structural error in Ohio

2026See State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 199 , 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “found that it had no authority to create a ‘structural error exception’ to the [plain- error] rule, and seemed to hold that, in direct appeals from federal convictions, a structural error analysis is inappropriate in a plain-error situation”), citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 59 (holding that “counsel’s failure to object to the closing of the co

2026See State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 199 , 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “found that it had no authority to create a ‘structural error exception’ to the [plain- error] rule, and seemed to hold that, in direct appeals from federal convictions, a structural error analysis is inappropriate in a plain-error situation”), citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 59 (holding that “counsel’s failure to object to the closing of the co

2025When a defendant has objected to a structural error at trial and demonstrates that error on appeal, “ ‘the defendant is generally entitled to “automatic reversal” regardless of the error’s actual “effect of the outcome.” ’ ” Bond at ¶ 42 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only), quoting Weaver at 289 , quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 4.

2025Thus, when a structural error has been preserved and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant “generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s actual ‘effect on the outcome.’ ” Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 299 (2017), quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).

2026See State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 199 , 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “found that it had no authority to create a ‘structural error exception’ to the [plain- error] rule, and seemed to hold that, in direct appeals from federal convictions, a structural error analysis is inappropriate in a plain-error situation”), citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 59 (holding that “counsel’s failure to object to the closing of the co

2026See State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 199 , 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “found that it had no authority to create a ‘structural error exception’ to the [plain- error] rule, and seemed to hold that, in direct appeals from federal convictions, a structural error analysis is inappropriate in a plain-error situation”), citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 59 (holding that “counsel’s failure to object to the closing of the co

2026Structural error analysis is reserved for "constitutional deprivations . . . affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , -4- Fayette CA2025-09-024 310 (1991), quoted with approval in State v. Fisher, 2003-Ohio-2761 , ¶ 9.

2025See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, ¶ 35-42 (8th Dist.); In re KB, 2007-Ohio-1647, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.) (“Under the narrow circumstances of this case, in which the record strongly suggests actual consideration by the trier of fact of an accused’s silence, we find structural error requiring reversal.”). {¶19} A structural error “ ‘[a]ffects the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the process itself.’ ” State v. Tabor, 2017-Ohio- 8656, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017), quoting Arizona v. Fulmi

2024“Defendants should bring any potential structural errors to the trial court’s attention so they may be corrected; they should not wait to raise the claim on appeal with the thought that prejudice will be presumed if a structural error is found.” State v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316 , 2022-Ohio-4150 , 212 N.E.3d 880 , ¶34 citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 23 . {¶14} In the case at bar, Haudenschild did not object during the sentencing hearing and assert that the judge displayed bias.

2024“Defendants should bring any potential structural errors to the trial court’s attention so they may be corrected; they should not wait to raise the claim on appeal with the thought that prejudice will be presumed if a structural error is found.” State v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316 , 2022-Ohio-4150 , 212 N.E.3d 880 , ¶34 citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 23 . {¶14} In the case at bar, Haudenschild did not object during the sentencing hearing and assert that the judge displayed bias.

2025To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the long-standing structural-error doctrine, the purpose of which “is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial.” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017). {¶65} The Court’s expansion of the third prong of the plain-error analysis was based on the unique nature of structural errors and was incontrovertibly limited to cases involving structural error.

2025See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, ¶ 35-42 (8th Dist.); In re KB, 2007-Ohio-1647, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.) (“Under the narrow circumstances of this case, in which the record strongly suggests actual consideration by the trier of fact of an accused’s silence, we find structural error requiring reversal.”). {¶19} A structural error “ ‘[a]ffects the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the process itself.’ ” State v. Tabor, 2017-Ohio- 8656, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017), quoting Arizona v. Fulmi

2026"A structural error is a violation of the basic constitutional guarantees that define the framework of a criminal trial; it is a fundamental constitutional defect in the proceeding that is presumptively prejudicial and not susceptible to harmless-error review." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 2 .

2025Id., citing State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17-18 . {¶26} The Court then recognized that a public-trial violation is a structural error.

2014Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). {¶26} A structural error mandates a finding of “per se prejudice” and results in “automatic reversal.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 20 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466 , 2010-Ohio-3830 , 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 45 .

