structural error in Connecticut

2026State v. Joseph A., 336 Conn. 247 , 264-65, 245 A.3d 785 (2020).”). 23 We note that, in State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 487, 533 , our Supreme Court, after determining that the defendant’s right to counsel in the violation of probation proceeding had been violated, reversed State v. Lewis “has failed to demonstrate that a structural error analysis is applicable to alleged errors at revocation hearings”; that, even if a structural error analysis applies, the defendant has failed to demonstrate structural error in this case; and that the alleged constitutional error was harmless.

2026State v. Joseph A., 336 Conn. 247 , 264-65, 245 A.3d 785 (2020).”). 23 We note that, in State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 487, 533 , our Supreme Court, after determining that the defendant’s right to counsel in the violation of probation proceeding had been violated, reversed State v. Lewis “has failed to demonstrate that a structural error analysis is applicable to alleged errors at revocation hearings”; that, even if a structural error analysis applies, the defendant has failed to demonstrate structural error in this case; and that the alleged constitutional error was harmless.

2025Henderson, ‘‘A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine,’’ 85 Mo. L. Rev. 965 , 1008-10 (2020) (discussing rationale behind courts’ application of waiver doctrine in context of claims of structural error). 26 Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error, requiring a new trial.’’ State v. Petteway, 351 Conn. 682, 692 , 332 A.3d 196 (2025); see also State v. Braswell, supra, 318 Conn. 846-47; State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 23 , 44 A.3d 794 (2012). 50 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 State v. Trice In sum, even if we assume th

2025Henderson, ‘‘A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine,’’ 85 Mo. L. Rev. 965 , 1008-10 (2020) (discussing rationale behind courts’ application of waiver doctrine in context of claims of structural error). 26 Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error, requiring a new trial.’’ State v. Petteway, 351 Conn. 682, 692 , 332 A.3d 196 (2025); see also State v. Braswell, supra, 318 Conn. 846-47; State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 23 , 44 A.3d 794 (2012). 50 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 State v. Trice In sum, even if we assume th

2026Under the structural error doctrine, “the error always results in fundamental unfairness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simmons, 188 Conn. App. 813, 837 , 205 A.3d 569 (2019).

2026Under the structural error doctrine, “the error always results in fundamental unfairness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simmons, 188 Conn. App. 813, 837 , 205 A.3d 569 (2019).

2025In . . . [United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984)] . . . which was decided on the same day as Strickland, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the following three scenarios in which prejudice may be presumed: (1) when counsel is denied to a [petitioner] at a critical stage of the proceeding; (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when counsel is called upon to render assistance in a situation in which no competent attorney could do so. . . .

2025In . . . [United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984)] . . . which was decided on the same day as Strickland, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the following three scenarios in which prejudice may be presumed: (1) when counsel is denied to a [petitioner] at a critical stage of the proceeding; (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when counsel is called upon to render assistance in a situation in which no competent attorney could do so. . . .

2024This is because ‘‘dependent children have a critical interest in avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-term placement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 841. ‘‘[A] sense of permanency, in and of itself, is crucial for a child’s welfare.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692 , 734, 271 A.3d 633 (2022).

2022She further contends that, even if the error is amenable to a harmlessness analysis, the record demonstrates that ‘‘having one attorney represent three children with differing goals’’ was harmful because it ‘‘made it impossible for the trial court to properly determine . . . in the first instance, whether the respondent was unable to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as to encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in her children’s lives within a reasonable time. [It] also made it impossible for the trial court to properly determine whether it was in the best

2022She further contends that, even if the error is amenable to a harmlessness analysis, the record demonstrates that ‘‘having one attorney represent three children with differing goals’’ was harmful because it ‘‘made it impossible for the trial court to properly determine . . . in the first instance, whether the respondent was unable to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as to encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in her children’s lives within a reasonable time. [It] also made it impossible for the trial court to properly determine whether it was in the best

2022See, e.g., Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 339 Conn. 1, 29 , 259 A.3d 1082 (2021) (‘‘[o]nly a small share of constitutional errors are structural, that is, so presumptively harmful that they require automatic reversal’’); State v. Artis, 314 Conn. 131 , 153, 101 A.3d 915 (2014) (‘‘most constitutional violations are subject to . . . harmless error review’’). ‘‘Determining whether an error is structural requires a review of the nature of the right at issue and the effect of its denial on the proceeding.

2022See, e.g., Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 339 Conn. 1, 29 , 259 A.3d 1082 (2021) (‘‘[o]nly a small share of constitutional errors are structural, that is, so presumptively harmful that they require automatic reversal’’); State v. Artis, 314 Conn. 131 , 153, 101 A.3d 915 (2014) (‘‘most constitutional violations are subject to . . . harmless error review’’). ‘‘Determining whether an error is structural requires a review of the nature of the right at issue and the effect of its denial on the proceeding.

2019For the same reason, a structural error def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-1908, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017). 6 As such, a trial is affected by structural error when "the error always results in fundamental unfairness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cushard , 328 Conn. 558 , 570, 181 A.3d 74 (2018).

2019For the same reason, a structural error def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-1908, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017). 6 As such, a trial is affected by structural error when "the error always results in fundamental unfairness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cushard , 328 Conn. 558 , 570, 181 A.3d 74 (2018).

