverage issues in a pending lawsuit”; that “bringing a cross claim against Mr. Rose would interject evidence of liability insurance into a construction defects case”; and that “if an insurer were required to intervene it could potentially prejudice the insured and insurer.” In Tallent v. Sherrell, this Court set forth the test for determining whether two lawsuits involve identical s | 2 | 2 |
Kilpatrick v. Bryantgreen1 sentence2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. 2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. | 1 | 1 |
Bradshaw v. Danielgreen2 sentences2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. 2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blandgreen2 sentences1998In State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997), this Court set forth the analysis it would follow in performing comparative proportionality review of capital cases. 1998In State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn.1997), this Court set forth the analysis it would follow in performing comparative proportionality review of capital cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Camper v. Minor
green
1 sentence2011A plaintiff in Tennessee must (1) satisfy the five elements of ordinary negligence: duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause, id. at 446 (citing Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993)); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); (2) establish a “serious” or “severe” emotional injury, id. (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1992); St. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Hoover
green
2 sentences2006In State v. Hoover, 594 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979), this court set forth the factors which should be considered to determine whether a change of venue is warranted. 2006In State v. Hoover, 594 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979), this court set forth the factors which should be considered to determine whether a change of venue is warranted. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Guess
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pritchard v. Rebori
green
1 sentence2004Pritchard v. Rebori, 135 Tenn. 328 , 186 S.W.121 (1916); Minor v. Belk, 50 Tenn. App. 213 , 360 S.W.2d 477 (1962); Doss v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Minor v. Belk
green
2 sentences2004Pritchard v. Rebori, 135 Tenn. 328 , 186 S.W.121 (1916); Minor v. Belk, 50 Tenn. App. 213 , 360 S.W.2d 477 (1962); Doss v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. 2004Pritchard v. Rebori, 135 Tenn. 328 , 186 S.W.121 (1916); Minor v. Belk, 50 Tenn. App. 213 , 360 S.W.2d 477 (1962); Doss v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Citizens Real Estate & Loan Co. v. Mountain States Development Corp.
green
1 sentence2001Id. -11- In Cole v. Clifton, 833 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), a trespass case, this court recognized that at least one party saw a need to reconcile the Killian holding with that of Fuller v. Orkin and Redbud. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cole v. Clifton
green
1 sentence2001Id. -11- In Cole v. Clifton, 833 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), a trespass case, this court recognized that at least one party saw a need to reconcile the Killian holding with that of Fuller v. Orkin and Redbud. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Walter v. United States
green
2 sentences1985Defendant argues that the testing was a significant expansion beyond the scope of the private search under Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), in which the majority of the Court set forth the standard that the legality of the governmental search must be tested by the scope of the antecedent private search. 1985Defendant argues that the testing was a significant expansion beyond the scope of the private search under Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), in which the majority of the Court set forth the standard that the legality of the governmental search must be tested by the scope of the antecedent private search. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Jacobsen
green
2 sentences1985Under the analysis used in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 , 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1661-1662 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), to determine the legality of a field test of suspected contraband discovered by a private search, the subsequent testing of Zagor-ski’s rifle did not compromise any further legitimate interest in privacy on the part of the defendant and the testing was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 1985Under the analysis used in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 , 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1661-1662 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), to determine the legality of a field test of suspected contraband discovered by a private search, the subsequent testing of Zagor-ski’s rifle did not compromise any further legitimate interest in privacy on the part of the defendant and the testing was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.