2014Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). {¶26} A structural error mandates a finding of “per se prejudice” and results in “automatic reversal.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 20 , overruled on other grounds, State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466 , 2010-Ohio-3830 , 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 45 .

2021Structural error analysis is reserved for “constitutional deprivations * * * affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 789 N.E.2d 222 , 2003–Ohio– 2761, at ¶ 9.

2021State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286 , 525 N.E.2d 792 (1988). {¶ 20} Appellant makes a blanket argument that the errors were structural and not harmless, but does not elaborate on the law of structural error and how the errors constitute structural error. {¶ 21} "Structural error" are those errors that " 'defy analysis by "harmless error" standards' because they 'affect[ ] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply [being] an error in the trial process itself.' " State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222 , ¶ 9, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

2021Structural error analysis is reserved for “constitutional deprivations * * * affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 789 N.E.2d 222 , 2003–Ohio– 2761, at ¶ 9.

2021State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286 , 525 N.E.2d 792 (1988). {¶ 20} Appellant makes a blanket argument that the errors were structural and not harmless, but does not elaborate on the law of structural error and how the errors constitute structural error. {¶ 21} "Structural error" are those errors that " 'defy analysis by "harmless error" standards' because they 'affect[ ] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply [being] an error in the trial process itself.' " State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222 , ¶ 9, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

2026See, e.g., Bond at ¶ 33 (“a defendant may show that a structural error to which he has failed to object at trial may have affected substantial rights for the purposes of a plain-error analysis, even if the defendant cannot show that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different”).

2026See State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556 (a plain error analysis is appropriate in raising an unobjected-to structural error claim of judicial bias) {¶ 26} Following McAlpin and West, in State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150 , the Ohio Supreme Court examined whether the partial closure of the courtroom during trial violated the constitutional right to a public trial, a structural error.

2008See State v. Issa at 74, 752 N.E.2d 904 (Cook, J., concurring). {¶ 22} We have previously cautioned against applying a structural-error analysis in cases that would otherwise be governed by Crim.R. 52(B) because the defendant did not raise the error in the trial court. 1 See State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, at ¶ 23 .

2008A structural error affects the entire trial process, and "involves the deprivation of a constitutional right." State v. Issa , 93 Ohio St.3d 49 , 74 , 2001-Ohio-1290 .

2017Id. at ¶ 32. {¶ 16} Because of the constitutional significance of an accused's right to a public trial, "[t]he violation of the right to a public trial is considered structural error and not subject to harmless-error standard." State v. Drummond , 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 50, citing Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), fn. 9. " 'A structural error is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." ' " Sowell at ¶ 33, quoting Drummond at ¶ 50, q

2017Id. at ¶ 32. {¶ 16} Because of the constitutional significance of an accused's right to a public trial, "[t]he violation of the right to a public trial is considered structural error and not subject to harmless-error standard." State v. Drummond , 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 50, citing Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), fn. 9. " 'A structural error is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." ' " Sowell at ¶ 33, quoting Drummond at ¶ 50, q

2010See Cihonski, 2008-Ohio-5191, at ¶¶20-21 .3 {¶24} Wilson argues that an “incorrect reasonable doubt instruction” is one of the limited class of cases which “always requires reversal of the conviction” because it constitutes a structural error, citing to Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 .

2010See Cihonski, 2008-Ohio-5191, at ¶¶20-21 .3 {¶24} Wilson argues that an “incorrect reasonable doubt instruction” is one of the limited class of cases which “always requires reversal of the conviction” because it constitutes a structural error, citing to Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 .

2026“A structural error is a constitutional defect that defies analysis by harmless error standards, because it affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply being an error in the trial process itself.” State v. Fields, 2005-Ohio-6270, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.).

2025Structural error is recognized when “the errors permeate the ‘entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end,’ so that the trial court cannot ‘reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’ ” State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-2959, ¶ 67 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fields, 2005-Ohio-6270, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.), quoting Arizona v. Fulminante at 309-310 .