2019Furthermore, the petitioner contends that this issue rises to the level of structural error and therefore is not subject to harmless error analysis. 3 In his reply brief, the petitioner relies on McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018), which was released by the United States Supreme Court after he had filed his principal brief in the present case.

2019Furthermore, the petitioner contends that this issue rises to the level of structural error and therefore is not subject to harmless error analysis. 3 In his reply brief, the petitioner relies on McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018), which was released by the United States Supreme Court after he had filed his principal brief in the present case.

2018Courts have concluded, for instance, that the lack of counsel at arraignment is generally not a structural error when "the arraignment involved no necessary or inevitable impact on the subsequent criminal proceedings ...." United States v. Owen , 407 F.3d 222 , 227 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1098 , 126 S.Ct. 1026 , 163 L.Ed.2d 867 (2006).

2018Courts have concluded, for instance, that the lack of counsel at arraignment is generally not a structural error when "the arraignment involved no necessary or inevitable impact on the subsequent criminal proceedings ...." United States v. Owen , 407 F.3d 222 , 227 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1098 , 126 S.Ct. 1026 , 163 L.Ed.2d 867 (2006).

2018Courts have concluded, for instance, that the lack of counsel at arraignment is generally not a structural error when "the arraignment involved no necessary or inevitable impact on the subsequent criminal proceedings ...." United States v. Owen , 407 F.3d 222 , 227 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1098 , 126 S.Ct. 1026 , 163 L.Ed.2d 867 (2006).

2018Thus, for instance, in Hamilton v. Alabama , 368 U.S. 52 , 53-55, 82 S.Ct. 157 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), the United States Supreme Court found the denial of counsel at an arraignment to be structural error when state law provided that defenses not pleaded at arraignment were irrevocably waived and could not be raised at trial.

2018Thus, for instance, in Hamilton v. Alabama , 368 U.S. 52 , 53-55, 82 S.Ct. 157 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), the United States Supreme Court found the denial of counsel at an arraignment to be structural error when state law provided that defenses not pleaded at arraignment were irrevocably waived and could not be raised at trial.

2018Courts have concluded, for instance, that the lack of counsel at arraignment is generally not a structural error when "the arraignment involved no necessary or inevitable impact on the subsequent criminal proceedings ...." United States v. Owen , 407 F.3d 222 , 227 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1098 , 126 S.Ct. 1026 , 163 L.Ed.2d 867 (2006).

2016Id., at 877-79 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 (concluding that in addition to cases demonstrating personal financial interest of judge, structural error also may be found where newly elected appellate judge participates in appeal that was pending during his campaign and where judge's campaign had received financing from party prevailing in appeal).

2016Id., at 877-79 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 (concluding that in addition to cases demonstrating personal financial interest of judge, structural error also may be found where newly elected appellate judge participates in appeal that was pending during his campaign and where judge's campaign had received financing from party prevailing in appeal).

2016In contrast to the unpersuasive decisions of those courts following the minority approach, those courts adopting the majority approach reason that a trial court's "failure to give a requested ... instruction" pursuant to Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , is not a structural error "for which an assessment of the evidence is unsuitable precisely because it concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant's election not to testify on his own behalf." 9 United States v. Brand, supra, 80 F.3d at 568 .

2016In contrast to the unpersuasive decisions of those courts following the minority approach, those courts adopting the majority approach reason that a trial court's "failure to give a requested ... instruction" pursuant to Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , is not a structural error "for which an assessment of the evidence is unsuitable precisely because it concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant's election not to testify on his own behalf." 9 United States v. Brand, supra, 80 F.3d at 568 .

2016In contrast to the unpersuasive decisions of those courts following the minority approach, those courts adopting the majority approach reason that a trial court's "failure to give a requested ... instruction" pursuant to Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , is not a structural error "for which an assessment of the evidence is unsuitable precisely because it concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant's election not to testify on his own behalf." 9 United States v. Brand, supra, 80 F.3d at 568 .

2015In Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 343, 351 , 81 A.3d 1226 (2013), cert. granted on other grounds, 311 Conn. 921 , 86 A.3d 467 (2014), the petitioner argued that ‘‘counsel’s failure to investigate his case beyond a review of the documentation provided by the prosecution constituted a complete denial of representation.’’ The court appears to have rejected this claim solely on prejudice grounds, concluding that the lack of an investigation did not constitute a structural violation of the petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel that obviated the need for demonstr

2015In Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 343, 351 , 81 A.3d 1226 (2013), cert. granted on other grounds, 311 Conn. 921 , 86 A.3d 467 (2014), the petitioner argued that ‘‘counsel’s failure to investigate his case beyond a review of the documentation provided by the prosecution constituted a complete denial of representation.’’ The court appears to have rejected this claim solely on prejudice grounds, concluding that the lack of an investigation did not constitute a structural violation of the petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel that obviated the need for demonstr

2015In Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 343, 351 , 81 A.3d 1226 (2013), cert. granted on other grounds, 311 Conn. 921 , 86 A.3d 467 (2014), the petitioner argued that ‘‘counsel’s failure to investigate his case beyond a review of the documentation provided by the prosecution constituted a complete denial of representation.’’ The court appears to have rejected this claim solely on prejudice grounds, concluding that the lack of an investigation did not constitute a structural violation of the petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel that obviated the need for demonstr