9 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2019See Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1908-12, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (holding that a deprivation of the right to a public trial, even though a structural error, does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal when brought as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 2019See Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1908-12, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (holding that a deprivation of the right to a public trial, even though a structural error, does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal when brought as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). | 2 | 2 |
McCoy v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2019See McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 1511, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) (stating that the deprivation of a defendant's right to self-representation is a structural error); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (same). 2019See McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 1511, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) (stating that the deprivation of a defendant's right to self-representation is a structural error); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (same). | 2 | 2 |
Bucci v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014A partial closure occurs where “courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attend”; a total courtroom closure occurs where “all members of the public [are] excluded during some phase of the trial.” Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 , 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Nowhere does our precedent suggest that the total closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial closure, and analyzed as such.”). 2014A partial closure occurs where "courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attend”; a total courtroom closure occurs where "all members of the public [are] excluded during some phase of the trial.” Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2011); see also Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 , 1315 (11th Cir.2001) ("Nowhere does our precedent suggest that the total closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial closure, and analyzed as such.”). | 2 | 2 |
Owens v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007). 2014Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir.2007). | 2 | 2 |
Judd v. Haleygreen2 sentences2014A partial closure occurs where “courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attend”; a total courtroom closure occurs where “all members of the public [are] excluded during some phase of the trial.” Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 , 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Nowhere does our precedent suggest that the total closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial closure, and analyzed as such.”). 2014A partial closure occurs where "courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attend”; a total courtroom closure occurs where "all members of the public [are] excluded during some phase of the trial.” Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2011); see also Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 , 1315 (11th Cir.2001) ("Nowhere does our precedent suggest that the total closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial closure, and analyzed as such.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bensongreen2 sentences2023State v. Benson, 155 Me. 115, 124 , 151 A.2d 266, 271 (1959). (“There are numerous cases in which it has been held a new trial will not be granted even if instructions are erroneous unless it appears also that they might have been prejudicial to the excepting party.” (quotation marks omitted)). 2023State v. Benson, 155 Me. 115, 124 , 151 A.2d 266, 271 (1959). (“There are numerous cases in which it has been held a new trial will not be granted even if instructions are erroneous unless it appears also that they might have been prejudicial to the excepting party.” (quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Russellgreen2 sentences2022In 2018, the First Circuit stated that it "view[s] the presence of a biased juror as a structural error-that is, per se prejudicial and not susceptible to harmlessness analysis." United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 2018). 2022In 2018, the First Circuit stated that it "view[s] the presence of a biased juror as a structural error-that is, per se prejudicial and not susceptible to harmlessness analysis." United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it “casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error.” Benson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 1 |
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trustgreen2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it “casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error.” Benson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Flowersgreen2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it “casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error.” Benson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001Structural error is a "`defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). 2001Structural error is a "`defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001The Supreme Court has found "structural errors only in a very limited class of *328 cases." [16] Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 2001The Supreme Court has found "structural errors only in a very limited class of *328 cases." [16] Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKaskle v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2019See McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 1511, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) (stating that the deprivation of a defendant's right to self-representation is a structural error); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (same). 2019See McCoy v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1500 , 1511, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) (stating that the deprivation of a defendant's right to self-representation is a structural error); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (same). | 3 | 2006–2019 |
State v. Burdick
green
2 sentences2026State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 27 , 782 A.2d 319 (explaining that a structural error is “intrinsically harmful” and requires the judgment to be vacated automatically, without regard to the effect the error had on the overall proceedings). 2026State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 27 , 782 A.2d 319 (explaining that a structural error is “intrinsically harmful” and requires the judgment to be vacated automatically, without regard to the effect the error had on the overall proceedings). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of Maine v. Kevin Carey
green
1 sentence2022Citing to that decision, the Law Court in 2019 determined that "[b]ecause of the constitutional rights at stake ... if we do discern an error that affects the right to an impartial adjudicator, that error cannot be regarded as harmless." Carey, 2019 ME 131 , ,r 16, 214 A.3d 488 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
green
1 sentence2022In Pena-Rodriguez, however, the Court declined to address what standard trial courts should apply when determining whether evidence of juror racial bias is sufficient to grant a new trial, noting a split in the 20 circuit courts as to that issue. 580 U.S. at 228 . 12 In the intervening years, the First Circuit and the Law Court have both held that juror bias causes a structural error. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Penson v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. David Mateo
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it “casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error.” Benson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Holloway v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Ronnie Peppers
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it “casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error.” Benson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Satterwhite v. Texas
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. 2006We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it "casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 , 109 S. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Renard Maurice Nealy
green
2 sentences2001In sum, the Apprendi error "did not recognize or create a structural error that would require per se reversal." United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825 , 829 (11th Cir.2000). [¶ 29] Having rejected Burdick's claim of structural error, we must determine whether the unpreserved error is "obvious error" requiring that the sentence be set aside. 2001In sum, the Apprendi error “did not recognize or create a structural error that would require per se reversal.” United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825 , 829 (11th Cir.2000). [¶29] Having rejected Burdick’s claim of structural error, we must determine whether the unpreserved error is “obvious error” requiring that the sentence be set aside. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2001Structural error is a "`defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). 2001Structural error is a "`defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.