2020State v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2008-Ohio-1195 , 884 N.E.2d 45 , ¶ 16. [Citations and internal quotation marks omitted]. {¶25} The Ohio Supreme Court pertinently addressed when structural error analysis should be used in State v. Perry, supra: We emphasize that both this court and the United States Supreme Court have cautioned against applying a structural-error analysis where, as here, the case would be otherwise governed by Crim.R. 52(B) because the defendant did not raise the error in the trial court.

2020State v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2008-Ohio-1195 , 884 N.E.2d 45 , ¶ 16. [Citations and internal quotation marks omitted]. {¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court pertinently addressed when structural error analysis should be used in State v. Perry, supra: We emphasize that both this court and the United States Supreme Court have cautioned against applying a structural-error analysis where, as here, the case would be otherwise governed by Crim.R. 52(B) because the defendant did not raise the error in the trial court.

2010Thus, the court concluded that the state was required to prove recklessness and that the indictment was defective for failure to charge recklessness, a point that the state conceded. 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008- Ohio- 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 14-15 . {¶ 42} We went on to hold that “[w]hen an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment,” id. at syllabus, and that instead, a structural error analysis is appropriate, id. at ¶ 23. {¶ 43} Upon reconsideration in Col

2010Thus, the court concluded that the state was required to prove recklessness and that the indictment was defective for failure to charge recklessness, a point that the state conceded. 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008- Ohio- 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 14-15 . {¶ 42} We went on to hold that “[w]hen an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment,” id. at syllabus, and that instead, a structural error analysis is appropriate, id. at ¶ 23. {¶ 43} Upon reconsideration in Col

2022See lead opinion at ¶ 26. {¶ 73} Because a structural error infects the entire trial process from beginning to end, it defies analysis by harmless-error standards, see Fulminante at 309-310 , and renders the criminal trial an unreliable vehicle to determine guilt or innocence or to impose a fair criminal punishment, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-578 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2022See lead opinion at ¶ 26. {¶ 73} Because a structural error infects the entire trial process from beginning to end, it defies analysis by harmless-error standards, see Fulminante at 309-310 , and renders the criminal trial an unreliable vehicle to determine guilt or innocence or to impose a fair criminal punishment, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-578 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2026See State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556 (a plain error analysis is appropriate in raising an unobjected-to structural error claim of judicial bias) {¶ 26} Following McAlpin and West, in State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150 , the Ohio Supreme Court examined whether the partial closure of the courtroom during trial violated the constitutional right to a public trial, a structural error.

2025ANALYSIS {¶ 21} Before we turn to Richardson’s assignments of error, we first consider the question of Richardson’s competency to stand trial and whether the trial court committed structural error by proceeding to trial. {¶ 22} “A structural error is a violation of the basic constitutional guarantees that define the framework of a criminal trial.” State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 2 .

2009“Structural error affects ‘the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end’ as well as ‘the framework within which the trial proceeds.’ Such errors ‘defy analysis by “harmless error” standards.’ ” State v. Esparza (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 660, 661 , 660 N.E.2d 1194 , quoting Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 .

2009“Structural error affects ‘the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end’ as well as ‘the framework within which the trial proceeds.’ Such errors ‘defy analysis by “harmless error” standards.’ ” State v. Esparza (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 660, 661 , 660 N.E.2d 1194 , quoting Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 .

2018The denial of a defendant's right to be represented by "retained counsel" of the defendant's choice "is a final, appealable order." Id. at ¶ 21, citing Chambliss , 128 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2011-Ohio-1785 , 947 N.E.2d 651 , ¶ 18, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140 , 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). {¶ 10} The denial "results in a structural error that renders a postconviction appeal meaningless because the defendant has been irretrievably deprived of the counsel's advice and representation at trial." Id. at ¶ 21, citing Chambliss at ¶ 22.

2018The denial of a defendant's right to be represented by "retained counsel" of the defendant's choice "is a final, appealable order." Id. at ¶ 21, citing Chambliss , 128 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2011-Ohio-1785 , 947 N.E.2d 651 , ¶ 18, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140 , 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). {¶ 10} The denial "results in a structural error that renders a postconviction appeal meaningless because the defendant has been irretrievably deprived of the counsel's advice and representation at trial." Id. at ¶ 21, citing Chambliss at ¶ 22.